rshu@ads.com (Richard Shu) (05/16/89)
From: Richard Shu <rshu@ads.com> I need info on the Warsaw Pact/NATO force ratios for tanks and artillery. Since the numbers will vary depending on what you're counting and how you count, please give more than just a number (e.g., 3.14:1). Specify what you're counting (e.g., Field Artillery but not MLRS) and how you're counting (e.g., number of tubes unadjusted for caliber or rate of fire). Also, please give the date your numbers were valid and attribute the source. Thanx. Rich
cdr@ames.arc.nasa.gov (Carl Rigney) (05/19/89)
From: amdcad!cdr@ames.arc.nasa.gov (Carl Rigney) In article <6587@cbnews.ATT.COM> you write: >From: Richard Shu <rshu@ads.com> > >I need info on the Warsaw Pact/NATO force ratios for tanks and >artillery. Run out and buy James Dunnigan's _How to Make War: A comprehensive guide to modern warfare_. Beancounting is of questionable usefulness; it's not enought to just count tanks, you also have to determine their quality WITH RESPECT TO their environment, doctrine, and opponent's doctrine. William Morrow just published a completely revised edition in 1988; ISBN is 0-688-07979-2 in softcover. It's the best overall book on factors in modern warfare I know of, but I'd be delighted to hear other people's choices. Andrew Cockburn's _The Threat_ is probably outdated, but is still worth reading if you can find it. Suvurov's books are a must for an inside look at the Soviets; particularly _Inside the Red Army_, but it's a qualitative analysis instead of quantitative. He doesn't say how many tanks the Russians have, but he does point out they called off an invasion of Poland to crush Solidarity in the early 80s when the mobilization utterly SNAFUed. In _The Liberators_ he discusses the more successful invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which he took part in. --Carl Rigney cdr@amdcad.AMD.COM {ames decwrl gatech pyramid sun uunet}!amdcad!cdr
dee@linus.MITRE.ORG (David E. Emery) (05/20/89)
From: dee@linus.MITRE.ORG (David E. Emery) This is a real bag of worms! For instance, do you count the following: (Artillery, because that's what I know best) NATO: U.S. III Corps and other POMCUS Active Army units Reserve and National Guard Artillery Brigades Reserve and National Guard Divisions German Territorial Units (They DO have some artillery) WP: East German, Polish, Czech, etc Soviet Units not in GSFG, but potentially depolyable in the same amount of time as U.S. reinforcements Next, you need to come up with some way of comparing apples to oranges. For instance, how do you count 1 MLRS launcher? In 'single volley' firepower, it equates to about a battalion (rough guess, not GMET figures) of 155 Howitzers. However, we can fire 155's all day long compared to MLRS. Finally, the limiting factor for Artillery is not tubes, but bullets. I strongly believe that we'll run out of bullets by Day 23 if we shoot everything we see. Ammo reinforcement is THE key issue in artillery deployment in a High-Intensity conflict. dave emery@mitre.org
marsh@linus.UUCP (Ralph Marshall (617 271-7648)) (05/23/89)
From: marsh@linus.UUCP (Ralph Marshall (617 271-7648)) In article <6710@cbnews.ATT.COM> amdcad!cdr@ames.arc.nasa.gov (Carl Rigney) writes: > >Run out and buy James Dunnigan's _How to Make War: A comprehensive >guide to modern warfare_. Beancounting is of questionable usefulness; >it's not enought to just count tanks, you also have to determine their >quality WITH RESPECT TO their environment, doctrine, and opponent's >doctrine. William Morrow just published a completely revised edition >in 1988; ISBN is 0-688-07979-2 in softcover. It's the best overall >book on factors in modern warfare I know of, but I'd be delighted to >hear other people's choices. I have to disagree with you. I read Dunnigan's book, and I didn't think it was all that hot. He had a number of typos and printing errors that made me a little suspicious about the quality of the charts full of numbers. I liked some of his comments, especially the one which states something like "The abilities that make for a good combat commander usually make for a bad peacetime officer; hence, after a long period of peace most units will be commanded by people who are excellent politicians but terrible commanders." The basic problem with writing a book about contemporary force structures is the same one that plagues the Pentagon: we haven't sent 10's of divisions to Germany in a few weeks to stop a mobile army backed up by tactical nukes and gas, so we have NO IDEA what it will really be like. We obviously have to make some guess, since the only other choice is to plan to "improvise", which probably won't work this time around. What I think we need to see is more realistic training and testing units and equipment. Modern tanks are too expensive to practice blowing them up with the latest anti-tank weapon, so we simulate it instead. This is all well and good, but too much simulation and your results no longer match what will happen when the line of sight is much shorter/longer than on your proving ground, when the thing gets mud/dust/water in it, and when some grunt humping it around on his back drops it every once in a while. If we were willing to spend more money testing and perfecting systems under realistic situations they'd probably work more like we intended. Since w don't, it is very hard for either the military brass or an outside author like Dunnigan to make accurate predictions about what will happen in a large scale war. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ralph Marshall (marsh@mbunix.mitre.org) Disclaimer: Often wrong but never in doubt... All of these opinions are mine, so don't gripe to my employer if you don't like them. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------