fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) (06/08/89)
From: fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) > [2] > > [Bill: Call this topic "irregular troops" or "urban combat", and it'll > fit under the sci.military charter. 8-) ] What can urban civilians do > to attack troops, given the "usual" equipment in foreign cities (i.e. > guns are not usually available)? For example, I've heard that large > rocks or cement blocks can be used to detrack tanks, which then are > more vulnerable if infantry is absent. Molotov cocktails have been > used to some good effect in Beijing. What other things can be done? One area to study might be the 1950 Hungarian uprising in Budapest. There an essentially unarmed populace took on armored forces successfully for a while. They had some help, in that a respectable percentage of both Russian and Hungarian troops either stood aloof from the the fighting, or actively sided with the civilians. (The revolt wasn't put down until Asian soviet troops were brought in.) Some examples: Budapest is not flat, so on some tight uphill corners, liquid soap was poured on the road just ahead of oncoming tanks. The first tank in the line hit the soap, lost traction, and ended up jammed against a building and blocked the progress of the following tanks. (They were not well supported by infantry, which made this sort of thing workable.) A rope would be run across a narrow street between two buildings. just before a tank arrived, the rope would be pulled from one to the other, with some antitank mines tied to the middle of the rope. On a narrow intersection, some unglazed brown plates were placed upside down in the roadway. While the tank commander hesitated, trying to decide whether or not they were mines, someone would run out from cover and place a hand grenade (or other explosive) in the tanks' tracks. Tanks or armored cars (to say nothing of trucks or jeeps) could not operate in built-up areas of Budapest unless they were buttoned up: Molotov cocktails would otherwise rain down from high buildings in the neighborhood. Incidentally, many of the anti-armor tactics were taught to the civilians by Hungarian military personnel who had been taught them by the Russians. In all this, effective action by the Hungarians depended on leadership by people like Pal Maleter (an Hungarian Army General) to direct and inspire the civilians to fight effectively. They also needed (and got) direction in tactics and weapons use by military personnel who sided with them. There was one instance near the headquarters of the Hungarian secret police when a police sniper on the roof of the building began shooting civilians on the ground below. A Russian tank officer, who had been ordered to observe only, got fed up watching the scene and climbed into his tank, buttoned up, and he and his crew proceeded to knock out the searchlights on the roof (which the sniper needed to select targets), and continued pounding the top of the building until there was no more activity up there. (Things like this required the dispatch of Asian troops to put down the uprising.)
jharper%euroies.ucd.ie%CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU (Jerry Harper) (06/15/89)
From: Jerry Harper <jharper%euroies.ucd.ie%CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU> Anyone interested, historically, in the formation of guerilla units to combat regular forces should read "Guerilla days in Ireland" by Tom Barry. The author was the leader of an IRA guerilla group colloquially termed a "flying column" due to the rapid mobility over vey rough terrain. Barry's group was probably the most successful of all the guerilla groups in acting against the British forces, and the book documents not merely the type of weapons they improvised/ used but also ambushing strategies and intelligence gathering techniques. The dates for these operations lie between 1919 and 1921 during what we term the War of Independence. The book may be unavailable at the moment except through libraries as the current situation in the North has negatively affected the reception of such books. Another book on the same theme is "My fight for Irish freedom" by Dan Breen, a prime instigator in the independence struggle. It, however, has much more political analysis than Barry's work and is slightly more conventional than the latter. By way of penultimate comment I should mention that Barry's work is considered a seminal textbook on guerilla tactics and was used extensively by partisan movements after WWII (particularly true of the Irgun, by the way). Finally, the current successors to the Old IRA legacy, the Provisional IRA, also publish a series of manuals on the conduct of guerilla warfare. However, these are illegal publications here, possession of which usually entails a four year prison sentence. Hopefully, anyone coming in contact with such materials will have the good sense not to circulate them. Just as a personal aside, which Bill may choose to excise if he wishes, I think readers of the group who may be considering adopting a fantasy concerning the excitment and nobility of urban combat would do well to reflect on the threat which many guerilla groups pose to the population they alledgedly represent. Disclaimer: The information herein is not provided with the objective of supporting or condoning guerilla warfare, or garnering sympathy for groups engaged in guerilla operations. Jerry Harper jharper@euroies.uucp AI Research Centre tel: 353-1-693244 x 2484 Computer Science Department University College Dublin Dublin 4 IRELAND
howard@cos.com (Howard C. Berkowitz) (06/17/89)
From: howard@cos.com (Howard C. Berkowitz) Let me preface certain of my remarks with a the comment that they are intended to stay within the sci.military charter of dealing with military technology (including tactics). Especially when dealing with guerillas in the early -- i.e., Mao/Giap stages I and to some extent II -- phases, it is virtually impossible to separate political and psychological tactics of guerillas fromt their combat tactics. The same basic tactics emerge, in general, at either end of the guerilla ideological spectrum. [mod.note: The topic is certainly borderline; but in this article, as in the previous one, the presentation is excellent. I can tolerate straying a bit from the charter, so long as the posting doesn't draw flames; and I doubt this one will. - Bill ] Briefly, my background in this includes graduate study in national security policy (read that unconventional warfare and intelligence), work as a writer and research assistant at the Army-funded Center for Both the above were at The American University in Washington. Research in Social Systems (formerly Special Operations Research Office). and engineering devices for low-intensity combat during the late 60s and early 70s, coupled with continued reading in the field and parties with the current practitioners! > From: Jerry Harper <jharper%euroies.ucd.ie%CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU> > Anyone interested, historically, in the formation of guerilla units to combat > regular forces should read "Guerilla days in Ireland" by Tom Barry. The author > was the leader of an IRA guerilla group colloquially termed a "flying column" > due to the rapid mobility over vey rough terrain. Barry's group was probably > the most successful of all the guerilla groups in acting against the British > forces, and the book documents not merely the type of weapons they improvised/ This sounds rather interesting, as guerilla groups (defined as early in a guerilla conflict, as opposed to the later stages where guerilla units take on more characteristics of regular combatants). The term "partisan" is reserved by some writers (and used more casually by others) to refer to such mobile units, which can trace their antecedents to 19th century irregular cavalry units operating behind enemy lines. There is a collection of essays, unfortunately in storage at the moment, which I believe is titled _Readings in Guerilla Warfare_, which has an extensive article on a Spanish unit in such cavalry operations (Peninsular War?). Soviet units in early WWII also occasionally had such a "traditional" partisan role, as opposed to the more common guerilla tactic of ambush, disperse, and reform, as opposed to the partisan style of patrol, strike, and run like hell AS A UNIT. ). Finally, the > current successors to the Old IRA legacy, the Provisional IRA, also > publish a series of manuals on the conduct of guerilla warfare. However, these > are illegal publications here, possession of which usually entails a four year > prison sentence. Hopefully, anyone coming in contact with such materials > will have the good sense not to circulate them. I don't know if the criminality of such materials is for specific titles, or for the general subject. I am rather amused, however, to note that if "left-wing" guerilla texts are forbidden, something like the Cypriot offering, "Grivas on Guerilla Warfare," is a thorough text from a very right-wing viewpoint of politics. > > Just as a personal aside, which Bill may choose to excise if he wishes, I think > readers of the group who may be considering adopting a fantasy concerning the > excitment and nobility of urban combat would do well to reflect on the threat > which many guerilla groups pose to the population they alledgedly represent. > I second this comment. Again and again in guerillas' own handbooks, there is a point emphasized that it is to the insurgents' ADVANTAGE to have the central authority strike at the general population; such actions are perceived as repression and can assist in gaining sympathy for the insurgents, perceived as opponents of the government. When looking at a terrorist incident in the news, it is often informative to ask the question: while I may be horrified by this, could this act make solid strategic sense to the guerilla, because it triggered expected government roundups (for example) of people on the political fringe but not KNOWN to be guerilla supporters, or triggered some other form of counteraction which could gain support for the guerillas? Of course, in many cases today, terror is a nihilistic action of a few crazies without a strategic plan. It's worth knowing the difference. -- howard@cos.com OR {uunet, decuac, sun!sundc, hadron, hqda-ai}!cos!howard (703) 883-2812 [W] (703) 998-5017 [H] DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the Corporation for Open Systems, its members, or any standards body.