[sci.military] Shielding Nukes

arf@chinet.chi.il.us (Jack Schmidling) (07/24/89)

From: arf@chinet.chi.il.us (Jack Schmidling)

ashielding722/e4 
 
Kirby says: 
 
> When eqipped with the right instruments, you can locate Fermilab (near  
Chicago) without knowing quite where it is.  
 
ARF says: 
 
I don't believe the dosimeters worn by workers in the nuclear industry would  
detect Fermilab from very far away.  If the conclusion is that it requires a  
detector capable of detecting Fermilab from orbit, to detect a nuke at close  
range, then the case is closed. 
 
Spencer says: 
 
>Sigh.  Warheads are not reactors.   You probably wouldn't want to spend ten  
years sleeping in the same room with them if you could avoid it, but the odds  
that normal occupational exposure would harm you are slim. 
 
ARF says: 
 
Watches with illuminous dials are not reactors either but lots of women died  
very horrible deaths from painting the dials.  Frankly, I wouldn't sleep with  
a watch, much less a nuke. 
 
Norton says: 
 
>No radiation is released by the warheads become "hot to the touch", i.e.  
100+ deg F. 
 
ARF says: 
 
This whole discussion got started because the original poster, John Ralls   
said "As for finding nukes, that's easy.  Warheads aren't shielded because of  
the weight, so you just point a radiation detector at it." 
  
However, I detect {pun} a "don't worry, be happy" attitude.  It reminds me of  
the standard statement from the management of a power station whenever they  
get caught releasing radiation... 
 
     "a radiation release, which is now under control, 
      poses no serious threat to public health". 
 
 Let's try to put it into the proper perspective.  Can anyone asign some  
numbers here?   Like... how many milirems, at one meter from a nuke?... would  
be a good place to start.  Then, we could let the consumer be the judge. 
 
It would be a pity if I had to move this off to sci.physics to get a hard  
answer. 
 
The Amateur Radio Forum (arf) 
 
 

nak@cbnews.ATT.COM (Neil A. Kirby) (07/25/89)

From: nak@cbnews.ATT.COM (Neil A. Kirby)
In article <8530@cbnews.ATT.COM> arf@chinet.chi.il.us (Jack Schmidling) writes:
>
>
>From: arf@chinet.chi.il.us (Jack Schmidling)
>
>ashielding722/e4 
> 
>Kirby says: 
> 
>> When eqipped with the right instruments, you can locate Fermilab (near  
>Chicago) without knowing quite where it is.  
 
[lots of others say...]
 
>ARF says: 
> 
>This whole discussion got started because the original poster, John Ralls   
>said "As for finding nukes, that's easy.  Warheads aren't shielded because of  
>the weight, so you just point a radiation detector at it." 

	I think my effort to be short and to the point dropped too much
	detail.  From what my friend (a nuke type) told me, the gear needed
	to find Fermilab would fit easily on your back, though you'd rather 
	have it on a cart.  This was in the late 70's.  Equipment has
	gotten better since then.

	If the warhead is twice or ten times more radient than the
	background, it will show up noticably on person-portable
	instruments.  One hundred times more radient than background would
	be very easy to pick up.  

	Backgroud radiation itself varies by over a factor of ten (if not a
	hundred, real experts please speak up) depending on where you are.
	Hot Springs Arkansas has a higher backgroud level of radiation than
	lots of other places (due to the springs) and it's a _health_
	resort.
>  
>However, I detect {pun} a "don't worry, be happy" attitude.  It reminds me of  
>the standard statement from the management of a power station whenever they  
>get caught releasing radiation... 
> 
>     "a radiation release, which is now under control, 
>      poses no serious threat to public health". 

	Sorry, no "don't worry be happy" here.  Very simply stated, the gear
	is good enough, which was the answer the original poster was after.

	You have here a separate issue, one that could easily wander beyond
	the charter of the newsgroup: How much radiation is safe? And in the
	context here - How much radiation do nuke warheads produce in the
	can?
> 
> Let's try to put it into the proper perspective.  Can anyone asign some  
>numbers here?   Like... how many milirems, at one meter from a nuke?... would  
>be a good place to start.  Then, we could let the consumer be the judge. 

	I'll leave those to the experts - the ansers may be classified.

>It would be a pity if I had to move this off to sci.physics to get a hard  
>answer. 
> 
>The Amateur Radio Forum (arf) 

	Neil Kirby
	...cbsck!nak

fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) (07/26/89)

From: fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix)

In article <8530@cbnews.ATT.COM>, arf@chinet.chi.il.us (Jack Schmidling) writes:
>  
> Spencer says: 
> >Sigh.  Warheads are not reactors.   You probably wouldn't want to spend ten  
> years sleeping in the same room with them if you could avoid it, but the odds  
> that normal occupational exposure would harm you are slim. 
>  
> ARF says: 
>  
> Watches with illuminous dials are not reactors either but lots of women died  
> very horrible deaths from painting the dials.  Frankly, I wouldn't sleep with  
> a watch, much less a nuke. 

The women (and occasional man) who had the job of painting luminous watch
dial and eventually died as a result, didn't get clobbered by being near
the luminous paint, they died because they had a habit of licking the
brushes before painting on the next marker.  Getting the brush set to a
fine point that way also let them ingest the radium compounds in the paint.

Do many people working around nuclear warheads have a tendency to lick
them?

(To be more direct, the two situations are not as comparable as they might
look at first glance.)

john@gatech.edu (John DeArmond) (07/27/89)

From: stiatl!john@gatech.edu (John DeArmond)


This discussion regarding radiation hazards and detectability of nukes
is getting a bit out of hand.  Being a health-physicist by training
and having worked on some projects in this area, I want to try to add
some fact to the fiction being bantered about.  Some of the details will
be sketchy, as some of my work was classified and I really don't want to
make fine line distinctions here.

The 4 major constituents of a bomb are U-235, U-238, Pu, and 
H-3 (tritium).  Tritium emits a weak beta with insufficient energy
to escape its matrix/solution.  Thus the radiation may only be detected
by in-situ detectors.  Unless ingested in LARGE quantities, H-3 is harmless.
Plutonium in its refined state emits an alpha which has a range in air of
about 3 inches.  Daughter products emit a variety of radiations, some
energetic enough to be detected.  Uranium and its ever-present daughter
products emit all 4 emissions (alpha, beta, gamma & neutrons).

Plutonium and Uranium are both low specific activity isotopes which means that
a given mass emits relatively low radiation levels.  In real terms, 
Uraninum metal may be handled with relative inpunity as it presents essentially
no hazard.  Plutoninum's chemical toxicity greatly outweighs its radiological
hazard.  Working levels (permissible human exposure) are measured in micrograms.
Plutoninum is only a hazard if ingested.  The radiation emitted 
external to the body is harmless.

In practical terms, a warhead presents no radiation hazards to people (un-
detonated, of course).  Depending on the configuration, there may be some
sensible heat on the surface of the weapon.

In terms of detection, technology exists to detect Special Nuclear Materials
(SNM) at great distance.  This technology involves large volume detectors,
gamma spectroscopy, active shielding, and computer analysis.  This equipment
can recognize the unique gamma signatures emitted by SNM.   I have worked
with helicoptor-mounted equipment that is used to sweep a large area.
One instrument I worked with was tested by being able to locate a kg of 
Pu oxide suspended in a 100 foot deep well.

For those wanting more information, consult the public literature on
the Nuclear Emergency Response Team (NEST).  If you REALLY want to 
find out how well these fellows do their jobs, just acquire a kg of Pu and
sit tight.  They'll find you soon enough :-)
-- 
John De Armond, WD4OQC                     | Manual? ... What manual ?!? 
Sales Technologies, Inc.    Atlanta, GA    | This is Unix, My son, You 
...!gatech!stiatl!john    **I am the NRA** | just GOTTA Know!!! 

royf@cs.utexas.edu (Roy Forsstrom) (07/27/89)

From: pwcs!royf@cs.utexas.edu (Roy Forsstrom)

In article <8530@cbnews.ATT.COM> arf@chinet.chi.il.us (Jack Schmidling) writes:
> 
> Let's try to put it into the proper perspective.  Can anyone asign some  
>numbers here?   Like... how many milirems, at one meter from a nuke?... would  
>be a good place to start.  Then, we could let the consumer be the judge. 
> 
>It would be a pity if I had to move this off to sci.physics to get a hard  
>answer. 
> 
On the California, CGN-36, the engineroom was zoned for maximum hours per day
that a person could remain in a particular area while the reactor was operating.The times ranged from a minimum of 3 h/d along the reactor compartment wall
to 24 h/d in the control room. 

As for weapons, I was never inside the ASROC compartment, so I honestly 
don't know if we had nuclear depth charges aboard, (but who would go to
Iran without them?). However, I don't recall seeing any signs limiting 
exposure in the vicinity of the ASROC compartment. I did tour the Sherwood
Forest area of several boomers, and also don't recall seeing any signs.
In fact, I did see weightlifing equipment and lounge chairs!  

-----------------------------------+-------------------------------------------
Roy Forsstrom 612-298-5569         |   What are the Rights of Man and the
Public Works Computer Services     |   Liberties of the World but Loose-Fish?
pwcs!royf  royf@pwcs.StPaul.GOV    |         - Moby Dick
-----------------------------------+-------------------------------------------

mcgrew@topaz.rutgers.edu (Charles) (07/27/89)

From: mcgrew@topaz.rutgers.edu (Charles)


	ARF says: 
	Watches with illuminous dials are not reactors either but lots
	of women died very horrible deaths from painting the dials.
	Frankly, I wouldn't sleep with a watch, much less a nuke.

   This is rather misleading.  The women were encouraged by the watch
company to put the paintbrushes between their lips to keep the point
on the brush.  This obviously lead to injesting the radium, which is
not so good.  Also, shielding was non-existant - the stuff was just
lying around in cans (and lots of it, too).  Wearing a luminous watch
is no more dangerous than breathing New Jersey air :-).  Obviously,
these women were not told of the dangers (since the owners of the
watch factory didn't give a damn what happened to them - they could
just hire more), and so took no precautions.  Anyway, I don't think it
can be used as a valid arguing point in the discussion.

Charles

ron@hpfcmgw.hp.com (Ron Miller) (07/28/89)

From: hplabs!ron@hpfcmgw.hp.com (Ron Miller)

Re: Radiation & warheads


I served on a ship that was "nuclear capable"   If said ship had carried
nukes ("I can neither confirm nor deny the presence of said weapons.")
there were crew bunks within 10 meters of the weapons. Yes, torpedoes
might be moved into the way but, fundamentally, the intact weapon would
pose no radiation hazard. That vessel's engineroom where there were normal
watchstanding duties required, would have higher radiation levels.

A ruptured weapon is a different situation of course.

Ron (158 mR in 5 years of proximity to nukes including entry to 
     reactor compartments during shutdown) Miller

fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) (07/28/89)

From: fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix)

In article <8633@cbnews.ATT.COM>, mcgrew@topaz.rutgers.edu (Charles) writes:
> 	ARF says: 
> 	Watches with illuminous dials are not reactors either but lots
> 	of women died very horrible deaths from painting the dials.
> Obviously
> these women were not told of the dangers (since the owners of the
> watch factory didn't give a damn what happened to them - they could
> just hire more), and so took no precautions.  

The factory owners could hardly be expected to warn their workers of
hazards that they didn't know about themselves.  These events occurred
before the hazards of radiation were well known, if at all.

Remember what happened to Roentgen and Curie.

sfn20715@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (Steve Norton) (07/28/89)

From: Steve Norton <sfn20715@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu>
 Let's try to put it into the proper perspective.  Can anyone asign some  
numbers here?   Like... how many milirems, at one meter from a nuke?... would  
be a good place to start.  Then, we could let the consumer be the judge. 
 
It would be a pity if I had to move this off to sci.physics to get a hard  
answer. 
 
The Amateur Radio Forum (arf) 
 
+-+-+-+-+-+
No offense to you readers out there, but I think very few of us could
assign numbers.  I also think that anyone who could assign numbers would
have to know quite a bit of info about a warhead (i.e. mass of Pu, location,
materials used, etc.) and would thus have a pretty good security clearance.
(I.e. the feds will bust ya if you tell us.)

I once had a Nuclear Engineering professor who couldn't talk to us undergrads
about the experimental reactor on campus because of such a federal restriction.
(Of course, there were plenty of non-restricted professors on campus who would
be more than willing to discuss warhead and reactor design with us! ;-) )

smb@ulysses.homer.nj.att.com (Steven M. Bellovin) (07/28/89)

From: smb@ulysses.homer.nj.att.com (Steven M. Bellovin)

In article <8530@cbnews.ATT.COM>, arf@chinet.chi.il.us (Jack Schmidling) writes:
> Watches with illuminous dials are not reactors either but lots of women died  
> very horrible deaths from painting the dials.  Frankly, I wouldn't sleep with  
> a watch, much less a nuke. 

We're getting a bit far afield here, but...

Comparing the hazards from painting watch dials to being near a nuclear
weapon is like comparing apples and oranges.  First, the watch dials were
painted with radium, not plutonium, U-235, or tritium, the major
radioactive substances in today's bombs.  (Actually, I don't think
U-235 is used anymore, since it's not suitable for implosion detonation.)
There is also a very small amount of something else as a neutron
source; I don't know what's used today.

Second, the women did not die just from painting the dials -- though
that might have been sufficient -- rather, they were taught to twirl
the tip of the brush in their mouths to produce a nice fine point.
They were *ingesting* radium, in other words.

You may be right about the risks from being too near nuclear weapons --
I don't know; I've never been that intimate with one -- but I'd like
to see some hard data, rather than analogies.

As long as I'm being technical, an earlier poster spoke of how cold
space is.  Space, being a vacuum, has no temperature; only objects
in space do.  In many satellites -- and certainly in something like
the shuttle or a space station -- the major problem is getting rid
of excess heat, not in staying warm.  A satellite containing a
nuclear weapon may show up as warmer than other satellites of the
same size and power consumption, but that's not at all the same thing.


		--Steve Bellovin

bill@beaver.cs.washington.edu (William Swan) (07/29/89)

From: sigma!bill@beaver.cs.washington.edu (William Swan)

In article <8572@cbnews.ATT.COM> nak@cbnews.ATT.COM (Neil A. Kirby) writes:
>>This whole discussion got started because the original poster, John Ralls   
>>said "As for finding nukes, that's easy. Warheads aren't shielded because
>>of the weight, so you just point a radiation detector at it." 
>	If the warhead is twice or ten times more radient than the
>	background, it will show up noticably on person-portable
>	instruments.  One hundred times more radient than background would
>	be very easy to pick up.  
  
A question:  Given the potential prospect of terrorist nukes, which would be
far more likely to be smuggled in than delivered by missile, is it possible
with this detection equipment to:
	a) detect, and
	b) locate
said nuke, say, one of a size and mass (including shielding, if any) readily
surreptitiously transported, within a typical city? What amount of shielding
is sufficient to hide it, if any? Is this classified secret information? :-)
  
  
-- 
Bill Swan  entropy.ms.washington.edu!sigma!bill  Send postal address for info:
	Innocent but in prison in Washington State for 13.5 years:
	Ms. Debbie Runyan: incarcerated 01/1989, scheduled release 07/2002.
	                   In now:  0 years,  6 months,  1 week,   0 days.

john@gatech.edu (John DeArmond) (07/31/89)

From: stiatl!john@gatech.edu (John DeArmond)

In article <8676@cbnews.ATT.COM> sigma!bill@beaver.cs.washington.edu (William Swan) writes:
>A question:  Given the potential prospect of terrorist nukes, which would be

>far more likely to be smuggled in than delivered by missile, is it possible
>with this detection equipment to:
>	a) detect, and
>	b) locate
>said nuke, say, one of a size and mass (including shielding, if any) readily
>surreptitiously transported, within a typical city? What amount of shielding
>is sufficient to hide it, if any? Is this classified secret information? :-)

Yes (it can be detected and yes some parts are classified)

The amount of shielding would vary with the geometry and size of the
core.  Shielding attenuation is not hard to calculate.  Sensitivity of
equipment used for detection is as far as I know, still classified.
This is necessary in order to deny a potential terrorist the comfort of
being able to know exactly how much shielding would be necessary.

An important thing to remember is that shielding of gamma rays does not
stop the rays like it does particle beams.  It ATTENUATES the beam.  
The chore is to select the amount of shielding to attenuate the beam
to the desired level.  To protect against detection, one would have
to reduce the gammas to below ambient background.  Since the 
equipment used is capable of discriminateing gamma ray energy, one 
would have to take into account the energy spectrum of background.

One other note.  Lead emits a characteristic fluorscent X-ray when
excited by gamma radiation.  Therefore lead alone is not sufficient
to shield a nuke from detection.

Like I mentioned in another posting, the group charged with protecting
the public against abuse of SNMs (special nuclear materials) is the
NEST (Nuclear Emergency Strike Team).  Since I have done classified
work relating to this and since I really don't want to try to figure
out what portions of my knowledge is in the clear, I'll simply refer you 
to publicly available literature on NEST.  I will comment, though,
that they do their job exceedingly well.

John
-- 
John De Armond, WD4OQC                     | Manual? ... What manual ?!? 
Sales Technologies, Inc.    Atlanta, GA    | This is Unix, My son, You 
...!gatech!stiatl!john    **I am the NRA** | just GOTTA Know!!! 

arf@chinet.chi.il.us (Jack Schmidling) (07/31/89)

From: arf@chinet.chi.il.us (Jack Schmidling)


areich/e4 
 
 
Article 2118 (10 more) in sci.military: 
From: pwcs!royf@cs.utexas.edu (Roy Forsstrom) 
Subject: Re: Shielding Nukes 
 
>On the California, CGN-36, the engineroom was zoned for  
maximum hours per day that a person could remain in a  
particular area while the reactor was operating.The times  
ranged from a minimum of 3 h/d along the reactor compartment  
wall to 24 h/d in the control room.  
 
>As for weapons, I don't recall seeing any signs limiting 
exposure in the vicinity of the ASROC compartment. I did  
tour the Sherwood Forest area of several boomers, and also  
don't recall seeing any signs. In fact, I did see  
weightlifing equipment and lounge chairs!   
 
ARF says: 
 
In view of the fact that no numbers appear to be  
forthcoming, I accept your anecdotal and circumstantial  
evidence as indicating that there is probably no conspiracy  
to coverup the radiation danger of nukes because the same  
incentive would exist for reactors. 
 
             CASE CLOSED  
 
Well, then again, one thing did occur to me.  If the  
presence of nukes was supposed to be a secret, the warnings  
would be a give away. 
 
Thanks, 
 
The Amateur Radio Forum (arf) 

sfn20715@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (Steve Norton) (07/31/89)

From: Steve Norton <sfn20715@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu>
/* Written  9:55 pm  Jul 27, 1989 by smb@ulysses.homer.nj.att.com in uxa.cso.uiuc.edu:sci.military */
As long as I'm being technical, an earlier poster spoke of how cold
space is.  Space, being a vacuum, has no temperature; only objects
in space do.  In many satellites -- and certainly in something like
the shuttle or a space station -- the major problem is getting rid
of excess heat, not in staying warm.  A satellite containing a
nuclear weapon may show up as warmer than other satellites of the
same size and power consumption, but that's not at all the same thing.
-=-=-=-=-=-=-
The lower-than-low-earth orbit used by nuclear warheads during the cruise
phase of flight is a long way from a vacuum.  Admittedly, there is still
not enough air to create noticable wind resistance, but a pure vacuum it
is not.  Furthermore, the energy detected by IR scanners developed as
part of the SDI program detect _radiated_ energy only, not conducted or
convected.  As the radiation of energy (via electromagnetic waves) requries
no medium, the heat developed from nuclear decay will make the warhead very
visible in the IR spectrum _independent of the ammount of atmosphere surrounding
the warhead_!!!!!
Point 3: During the cruise phase, warheads consume zero power.
Point 4: The problem of heat buildup for orbiting bodies is apparent only
where the body faces the sun.  This is apparently one of the problems facing
space-station designers: The side of the station facing the sun is _mucho_
hot while the side away from the sun is really chilling out.  Efficient
heat transfer would stop this problem (but no, those silly rocket engineers
just _wont_ listen to us fluid flow and heat transfer specalists. ;-)