military@att.att.com (Bill Thacker) (05/06/89)
From: military@att.att.com (Bill Thacker) goofy!Apple.COM!livesey@apple.com (John Livesey) write: [excellent description of the Kriegmarine's strategic options] >It has always seemed to me that the German Navy chose the strategy >that had the highest risk and the lowest payoff. Comments? There were many other mitigating factors. Perhaps foremost is the success achieved by German convoy raiders in WWI, exemplified by the Emden. This led to a large portion of German naval policy being aimed at surface raiding, and was reinforced by the fact that Germany could not build a fleet strong enough to seriously compete with the Royal Navy; it was economically unfeasible, and Hitler wanted, politically, to keep the British unruffled. He personally decided to arm the Scharnhorsts with 11" guns largely to appease the British. Further, Admiral Raeder was under considerable pressure to produce results. Hitler had little love for capital ships, to begin with, and probably didn't want to wait patiently for Tirpitz' completion; he demanded results. Bismarck's sortie was to be a propaganda coup, and, if successful, would probably had led to the Kriegsmarine gaining considerably more influence and respect. Finally, Hitler was riding a nearly unbroken string of successes, and probably felt that he could do no wrong. By and large, though, the Kriegsmarine's war efforts seem to be a comedy of errors. The Norway operation was terrifically bungled; Graf Spee suffered an ignonimous fate; Bismarck, then Tirpitz were lost in futile efforts; Scharnhorst, at least, went down honorably, while her sister Gneisenau rusted away in port. The light cruisers saw vitually no action, being considered unsafe in high seas, and most of the rest of the fleet was confined to the safe waters of the Baltic, providing offshore bombardment for the Army. Hidden, though, are numerous successes; the minelayers and minesweepers performed well in the Channel; torpedo boats and E-boats also gave heroic service. And of course, the U-boats are famed. My impression is that Raeder, with all due respect, was overly timid; and when pressured for results, usually bungled the job. It is, of course, easy to second- guess after nearly 50 years. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Bill Thacker moderator, sci.military military@att.att.com (614) 860-5294 "War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied." - Sun Tzu
willner%cfa183@harvard.harvard.edu (Steve Willner) (05/12/89)
From: willner%cfa183@harvard.harvard.edu (Steve Willner) Bill Thacker writes: > Hitler had little love for capital ships, to begin with, and probably > didn't want to wait patiently for Tirpitz' completion; he demanded results. Are you sure? My memory is that Hitler specifically ordered the battleships built (the "Z-plan") and rejected shorter-term naval buildups that would have emphasized submarines (the "X-plan") or surface commerce raiders like Graf Spee (the "Y-plan"). Further, Doenitz claims (if my memory serves) that Hitler was enamored of the details of construction of the battleships and, for example, was greatly impressed by their firepower. Doenitz' criticism is that Hitler was unmindful of the strategic issues. [For those who don't remember, Adm. Karl Doenitz was the U-boat Commandant before and through most of the war. He followed Adm. Raeder as Chief of Staff, and after Hitler's suicide, Doenitz headed the brief interim government that actually surrendered. His memoirs have been translated into English and should be available at any good library.] [mod.note. Yes, I worded that very poorly. Hitler did like to dabble in battleship construction, much as he did in tank development. The Z-plan was indeed a far-sighted proposal, which would have made the Atlantic an interesting place if the war hadn't started until 1946, as was planned. However, the Navy got little from him, as a whole; they received lower priority on materials than did the Army and Luftwaffe (which is why no new major combattants were constructed during the war, save Tirpitz). Basically, Raeder and later Doenitz had to prove to Hitler that large ships were worthwhile, and neither succeeded. - Bill ] Of course, the Hitler's fascination with battleships ended sometime early in the war. Later in the war, Hitler indeed showed contempt for the surface navy. Didn't he at one point order - or maybe just threaten to order - Tirpitz broken up for scrap? But all that was, I believe, after Bismarck's sortie (and at least partly a result of that sortie). On the more general issue of strategic doctrine, there is a very interesting claim that German strategy was essentially a bureaucratic way to justify the existence of the surface navy. (My reference is at home, and I'm leaving for a week, but the study may have been by Eccles.) The argument goes that the Germans realized that they could never achieve sea control (a la Mahan), so they argued instead that the important thing was really the direct attack upon the enemy's sea commerce. Seen in this light, many of the strategic decisions make sense, though I don't know whether the historical evidence really can support this point of view.