[sci.military] Dogfighting

military@att.att.com (Bill Thacker) (06/05/89)

From: military@att.att.com (Bill Thacker)
>...maneuverability is not very good and hence is not a very good
>dogfighter...

For the uninitiated, it might be useful to add to this that dogfighting
ability is greatly overrated.  The fact is that most victims of air combat
are taken completely by surprise and there is no dogfight involved.  (The
numbers are 80-90% depending on which source you believe.)  Smart pilots
avoid dogfights as unproductive and dangerous.  Despite his reputation,
Von Richthofen (sp?) avoided dogfights whenever possible and counselled his
junior pilots to do likewise.  Erich Hartmann avoided them at all costs --
and it's hard to argue with the top-scoring ace of all time, 352 confirmed
kills (WW2 Eastern front), never even scratched, never lost a wingman.
(Hartmann also had a lot to say about the dangers of getting greedy:  better
to be patient and look for an easy victim than to charge right in at every
opportunity.)

Of course, there are occasions when even smart pilots may not have a choice.

                                     Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology
                                 uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu

rshu@ads.com (Richard Shu) (06/06/89)

From: rshu@ads.com (Richard Shu)

Can anybody supply reference material on fighter performance and tactics?  

Stuff like 

- specific energy and specific power
- what a Luftberry is
- meeting engagements (one circle vs. two circle fights)

I have some material on the above.  I'm interested in finding more detailed
sources.  Also, the material I have focuses on 1 on 1 fights and doesn't
say anything about what the wingman's role is.  Finally, I'm interested in
finding out what a fighter does when escorting a bomber, especially what
he does if a missile (SAM or AAM) is fired at him/the bomber.  What does
the bomber do?

Rich



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tek@CS.UCLA.EDU (Ted Kim (ATW)) (06/07/89)

From: tek@CS.UCLA.EDU (Ted Kim (ATW))

In article <7163@cbnews.ATT.COM> rshu@ads.com (Richard Shu) writes:
> ...
>Can anybody supply reference material on fighter performance and tactics?  
> ...

The best reference I have seen on the subject is:

	Fighter Combat: Air Tactics and Maneuvering
	by Shaw
	Naval Institute Press

The book has a general discussion of performance factors and equipment
as well as tactics. The tactics material covers the air combat
situation from several different points of view: equipment oriented
tactics (eg gun attack, rear quarter missile defense), energy vs.
angles tactics, one on one, two on one, dissimilar aircraft matchups,
team tactics (eg loose deuce) and a little on operation planning. The
book tries to outline general principles and not focus on particular
matchups or aircraft, though some examples mention specific aircraft. 

DISCLAIMER: I have no connection with the USNI book sales division. 
	I just happen to think this is a good book.

Ted Kim                           ARPAnet: tek@penzance.cs.ucla.edu
UCLA Computer Science Department  UUCP:    ...!ucbvax!cs.ucla.edu!tek
3804C Boelter Hall                PHONE:   (213) 206-8696
Los Angeles, CA 90024             ESPnet:  tek@ouija.board

aws@vax3.iti.org (Allen W. Sherzer) (06/07/89)

From: aws@vax3.iti.org (Allen W. Sherzer)

In article <7163@cbnews.ATT.COM> rshu@ads.com (Richard Shu) writes:
>Can anybody supply reference material on fighter performance and tactics?  

Look for "Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering" by (I think) Shaw. It is 
published by the Naval Institute (if memory serves).

There is an Air Force manual (I think it is 53-10 but that is likely wrong)
which outlines types of missions (like Combat Air Patrol, Fighter Sweep,
and Battlefield Area Interdiction). I don't think this document is 
classified so you might get it from DTIC. 

The best source is a twelve volume classified set of manuals. However you
won't get to see those even if you're cleared and have need to know. The
AF won't give them to contractors (which gave me lots of problems on a
previous project).

  Allen
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Allen Sherzer                      |  To iterate is human,              |
|  aws@iti.org                        |  to recurse divine                 |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

jkmedcal@uunet.UU.NET (Jeff K Medcalf) (06/07/89)

From: Jeff K Medcalf <sun!Central!uokmax!jkmedcal@uunet.UU.NET>

>From: military@att.att.com (Bill Thacker)
>
>Erich Hartmann avoided them at all costs --
>and it's hard to argue with the top-scoring ace of all time, 352 confirmed
>kills (WW2 Eastern front), never even scratched, never lost a wingman.
>
>                                     Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology
>                                 uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu

But remember that during WW2, German pilots also counted kills on the ground,
rather than solely in the air.  And since 90+% of the prewar Soviet Air Force
was destroyed on the ground, as were much of the French and Belgian Air Forces,
German fighter kills tend to be unrealistic.  I think that the top scoring ace
of WW2 in air kills only was British, but I don't remember for sure.


-- 
I dream I'm safe				jkmedcal@uokmax.UUCP
Soft and so nice 				Jeff Medcalf
Soft and so nice
It's a wonderful womb				<-The Church, "Hotel Womb"

wlm@uunet.UU.NET (William L. Moran Jr.) (06/07/89)

From: bywater!archet!wlm@uunet.UU.NET (William L. Moran Jr.)

...
>...  Erich Hartmann avoided them at all costs --
>and it's hard to argue with the top-scoring ace of all time, 352 confirmed
>kills (WW2 Eastern front), never even scratched, never lost a wingman.
>(Hartmann also had a lot to say about the dangers of getting greedy:  better
>to be patient and look for an easy victim than to charge right in at every
>opportunity.)

I recall reading that Hartman told the Soviets that although he had
shot down 352 planes (almost all Soviet), someone on the western front
(Hans Marseille unless I'm mistaken) had shot down 158 British planes,
and since one plane flown by the British was worth three flown by
Russians, he wasn't the leader :)  I can guess how the Soviets must
have reacted to this. Anyway, I think the point about dogfights is
well made.

				Bill Moran

-- 
arpa: moran-william@cs.yale.edu or wlm@ibm.com
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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But in the midst of effort faint and fail;

fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) (06/08/89)

From: fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix)

> From: Jeff K Medcalf <sun!Central!uokmax!jkmedcal@uunet.UU.NET>
> 
>>Erich Hartmann avoided them at all costs --
>>and it's hard to argue with the top-scoring ace of all time, 352 confirmed
>>kills (WW2 Eastern front), never even scratched, never lost a wingman.
>>
>>                                     Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology
>>                                 uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
> 
> But remember that during WW2, German pilots also counted kills on the ground,
> rather than solely in the air.  And since 90+% of the prewar Soviet Air Force
> was destroyed on the ground, as were much of the French and Belgian Air Forces,
> German fighter kills tend to be unrealistic.  I think that the top scoring ace
> of WW2 in air kills only was British, but I don't remember for sure.

Maybe.  (The RAF top-scorer was Johnnie Johnston?  With 38 or so?)

While the Soviet AF was almsot totally destroyed in the very beginning,
remember that a lot of the one destroyed on the ground were knocked
out by bombers (Ju-87, Ju-88, He-111 and so on) as well as the ones
done in by fighters.  Especially in the beginning, the fighters would
have been providing high cover for the bombers.  (Not that they didn't
come down to the ground whenever they could.)

Note also that Luftwaffe requirements for a confirmed kill were much
more stringent than was the allies'.  I think one of them was that a
kill had to be confirmed, in writing, by at least two ground observers,
one of whom had to be a commissioned officer.  (I.e., Hartmann dropped
more than the 352 he's credited for.)

Also, at least some of the Luftwaffe's high scorers were not in
the Eastern theater at the very beginning, having been transferred
from the west after "See Lowe" was finally cancelled and the Western
front turned pretty static for a while.  (I'm not certain about
Hartmann, but he *was* pretty young at the time.  Still, he might
have been in from the very beginning.)

Hans Joachim Marseille (158 confirmed) got all his in the West,
almost all of them in the air, too.

[mod.note: Marseille gets my vote for most phenomenal pilot of the
war.  He apparently loved to get into dogfights, and was superb
at deflection shooting (i.e., at a target moving across your line of fire).
In one case, he and his wingman got inside a group of South African
P-40's flying a defensive circle; he orbited inside the circle at low
speed, shooting down 6 P-40's in 12 minutes.  His wingman noted that,
"each time he fired, I saw his shells strike first the enemy's nose, then
travel along to the cockpit. No ammunition was wasted."   In downing
the six aircraft, he used only 10 20mm rounds and 180 rounds of MG ammo.
On another day, he shot down 17 aircraft. (Ref: _Fighter Pilots of WWII_ by
Robert Jackson.) - Bill ]

One reason that the German scores got to be so high (as were some
Japanese, such as Nishizawa with 102) was that they were *not*
rotated out from the front periodically as were nearly all allied
pilots.  They stayed in combat (excepting R&R leave) until they
were either killed or the war ended.

aws@vax3.iti.org (Allen W. Sherzer) (06/08/89)

From: aws@vax3.iti.org (Allen W. Sherzer)

Henry Spencer writes:
>From: military@att.att.com (Bill Thacker)
>>...maneuverability is not very good and hence is not a very good
>>dogfighter...
>
>For the uninitiated, it might be useful to add to this that dogfighting
>ability is greatly overrated.  The fact is that most victims of air combat
>are taken completely by surprise and there is no dogfight involved.  (The
>numbers are 80-90% depending on which source you believe.)  

True but if you are in the 10 to 20 percent, it is a nice capability to
have :-). There are still a lot of dog fights in war plus maneuverability
is good to have for SAM evasion.

Now this situation (80% of killed aircraft don't know they are under
attack) is the result of a loss of Situational Awareness (SA). Pilots
who are better at maintaining SA are better in battle than those who
can't. What happens is that during a mission (starting with the briefing)
the pilot's SA gets better and better. This reaches a peak just before
contact with the enemy. At that time the pilot is forced to focus on his
target and must ignore the battle around him. He therefore looses track
of the situation (except for his small part of it). This makes it easy to
sneak up on him and kill him.

Now the interesting question is what the future holds. Past attempts to
help the pilot maintain SA have included more sensors (like Radar Warning
Receivers) which have only made the job more complex. One pilot said to
me "I am drowning in data but starved for infomration". I read one study
which said that the average F-15 pilot can only use 15% of the sensors
available to him, more than that and they become overworked.

On the other hand, there are efforts like Pilot's Associate and Super-
cockpit which are attempting to provide better SA. Pilot's Associate is
attempting to use computers so that the integration of data is done by 
the aircraft instead instead of the pilot. This should allow the pilot
to understand the global situation much faster than before. Supercockpit
is attempting to take that information and present it to the pilot so it
can be understood faster.

Now if these efforst work out, future pilots will have their heads out
of the cockpit and be analyzing situations not dials. This should make
it a lot harder to senak up on a pilot at any time during a mission.
Does this mean that a "golden age of dogfighting" lies in the future?

  Allen
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Allen Sherzer                      |  To iterate is human,              |
|  aws@iti.org                        |  to recurse divine                 |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

robert%island@uunet.UU.NET (Robert Leyland) (06/08/89)

From: robert%island@uunet.UU.NET (Robert Leyland)



In article <7163@cbnews.ATT.COM> rshu@ads.com (Richard Shu) writes:
>From: rshu@ads.com (Richard Shu)
>Can anybody supply reference material on fighter performance and tactics?  
>Stuff like 
>- specific energy and specific power
>- what a Luftberry is
>- meeting engagements (one circle vs. two circle fights)
>I have some material on the above.  I'm interested in finding more detailed
>sources.  Also, the material I have focuses on 1 on 1 fights and doesn't
>say anything about what the wingman's role is.  Finally, I'm interested in
>finding out what a fighter does when escorting a bomber, especially what
>he does if a missile (SAM or AAM) is fired at him/the bomber.  What does
>the bomber do?
>
>Rich

I believe that the best reference for modern fighter combat is:-

Fighter Combat - Tactics and Maneuvering, by Robert L. Shaw, 1985
	Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, ISBN 0-87021-059-9

This has very good stuff about 1v1 and 2v1 engangements, as well as some
comments about unlimited fighter engagement.

There is however a lot of armed forces terminology. It seems the military loves
their TLAs (Three Letter Acronyms). Which makes it hard reading in places,
fortuneately there is a good glossary.


-- 
Robert Leyland - Island Graphics, 4000 Civic Ctr Dr #400, San Rafael, CA 94903 
{uunet|sun}!island!robert - (415) 491-1000 - GEnie: r.leyland - std disclaimers

mayse@p.cs.uiuc.edu (06/09/89)

From: mayse@p.cs.uiuc.edu


I'm not familiar with defensive tactics for air-to-air missiles, but
think I remember what a "Lufbery" was.  It was a defensive tactic, 
usually employed by an outnumbered fighter force, in which a number of
planes would fly consecutively in a tight circle, so that no one could
get "behind" any of them.  The maneuver was named for Frenchman Raoul
Lufbery, who flew with (commanded?) the American volunteer squadron 
known as the Lafayette Escadrille in WWI.  I doubt that it has much
utility in an era of missiles and fighters with 3-d maneuvering 
capability.

m1b@rayssd.RAY.COM (M. Joseph Barone) (06/09/89)

From: m1b@rayssd.RAY.COM (M. Joseph Barone)

In article <7210@cbnews.ATT.COM> sun!Central!uokmax!jkmedcal@uunet.UU.NET
(Jeff K Medcalf) writes:
> 
> >Erich Hartmann avoided them at all costs --
> >and it's hard to argue with the top-scoring ace of all time, 352 confirmed
> >kills (WW2 Eastern front), never even scratched, never lost a wingman.
> 
> But remember that during WW2, German pilots also counted kills on the ground,
> rather than solely in the air.  And since 90+% of the prewar Soviet Air Force
> was destroyed on the ground, as were much of the French and Belgian Air Forces
> German fighter kills tend to be unrealistic.  I think that the top scoring ace
> of WW2 in air kills only was British, but I don't remember for sure.

Unfortunately, this statement cannot be made concerning Erich Hartmann.
Erich Hartmann's first kill was on November 5, 1942.  Another interesting
claim he holds is that his downing of a Yak 11 on May 8, 1945 was the
last known Luftwaffe aerial claim of the war.
-- 
Joe Barone ------------------------> m1b@rayssd.RAY.COM
{gatech, decuac, sun, necntc, ukma, uiucdcs}!rayssd!m1b
Occupation: Former historian, now a demon.

bryden@vax1.acs.udel.edu (Christopher F. Bryden) (06/12/89)

From: "Christopher F. Bryden" <bryden@vax1.acs.udel.edu>


An interesting side note :

While listening to General Yeager speak to an auidence at the Air and Space
Museum about 8 months ago, I got the feeling that with sealth, radar and missle 
technology the role of the dogfight is becoming less and less important in a 
tactical sense.  In fact, General Yeager seemed to be of the opinion that the 
weight and space used for carrying "close in" weapons and ammo is, in fact,
wasted space.

Besides this, the biological limits of the human body have already been reached
in dogfighting.  Stuka dive bombers would come back from bombing raids coughing 
up blood from damaged lung tissue (not dogfighing exactly, but similar g-forces
are involved).  Blood vessels in the eye damage very easily (3-4 g's) and, even 
with g-suits, well conditioned pilots pass out after about 10-15 seconds at 8g's.
It really is only a matter of time before the hook the pilot up to a computer 
that will determine of he/she is conscious or not, and it will be able to carry 
on the dogfight with or without their consciousness.

Unmaned smart fighters are, of course, the ultimate direction that technology
would lead us if it were not guided by risk.  I would like to think that, no
matter how unreliable, a human pilot will always be part of the control loop.
However, more and more the human pilots' control inputs are becoming control
suggestions (witness the new generation X-planes).  I think that there will 
always be a human pilot in the control loop for the single reason that we like
to have someone rather than something to blame when technology fails to work
correctly (the Airbus crash?).  In addition to having someone to blame, 
computers don't understand foreign policy all that well.  I guess you could
argue that you average pilot doesn't either, but they seem to preform rather
will when you have an touchy situation like intercepting Soviet bombers that
skim our airspace.

I don't mean to imply that the ablitiy to preform under "close in" situations 
is not important.  Unfortunatly, the dogfight is the icon by which most fighter
pilots and planes get judged by.  Many people believe that the dogfight is 
the ultimate position that tactical maneuvers involving fighters are supposed 
to end in.  This is a fallacy.

Chris
-- 
arpa  : bryden@vax1.acs.udel.edu |    In the land of the fat, balding tourists,
bitnet: AIT05167 at ACSVM        |        the one eyed surfer dude is king.
plato : bryden/itpt/udel          ----------------- I could turn you inside out
uucp  : ...{unidot,uunet}!cfg!udel!udccvax1!bryden | ...what I choose not to do.

jkmedcal@uunet.UU.NET (Jeff K Medcalf) (06/13/89)

From: Jeff K Medcalf <sun!Central!uokmax!jkmedcal@uunet.UU.NET>

>From: "Christopher F. Bryden" <bryden@vax1.acs.udel.edu>
>pilots and planes get judged by.  Many people believe that the dogfight is 
>the ultimate position that tactical maneuvers involving fighters are supposed 
>to end in.  This is a fallacy.

I agree with your ending statement.  However, I cannot accept all of what
preceeded it.

In the 1950's and early '60's, the Age of Missiles had made guns obsolete, and
many warplanes could only carry them in external pods (for ground support).  The
fallacy of such thinking was that missiles were not able to always keep you out
of a close engagement.  In fact, with the poor accuracy of missiles of the
period in field use (as opposed to theoretical), aircraft would often fire a
missile for the sole purpose of putting the opponent on the defensive to make a
gun kill easier.

I cannot see stealth, new missile technology, and human limits overcoming all,
or even most, close engagements.  Admittedly 80% of killed pilots never saw the
attacker, but that does not mean that they were killed BVR.  Many of them were
likely killed in a "dogfight" consisting of the attacker coming up in their six
and getting a quick kill.

Nonetheless, I believe that fighter pilots should be trained in dogfighting as
well as missile skills.  There will probably come a time when it will be needed.
The US was caught in VietNam without dogfighting skills, and it should not be
neglected again.


As a side note, has anyone else noticed how quickly lessons of war are
forgotten?  It seems that every 20 years or so nations must send men into wars
without training them with the lessons of previous conflicts.

[mod.note: Or, worse yet, we remember the wrong lessons... - Bill ]

-- 
I dream I'm safe				jkmedcal@uokmax.UUCP
In my hotel womb 				Jeff Medcalf
Soft and so nice
It's a wonderful womb				<-The Church, "Hotel Womb"

gardiner@umn-cs.cs.umn.edu (David Gardiner) (06/13/89)

From: "David Gardiner" <gardiner@umn-cs.cs.umn.edu>
While dogfighting should not be a fighter pilot's objective, there
are many cases where it is virtually inevitable.  Stealth and long range
missile technology is great if you are fighting WWIII and can safely
assume that all unidentified aircraft are hostile.  The real situation
that our pilots have to deal with (and probably will continue having to
deal with for the foreseeable future) is more fuzzy.  Recent examples
include our forces off of Iran and Libya.  With the Libyan MiG-23s,
the F-14s were essentially forced into a dogfighting situation because
they could not fire until there was overwhelming evidence that the MiGs were
hostile.  In Vietnam, due to a couple cases of friendly aircraft being
shot down by our long range AA missiles, Congress decreed that no shots
could be fired until the target aircraft had been identified visually.
With 2000+ kt closure rates, if you can see the other aircraft well enough
to identify it, you are in a dogfight.  The obvious example of the dangers
of beyond visual range weapons in non-all-out war situations is the 
downing of the Iranian airliner.

Early versions of the F-4 were developed on the missile platform theory.
That is, most of the enemy would be destroyed with long range missiles
(Sparrows) and the few that sneaked through would be dispatched with
short range missiles (Sidewinders).  Guns were unnecessary as dogfights
were a thing of the past.  Since the aircraft needed only to be a missile
platform, maneuverability was not important.

Unfortunately, the Sparrows were horribly unreliable.  The requirement 
of visual identification forced the F-4s into dogfights, for which they
were at a great disadvantage.  Later versions of the F-4 were improved to
make them adequate dogfighters

The F-14 was designed to incorporate many of the lessons learned from
Vietnam.  It was designed for ACM performance (though they did skimp
a bit on the engines) and included a gun.  The primary lesson that had
been learned was that ACM CAPABILITY IS ESSENTIAL REGARDLESS OF THE
AVAILABLE WEAPON TECHNOLOGY!

Note also that the F-14 includes a high power television camera that
allows the crew to identify fighter sized aircraft at ranges of fifty
miles or so (a partial solution to the requirement for identification 
prior to firing).

According to the book _Top Gun_, a part of the class teaches students
how to deal with aircraft that may or may not be hostile.  The primary
lesson is to maintain a position so that, if the situation turns into
a dogfight, you have the advantage.

Aircraft maneuvering technology seems to be heading away from high G
turns to other forms of maneuverability, such as piroette turns (stand
the plane on it's tail and spin).  At least one of the new X planes
is designed to research this (the X-31, I believe).  The X-29 is testing
high angle of attack but I do not know the details.

A note regarding stealth fighters.  One of the uses of fighters in 
non-all-out war situations is to warn nasties to keep away.  We WANT
Kadaffi to know that there are F-14s protecting our ships.  Everything
that I have read seems to agree with my conclusion that the primary use
for Stealth aircraft is for attack.

The moral of the story seems to be the same one that was learned from 
the F-4.  Most of the missions that fighter aircraft are used for require
dogfighting capability.

David Gardiner 

yngve@whoozle.softlab.se (Yngve Larsson) (06/13/89)

From: yngve@whoozle.softlab.se (Yngve Larsson)

In article <7250@cbnews.ATT.COM> fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) writes:
>One reason that the German scores got to be so high (as were some
>Japanese, such as Nishizawa with 102) was that they were *not*
>rotated out from the front periodically as were nearly all allied
>pilots.  They stayed in combat (excepting R&R leave) until they
>were either killed or the war ended.

Question: did this practice have a known detrimental effect on the overall
capacity of the German and Japanese forces? I assume that the rotated
pilots of the US and British forces were used for something like flight
schools or higher staff duties, were they could make good use of their
talents and experience. In not using their experienced pilots to educate
the fresh ones, they might have ended up with a few _very_ capable fighters,
and a horde of nearly-useless ones.

			Yngve Larsson

[mod.note:  This has often been attributed to the collapse of Japanese
naval aviation; toward the end of the war, they had a decided lack of
trained pilots, which contributed to the adoption of kamikaze tactics.
I'm unaware of similar allegations for the Luftwaffe, though. - Bill ]

-- 
Yngve Larsson                               UUCP: ...mcvax!enea!liuida!yla
Dept of CIS                                       Internet: yla@ida.liu.se
Linkoping University, Sweden                          Phone: +46-13-281949

bash@ihlpb.ATT.COM (Basham) (06/14/89)

From: bash@ihlpb.ATT.COM (Basham)

>From: "Christopher F. Bryden" <bryden@vax1.acs.udel.edu>

>While listening to General Yeager speak to an auidence at the Air and Space
>Museum about 8 months ago,I got the feeling that with sealth, radar and missle
>technology the role of the dogfight is becoming less and less important in a 
>tactical sense.  In fact, General Yeager seemed to be of the opinion that the 
>weight and space used for carrying "close in" weapons and ammo is, in fact,
>wasted space.


This same thinking went into the design of the F-4, and the early versions
didn't have a cannon.  Missiles were supposed to intercept any target long
before they got into "dogfighting" range.  

Then along came the politicians who wouldn't allow the F-4 to lauch 
without all sorts of identifications and confirmations.  Pretty much
made the idea of a long range missile useless.

Granted, the optimum mission would be sneak up on the target, shoot it
from a long range, and go home before anybody knew you were there.
However, with the BS political system of the world, this type of mission
may not always be possible.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Tom Basham   	     AT&T Bell Laboratories        (312) 979-6336
att!ihlpb!bash				"If you can't beat 'em, infiltrate
bash@ihlpb.ATT.COM             	         and destroy them from within."
bash@cbnewsd.ATT.COM           

welty@lewis.crd.ge.com (richard welty) (06/14/89)

From: welty@lewis.crd.ge.com (richard welty)

In article <7395@cbnews.ATT.COM>, Yngve Larsson writes: 
=In article <7250@cbnews.ATT.COM> fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) writes:
=>One reason that the German scores got to be so high (as were some
=>Japanese, such as Nishizawa with 102) was that they were =not=
=>rotated out from the front periodically as were nearly all allied
=>pilots.  They stayed in combat (excepting R&R leave) until they
=>were either killed or the war ended.

=Question: did this practice have a known detrimental effect on the overall
=capacity of the German and Japanese forces?

definitely on the Japanese; they lost 2/3 of their Pearl Harbor
veterans at Midway, many more of them near Guadalcanal (along with
many of their best Army pilots.)  their carrier forces became largely
inactive until they trained more pilots (but the new ones were not as
good as the ones they lost at Midway), and then they lost most of
the newly-trained ones at The Battle of the Phillipine Sea (aka
the Marianas Turky Shoot.)  except for kamikaze attacks, Japanese
aviation ceased to be a major force in the pacific war at that point.

= I assume that the rotated
=pilots of the US and British forces were used for something like flight
=schools or higher staff duties, were they could make good use of their
=talents and experience.

yes, in fact.  Dick Bong, for example, served two tours.  between them,
he was rotated stateside to go to school (both to learn and to teach
-- he actually wasn't a very good shooter on his first tour, but he
managed to become ace-of-aces anyway on sheer bravado.  reportedly
he came back for his second tour a fairly good deflection shooter.)
on his second trip home, he tested jets (and died when an early P-80
crashed.)

= In not using their experienced pilots to educate
=the fresh ones, they might have ended up with a few _very_ capable fighters,
=and a horde of nearly-useless ones.

=[mod.note:  This has often been attributed to the collapse of Japanese
=naval aviation; toward the end of the war, they had a decided lack of
=trained pilots, which contributed to the adoption of kamikaze tactics.
=I'm unaware of similar allegations for the Luftwaffe, though. - Bill ]

as far as i know, this is not considered a factor in the decline
of the Luftwaffe.  the Luftwaffe was hurt mostly by the loss of
fuel sources and by Hitler's insistence on offense over defense.
many many aircraft and pilots were grounded by lack of fuel at the
end of wwii.

richard
-- 
richard welty         welty@lewis.crd.ge.com         welty@algol.crd.ge.com
           518-387-6346, GE R&D, K1-5C39, Niskayuna, New York
``but officer, i was only speeding so i'd get home before i ran out of gas''

henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (06/14/89)

From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer)
>... someone on the western front
>(Hans Marseille unless I'm mistaken) had shot down 158 British planes,
>and since one plane flown by the British was worth three flown by
>Russians, he wasn't the leader :)  I can guess how the Soviets must
>have reacted to this...

Well, he did spend some years in a Soviet prison; perhaps this remark
contributed! :-)

Although Hartmann's kill total is generally thought accurate, Marseille's
is classed as doubtful last I heard.  He did a lot of deflection shooting --
shooting at a target crossing his nose at speed -- and while he was quite
definitely good at it, British loss records don't back up some of his
claims.  There is suspicion that a significant fraction of his "kills" may
have been only damaged.

[mod.note:  There is one highly-disputed case from the Desert, where
Marseille claimed a large number of aircraft over a 3-day period;
the British responded that that number exceeded their losses for the
period.  However, when the losses of the South Africans are included,
the number is possible (provided, of course, that the rest of the Luftwaffe
shot down very few aircraft.)  In any case, Marseille's successes are
highly contested. - Bill ]

No such doubt arises for Hartmann, since *his* rule on gunnery was not to
open fire until the target filled his whole windshield.  Not for the faint
of heart, but effective.

                                     Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology
                                 uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu

shafer@drynix (Mary Shafer) (06/15/89)

From: Mary Shafer <shafer@drynix>

David Gardiner writes:

>   Aircraft maneuvering technology seems to be heading away from high G
>   turns to other forms of maneuverability, such as piroette turns (stand
>   the plane on it's tail and spin).  At least one of the new X planes
>   is designed to research this (the X-31, I believe).  The X-29 is testing
>   high angle of attack but I do not know the details.

The X-29 isn't going to go to very high alpha, only about 25 or 30
deg.  This sounds impressive compared to F-4s for example, but the
F-18 can trim above 40 deg alpha and can go to 70 deg quite nicely.

[mod.note:  For those of us unfamiliar (me included)... I take it
alpha == angle of attack.  Now, what's angle of attack ?  Does (I'm
guessing from context) an alpha of 30 degrees mean the plane can
fly level with its nose 30 degrees above level ?  -  Bill ]

Incidentally, the latest buzz word for all this is `agility', with the
terms 'maneuverablity', `post-stall maneuverability', and
`supermaneuverablity' also used.

I'm the technical monitor on an SBIR to develop displays to make all
this agility more useful to the pilot.  This is the real challenge,
since it does no good to have a capability if it's not used.  A pilot
will be reluctant to bleed off all his airspeed and energy at high
alpha, unless he knows that he'll get a good shot at the opponent.
Otherwise he has made himself very vulnerable, out of energy with no
place to go.  We're looking at ways of letting the pilot know whether
he can get a weapons solution or not.  

Agility is a very hot topic right now.  There are a lot of people
working on this problem, including NASA Langley, USAF at Wright
Research & Development Center, McDonnell Aircraft, etc.  I think
there's going to be at least one agility session at the AIAA
Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference in Boston in August.
(Advertisement--come see my paper there on Monday afternoon, August
14.  It's about flying qualities, not agility, but it's good anyway
:-) and I have a video with real aircraft on it.)

Another important element is the weapon envelope.  If you can't launch
a missile at 70 deg, what good does it do to go to 70 deg?  You're
only there to kill the other aircraft.

I attended an agility workshop at the AIAA conference in Reno this
January.  One exchange between a questioner and the NASA ADFRF pilot
on the panel went approximately like this:
Q:  What do you do if you engage an aircraft as agile as yours?  
    What if you can't beat him?
A:  I pop off a missile and bug out.
Q:  Why launch the missile?
A:  To give him something to really worry about!  There are very
    few worries so imperative as where is the live missile.

Here's a book recommendation: "Modern Combat Aircraft Design" by Klaus
Huenecke, copyright 1984 and published in English in the US and Canada
in 1987 by the Naval Institute.  This is an extremely good book that
goes into philosophy and history as well as the boring engineering
stuff.  It's well illustrated and is accessible (IMO) to people who
aren't aero engineers.  I recommend it strongly to group readers
interested in fighters.


M F Shafer                                |Ignore the reply-to address
NASA Ames-Dryden Flight Research Facility |Use shafer@elxsi.dfrf.nasa.gov

NASA management doesn't know what I'm doing and I don't know what they're
doing, and everybody's happy this way.

shafer@drynix (Mary Shafer) (06/16/89)

From: Mary Shafer <shafer@drynix>
Bill wrote:

   [mod.note:  For those of us unfamiliar (me included)... I take it
   alpha == angle of attack.  Now, what's angle of attack ?  Does (I'm
   guessing from context) an alpha of 30 degrees mean the plane can
   fly level with its nose 30 degrees above level ?  -  Bill ]

Yes, angle of attack (AOA) is alpha (alpha is shorter to key).  The
angle of attack is the angle between the fuselage reference line (FRL)
and the relative wind vector, which is to say the flight path.  The
reason that alpha is more important then pitch (the angle between the
FRL and the surface of the earth) in discussing the flight
characteristics of an aircraft is that the aircraft flies in the
relative wind.

If someone would like to take the time to `draw' it for the newsgroup,
I'll gladly send a xerox of a diagram showing this.


M F Shafer                                |Ignore the reply-to address
NASA Ames-Dryden Flight Research Facility |Use shafer@elxsi.dfrf.nasa.gov

NASA management doesn't know what I'm doing and I don't know what they're
doing, and everybody's happy this way.

asulaima@udenva.cair.du.edu (SULAIMAN) (06/16/89)

From: asulaima@udenva.cair.du.edu (SULAIMAN)

In article <7446@cbnews.ATT.COM> bash@ihlpb.ATT.COM (Basham) writes:
>>From: "Christopher F. Bryden" <bryden@vax1.acs.udel.edu>
>
>>While listening to General Yeager speak to an auidence at the Air and Space
>>Museum about 8 months ago,I got the feeling that with sealth, radar and missle
>>technology the role of the dogfight is becoming less and less important in a 
>>tactical sense.  In fact, General Yeager seemed to be of the opinion that the 
>>weight and space used for carrying "close in" weapons and ammo is, in fact,
>>wasted space.
>

Another reason for having good dogfight ability in both pilot and aircraft 
is to AVOID missiles launched on you. Most of the time the 8-9G turns are used
are in missile avoidance. The catch in firing without visual confirmation has
been always the chance of 'own goals'. The IFF transmitter is a way of 
avoiding it but even that is a double edged sword. It lets the enemy know
for sure u are not friendly. With the new generation stealth planes you
may not see the plane until its in visual range. I am assuming of course 
that the Sovs are also trying to build something like the US staelth planes.

I am sure that Gen Yeager knows what he is talking about but I think as 
USAF and USN found out in Vietnam there is always a chance that u will get 
into a dogfight and if u do what are you going to do then? Yell don't fire
I didn't practice this!!

One other point. While the hallowed F-15, F-14 air superiority fighters 
may never get worried about the dogfights think about the poor A-6 and
A-7 and F-16s fully loaded out for a strike mission at low altitude 
meeting a flight of MIGs. Its situations like that where it is too close
for RHM or AHMs that you will have to go into a dogfight and try to win.


	Ameer Z. Sulaiman.

bill@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu (William S. Smith) (06/16/89)

From: bill@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu (William S. Smith)
In 1958 on a flight out of Taiwan an air force pilot, who was returning from
a tour teaching the Chinese Nationalists how to beat the MIGs with F86s,
told me, a non-aviator, that his technique for solving the agility problem
was to allow the MIG to get on his tail, pop the flaps, and fire a
sidewinder as the MIG streaked past - always provided that the MIG didn't
get off a shot first, of course.  It sounds as if the speeds and distances
have changed, but not much else!

marsh@linus.UUCP (Ralph Marshall) (06/16/89)

From: marsh@linus.UUCP (Ralph Marshall)
In article <7450@cbnews.ATT.COM> welty@lewis.crd.ge.com (richard welty) writes:
>
>
[stuff about merits of rotating out pilots deleted]
>
>as far as i know, this is not considered a factor in the decline
>of the Luftwaffe.  the Luftwaffe was hurt mostly by the loss of
>fuel sources and by Hitler's insistence on offense over defense.
>many many aircraft and pilots were grounded by lack of fuel at the
>end of wwii.
>
>richard

	Another cause for the decline of the Luftwaffe was the sheer lack
of planes.  Their military production was messed up during the war due
to a variety of problems: Hitler expected a short war and thus didn't 
concentrate on coming up with a second generation of planes to replace
the Me109 until it was really too late (the FW 190 was only available after
they had lost most of their aircraft factories and strategic materials)
Also, the rate of loss exceeded the new production rate (regardless of
quality of the replacements) for most of the war, while both the United
States and Russia built HUGE numbers of planes from 1943 onward. So,
the Luftwaffe never really had problems with pilots (until 1945, when
everything went to hell and they had boys and old men in the army) as much
as they did with planes and fuel.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ralph Marshall (marsh@mbunix.mitre.org)

Disclaimer:  Often wrong but never in doubt...  All of these opinions
are mine, so don't gripe to my employer if you don't like them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) (06/20/89)

From: fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix)

> [mod.note:  For those of us unfamiliar (me included)... I take it
> alpha == angle of attack.  Now, what's angle of attack ?  Does (I'm
> guessing from context) an alpha of 30 degrees mean the plane can
> fly level with its nose 30 degrees above level ?  -  Bill ]

No.  Not quite.

Take a line between the leading and trailing edges of the wing.
That's a chord.  Measure the angle between the chord line and
the direction the air going due to the aircraft's motion.

The angle is what you're looking for.

(Roughly, a wing's lift [and drag] increase with increasing angle of attack.
Up to a point...past that point, lift falls off, usually with a related
separation of airflow from the wing.  At that point the wing stalls.

The stall is dependant on the angle of attack, the attitude of the aircraft
in relation to the earth is essentially irrelevant.  You can stall at any
attitude or speed.)

henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (06/20/89)

From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer)
>The F-14 was designed to incorporate many of the lessons learned from
>Vietnam.  It was designed for ACM performance (though they did skimp
>a bit on the engines...

They skimped on the engines in the F-14A, which was meant as an initial
interim version.  The F-14B was to have had much more advanced engines.
Said engines ran into problems (both technical and financial, I think)
and the F-14B got quietly forgotten.

                                     Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology
                                 uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu

fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) (06/20/89)

From: fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix)

> From: marsh@linus.UUCP (Ralph Marshall)
> 
> 	Another cause for the decline of the Luftwaffe was the sheer lack
> of planes.  Their military production was messed up during the war due
> to a variety of problems: Hitler expected a short war and thus didn't 
> concentrate on coming up with a second generation of planes to replace
> the Me109 until it was really too late (the FW 190 was only available after
> they had lost most of their aircraft factories and strategic materials)

Centralized war production took a major hait after the RAF's night and
USAAF's round-the-clock bombing wound up...so the Germans decentralized
their production facilities.  Aircraft production in 1943 was up from 
the previous year, and I think (somebody please verify!) 1944 was the
highest year for fighter production.  But they couldn't get enough fuel
to run everything.  Or ball bearings to build enough of almost everything.

The loss rate > production rate (especially in the east) was probably the
worst part, especially for morale.

wlm@uunet.UU.NET (William L. Moran Jr.) (06/20/89)

From: bywater!archet!wlm@uunet.UU.NET (William L. Moran Jr.)

In article <7521@cbnews.ATT.COM> marsh@linus.UUCP (Ralph Marshall) writes:
>
>
>From: marsh@linus.UUCP (Ralph Marshall)
...
>[stuff about merits of rotating out pilots deleted]
>>
... stuff deleted
>
>	Another cause for the decline of the Luftwaffe was the sheer lack
>of planes.  Their military production was messed up during the war due
>to a variety of problems: Hitler expected a short war and thus didn't 
>concentrate on coming up with a second generation of planes to replace
>the Me109 until it was really too late (the FW 190 was only available after
>they had lost most of their aircraft factories and strategic materials)

It wasn't so much that Hitler planned on a short war, but he had come
to power promising prosperity and not hardship. Germany was not on a
real war footing until at least 1943; many Germans had servants until
at least then. This meant that there were fewer people to work in the
war related industries. In any event, Germanies production of planes
peaked after the Focke Wolfe was in production. I have a pamphlet I
picked up at the Imperial War Museum which give FW 190 Production
figures as:
1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
228	1850	2171	7488	1630
At least part of the problem was that the people in charge of
production were fairly short sighted. For example, look at the
production of ME 109s

2764	2657	6013	12807	2798

As can be seen from this, German production peaked in 1944, and they 
hadn't decided by then to emphasize FW 190 production. They were
still building JU 88s as fighters then; this can't be considered one
of the best decisions of the war (yes I know they were used as night
fighters with some effect). If the Germans had gotten the ME 262 into
production in 1943, as they might have had Hitler not tried to make it
a Fighter/Bomber, the air war would certainly have been far more
costly for the Allies.

>Also, the rate of loss exceeded the new production rate (regardless of
>quality of the replacements) for most of the war, while both the United
>States and Russia built HUGE numbers of planes from 1943 onward. So,
>the Luftwaffe never really had problems with pilots (until 1945, when
>everything went to hell and they had boys and old men in the army) as much
>as they did with planes and fuel.

I'm not sure this is true. My vague recollection is that the Germans
peaked in terms of number of fighters available for defence of Germany
in August of 1944 ( this may be wrong ). Anyway, the fighters of the
Luftwaffe were never used very well in defense of Germany (Goering was
a fool). Also, Fighter production wasn't emphasized by Hitler until
mid 1944 at the earliest (fighters were defensive). 

			Bill Moran


-- 
arpa: moran-william@cs.yale.edu or wlm@ibm.com
uucp: uunet!bywater!acheron!archet!wlm or decvax!yale!moran-william
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
``There is Jackson standing like a stone wall. Let us determine to die,
  and we will conquer. Follow me.'' - General Barnard E. Bee (CSA)

wolit@cbnewsm.ATT.COM (Jan Wolitzky) (06/20/89)

From: wolit@cbnewsm.ATT.COM (Jan Wolitzky)

> From: bill@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu (William S. Smith)
> In 1958 on a flight out of Taiwan an air force pilot, who was returning from
> a tour teaching the Chinese Nationalists how to beat the MIGs with F86s,
> told me, a non-aviator, that his technique for solving the agility problem
> was to allow the MIG to get on his tail, pop the flaps, and fire a
> sidewinder as the MIG streaked past - always provided that the MIG didn't
> get off a shot first, of course.  It sounds as if the speeds and distances
> have changed, but not much else!

I recall that this technique was used with success by British Harrier
pilots against Argentine Mirages during the Falklands/Malvinas
conflict.  The Harrier pilot would rotate his exhaust nozzles from
their normal rearward-pointing position (in forward flight) through the
downward-pointing position used for vertical flight, until they pointed
a bit forward, providing some reverse thrust.  Not sure whether dive
brakes were used as well, but the plane slowed down in a hurry.  The
Mirage pilot was obviously unable to maintain his position on the
Harrier's tail, and provided a good target for a Sidewinder as it went
past.  The British pilots dubbed the maneuver "vff-ing," though I
forget exactly what the "VF" stood for -- "vertical flight" or "vector
forward" or something like that.

Of course, I doubt that any pilot would actually CHOOSE to go up
against a Mirage with a Harrier in a dogfight.  The technique does
give the other guy the first crack at a tail shot, after all.
-- 
Jan Wolitzky, AT&T Bell Labs, Murray Hill, NJ; 201 582-2998; mhuxd!wolit
(Affiliation given for identification purposes only)

fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) (06/20/89)

From: fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix)

In article <7395@cbnews.ATT.COM>, yngve@whoozle.softlab.se (Yngve Larsson) writes:
> In article <7250@cbnews.ATT.COM> fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) writes:
>>One reason that the German scores got to be so high (as were some
>>Japanese, such as Nishizawa with 102) was that they were *not*
>>rotated out from the front periodically as were nearly all allied
>>pilots.  They stayed in combat (excepting R&R leave) until they
>>were either killed or the war ended.
> 
> Question: did this practice have a known detrimental effect on the overall
> capacity of the German and Japanese forces? I assume that the rotated
> 
> [mod.note:  This has often been attributed to the collapse of Japanese
> naval aviation; toward the end of the war, they had a decided lack of
> trained pilots, which contributed to the adoption of kamikaze tactics.
> I'm unaware of similar allegations for the Luftwaffe, though. - Bill ]

The Luftwaffe training system was different than that of the Imperial
Navy's.  The Japanese pre-war training seemed to depend on *lots* of
training, lots of flight time, after pilots arrived in operational
units.

By the time of the Marianas Turkey Shoot, not only had the most
experienced Naval pilots been lost for the most part, the operational
pilots remaining had nowhere near the flying experience of their...um...
ancestors.  (It didn't help that no replacement for the aging Zero was
ever to show up in significant numbers.)  There *were* still excellent
pilots available to Japan, but they were pretty rare.  Saburo Sakai,
for instance, even though after Guadalcanal he was missing one eye.

Speaking of which...

The Luftwaffe allowed pilots to stay on active duty after major injuries,
such as Rudel (Stuka driver) after losing an eye, and the RAF with Bader
after losing both legs.  Admittedly rare, but did the USAAF have any
active-duty pilots in equivalent condition?

hhm@ihlpy.ATT.COM (Mayo) (06/20/89)

From: hhm@ihlpy.ATT.COM (Mayo)

In article <7521@cbnews.ATT.COM>, marsh@linus.UUCP (Ralph Marshall) writes:
> 
> >as far as i know, this is not considered a factor in the decline
> >of the Luftwaffe.  the Luftwaffe was hurt mostly by the loss of
> >fuel sources and by Hitler's insistence on offense over defense.
> >many many aircraft and pilots were grounded by lack of fuel at the
> >end of wwii.
> >
> >richard
> 
> 	Another cause for the decline of the Luftwaffe was the sheer lack
> of planes.  Their military production was messed up during the war due
> to a variety of problems: Hitler expected a short war and thus didn't 
> concentrate on coming up with a second generation of planes to replace
> the Me109 until it was really too late (the FW 190 was only available after

Speer's memoires deal a mortal blow to this old canard. German production
of planes skyrocketed at the end of the war. (he shows production charts
in Inside the Third Reich)  Pilots, however, were not available for them
or fuel to get them into the air. 


                                                           Larry

[mod.note:  I seem to recall having read similar sentiments in
Erich Hartmann's _I Fought You From the Skies_.  - Bill ]

shafer@drynix (Mary Shafer) (06/21/89)

From: Mary Shafer <shafer@drynix>

Steve Hix writes:

>> [mod.note:  For those of us unfamiliar (me included)... I take it
>> alpha == angle of attack.  Now, what's angle of attack ?  Does (I'm
>> guessing from context) an alpha of 30 degrees mean the plane can
>> fly level with its nose 30 degrees above level ?  -  Bill ]

>No.  Not quite.

>Take a line between the leading and trailing edges of the wing.
>That's a chord.  Measure the angle between the chord line and
>the direction the air going due to the aircraft's motion.

>The angle is what you're looking for.

Well, not quite.  This is the wing angle of attack.  The angle between 
the fuselage reference line and the relative wind is the aircraft angle
of attack.

>(Roughly, a wing's lift [and drag] increase with increasing angle of attack.
>Up to a point...past that point, lift falls off, usually with a related
>separation of airflow from the wing.  At that point the wing stalls.

In fighters, the aircraft angle of attack of much greater interest
because stall/spin/departure behavior is almost entirely a function of
the flow at the nose and forebody (about back to the canopy), rather
than the wings.  The opposite is, however, true for general aviation
and transport aircraft.  Departure resistance is also related to
stores loading and thrust assymetries.  For example, F-4s and F-15s
with centerline drop tanks are more easily departed.

Did you see the article about the Dryden F-18 High Alpha Research
Vehicle (HARV) in a recent AvWeek (it's on the cover)?  (I think the
article also mentions Dryden's earlier stall/spin/departure research
using a 3/8-scale model of the F-15.  We think that we have the
unofficial world record for number of turns in a spin--83.)  We have
done a lot of wind and water tunnel testing, computational aerodynamics,
and flight test with this aircraft.  We've put smokers in the nose and
injected smoke into the nose and LEX vortices, as well as doing surface
flow visualization on the nose and LEX.  The AvWeek article has some very
nice pictures and good explanations of all this.

>The stall is dependant on the angle of attack, the attitude of the aircraft
>in relation to the earth is essentially irrelevant.  You can stall at any
>attitude or speed.)

If you pull the nose of your fighter up, bleed off the airspeed, and
stall the aircraft, you may, if the a/c has a flat spin mode, find
yourself spinning with the a/c quite level with respect to the ground.
The aircraft is essentially falling out of the sky, so your angle of
attack is 90 deg and your pitch angle is 0.

 a/c-- _____
|
  direction |
  of  |
flight|
 (velocity  |
  vector)V
ground _____

This can be a very comfortable ride, according to our pilots.  The
horizon just goes by, nice and level.  Much better then oscillatory or
inverted spins!  The F/A-18, which is _not_ spin-prone, has three
upright spin modes--one flat, smooth, and fast and the other two
oscillatory and slower.  The F-15 is also very spin-resistant, but it
can be provoked into both upright and inverted, oscillatory and steady
spins.  It recovers by itself with neutral controls.

  -- M F Shafer|Ignore the reply-to address 
NASA Ames-Dryden Flight Research Facility |Use shafer@elxsi.dfrf.nasa.gov

NASA management doesn't know what I'm doing and I don't know what they're
doing, and everybody's happy this way.

bsmart@uunet.UU.NET (Bob Smart) (06/21/89)

From: vrdxhq!vrdxhq.verdix.com!bsmart@uunet.UU.NET (Bob Smart)

In article <7590@cbnews.ATT.COM>, wolit@cbnewsm.ATT.COM (Jan Wolitzky) writes:
> 
> 
> From: wolit@cbnewsm.ATT.COM (Jan Wolitzky)
> 
> I recall that this technique was used with success by British Harrier
> pilots against Argentine Mirages during the Falklands/Malvinas
> conflict.  The Harrier pilot would rotate his exhaust nozzles from
> their normal rearward-pointing position (in forward flight) through the
> downward-pointing position used for vertical flight, until they pointed
> a bit forward, providing some reverse thrust.  Not sure whether dive
> brakes were used as well, but the plane slowed down in a hurry.  The
> Mirage pilot was obviously unable to maintain his position on the
> Harrier's tail, and provided a good target for a Sidewinder as it went
> past.  The British pilots dubbed the maneuver "vff-ing," though I
> forget exactly what the "VF" stood for -- "vertical flight" or "vector
> forward" or something like that.

Viff stands for vector in forward flight, ie the use of the nozzles as descibed
while in forward flight. using dive brakes would have very little additional
effect ( what use is a few square feet of metal compared to several thousand
pounds of thrust :-))

> 
> Of course, I doubt that any pilot would actually CHOOSE to go up
> against a Mirage with a Harrier in a dogfight.  The technique does
> give the other guy the first crack at a tail shot, after all.

I worked on F-15s at Red Flag in the late 70's early 80's ( when there was no
argument that the eagle was the hottest thing around) and remember pilots
coming back after running into some USMC AV-8's on a strike mission
"The f---ers don't fight fair, you line up a good aim-9 or gun shot and
the d--ned thing stops in midair, it just ain't fair" ( pilot walks away
shaking his head and mumbleing to himself :-)) The only other plane
that had the respect of these guys was the A-4. The small size combined with
excellent manouverability and SMOKELESS engines mad them tough targets. The
British Vulcan, in it's first Redflag surprised the eagle drivers with its
slloooow speed " I had my barn door open(speed brake) flaps down and I'm
sitting beside him trying to slow up enough to get behind him AND HE SLOWS UP!
so I just cleaned up hit AB and looped in behind him, but I wouldn't believe
that big plane could fly that slow". Needless to say the surprise factor only
works the first one or two times for any aircraft. But the Harrier was so
unpredictable that the recommended solution was to kill them at long range or
blow past them at high speed and take snap shots, but NEVER try to manouver
with them.

Bob Smart (bsmart@verdix.com)

> -- 
> Jan Wolitzky, AT&T Bell Labs, Murray Hill, NJ; 201 582-2998; mhuxd!wolit
> (Affiliation given for identification purposes only)

tek@CS.UCLA.EDU (Ted Kim (ATW)) (06/21/89)

From: tek@CS.UCLA.EDU (Ted Kim (ATW))

In article <7585@cbnews.ATT.COM> henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes:
> ...
>They skimped on the engines in the F-14A, which was meant as an initial
>interim version.  The F-14B was to have had much more advanced engines.
>Said engines ran into problems (both technical and financial, I think)
>and the F-14B got quietly forgotten.

Which leads us up to the present day situation ...

The Navy is developing the F-14D (ie Super Tomcat) to correct all
these problems. (I forget when development is supposed to be done, but
I want to say 1990.) The "D" version has powerful engines and updated
electronics, but it may not be affordable in the current budget
climate. Part of the problem revolves around a low planned production
(~24/year) rate, leading to very high unit cost (~ $50M). (These
numbers come from an article in the USNI Proceedings.) This because
the Navy does not think it can come up with all the money up front,
even though it would cheaper in the long run to do so. I have not
heard of any technical problems, but then I may not have my ear close
enough to the ground. :-)  

As an interim measure, some (6-12 in this last year) of the F-14As
have had their engines replaced with the engine to be used in the
F-14D. These upgraded planes are sometimes referred to as the F-14A+.   

Given the high cost of F-14Ds, some suggest that the Navy not bother
at all and instead wait for the Navy version of the ATF. However, many
Navy people just are not happy with this ATF thing anyway. The
congress made the ATF a joint Navy/Air Force production. (Insert Navy
memories of the F-111 joint development here.) The source selection
for the Air Force ATF is supposed to happen in 1990. My impression is
that the Navy side is not that far along. The Navy is worried that
their somewhat different requirements will lead to a version of the
ATF which does not have that much in common with the Air Force one and
hence not much joint production savings.

Ted Kim                           ARPAnet: tek@penzance.cs.ucla.edu
UCLA Computer Science Department  UUCP:    ...!ucbvax!cs.ucla.edu!tek
3804C Boelter Hall                PHONE:   (213) 206-8696
Los Angeles, CA 90024             ESPnet:  tek@ouija.board

shafer@drynix (Mary Shafer) (06/21/89)

From: Mary Shafer <shafer@drynix>
Jan Wolitzky writes:

>> From: bill@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu (William S. Smith)
>> In 1958 on a flight out of Taiwan an air force pilot, who was returning from
>> a tour teaching the Chinese Nationalists how to beat the MIGs with F86s,
>> told me, a non-aviator, that his technique for solving the agility problem
>> was to allow the MIG to get on his tail, pop the flaps, and fire a
>> sidewinder as the MIG streaked past - always provided that the MIG didn't
>> get off a shot first, of course.  It sounds as if the speeds and distances
>> have changed, but not much else!

>I recall that this technique was used with success by British Harrier
>pilots against Argentine Mirages during the Falklands/Malvinas
>conflict.  The Harrier pilot would rotate his exhaust nozzles from
>their normal rearward-pointing position (in forward flight) through the
>downward-pointing position used for vertical flight, until they pointed
>a bit forward, providing some reverse thrust.  Not sure whether dive
>brakes were used as well, but the plane slowed down in a hurry.  The
>Mirage pilot was obviously unable to maintain his position on the
>Harrier's tail, and provided a good target for a Sidewinder as it went
>past.  The British pilots dubbed the maneuver "vff-ing," though I
>forget exactly what the "VF" stood for -- "vertical flight" or "vector
>forward" or something like that.

It's VIFFing, for vectoring in forward flight.  The speed brakes
aren't used--you don't want to provide any cues to the pursuer.
However, I saw a briefing (at a Society of Experimental Test Pilots
Symposium) by one of the RAF pilots who flew in the Falklands War and
he explicitly said that VIFFing was not used in the war.  I have also
read this in a (borrowed) book, but I don't remember the title.

The real problem with doing this is that you have markedly reduced
your energy.  You are now hanging in the sky and your opponent's
wingman can just pick you off.  This is OK if you have _no_ other way
to escape, but it's kind of a last-ditch maneuver.  The Harrier, with
vectored thrust, is better than a conventional aircraft, but you still
sacrifice maneuverability, speed, and/or altitude.  In `Top Gun'
Maverick does this, but I sure wouldn't want to get an F-14 slow.
They have a departure problem that still isn't fixed.  Maverick's
subsequent departure and spin is based on a real accident.

--

M F Shafer                                |Ignore the reply-to address
NASA Ames-Dryden Flight Research Facility |Use shafer@elxsi.dfrf.nasa.gov

NASA management doesn't know what I'm doing and I don't know what they're
doing, and everybody's happy this way.

willey@arrakis.NEVADA.EDU (Adm. Pavel Chekov) (06/21/89)

From: willey@arrakis.NEVADA.EDU (Adm. Pavel Chekov)


In article <7590@cbnews.ATT.COM> wolit@cbnewsm.ATT.COM (Jan Wolitzky) writes:
:From: wolit@cbnewsm.ATT.COM (Jan Wolitzky)
:
:> From: bill@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu (William S. Smith)
:> In 1958 on a flight out of Taiwan an air force pilot, who was returning from
:> a tour teaching the Chinese Nationalists how to beat the MIGs with F86s,
:> told me, a non-aviator, that his technique for solving the agility problem
:> was to allow the MIG to get on his tail, pop the flaps, and fire a
:> sidewinder as the MIG streaked past - always provided that the MIG didn't
:> get off a shot first, of course.  It sounds as if the speeds and distances
:> have changed, but not much else!
:
:I recall that this technique was used with success by British Harrier
:pilots against Argentine Mirages during the Falklands/Malvinas
:conflict.  The Harrier pilot would rotate his exhaust nozzles from
:their normal rearward-pointing position (in forward flight) through the
:downward-pointing position used for vertical flight, until they pointed
:a bit forward, providing some reverse thrust.  Not sure whether dive
:brakes were used as well, but the plane slowed down in a hurry.  The
:Mirage pilot was obviously unable to maintain his position on the
:Harrier's tail, and provided a good target for a Sidewinder as it went
:past.  The British pilots dubbed the maneuver "vff-ing," though I
:forget exactly what the "VF" stood for -- "vertical flight" or "vector
:forward" or something like that.
:

	I was reading a book about the air war in the Falklands, sorry, I
forget the title, which went into some of the Harrier combat maneuvers made
possible by its unique thrust vectoring. The majority of them involved letting
the enemy get on your tail [right where you want him]. One of the most
interesting things to do once you got the enemy on your tail was to execute
a loop. As the Harrier approached the top of the loop, if the enemy was still
following, the thrust was vectored down, but since the plane is inverted, the
thrust is actually up, forcing the plane down. After the Harrier starts to
fall, the plane goes through a half roll and the thrust, now vectored down,
slows the descent of the Harrier. The thrust is then vectored to normal 
flight configuration, and with a bit of luck, the enemy is now in your sights.
Provided that the enemy pilot follows you into the loop, there isn't much
he can do except pray, or so the theory goes.
	I'll try to find find out which book it was. If your interested, I'll
E-Mail you the title and ISBN. I would recommend Military Lessons of the 
Falkland Islands War to anybody interested in the subject. It breaks
everything down into basic categories, so its easy to find what you want.

asulaima@udenva.cair.du.edu (SULAIMAN) (06/22/89)

From: asulaima@udenva.cair.du.edu (SULAIMAN)

In article <7590@cbnews.ATT.COM> wolit@cbnewsm.ATT.COM (Jan Wolitzky) writes:
>
>
>I recall that this technique was used with success by British Harrier
>pilots against Argentine Mirages during the Falklands/Malvinas
>conflict.  The Harrier pilot would rotate his exhaust nozzles from
>their normal rearward-pointing position (in forward flight) through the
>downward-pointing position used for vertical flight, until they pointed
>a bit forward, providing some reverse thrust.  Not sure whether dive
>brakes were used as well, but the plane slowed down in a hurry.  The
>Mirage pilot was obviously unable to maintain his position on the
>Harrier's tail, and provided a good target for a Sidewinder as it went
>past.  The British pilots dubbed the maneuver "vff-ing," though I
>forget exactly what the "VF" stood for -- "vertical flight" or "vector
>forward" or something like that.
Stands for Vectoring In Forward Flight (VIFFing). Basically the the engines
start providing thrust at an angle to line of flight allowing the aircraft to do 
all sorts of neat things like brake and climb away while in level flight.
Also can and is used to cut down turn radius drastically. Do not scissor
with Harriers...

>
>Of course, I doubt that any pilot would actually CHOOSE to go up
>against a Mirage with a Harrier in a dogfight.  The technique does
>give the other guy the first crack at a tail shot, after all.
>-- 
In a dogfight I'd take a Harrier against any other plane in the world. In 
USN USMC exercises the USMC Harriers won out 8 of 10 times against F-18s and
Tomcats. The plane is not glamorous like a Tomcat and has no standoff fire
ability but in a knife fight it will beat out any other plane. The Brits lost
0 Harriers to the Argentine Air Force and the plane itself killed more 
Argie aircraft than anything else. The Argentinian nickname for the 
Royal Navy Sea Harriers...'Grey Death'. The plane has no supersonic ability
and carries a modest load for its primary mission ground attack. So the
plane has recieved a lot of flack. But it has no competition in its
maneuverability or STOL performance.


	Ameer Z. Sulaiman.

henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (06/22/89)

From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer)

>> ... allow the MIG to get on his tail, pop the flaps, and fire a
>> sidewinder as the MIG streaked past...
>
>I recall that this technique was used with success by British Harrier
>pilots against Argentine Mirages during the Falklands/Malvinas
>conflict.  The Harrier pilot would rotate his exhaust nozzles from
>their normal rearward-pointing position...
>... The British pilots dubbed the maneuver "vff-ing," though I
>forget exactly what the "VF" stood for ...

"VIFFing" is Vectoring In Forward Flight.  It was invented some years
earlier, by the USMC Harrier pilots I believe.  And it was not used, ever,
in the Falklands -- both official records and the Harrier pilots confirm
this.  There were only a handful of serious air-to-air combats in the
Falklands War, before the Argentine command pulled their air-combat units
back to protect their mainland bases, and none of them ended up involving
a classical dogfight in which VIFFing would have been useful.  Most of
the air combat in the Falklands involved Harriers shooting and Argentine
aircraft trying to dodge.

                                     Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology
                                 uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu

johnson@gregsun.cs.umd.edu (Greg Johnson ) (06/27/89)

From: johnson@gregsun.cs.umd.edu (Greg Johnson )
In article <7671@cbnews.ATT.COM> henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes:
>
>"VIFFing" is Vectoring In Forward Flight.  It was invented some years
>earlier, by the USMC Harrier pilots I believe.
>
>                                     Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology
>                                 uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu

There have been some research efforts in recent years on jet fighters with
high maneuverability.  HIMAT and the X-31 come to mind.  The X-31 uses thrust
vectoring around the nozzle at the rear of the airplane to maneuver in
post-stall flight.  I read an intriguing article in a popular science magazine
about the X-31.  It can evidently do amazing, bizarre things.  It seems that
it can enter a stall and then turn around using thrust vectoring.  Detaching
air flow seems to be a wonderful way to increase maneuverability.

Some questions:

What sorts of air combat encounters are such airplanes optimized for?
Close-in gun engagements?  If so, how frequent are such encounters?
The experts were for a while predicting the demise of in-close
dogfighting; has opinion swung in the other direction?  As I understand
it, the F-4 was originally deployed in Viet Nam as a missiles-only
platform, but poor results and pleas from pilots resulted in modifications
to include guns for in-close fighting.  Missiles and radar have improved
substantially since the Viet Nam era, but rules for visual confirmation of
targets before firing have come into the picture.  So where does all this
leave us?  What does the future of aerial combat look like, and how does
high maneuverability fit in?  To make this set of questions impossibly
general, how will intelligent cockpits change the nature of ACM?

- Greg Johnson
  johnson@mimsy.umd.edu

  When you turn an ordinary page of code into just a handful of instructions
  for speed, expand the comments to keep the number of source lines constant.
      - Mike Morgan, taken from Jon Bentley's More Programming Pearls
- Greg Johnson
  johnson@mimsy.umd.edu
  
  When you turn an ordinary page of code into just a handful of instructions
  for speed, expand the comments to keep the number of source lines constant.
      - Mike Morgan, taken from Jon Bentley's More Programming Pearls

jtk@mordor.s1.gov (Jordan Kare) (06/27/89)

From: jtk@mordor.s1.gov (Jordan Kare)
In article <7513@cbnews.ATT.COM> asulaima@udenva.cair.du.edu (SULAIMAN) writes:
[... in the midst of a discussion on dogfighting vs. missiles...]

>... With the new generation stealth planes you
>may not see the plane until its in visual range. 

Amazing!  I bet you can't hear a stealth plane until it's in
audible range either :-)

	Jordin (Don't fire 'til their oculars are resolvable!) Kare