borynec@watmath.waterloo.edu (James Borynec) (08/04/89)
From: bnr-di!borynec@watmath.waterloo.edu (James Borynec) I believe that we are about to have a revolution in conventional warfare. Current doctrine maintains that we must concentrate our forces into one section of the battlefield in order to achieve success in offensive war. The idea is that we will be able to overcome the enemy in that sector before he can muster sufficient strengh to stop us. You have to do this in one (or a very few places) because you will never have enough strengh to overcome the enemy on the entire battlefield. This mustering of combat power requires the movement of men and machines. Unfortunately, bullets and rockets can concentrate much faster than men and their machines. Modern artillery doctrine covers the battlefield with observers. And, any one observer can, if the target is worthwhile, have every gun within range fire at that target. When you talk about guns and rockets with 30 to 40 km ranges, that can be a very large number of guns indeed. This wouldn't matter so much if it either took too long to organize all of these guns so that they would all point in the same direction (a particular drawback of the Russians, and to a lesser degree the Americans, when compared to the British), or if the fire that landed didn't do that much damage. This is particularly true of High Explosive fire against armoured fighting vehicles. The problem of organizing the fire is largely a matter of the proper doctrine. The British had this down pat in WWII. Today, with modern battlefield computers and communications, there is no technical reason that the time from initial call for fire for all of the guns in a Corps to the time that rounds start to land should be more than two minutes plus time of flight (say 3 minutes in total). Several of the worlds armies can do this today. The problem of the projectiles is a more difficult one. Tanks (buttoned up) are relatively immune to HE (High explosive) unless there is a direct hit. Since artillery was traditionally an area weapon, you had to fire a lot of bullets to get a few direct hits. With the advent of terminally guided and self guided munitions this changes. Now, if you can get these munitions into the right area, a lot more of them will find their targets. You may even place an instant minefield directly on top of your conveniently concentrated enemy forces. Since the guns are distributed over a radius of 30 kms, it is hard to strike at them, and it may be quite difficult to locate the joker with the radio who is making life so difficult for them. The result of all of this, is that you can concentrate immense and effective firepower faster than the enemy can concentrate his men and machines. Since you need to concentrate your forces in order to achieve offensive success, the defensive comes to the fore. A similar situation held in World War I. The strategic mobility of the railroad was greater that the tactical mobility of attacking troops. Thus, you could always rush enough men to the area with the heaviest fighting before the attacking troops got too far. Needless to say, this placed a great damper on offensive action. With the advent of long range guns and rockets, tied together into an effective communications network, and equipped with weapons (ie. projectiles) which will destroy (or at least immobilize) armoured fighting vehicles, warfare will once again, become a matter of siegework. -- UUCP : utzoo!bnr-vpa!bnr-di!borynec James Borynec, Bell Northern Research Bitnet: borynec@bnr.CA Box 3511, Stn C, Ottawa, Ontario K1Y 4H7
military\@att.att.com (Bill Thacker) (08/04/89)
From: military\@att.att.com (Bill Thacker) bnr-di!borynec@watmath.waterloo.edu (James Borynec) writes: > >I believe that we are about to have a revolution in conventional >warfare. [...] > >This mustering of combat power requires the movement of men and machines. >Unfortunately, bullets and rockets can concentrate much faster than >men and their machines.[...] > >Modern artillery doctrine covers the battlefield with observers. And, >any one observer can, if the target is worthwhile, have every gun >within range fire at that target. When you talk about guns and rockets >with 30 to 40 km ranges, that can be a very large number of guns >indeed. [...] > >Since the guns are distributed over a radius of 30 kms, it is hard to >strike at them, and it may be quite difficult to locate the joker with >the radio who is making life so difficult for them. > >The result of all of this, is that you can concentrate immense and >effective firepower faster than the enemy can concentrate his men and >machines. Certainly, the advent of improved conventional munitions for artillery will make a difference in warfare. However, I feel your argument overlooks several important issues. You mention the defender's ability to bring to bear "an entire corp's artillery" on a moment's notice. However, this corp is strung out along, (heck, what is the prescribed frontage for a modern corp ?); well, along quite some distance. And while the attacker will no doubt be highly concentrated at the schwerepunkt (literally, "heavy point" of the assault), a requirement for this sort of mobile warfare is a holding attack along other points of the front. At the attack point, the one defending corp's front will likely face 2 or three attacking corps. This secondary holding attack is necessary to specifically prevent what your forsee; a redeployment of enemy resources to meet your spearhead. The holding attack confuses the enemy during the critical early stages of the battle; arty HQ, for example, becomes quickly flooded with demands for fire missions, from the corp's entire front. It takes time, much more than the 2-3 minutes needed to actually direct the fire, simply to sort out which targets get priority. The holding attack likewise prevents movement of troops, either in withdrawal or to other parts of the front. Further, the attacker, too, is concentrated, as I said; probably two or three corps facing the lone defender. That means two or three times the assets, including artillery. The attacker could, for instance, commit half his artillery to counterbattery fire against the defending arty, keeping the rest for other fire missions. Other assets, such as air power, will likewise be in the attacker's favor. Finally, we must consider tactical surprise. IMHO, tactical surprise is the biggest reason to question the viability of mobile warfare. In WWII, when surprise was achieved, victory was greatly facilitated. If it was lost, things became unpleasant for the attacker. As an example of the latter, consider Kursk. Given that modern troops of all nations are fully motorized (which, in WWII, could only be said for the Western Allies after the American entry), their tactical mobility is quite high; with a reasonable warning (gained from, for example, satellite reconnaissance), it should be simple to redeploy reserves to meet an enemy thrust. This one, however, is too close to call... heck, we can't even be sure the recon satellites will still be there in the event of a war. Your article reminds me of many I've read predicting the demise of the tank on the modern battlefield. They've been written since 1919, and haven't yet been shown correct. I think you've overlooked many factors in combat (and, for that matter, so have I !); the point being that warfare is complicated and confusing, and very, very rarely is it possible to reduce it to so basic an equation as you present. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Bill Thacker moderator, sci.military military@att.att.com (614) 860-5294 "War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied." - Sun Tzu
paulf@mcnc.org (Paul Damian Franzon) (08/09/89)
From: paulf@mcnc.org (Paul Damian Franzon) In article <8803@cbnews.ATT.COM> bnr-di!borynec@watmath.waterloo.edu (James Borynec) writes: > > >From: bnr-di!borynec@watmath.waterloo.edu (James Borynec) > >I believe that we are about to have a revolution in conventional >warfare. Current doctrine maintains that we must concentrate >our forces into one section of the battlefield in order to achieve >success in offensive war. The idea is that we will be able to >overcome the enemy in that sector before he can muster sufficient >strengh to stop us. You have to do this in one (or a very few places) >because you will never have enough strengh to overcome the enemy on the >entire battlefield. > >The problem of organizing the fire is largely a matter of the proper >doctrine. The British had this down pat in WWII. Today, with modern >battlefield computers and communications, there is no technical reason >that the time from initial call for fire for all of the guns in a Corps >to the time that rounds start to land should be more than two minutes plus >time of flight (say 3 minutes in total). Several of the worlds armies >can do this today. > >The result of all of this, is that you can concentrate immense and >effective firepower faster than the enemy can concentrate his men and >machines. Since you need to concentrate your forces in order to >achieve offensive success, the defensive comes to the fore. > The big problem with trying to win a conventional Europe style war (which incidentally may today be seen as relatively unlikely compared with lower level conflicts?) with Artillery firepower is the reality of logistics. One simply does not usually have enough artillery power at the front to simply "blow away" everything you see and win the war that way. All of your firepower resources ARE needed along with carefully planned tactics. Modern Soviet dosctrine calls for very rapid movement of forces to very near the battle area and then rapid and massive concentration on narrow fronts so that in the final attack the defender almost sees wall to wall tanks. Many many artillery targets will present themselves during this process with the most concentrated target only appearing for the last 1500 meters of the attack, and it is really too late to defeat the enemy then. Thus the temptation is to engage every target you see before it reaches the attack line. Unfortunately if you do this you will run out of artillery ammo well before the main attack, much to your later discomfort :-8 One reason for this is that these pre-battle targets are not usually massed. I have been on exercises where this has happened. Lets consider some objections to this: Stockpile more ammo? Great if you can do it in time and are confident that you wont need to withdraw, leaving it behind. The other major problem with this is that artillery needs to move every time it fires to prvent effective counter-battery fire. OK, Use laser guided shells, arty delivered mines, etc to reduce the number needed? Unfortunately the number of these available are too low to use on each of the 1000+ tanks facing your front. They are quite expensive ($30k for one shell ??) though admittedly comparable with anti tank missiles in terms of cost. And remember the rate of fire of these is limited by the number of laser designators you have. ----- No, the answer is clever tactics, maximum effective use of ALL your firepower, as well as more and better shells. Use direct firepower to attrit the enemy before he masses for the attack (involves expending fewer shells.) Concentrate on "high value targets" before and during the massing, such as command and control, air defence, etc. Fool the enemy into massing at the wrong time and place to make arty more effective while not forcing a decision on your defence. Ensure that you have enough arty left to fire at high rate on his final attack and to cover your withdrawl or counter attack. The other potential problem with the "supergrunt" theory -- One guy and a radio calling in B52 strikes :-) is the "fog of battle". Command, control and communications works reasonably well up until the battle starts, then it is likely to deterioriate with jamming, and people becoming more concerned with surviving their immediate battle than with feeding enough info for a corps coordinated fire plan. ---- How can technology help? The US Army has a program here, including the development of fire & forget artillery launched tank-homing shells. It has also helped (at division level) with providing more robust communications. Still remember the limitation of only being able to shoot what you can carry in the course of a single battle results in a sever limitation on artillery use. Also remember that the "fog of battle" means that every level of commander wants firepower that is in his immediate control rather than rely on perhaps one artillery unit, that may be out of communications. Winning a battle requires a balancing act of resources and a lot of redundancy, if that makes sense. The infantryman is still the king of the battlefield :-)
willey@arrakis.nevada.edu (James P. Willey) (08/11/89)
From: willey@arrakis.nevada.edu (James P. Willey) [This article originally used [] for parenthetical comments. Please use () instead since [] are usually used for the moderator's comments, like this one. --CDR] In article <8803@cbnews.ATT.COM> bnr-di!borynec@watmath.waterloo.edu (James Borynec) writes: >The problem of organizing the fire is largely a matter of the proper >doctrine. The British had this down pat in WWII. Today, with modern >battlefield computers and communications, there is no technical reason >that the time from initial call for fire for all of the guns in a Corps >to the time that rounds start to land should be more than two minutes plus >time of flight (say 3 minutes in total). Several of the worlds armies >can do this today. I recently read First Clash: Combat Close Up In World War Three by Kenneth Macksey. It was apparently written as a training aid for the Canadian military. (I highly recommend it.) Anyway, it deals with the problems of communication on the battlefield, among other topics. Several problems arose with the use of the fancy equipment used these days. 1. Radio silence has to be maintained for as long as possible. The forward observation officer (FOO) wants to keep his location unknown to the enemy for as long as possible. The enemy will do his utmost to locate him and remove him from the action as soon as possible. If the FOO is located early in the engagement, then he may likely be incapacitated when he is needed most. 2. The defenders know that the enemy is coming, so the attackers will be more likely to use their radios. As the forces get closer, the frequencies begin to overlap. Thus it may take a while to find a clear frequency. 3. Like the artillery, the FOO is easy to locate. (location of artillery has already been discussed, so I will not go into that here) Thus, if the FOO is to survive, he must move if his position might have been compromised. (like using his radio to call for fire support) During these moves, he will be out of contact. 4. This is less of a problem, but since the enemy can locate the FOO easier than most other troops, any troops defending the area the FOO is currently in will not appreciate the artillery bombardment that would be inevitable if the enemy were to locate the FOO. (The fire support may be beneficial to the troops, but tell it to them when they have to ride out the bombardment after the FOO has high-tailed it out of there:-)) Moral of the story: High tech computers and communications equipment may be nice, but they aren't the cure-all they are advertised to be. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Kyle held his chin high, gazing down his nose at Rick. "What d' you think's so good about the military?" Rick showed his teeth in a snarling smile. "Free bullets, free food ... and it sure beats working for a living." (Robotech)
borynec@bnr.CA (James Borynec) (08/11/89)
[Discussion Caution! When discussing potential tactics rather than facts, I hope everyone will be careful to avoid repetition. So far I'm enjoying this thread, but I think a look at Rommel's comments on how to conduct mobile warfare when the opponent has complete air superiority would be enlightening. --CDR] From: borynec@bnr.CA (James Borynec) In response to Bill Thackers reply, I would like to make a few comments. I understand that there are techniques designed to prevent the redeployment of enemy forces during an attack. But my point was that technology has changed (or will change) the dynamics of war in that with modern technology, the defeat of part of the enemy can only be achieved with the defeat of all of the enemy, thus resulting in a grinding war much like WWI. Mutual support is a basic tennant of modern defense. Basically, the idea is that the enemy must overcome the entire defense at once, or be cut up by one group of defenders while attacking another group of defenders. Much effort is spent trying to isolate defenders. With today's technology, mutually supporting defenders can be up to 30 kilometers away. This means that you must muster enough power to overwhelm all of them, more or less at once. You mention holding attacks. Of course you will use them, but mostly they are good for keeping the defenders in place. Long ranged weapons can respond in much less time than it takes to move troops. As soon as the vital targets are decided on, they can be engaged. Yes, there is a fog of war, and yes, the defender has to be able to quickly decide where the main attack is, before it can be engaged. There are methods to assist with decision process, the prime one of which is to put artillery commanders in intimate contact with the supported arms commanders, at all levels. The Americans are not that good at this. The important thing is that once a decision is made, help is on the way, almost at once. The defenders no longer have to wait the hours it would take for reinforcements to appear. The defenders can react. You mention counter battery fire. Yes the attackers will have more guns but if they use them before the attack, this is almost a dead giveaway for a coming attack. Bye bye suprise. Plus, the longer range missles will come into play, and pretty soon you will have a private duel between the entire theaters long range weapons. Again, will you have superiority over the entire theater? If you do who needs strategy? Just grind them slowly into the dirt. You talk about having more artillery on the attacking side. Of course, you will need them. Taking out a dug in defender is a difficult business. The difference between the defender and the attacker is that the attacker must expose himself in order to close with the defender. If the defender is not "neutralized" during the advance, they will blow away huge numbers of attackers. Witness the human wave attacks. Trying to do counter battery, and ordinary attacks at the same time, mean that you are splitting your efforts, and losing out on concentration. Finally, you mentioned the demise of the tank. I agree, that it hasn't happened yet (although from what little I hear, the Iran - Iraq war was not much on mobility). Clearly, the tank is central to mobile war. With the advent of smart (or even brilliant ;-) weapons the tank, or any other mechanized vehicle is in danger. We will have to wait and see if the military contracters can deliver on their promises. To sum up, with modern communications and long range weapons, defenders can be mutually supporting over vast tracks of land. In order to defeat them at any one place means that you must essentially defeat them over the entire theater. The ability to muster that kind of combat power is questioned, and thus I believe the classic mobile attack is obsolete. Cheers.. James Borynec -- UUCP : utzoo!bnr-vpa!bnr-di!borynec James Borynec, Bell Northern Research Bitnet: borynec@bnr.CA Box 3511, Stn C, Ottawa, Ontario K1Y 4H7
budden@manta.nosc.mil (Rex Buddenberg) (08/12/89)
[ Note to all contributors: PLEASE include a signature with your domain address - by the time the att mailer redirects your article to me there's little or no sign of where it came from, and I'd prefer to not have to read Recieved: lines to figure out your return address. Also, mail to military@amdcad.amd.com instead of military@att.att.com if possible. --CDR] From: budden@manta.nosc.mil (Rex Buddenberg) James, You may be right that the tactical defensive may be on the rise. If our broader assumptions about the next war remain unchanged. That is, if we have a general conventional war, it appears likely that the defensive may be in the ascendancy. At sea, the analog is that the Soviets would find accomplishment of a sea denial mission to be easier than we would find a successful sea control mission. We've always recognized that it takes far more maritime power to control than deny. But, back to the unstated assumption. It appears that our foreseeable future may include a lot of local wars rather than a global unlimited (eve in non-nuclear) one. The Persian Gulf is perhaps an archetype of a low intensity conflict; our drug interdiction work along the southern US border is a cognate example of a high intensity law enforcement mission -- there is some convergence here... In both cases, on scene units do not act either as lone units (the traditional Coast Guard mode) or as tight battle groups with interlocking firepower (traditional Navy mode). Rather, each unit is fairly autonomous regarding defensive firepower... but you need interlocking C3I in order to get the wide area, multi-unit synergism. The impacts on force structure are interesting, and a bit in evidence, although the driving strategy isn't always understood well. The marines, as usual, seem to have the doctrine and force structure planning down about as well as anyone. They changed the term Marine Amphibious Unit to Marine Expeditionary Unit a couple years ago -- amphibious doctrine is still alive and well, but it now fits into a larger limited intensity conflict structure as an integral component. The Marines are right now getting their 20 year procurement strategy out the door along with the tactical doctrine that drives it. I'm rather impressed. The Navy hasn't done as impressive a job, but the reactions to the Stark and Roberts incidents is seeing improvements to ships' local area self defense capabilities. We're also seeing improvements in the C3I structure -- including some long overdue impetus to get some interoperability. Recall that the AWACS over Saudi Arabia watched the whole Stark incident happen -- impotent to do anything about it because they lacked rapid communications with Stark. I'm sad to state that the Coast Guard's planning approach is somewhat slower than either of the other sea services. (Since I'm a planning officer these days, I'm allowed to say that). But we are trying to drive some interoperability between different mission areas within the service -- rather toward similar objectives. Perhaps, without any capital investment money to carry them out, going though the planning process seems rather pointless....alas. Yes, the tactical defensive in a hot war may be formidable, but is the question relevant? Rex Buddenberg
fly@blake.acs.washington.edu (Michael Griesbaum) (08/14/89)
From: fly@blake.acs.washington.edu (Michael Griesbaum)
Advances in technology will do anything but kill mobile war.
Traditionaly, offensive capability precedes defensive in effectiveness
(one has to know what to protect from before it can be done) but at the
same time, offensive capabilities are often overstated.
The F-4, for example, was originaly designed as a platform for missiles
so sophisticated that dogfighting would become obsolete. The existence
of the F-16 should awaken anyone who is not aware of the early preformance
record of air to air missiles over Vietnam.
Even with increasing sophistication in both theory and execution in
munitions, the problems of cost and production limit the newest and
deadliest munitions and weapons from being used on the battlefield.
Strategic anihilation weapons dictate that a large scale war is not
practical, at least as far as superpowers go. Large scale war (in
proportion to beligerents) is an option only for relatively small
nations (Iran/Iraq; Libya/Chad; Israel/Syria).
The combination of deadlier munitions and strategic deterent allows
for high intensity, small scale involvements, such as El Salvador.
(No political judgements, just application of _tools_ discussed
here) In an incredibly small nation the airmobile army fights a
very mobile counterguerilla war. Until the fall of the base at Guazapa,
the battery of 105s there could hit almost anything in the country, and
the half dozen ES AF Hughes 500s could engage in close support in minutes.
The high tech weapons make for a very mobile war in a very small area.
Because greater force can be delivered in a relatively short time,
With the ability to muster great force quickly, large scale conflicts
slow, but high intensity small scale conflicts increase. The destructiveness
of a single soldier has vastly increased, but the ability of an individual
soldier to withstand destruciveness does not increase proportionally.
{please don't post, but any reply would be appreciated}
fly@blake.acs.washington.edu
All you have to do to fly is lift one foot off the ground, then lift
up the other one without setting the first one down. -HHGjeffm@uokmax.uucp (Jeff Medcalf) (08/16/89)
From: Jeff Medcalf <jeffm@uokmax.uucp> >From: bnr-di!borynec@watmath.waterloo.edu (James Borynec) > >With the advent of long range guns and rockets, tied together into >an effective communications network, and equipped with weapons (ie. >projectiles) which will destroy (or at least immobilize) armoured >fighting vehicles, warfare will once again, become a matter of >siegework. I disagree. Any time that you limit your forces to a specific place, and say that they cannot move, you have committed suicide. The reasons are many: for one thing, what about nuclear weapons? If your enemy decided to employ them, I daresay that you will not have any troops left. At least with your forces spread out, you have a chance of some troops surviving. Second, a fixed defense can be bypassed (can you say Maginot line?). Third, there is no flexibility in static warfare. What happens if all of a sudden there is a breakthrough in some place that you have no fortress, or if all that money that you sank into the building of fortresses means that you have not enough troops and equipment to stop even a localized breakthrough? I do not think that artillery and rockets are a cure-all. NATO certainly does not have enough guns to make this true, and with modern artillery spotting radar, I submit that ANY power facing a modern opponent will not have enough artillery after the first few days of conflict. After that time, even assuming that you are correct on artillery 's power, fortresses will be useless.
jwtlai@watcgl.waterloo.edu (Jim W Lai) (08/16/89)
From: jwtlai@watcgl.waterloo.edu (Jim W Lai) In article <26711@amdcad.AMD.COM> borynec@bnr.CA (James Borynec) writes: >Finally, you [Bill Thacker] mentioned the demise of the tank. I agree, that >it hasn't happened yet...[comment deleted] Clearly, the tank is central to >mobile war. With the advent of smart (or even brilliant ;-) weapons >the tank, or any other mechanized vehicle is in danger. We will have >to wait and see if the military contracters can deliver on their promises. Just a thought: if tanks are to be the targets of missiles then there might be an analog between this and missiles fired on ships. If so, then some technological countermeasures might include chaff, ECM, antimissile guns, and Aegis :-). Any validity to my comments?
cdr@amdcad.AMD.COM (Carl Rigney) (08/16/89)
From: uunet.UU.NET!bnr-fos!bnr-di!borynec (James Borynec) You state that advances in technology will increase offensive power. I agree, this however, may not make for mobile war. Look at the American Civil War, and WWI. The advance of technological killing power made everyone dig in. Thus it effectively killed mobility. If technology killed mobile war once, it may again. j.borynec (btw. Your observations on small scale war are very good. Note that airmobile troops are subject to "the thousand yard stare" and burn out very quickly as they see a different battle every day.)
dee@linus.MITRE.ORG (David E. Emery) (08/16/89)
From: dee@linus.MITRE.ORG (David E. Emery) It is true that a single (NATO) observer can mass all the guns in range on a single target. The problems are: 1. there are many more targets than guns and bullets 2. counterfire I can give you 'back of the envelope' calculations for the former, but take my word for it that the Soviets have a heluva lot more targets than we have cannon. One thing you have to remember is that artillery is never 100% effective. For instance, if I remember right, we plan about 100-200 rounds to inflict 10% casualties on an attacking maneuver company. 200 rounds is the equivalent of firing 2 rounds from every cannon assigned and routinely attached to a division. Counterfire is the real problem. We can acquire the Soviet artillery on the first round, seeing only ~500 meters of trajectory. They are not far behind. Even in a SP unit, it still takes a long time to displace. To save your behind, you move constantly, so assume 50% of your artillery is moving. The problem is then the traditional 'battle management' problem, selecting the few targets that give you significant payback, based on the availability and expenditure of ammunition, and the availability and exposure (to counterfire) of firing units. Direct Fire is still more efficient than indirect fire at killing things that can be seen. That means that a tank is a better tank killer than a cannon, and will remain so for a while. dave emery emery@aries.mitre.org (CPT, Field Artillery, NH Army NG)
welty@lewis.crd.ge.com (richard welty) (08/18/89)
From: welty@lewis.crd.ge.com (richard welty)
In article <26786@amdcad.AMD.COM>, Carl Rigney writes:
[No I didn't - there was a glitch that just made it look that way.
Everyone PLEASE include signatures! -- CDR]
*I agree, this however, may not make for mobile war. Look at the American
*Civil War, and WWI. The advance of technological killing power made
*everyone dig in. Thus it effectively killed mobility.
i'd argue that in the civil war, the main thing that killed
mobility was failure of many of the commanders to comprehend
the changes that new weaponry wrought on the battlefield (not
to mention that McClellan was fairly worthless as a field
commander.)
certainly, you cannot argue that Grant's Vicksburg Campaign was
static, that Lee's incursions into the north were static, or that
Sherman's march was static. if you are talking about the
Virgina theater, i'd argue that it is in many ways irrelevant to
the outcome of the war, and that Grant fell into static battles
largely because the army that McClellan trained, while very
disciplined, was also very slow to react; slower than the western
armies that Grant had commanded early in the war.
you need to keep in mind that there were really two wars, the war
in Virginia, and the war in the west, and that they were of very
different characters.
(i'm not prepared to argue about WWI, as my background there
is fairly limited.)
[ I think in WW I as well, the static warfare was the result of tactical
thought among the commanders not catching up with the new technology.
--CDR ]
richard
--
richard welty 518-387-6346, GE R&D, K1-5C39, Niskayuna, New York
..!crdgw1!lewis.crd.ge.com!welty welty@lewis.crd.ge.com
Officer: Do you know how fast you were going?
Driver: No. The speedometer only goes up to 85borynec@bnr-di.UUCP (08/21/89)
From: borynec@bnr-di.UUCP In article <26784@amdcad.AMD.COM>, jeffm@uokmax.uucp (Jeff Medcalf) writes: > >From: bnr-di!borynec@watmath.waterloo.edu (James Borynec) > >With the advent of long range guns and rockets, tied together into > >an effective communications network, and equipped with weapons (ie. > >projectiles) which will destroy (or at least immobilize) armoured > >fighting vehicles, warfare will once again, become a matter of > >siegework. > > I disagree. Any time that you limit your forces to a specific place, and say > that they cannot move, you have committed suicide. The reasons are many: for Maybe I have not expressed myself clearly. Throughout history, battlefields have been getting larger. Armageddon is a tiny little place, Kursk occupied tens and almost hundreds of miles. With modern communications and fire control, I would say that the size of a battlefield is now on the order of the size of Europe. This does not mean the density of the troops needs to be very high. Indeed, if you concentrate you provide a very good target. That is why I think that the offense is in trouble. You need to concentrate in order to attack. Furthermore, you must shed all of your nonmoveable armour (ie. earthworks). This makes you a very good target for all of those defensive weapons that move faster than your concentrating forces (ie. rockets, projectiles, and airplanes.) The matter is analagous to WWI, where the machine gun, and the field gun made it hell on earth for the poor bloody infantry who had to get out of their holes and try to break the wire. > I do not think that artillery and rockets are a cure-all. NATO certainly does I agree. I also agree with the person who said that ammunition supply is the major limiting factor. I most of all agree with the person who said that a major conventional war with the Soviets is so unlikely as to be irrelevant. However, I do think that the nature of war is considerably different from what it was in WWII. Has anyone heard of any lessons coming from the Iran-Iraq war? -- UUCP : utzoo!bnr-vpa!bnr-di!borynec James Borynec, Bell Northern Research Bitnet: borynec@bnr.CA Box 3511, Stn C, Ottawa, Ontario K1Y 4H7
m1b@rayssd.RAY.COM (M. Joseph Barone) (08/31/89)
From: m1b@rayssd.RAY.COM (M. Joseph Barone) In article <26962@amdcad.AMD.COM> zenon@chopin.llnl.gov (Maciej Zenon Pindera) writes: > >As long as the tanks had the open terrain to maneuver in. > > Would it not depend on the degree of artillery concentration and the > amount of terrain? For example, during the battle of Kursk, the > Russian artillery concentration was somewhere on the order of > 10-20 guns/kilometer. I don't have my sources handy, but I don't > think the Germans were able to make much more than a 20 mile dent in > the Russian defences. I think that when one has a _lot_ of room for > maneuver, artillery will not have much difficulty grinding down an > armored motorized assault. This is a common misconception of the Battle of Kursk. This "strong defense in depth" strategy ultimately proved tactically wrong but other political and strategic factors came into play to vindicate it. It should also be noted that the Soviets had rather accurate information on the Germans intentions, thanks, in no small part, to the Lucy spy ring. The Soviet positions were six belts of defense, consisting of dug-in anti-tank, mortar, and machine-gun strongpoints well sited behind intensely dense minefields. In the southern pincer, the Germans used the "panzerkeil" concept -- massive armored wedges followed by the infantry. In the north, the Germans sent in the infantry first to clear out the anti-tank gun nests, followed by the Panzers. Both methods proved effective and the first line of defenders were dislodged. When the Soviets finally launched their counter-offensive eight days later, the largest tank battle in the war took place. The Soviets forces withdraw first after eight hours of armored battle at point-blank ranges. Though the German losses were heavy, the Soviet losses were much worse. Unfortunately for the Germans, the Allies had landed in Sicily and Hitler was vasillating on continuing the offensive. He finally decided to withdraw and even pulled the 1st SS Panzer division and sent it to Italy. Operation "Zitadelle" was over. Despite the Soviets' elaborate preparations, with their heavy concentration of artillery, the Germans managed (though not easily) to dislodge the defenders. -- Joe Barone ------------------------> m1b@rayssd.RAY.COM {gatech, decuac, sun, necntc, ukma, uiucdcs}!rayssd!m1b Owl be back.
es@uunet.UU.NET (Dr. Sanio) (09/06/89)
From: unido!athen!sinix!es@uunet.UU.NET (Dr. Sanio) [I'm posting this because it provides another view of Kursk, although its a bit inflammatory. I urge people to correspond directly rather than submitting to the list, unless they have something significant and new to add. --CDR] In article <27048@amdcad.AMD.COM> m1b@rayssd.RAY.COM (M. Joseph Barone) writes: > This is a common misconception of the Battle of Kursk. This >"strong defense in depth" strategy ultimately proved tactically wrong >but other political and strategic factors came into play to vindicate >it. It should also be noted that the Soviets had rather accurate >information on the Germans intentions, thanks, in no small part, to >the Lucy spy ring. (lot of stuff about battles in the North and Middle of Kursk front bow deleted) > Though the German losses were heavy, the Soviet losses were >much worse. Unfortunately for the Germans, the Allies had landed in >Sicily and Hitler was vasillating on continuing the offensive. He >finally decided to withdraw and even pulled the 1st SS Panzer division >and sent it to Italy. Operation "Zitadelle" was over. > > Despite the Soviets' elaborate preparations, with their >heavy concentration of artillery, the Germans managed (though not >easily) to dislodge the defenders. J. Barone's opinion fits perfectly in a certain kind of historiography I experienced in Germany when I was young (maybe accidentially). Then, German WWII veterans as well as historians tried to prove that they almost won the war, especially on the Eastern front. IMHO, they simply couldn't stand that they were beaten by the 'inferior race'. Might it be the same thing with Joseph & the bloody Commies :-) ? Well, let's remember what was intended by both sides in the summer of 43. The front had stabilized in the south & the middle part of the eastern front after the battle of Stalingrad and the subsequent Soviet offensives. The mud period in spring had stopped major actions on both sides. The heavy defeats and losses forced the Nazis to change their strategical goals. They couldn't hope any more to conquer Russia and they had to face major actions by the Western allies in the near future, which were considered as utterly hazardous by most military leaders (not only Hitler) due to the experiences of WWI. Therefore, the goal of Zitadelle was to defeat major Soviet forces and to win territories which allowed long-term-defense with less forces in order to establish a "fortress Europe". In short, Zitadelle was an attempt to win back initiative in the East and to stabilize Nazi rule in the conquerred territories. The Soviet's goals were just the contrary: preventing any stabilization of the German military position, keeping the initiative and after all that, causing as much losses as possible to the enemy with a minimum of own losses. I don't know anything about the Lucy spy ring, but I consider reconnaissance as just one part of the military balance of power and believe that it's often overestimated. Spy tales are romantic and give the chance to blame bad traitors (not the good military leaders) for a defeat. Anyway, the Soviets were better informed, also by partisan activities behind the enemy lines. And, pls note that during the whole war, the allies (not only the Soviets) had armies of spies-by-conviction available, even in Germany itself. This resulted out of the destructive nature of Nazi rule itself, who, on the other hand, were mainly left to buy the service of traitors. [Knowing your opponent's intentions is a tremendous advantage. I'm unfamiliar with the details of the Lucy spy ring so I don't know how much that affected things. --CDR] Back to the front. The Nazis started with very strong forces and hoped to win back Blitzkrieg mobility. Though they even won air superiority (at least temporarily, as I remember), they failed. They won some territory, but didn't succeed in uniting the northern and the middle wing of the attack. Instead, the biggest tank battle of military history so far (were ther a bigger since then?) took place near the village of Prochorovka in the middle of the front. The Soviets held the battlefield and slowed down the attack so that the idea of cutting a 100 miles hole into the Soviet front proved impossible. Though the Soviets suffered heavier losses than they presumably expected, organization and command structures of the involved units kept intact. Under tactical considerations, the Soviet approach was the more modern one. The Nazis tried to repeat 1939 (or 1941) and failed. Though the Russian deeply structured defence was not overall successful, it proved operable and lots of military leaders have studied it since then. Under the strategical aspect, the operation was a disaster for the Nazis. They had to give up all the territory won very soon without preventing further offensives of the enemy (see the following events of this year). As their resources were more limited (staff & eqipment), the heavy losses beat them much harder. No forces were freed to face the menace in the West, instead they had to stuff one hole by opening another. I don't know how far the Italian operation influenced the decision for withdrawal. But this decision makes only sense because the whole operation was a failure or at least highly questionable to succeed. One thing at the end: It's boring always to hear that "Hitler decided ..." when anything went wrong, whereas the ingenious German military leaders won in case of success. I read this in the memoirs of lots of German WWII generals and consider it an utterly cowardish and irresponsible attitude. I'm convinced that this war was not only a huge crime (which is not subject of sci.military [That's right, it's not! --CDR]), but starting it with the expectation to win it was irrealistic and illusionary from the beginning on. Contradictory decisions - by Hitler as well as by other political and military leaders of Germany - were simply a consequence of that, responsible and realistic ones had never begun the war. [My own feeling is that control from the rear by politicians does lead to failed military actions, because the commander needs to understand the situation, and that requires up to the moment knowledge of the local terrain, forces, etc. -- CDR] best regards, es