zenon@chopin.llnl.gov (Maciej Zenon Pindera) (09/15/89)
[ While the Soviets are notorious for slanting their history, I thought the following account of Kursk from Zukov's book was worth posting to provide a balance. --CDR] From: zenon@chopin.llnl.gov (Maciej Zenon Pindera) In article <27048@amdcad.AMD.COM> m1b@rayssd.RAY.COM (M. Joseph Barone) writes: >In article <26962@amdcad.AMD.COM> zenon@chopin.llnl.gov (Maciej Zenon Pindera) >writes: >> >As long as the tanks had the open terrain to maneuver in. >> >> Would it not depend on the degree of artillery concentration and the >> amount of terrain? For example, during the battle of Kursk, the >> Russian artillery concentration was somewhere on the order of >> 10-20 guns/kilometer. I don't have my sources handy, but I don't >> think the Germans were able to make much more than a 20 mile dent in >> the Russian defences. I think that when one has a _lot_ of room for >> maneuver, artillery will not have much difficulty grinding down an >> armored motorized assault. > > This is a common misconception of the Battle of Kursk. This >"strong defense in depth" strategy ultimately proved tactically wrong >but other political and strategic factors came into play to vindicate >it. It should also be noted that the Soviets had rather accurate >information on the Germans intentions, thanks, in no small part, to >the Lucy spy ring. Its been a while since I posted my short note and I couldn't attend to the followups since I've been swamped. Well, in the meantime Mr. Sanio posted a very complete overall picture so all that remains for me is to fill in a few details. Below, I'll try to outline the view of the battle from the Soviet perspective. My reference is Zukov, the author of Kursk. First off, conduct of war is primarily dictated by political considerations and strategy. Tactics are a tool for their implementation. To say that strategy was tactically wrong but was vindicated by strategic and political considerations sounds a little odd to say the least. Perhaps if you provided a few more details. So far as military intelligence is concerned, Mr. Sanio provided very useful comments in his earlier post. Let me add that the Soviets had more than 200,000 partisans operating behind the German lines. Of course military intelligence is a two edged sword. Not only can it mislead, but the opposition also has their own sources. Hence Zukov states that the Germans had details of Soviet preparations also. This info. is based on prisoner interrogations. It may be useful at this point to briefly go over some dates and numbers. 31 January,1943 - Paulus surrenders at Stalingrad. In that theater of operations Russian estimates of German losses to be at "1.5 million men, 3500 tanks and self propelled guns, 12000 guns and mortars, 3000 planes and large amounts of other equipment". Estimates are for the Don, Volga, and Stalingrad). February Further Soviet operations resulted in recapture of Kharkov, Rostov March Germans recapture Kharkov and drive north to eliminate the Kursk salient. This is the only active area of the total front. The Germans are unable to surmount the Soviet defences, and after several intense battles oround Belgorod, the attack bogs down. Front stabilizes by the end of the month, and both sides dig in and start building up. Because of the reverses suffered by the Germans at Stalingrad, a major push was needed in order to regain the initiative. By early to mid April, various front (sector) commanders submitted the following reports. (The Kursk salient by this time comprised of two fronts, Central Front in the north, and Voronezh Front in the south and centered around Belgorod) Zhukov- April 8 Germans cannot hope to seize Moscow in one big outflanking swoop since they lack adequate reserves. Operations will be confined to a narrow front & proceed by stages with the aim of seizing Moscow in 1943. Expected attack will take place in the Kursk area since the Germans already have large forces massed there. Success here will put the Germans closer to Moscow, with the aim of outflanking it from the south. Germans will be expected to put up as many as 16 tank divisions (2500 tanks) with the aim of pinching off the salient at its base by attacks from the north and from the south. Germans will mainly rely on armor & air support since their infantry does not seem to be as well prepared as last year. Zukov proposes to station reserve armies behind the front to protect Moscow's southern flank. As a general philosophy, Zukov proposes to wait for the Germans to attack then grind then down, and then counterattack. (Stalin needed some convincing on that one) Central Front (north) - April 10 Disposition & state of German forces suggests operation on Kursk and going east. Germany will want to consolidate to consolidate their hold over Crimea, Donets Basin and the Ukraine. Success in the Kursk area will give the Germans control of the railroads necessary to achieve this aim. Germany will need at least 60 infantry divisions with tank and artillery and air support. They already have such forces for such an attack. Attack is expected after the spring thaw and mud. Probably around the second half of May. Must protect the railroads. Voronezh Front (south) - April 12 Prisoner interrogation & radio interceptions say southern front may face up to 10 tank divisions (1500 tanks) , at least 6 infantry divisions, 500 bombers and 300 fighters. Panzer divisions include Greater Germany, Adolf Hitler, Death's Head, the Reich (I believe these were the elite SS divisions). There is a possibility that the Germans may move northeastward to bypass Moscow, and not southeastward. Reserves should be placed accordingly. Attack is not expected to take place before 20 April, but within the first few days of May. Main attack is expected to take place around Belogrod. (About which the southern front is centered) As the above reports indicate, even though at that point the Soviets had no concrete plans for defence, they had a pretty good idea on where the next German attack will take place. You have not made clear what info. the Lucy spy ring provided, but the above shows that a lot of insight into the Germans' intentions was gotten from political and strategic considerations. As time wore on new plans and estimates started coming in, and in early May it became apparent that the Germans started pouring in massive reinforcements to augument their forces at Kursk. Since the Soviet General Hedquarters had info. that the Germans did not have the necessary forces for a major offensive in other sectors, the Soviets concluded that while the upcoming battle at Kursk was a certainty, all other sectors would be static. This was going to be a big one. It is interesting to give the Soviet estimate of the German strength. Total German strength on the eastern front was thought to consist of: "232 German and satellite divisions with a total of 5.3 million men, 56,000 guns and mortars, 5850 tanks and self propelled guns and 3000 planes." "For the operations against the Kursk salient, the German command intended to use at least 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, 10,000 guns, 2,700 tanks and 2000 planes". Clearly, the Germans were going all out here, and they could not afford to fail. (Not when they use 1/2 of their tanks and 2/3 of their planes). By May 10, Soviet troops were put on alert. There were two schools of thoughts on how to stop the Germans. Stalin wanted to launch a preventive attack because he feared that the Soviet troops may not be able to withstand a concentrated German onslaught. (There was precedent for this. Also from the psychological point of view, the Germans always win summer offensives). Zhukov on the other hand advocated the 'defence in depth' concept, where the Germans would be ground down by massive artillery and air bombardment, after which the Soviets would counterattack. An important idea associated with this scheme was the formation of reserve armies behind the front which could be used to prevent a German breakthrough, and would form a second assault wave when the Soviets counterattacked. Zukov's views prevailed. For this purpose, the soviets massed 1.3 million men, 3600 tanks, 20,000 guns and 3130 planes including long range bombers. This gave them a superiority in both the manpower and equipment. The overall Soviet fortification zone was over 100 miles deep, and 150-175 miles deep if one includes the defense line along the Don. Clearly, the Soviets were taking no chances. Having decided that the brunt of German attack will be on the Central Front (north), the Soviets provided for the artillery density of up to 148 guns and mortars / mile of front, with the antitank artillery exceeding 48/mile. Southern side of the salient was notably weaker. Zukov reports antitank density of 25 guns/mile or, 48 guns/mile if the second defence line is included. On the early morning of July 5, a captured sapper told the Soviets that the German offensive will start at 3 a.m. Accordingly the Soviets launch an artillery and air bombardment at 2:20 in order to disrupt the German jump-off. The bombardment was not very accurate due to insufficient info. regarding the German dispositions, and it also came too soon. Even though some damage was inflicted, the Germans were able to start a coordinated offensive two hours later. > The Soviet positions were six belts of defense, consisting of >dug-in anti-tank, mortar, and machine-gun strongpoints well sited behind >intensely dense minefields. In the southern pincer, the Germans used >the "panzerkeil" concept -- massive armored wedges followed by the >infantry. In the north, the Germans sent in the infantry first to >clear out the anti-tank gun nests, followed by the Panzers. Both methods >proved effective and the first line of defenders were dislodged. I have no idea of your criteria of effectiveness, but it seems to differ from mine. Out the six defence zones, the Germans were able to penetrate one. There was no breakthrough anywhere and the front retained its integrity. On the Central Front, the Germans advanced about 20 miles and their attack bogged down on July 10. On this front the Soviets were able to start a counteroffensive on July 12 using their northen reserves with Central Front joining in on July 15. At no time was there a danger of a breakthrough. I would say that defence in depth worked rather well here. On the southern -Voronozh Front- side of the salient things were a little more intense. It turns out that the Soviet intelligence screwed up. Whereas the General Staff were expecting the main attack to come from the north, it in fact came from the south. The estimates of German strength are as follows: --north -> 7 armored divisions, (1200 tanks) --south -> 9 motorized and tank divisions, (1500 tanks) Since the southern flank of the salient was less heavily fortified, (57 guns and 11 tanks per mile of front) the Germans were able to drive in a wedge about 40 miles in depth, into the Soviet positions. In this sector German activity lasted longer but on July 16 they stopped attacking and began withdrawing to their original defensive positions. Again, at no point were the Soviet defences compromised. So even undermanned, this tactic seemed to do O.K. Of course a reserve army unit, the Steppe Front, was also used to stem the German advance. This was in accordance with the idea of fluid defence mentioned earlier. >the Soviets finally launched their counter-offensive eight days later, >the largest tank battle in the war took place. The Soviets forces >withdraw first after eight hours of armored battle at point-blank ranges. Soviet counterattack took place in two stages. The northern sector was able to start on July 12, and July 15. The battle that you mention took place in the south, and was really a part of Soviet defensive operations in that region. By July 23 the Germans pulled back to Belgorod, ie their pre-attack July 5 positions. In this region, the REAL counteroffensive started on August 3. For THIS operation, the Soviets massed 350 guns & mortars and 70 tanks per mile of front. The divisional sectors were to be 2 miles of front in length. Zukov does not report the the Germans' strength. Now, I don't know who withdrew from that tank battle that you mentioned first, but in view of subsequent developments, this point seems of minor significance. > Though the German losses were heavy, the Soviet losses were >much worse. Unfortunately for the Germans, the Allies had landed in 3 August -- Soviets start of southern offensive against Belgorod. 5 August -- Soviets capture Belgorod 18 August -- Soviets 18 miles from Bryansk (northen offensive) thereby eliminating the Germans' salient pointing east. 23 August -- Soviets capture Kharkov. The salient is eliminated and the front is straightened out. For the entire operation Zukov places German losses at 500,000 men (seems high, but who knows), 2000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 3,000 guns and a large number of planes. No numbers are given for the Soviet side. I would appreciate seeing any data that you might have on the cost of this battle. >Sicily and Hitler was vasillating on continuing the offensive. He >finally decided to withdraw and even pulled the 1st SS Panzer division >and sent it to Italy. Operation "Zitadelle" was over. Citadel was over on the 16-th. To continue it may have caused the destruction of the German forces in that region. I find your statement about the SS Panzer division curious. Zukov doesn't mention it. Are you sure the division was not withdrawn for refitting, and then subsequently sent to Italy? I find it strange that a fighting-strength division would be removed from an already weakened front. What is your source for this info.? Zukov states that 14 divisions had to be transferred from other fronts (including Italy and France) to try to reinforce the front. > Despite the Soviets' elaborate preparations, with their >heavy concentration of artillery, the Germans managed (though not >easily) to dislodge the defenders. The Germans lost, and in a big way. Dislodging the defenders from a bit of real estate counts for nothing if it doesn't result in a breakthrough. That was the whole point of the battle. They failed to pinch off the salient. They did not even come close to succeeding. That in itself is bad enough, because for the first time in the war the German summer offensive failed. Gains in propaganda and morale value alone were incalculable to the Soviets. The Germans also squandered a large portion of their forces, a portion that could not be replaced, at least not at the rate to threaten the Soviets. The Germans never really recovered from this battle. Kursk was their last major offensive in the east. maciej
military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) (09/17/89)
From: military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) In article <27272@amdcad.AMD.COM>, Carl Rigney comments: > > [ While the Soviets are notorious for slanting their history, I > thought the following account of Kursk from Zukov's book was > worth posting to provide a balance. --CDR] I've read Zhukov. Aside from overt political infighting, he's relatively factual. > Panzer divisions include Greater Germany, Adolf Hitler, Death's >Head, the Reich (I believe these were the elite SS divisions). Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das Reich, and Totenkopf were 1st, 2nd, and 3rd SS Panzer divisions, respectively. Together, they formed the SS Panzerkorps. Grossdeustchland was a normal Wehrmacht division, albeit larger and better equipped than the rest. GD had significant propoganda value; most German divisions were of local origin (e.g., 2nd Panzer Division, mostly Viennese), while GD was comprised of troops from all over Germany. > I have no idea of your criteria of effectiveness, but it seems to >differ from mine. Out the six defence zones, the Germans were able to >penetrate one. There was no breakthrough anywhere and the front >retained its integrity. On the Central Front, the Germans advanced >about 20 miles and their attack bogged down on July 10. According to my maps, the first three of these defensive lines were concentric around the salient. The fourth ran rougly across the neck of the salient, while the last two were between the salient and Voronezh. The spearhead of Army Group South reached Prokhorovka, the site of the famous tank battle, which meant it penetrated the third line of defense and was at the fourth. (This, of course, was in the south; you are talking here of the north.) There can certainly be no doubt that the defenses took the teeth out of the blitzkrieg. This must be tempered, however, with the fact that the Soviets knew absolutely where the German attacks would fall, and could thus concentrate their entire reserves (despite internal disagreement) in the crisis area. They also had several months to prepare the defensive positions; Zhukov himself pays homage to the civilian workers who dug the fortifications. >>the Soviets finally launched their counter-offensive eight days later, >>the largest tank battle in the war took place. The Soviets forces >>withdraw first after eight hours of armored battle at point-blank ranges. > > Soviet counterattack took place in two stages. The northern sector >was able to start on July 12, and July 15. The battle that you mention >took place in the south, and was really a part of Soviet defensive >operations in that region. > Now, I don't know who withdrew from that tank battle that you >mentioned first, but in view of subsequent developments, this point >seems of minor significance. Again, the big battle was at Prokhorovka, in the south. It represented the climax of the German attack, and the Germans held the field at day's end. However, they did not stay long... It was significant, though, as he who holds the battlefield gets to recover his damaged tanks and wounded personnel. I would estimate that German casualties would have been far higher if the Soviets had held the field at Prokhorovka. At this point, von Manstein (in _Lost Victories_) felt that the battle had reached its climax, and was about to turn for the Germans. He cites that Soviet casualties in manpower were four times those of the Germans, and believes the Soviets were near cracking. I think his analysis was very mistaken; I doubt he had knowledge of the true magnitude of the Soviet defenses and reserves. He did not withdraw, however, until Hitler relieved him of the SS Panzerkorps (for service in Italy) and 48th Panzerkorps (sent to Army Group Center). >>Sicily and Hitler was vasillating on continuing the offensive. He >>finally decided to withdraw and even pulled the 1st SS Panzer division >>and sent it to Italy. Operation "Zitadelle" was over. > >I find your statement about the SS Panzer division curious. Zukov >doesn't mention it. Are you sure the division was not withdrawn for >refitting, and then subsequently sent to Italy? I find it strange that >a fighting-strength division would be removed from an already weakened >front. What is your source for this info.? The entire SS Panzerkorps was sent to Italy, without refit, following a conference with Hitler on the 13th. It seems possible that Himmler could have impacted on this decision. This is referenced in Manstein's _Lost Victories_, Guderian's _Panzer Leader_, and von Mellenthin's _Panzer Battles_. [ So it appears that Kursk teaches us the same old lesson - doing what the enemy expects and is prepared for never succeeds unless you have an overwhelming material advantage (which the Germans didn't) and sometimes not even then. --CDR] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Bill Thacker Moderator, sci.military military-request@att.att.com (614) 860-5294 Send submissions to military@att.att.com
zenon@chopin.llnl.gov (Maciej Zenon Pindera) (09/22/89)
From: zenon@chopin.llnl.gov (Maciej Zenon Pindera) In article <27302@amdcad.AMD.COM> military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) writes: > >According to my maps, the first three of these defensive lines were >concentric around the salient. The fourth ran rougly across the >neck of the salient, while the last two were between the salient >and Voronezh. The spearhead of Army Group South reached Prokhorovka, >the site of the famous tank battle, which meant it penetrated the third >line of defense and was at the fourth. (This, of course, was in the south; >you are talking here of the north.) Yes, I was talking of the north. (Zukov did not provide too many details of the southern battle except to emphesize the important role that the Soviet reserve Steppe Front played in helping to contain the German attack.) According to Guderian, this attack did not "neutralize let alone destroy" Soviet infantry, which was subsequently able to isolate German armor from its support infantry. "By the time they reached the Russian artillery they were on their own." And then, "... Model's attack bogged down after some 6 miles" It was in the north that the Soviets placed their heaviest defences, so this is perhaps not surprising. For the battle in the south, Guderian's info. is sketchy, but he does say that "... In the south our successes were somewhat greater, but not enough to seal off the salient or to force the Russians to withdraw." And here, the Soviet defences were considerably weaker. >There can certainly be no doubt that the defenses took the teeth out >of the blitzkrieg. This must be tempered, however, with the fact that >the Soviets knew absolutely where the German attacks would fall, and >could thus concentrate their entire reserves (despite internal >disagreement) in the crisis area. They also had several months to prepare >the defensive positions; Zhukov himself pays homage to the civilian workers >who dug the fortifications. Well, yes and no. Yes, the civilians helped. Yes, the blitzkrieg failed. But ... Guderian -> "Model had produced information, based largely on air May 3-4 photography, which showed that the Russians were preparing deep and very strong defensive positions in exactly those areas where the attack by the two army groups was to go in. The Russians had already withdrawn the mass of their mobile formations from the foreward area of their salient; in anticipation of a pincer-attack, as proposed in this plan of ours, they had strenghened the localities of our possible break-throughs with unusually strong artillery and anti-tank forces." So yes, the Soviets knew where the German attack would fall, just as the Germans knew where the Soviets placed their pieces. Guderian -> "From the area of Bielogrod in the south ten panzer, one panzergrenadier (motorized infantry I guess), and seven infantry divisions attacked, while in the north seven panzer, two panzergrenadier, and nine infantry divisions went in from the area west of Orel." So despite the fact that the brunt of the German attack came from the south, Soviet defences were set up for a major attack from the north. (According to Zhukov, as I posted earlier) Hence no, the Soviets did not know absolutely where German attack would fall. Finally yes, the Soviets had several months to prepare for this offensive, but then again so did the Germans. In fact, they started kicking the idea around in April. They had to prepare for it extensively. For according to Guderian, "...Everything that the German Army could muster in the way of attacking strength was committed to this offensive: Hitler had himself correctly said in Munich that it must not fail, since even a return to our original positions would spell defeat." >Again, the big battle was at Prokhorovka, in the south. It represented the >climax of the German attack, and the Germans held the field at day's end. >However, they did not stay long... It was significant, though, as he >who holds the battlefield gets to recover his damaged tanks and wounded >personnel. I would estimate that German casualties would have been far >higher if the Soviets had held the field at Prokhorovka. Of course you are correct. My comment (which I just erased, but which was to the effect that in the light of subsequent events, it didn't matter who held the field that day) really pertained to the overall operation which ended with the Soviet liberation of Kharkov. The whole thing took ~ 50 days. Of the whole battle Guderian says "Needless to say the Russians exploited their victory to the full. There were no more periods of quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on the enemy was in undisputed posession of the initiative" >The entire SS Panzerkorps was sent to Italy, without refit, following >a conference with Hitler on the 13th. It seems possible that Himmler >could have impacted on this decision. This is referenced in Manstein's >_Lost Victories_, Guderian's _Panzer Leader_, and von Mellenthin's >_Panzer Battles_. Gudarian only says that the armored formations were mangled and that would "be unemployable for a long time to come. It was problematical whether they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front; as for being able to use them in defence of the western front against the Allied landings that threatened for next spring, this was even more questionable." Does Manstein mention exactly when the divisions were pulled out? Their strength? Their role in Italy? It seems to me that if possible, the Germans would have wanted to keep those divisions around if they could be used to contain a Soviet counterattack. But if they felt that their whole sector was folding up, then it would have been been more prudent to save the remenants rather than loosing the whole thing. > [ So it appears that Kursk teaches us the same old > lesson - doing what the enemy expects and is prepared > for never succeeds unless you have an overwhelming > material advantage (which the Germans didn't) and > sometimes not even then. --CDR] Furthermore, if both sides are equally well prepared you can expect a slugfest. But in a slugfest, it's the guy with the horseshoe in his glove that wins. > [ In a slugfest the side with more factories and manpower eventually > grinds out a victory. :-( --CDR] maciej