eugene@eos.arc.nasa.gov (Eugene Miya) (05/13/89)
From: eos!eugene@eos.arc.nasa.gov (Eugene Miya) In article <6488@cbnews.ATT.COM> vrdxhq!vrdxhq.verdix.com!bsmart@uunet.UU.NET (Bob Smart) writes: >A lot of research went into anti kamikaze planning in the late stages >of the war. The lead time for design and construction was such that this wasn't entirely correct as kamikazes were relatively late in the war. More indicative were some of the earlier air attacks. The history of the WWII destroyer USS Evans (which was sliced in two by the Aust. Carrier Canberra shortly after Vietnam) can give you insight (note: it was pointed out by one author who's name escapes me, that the bows of ships are still considered ramming devices, so don't they don't have some structure [armor]). The Evans and another destroyer came under air attack for something approaching 18 hours. Both survived numerous hits, but the Evans using 5 inch, 40 mm and 20 mm shot down over 70 planes. Saying nothing of the planes it didn't get. It is difficult to normally convey the concept of "heat of battle," but numbers like these ..... [mod.note: !!! 70 aircraft ! I'd love to read an account of that; might be useful for my naval miniatures gaming, as well. Can you suggest a reference, Eugene ? - Bill ] Longish signature follows "Type 'n' now" Another gross generalization from --eugene miya, NASA Ames Research Center, eugene@aurora.arc.nasa.gov resident cynic at the Rock of Ages Home for Retired Hackers: "You trust the `reply' command with all those different mailers out there?" "If my mail does not reach you, please accept my apology." {ncar,decwrl,hplabs,uunet}!ames!eugene Live free or die.
military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) (05/16/89)
From: ulysses!nsscb!rolf!rolf (Rolf A. Buchner) In article <6546@cbnews.ATT.COM> you write: : : :From: eos!eugene@eos.arc.nasa.gov (Eugene Miya) : :In article <6488@cbnews.ATT.COM> vrdxhq!vrdxhq.verdix.com!bsmart@uunet.UU.NET (Bob Smart) writes: :the WWII destroyer USS Evans (which was sliced in two by the Aust. Carrier :Canberra shortly after Vietnam) can give you insight (note: it was pointed :out by one author who's name escapes me, that the bows of ships are :still considered ramming devices, so don't they don't have some structure :[armor]). : :The Evans and another destroyer came under air attack for something approaching :18 hours. Both survived numerous hits, but the Evans using 5 inch, 40 mm :and 20 mm shot down over 70 planes. Saying nothing of the planes it didn't get. :It is difficult to normally convey the concept of "heat of battle," but :numbers like these ..... I would like to point out the the accident involving the USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD-754) occurred on June 3,1969 (Asia date)/ June 2,1969 US date. As a former crew member of the USS FRANK E. EVANS I also would like reference to any material on the WWII activites of this ship. Rolf A. Buchner AT&T NSSC S. Plainfield, N.J.
bsmart@uunet.UU.NET (Bob Smart) (05/16/89)
From: vrdxhq!vrdxhq.verdix.com!bsmart@uunet.UU.NET (Bob Smart) In article <6546@cbnews.ATT.COM>, eos!eugene@eos.arc.nasa.gov (Eugene Miya) writes: > (Eugene refrences my article about the antikamikaze planning) > > The lead time for design and construction was such that this wasn't > entirely correct as kamikazes were relatively late in the war. This program was not a construction program but a overhaul and improvement program. It did have a lot of it's basis in the earlier anti-air prrograms that came out of the Solomins campaign ( Remember we lost 2 carriers there) but I believe was given a very high priority during and after the Leyte invasion when there was pretty convincing evidence that the "sucide" attacks were intentional and not a last ditch effort to hit a target by an injured pilot/plane. The program concentrated on short term improvements and changes in tactics ( I remember that the debate about whether the added firepower of turning broadside to an attack was worth the increased area that could be struck was a very big topic, But I cant remember the reult :-( ) This was conducted at least partially by the Operations Research group that spent a lot of 42-mid developing anti-sub tactics for the atlantic theater. Since the anti-sub war was under control they applied the same methodology to the anti-air problem. I believe the operational archives mentioned here recently has a fair amount available. I remember running across some of it when I was doing research up there about 8-9 years ago. Bob Smart (bsmart@verdix.com)