chenj@cmcl2.NYU.EDU (James Chen) (09/17/89)
From: chenj@cmcl2.NYU.EDU (James Chen) [Substantive answers only, please; lets keep the rampant speculation down to a dull roar. Doctrine and learning seem safely part of Military Science. --CDR] A common feature of war is the need for a nation to relearn the old lessons of previous wars or of the mistakes of other nations. For example, the US relearned the importance of visual sighting in air-to-air combat. That's why the smoky engines of the F-4 Phantom had to be replaced with smoke-free engines. It was too easy for the enemy to see the incoming planes. That's why modern fighter have so much glass for the pilot and electronics officier to see through. Unfortunately, it seems this lesson is about to be unlearned in the new steath fighter with its resessed cockpit. Now, I understand the importance of moving the pilot back to reduce radar cross section. And I'm not really interested in arguing the merits or demerits of steath. That's not my point. My question is: Why do nations keep forgetting past lessons? Especially, since most of these lessons were paid for in blood. What compels people to formulate nice sounding but totally useless theories that the next war just blows away? -Jimmy Chen (chenj@cmcl2.nyu.edu)
gt0818a%prism@gatech.edu (Paul E. Robichaux) (09/19/89)
From: gt0818a%prism@gatech.edu (Paul E. Robichaux) Stealth aircraft (i.e. the F-117A, B-2, and forthcoming ATA) depend on their "invisibility" and reduced electromagnetic signatures to accomplish their mission. Reduced radar cross-section, IR emission, and active emissions help to accomplish this, but, as with all design objectives, there's a trade- off made between being "low-observable" and being (manuverable/fast/able to see /pick your own.). One good way to reduce radar cross-section (RCS) is to fair the cockpit inside the fuselage. Unfortunately, this leads to reduced visibility and spotting potential. For these aircraft, designed for specific, limited missions (i.e. operating in places where it's critical to not be seen *at all*), invisibility is the most important design factor. All other design decisions were made with that in mind (thus the F-117A's slow speed and the B-2's high cost.) Note that even "stealth fighters" (i.e. the ATF, F-117A) depend on being unseen to accomplish their mission. They are *not* air superiority fighters, so they must depend on friendly air cover, low signature emissions, and good weaponry to stay alive. -- Paul E. Robichaux |"Collateral damage is the number of women Georgia Institute of Technology | and children you kill when attempting to do GT PO Box 30818; Atlanta, GA 30332 | something else."- Cap Weinberger. Internet: gt0818a@prism.gatech.edu | All opinions in this message are mine.
cew@venera.isi.edu (Craig E. Ward) (09/20/89)
From: cew@venera.isi.edu (Craig E. Ward) In article <27299@amdcad.AMD.COM> chenj@cmcl2.NYU.EDU (James Chen) writes: >A common feature of war is the need for a nation to relearn >the old lessons of previous wars or of the mistakes of >other nations. It has often been said that armies do not reform until after they've been beaten. This leads to a more interesting question: How can a military establishment unlearn the lessons of past victories? Technological change often renders the successful strategies and tactics of the past inappropriate. Examples are easy to find. By the mid-nineteenth century, weapons had advanced beyond the tactics of Napoleon, yet it took the armies of the Confederacy and the Union several years to begin to change -- at a terrible cost in lives. Even with the American Civil War and a Prussian *defeat* in a battle of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the French Army of 1914 marched off with the mentality of 1814 and suffered accordingly. The French experience of WWI was so horrible that they resolved to never let it happen again. As a result, they were much better prepared for a 1914 war in 1939 when WW2 began. Unfortunately for the French, they found themselves ready to fight the wrong war. What does this mean for the military establishments of today, not just for the US and NATO, but also for the SU and the Warsaw Pact? Are they ready for the next war or the last? -- ARPA: Craig E. Ward <cew@venera.isi.edu> PHONE: (213)822-1511 ext. 111 USPS: USC Information Sciences Institute 4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 1100 Marina del Rey, CA 90292 Slogan: "nemo me impune lacessit"
cew@venera.isi.edu (Craig E. Ward) (09/21/89)
From: cew@venera.isi.edu (Craig E. Ward) In article <27299@amdcad.AMD.COM> chenj@cmcl2.NYU.EDU (James Chen) writes: >A common feature of war is the need for a nation to relearn >the old lessons of previous wars or of the mistakes of >other nations. It has often been said that armies do not reform until after they've been beaten. This leads to a more interesting question: How can a military establishment unlearn the lessons of past victories? Technological change often renders the successful strategies and tactics of the past inappropriate. Examples are easy to find. By the mid-nineteenth century, weapons had advanced beyond the tactics of Napoleon, yet it took the armies of the Confederacy and the Union several years to begin to change -- at a terrible cost in lives. Even with the American Civil War and a Prussian *defeat* in a battle of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the French Army of 1914 marched off with the mentality of 1814 and suffered accordingly. The French experience of WWI was so horrible that they resolved to never let it happen again. As a result, they were much better prepared for a 1914 war in 1939 when WW2 began. Unfortunately for the French, they found themselves ready to fight the wrong war. What does this mean for the military establishments of today, not just for the US and NATO, but also for the SU and the Warsaw Pact? Are they ready for the next war or the last? - ARPA: Craig E. Ward <cew@venera.isi.edu> PHONE: (213)822-1511 ext. 111 USPS: USC Information Sciences Institute 4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 1100 Marina del Rey, CA 90292 Slogan: "nemo me impune lacessit"
prahrens@pttesac.UUCP (Peter Ahrens) (09/22/89)
From: prahrens@pttesac.UUCP (Peter Ahrens) In article <27375@amdcad.AMD.COM> cew@venera.isi.edu (Craig E. Ward) writes: > >It has often been said that armies do not reform until after they've been >beaten. This leads to a more interesting question: How can a military >establishment unlearn the lessons of past victories? >...[valid examples of the failure to adjust deleted]... >What does this mean for the military establishments of today, not just for >the US and NATO, but also for the SU and the Warsaw Pact? Are they ready for >the next war or the last? If that war is between these two establishments, perhaps it would be both next and last. But it is clear (to me, at least) that the war each is preparing for, against the other, is actually of very low probability. Neither is likely to be prepared for the war they will actually face. The Soviets currently appear to be facing something resembling civil war or uprising (performance in Afghanistan or Georgia is not reassuring in this context). The U.S. faces terrorist opponents, drug or jihad, who are not generally impressed with conventional military power, particularly when it is rendered impotent by domestic ethical, economic and political considerations. An effective demonstration of a small, deadly rapid deployment force against "narco-terrorists" would go a lot farther than the threat to shoot down civilian aircraft. (If you are really going to "make war" on somebody.) An interesting recent example is the case of the British in the Falklands, who were about to sell to the Australians one of their two carriers (Hermes, I think) based on an analysis of their support role in a European conflict against the Soviets. Turned out they needed it pretty badly a little bit farther south. Convincing demonstration of the utility of Carrier Battle Groups? A question for the learned: anyone willing to compare the exocet hit on HMS Sheffield in the Falklands versus the hit on the USS Stark in the Persian Gulf, with respect to the design of the vessels? -Peter Ahrens
adrian%cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk@NSFnet-Relay.AC.UK (Adrian Hurt) (09/24/89)
From: Adrian Hurt <adrian%cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk@NSFnet-Relay.AC.UK> In article <27388@amdcad.AMD.COM> cew@venera.isi.edu (Craig E. Ward) writes: >It has often been said that armies do not reform until after they've been >beaten. This leads to a more interesting question: How can a military >establishment unlearn the lessons of past victories? I don't know about "unlearn". As for learning the lessons of past actions, the future aggressor has the advantage, in that he can see what happened last time, and make up new attack theories to account for it. The defender can only respond to a new type of attack after he's been attacked, and probably beaten. >The French experience of WWI was so horrible that they resolved to never let >it happen again. As a result, they were much better prepared for a 1914 war >in 1939 when WW2 began. Unfortunately for the French, they found themselves >ready to fight the wrong war. That's an example of what I mean. The Germans formulated a whole new theory of war (blitzkrieg). The French (and everyone else, for that matter) couldn't make up defence plans against blitzkrieg until someone had shown them what it was. Actually, the French were quite well prepared for a 1918 war, in that they had a lot of tanks (better than some of the German ones), and a lot of aircraft (at least on a par with the German aircraft at the start of WW2). What they didn't have was much idea of what Germany would do with its tanks and aircraft. A counter-example is the various wars between Israel and Arab states. Israel had learnt one lesson from blitzkrieg - clobber the other guy's air force on the ground, and you can walk (or fly) all over him. Which is why the Six Day War only took six days. The Arabs learnt too, and next time they had lots of SAM's waiting for the Israelis to try it again. >What does this mean for the military establishments of today, not just for >the US and NATO, but also for the SU and the Warsaw Pact? Are they ready for >the next war or the last? There's a bit of a difference here, in that each side has its practise exercises in which it can try out its latest ideas, and the other side watches and can make up new ideas of its own. "Keyboard? How quaint!" - M. Scott Adrian Hurt | JANET: adrian@uk.ac.hw.cs UUCP: ..!ukc!cs.hw.ac.uk!adrian | ARPA: adrian@cs.hw.ac.uk
cdr@amdcad.amd.com (Carl Rigney) (09/24/89)
From: cdr@amdcad.amd.com (Carl Rigney) Adrian Hurt <adrian%cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk@NSFnet-Relay.AC.UK> writes: > That's an example of what I mean. The Germans formulated a whole new theory > of war (blitzkrieg). The French (and everyone else, for that matter) couldn't > make up defence plans against blitzkrieg until someone had shown them what it > was. Note that the German Blitzkrieg of the 40s was influenced strongly by the writings in the 20s of B.H. Liddell-Hart, a British military historian and theorist. Liddell-Hart's ideas on armored warfare would not have seemed novel to Philip of Macedon, Hannibal, or Belisarius. But 50 years after his principles were applied with great success by the Germans, many nations *still* don't get it. The French failure in WW II was not because the Germans had something totally new, but rather because the Germans had something the French hadn't bothered to learn. Defense plans against Blitzkrieg-style attacks were available in the 20s; the French and British (mostly) ignored them. If the Captains in one war are the Generals of the next, perhaps its not surprising that most armies are always one war behind the technology.
haynes@monet.Berkeley.EDU (Jim Haynes) (09/26/89)
From: haynes@monet.Berkeley.EDU (Jim Haynes) There was an article in Signal magazine some years ago - the author suggested the reason for the rapid success of Germany in tank warfare against France was possible because every German tank had radio, whereas the French tank forces relied on messengers on motorcycles.
djm@castle.ed.ac.uk (D Murphy) (09/26/89)
From: D Murphy <djm@castle.ed.ac.uk> In article <27442@amdcad.AMD.COM> adrian%cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk@NSFnet-Relay.AC.UK (Adrian Hurt) writes: >What they didn't have was much idea of what Germany would do with its tanks >and aircraft. Which was funny really, given that Guderian had published his book on the use of armour in the mid 1920's. Apparently Patton read this (as well, of course, as Rommel) and got the ideas for the tactics he used in North Africa. Murff....
jeffm%uokmax@uunet.UU.NET (Jeff Medcalf) (09/26/89)
From: Jeff Medcalf <mimsy!oddjob.uchicago.edu!uokmax!jeffm%uokmax@uunet.UU.NET> >From: Adrian Hurt <adrian%cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk@NSFnet-Relay.AC.UK> >> [The French defeat in WWII being caused by their preparation for a 1918 war.] >That's an example of what I mean. The Germans formulated a whole new theory >of war (blitzkrieg). The French (and everyone else, for that matter) couldn't >make up defence plans against blitzkrieg until someone had shown them what it >was. Well, that is not really true. For one thing, the theory of blitzkrieg is based on the ideas of Colonel J F C Fuller and others. Fuller's Plan 1919 was the first hint of blitzkrieg's true development. The French and British both chose to ignore these ideas (Fuller and other British officers had developed the theories quite well by 1925 or 1926). The Germans, however, found willing converts in Guderian and his students (including Rommel). Hitler was an early proponent of blitzkrieg. After seeing a demonstration of tanks in 1934 (?), Hitler said something to the effect of "I must have those." He supported Guderian against the established General Staff, first in the formation of a Panzerkorps, and later in the establishment of the theory of rapid, combined arms warfare (which was called blitzkrieg). Had the French been equally astute, they could have defended against the blitz fairly well. The French, however, had many problems: 1) Tactics: The French, who had more and better tanks than the Germans, put them in the field in penny packets, supporting the infantry. The idea of deploying tanks in concentration was not taken up by them. 2) Timidity: The French launched an offensive against the Germans while the Germans were busy in Poland. The offensive swept on against almost no opposition, advancing less than 10 (or was that 25) kilometers in over two weeks. 3) Morale: The French had no morale to speak of. 4) Strategy: The French ignored both blitzkrieg and the Benelux nations. Had they deployed north of the Maginot Line, or redeployed after the initial German invasion of the Low Countries, the war would have been much different. >A counter-example is the various wars between Israel and Arab states. Israel >had learnt one lesson from blitzkrieg - clobber the other guy's air force on >the ground, and you can walk (or fly) all over him. Which is why the Six Day >War only took six days. The Arabs learnt too, and next time they had lots of >SAM's waiting for the Israelis to try it again. How is this a counter-example? By your own previous words, the defender has to be beaten to develop a counter-strategy. The Arabs had been beaten, and then had later developed a counter-strategy. >There's a bit of a difference here, in that each side has its practise >exercises in which it can try out its latest ideas, and the other side watches >and can make up new ideas of its own. All nations had practice exercises then, as well as now. There is no difference except in the amount of observability (due to sattellites and SR-71s). > Adrian Hurt | JANET: adrian@uk.ac.hw.cs It is well to remember that wars often go to the side who innovates the most in the inter-war period. This is not always the attacker. If the defender is, for example, active in developing new methods of stopping his opponents' attacks, and his opponent attacks in the same old way, the attacker will often lose. This was true in the First World War. The attacker (Germany) could not overcome the new defense (machine guns). Neither could the British and French. When an effective new offense WAS developed (tanks by the British), the battle that followed (at Cambrai), went the way of the attacker for the first time (by the way, I think that this was also the first major battle that used walking artil- lery barrages instead of three days of preparatory shelling). [EVERYONE - Please don't use lines of ---'s in your signatures when mailing to sci.military - I have to strip them before building the digest. --CDR] -- jeffm@uokmax.UUCP | Arkansas state motto: At Least We're Not Oklahoma. | Jeff Medcalf
military@cbnews.att.com (09/28/89)
From: military@cbnews.att.com haynes@monet.Berkeley.EDU (Jim Haynes) writes: >There was an article in Signal magazine some years ago - the author suggested >the reason for the rapid success of Germany in tank warfare against France >was possible because every German tank had radio, whereas the French tank >forces relied on messengers on motorcycles. True and false. The Germans realized in the mid-30's that each tank must have a radio. Other nations, including Great Britain, came to similar conclusions, and designed tanks accordingly. Many nations, however, emphasized alternate means of communications. Radios were relatively expensive then, and difficult to use; there was concern about reliability, as well. For out-of-combat communication, dispatch riders were seen as acceptable; in combat, of course, they would be useless, so several techniques were developed. The earliest was the use of signal flags, in a sort of semaphore system. Each commander carried a card explaining the meanings of various colors and positions; for example, one set might mean "form column", another "form line abreast", a third "halt", etc. These, of course, required the commander to expose himself to fire. More novel techniques included attempts to train carrier pigeons to fly from tank to tank; smoke bombs and flares; a flag mast not unlike those on naval warships; and moveable metal arms. (The pigeons, BTW, proved a failure 8-) All required line-of-sight communication with the commander of the tank platoon. Almost universally, the platoon command tank was radio-equipped. Upon entry into the war, Germany, Britain, and the US had all-radio-equipped tanks. German tank radios, as well as those in the US, were carried in the hull and operated by the co-driver/hull gunner. Britain was adamant that the radio must be carried in the turret so that the commander could operate it; hence, they required a re-design of the US-built M3 Lee medium tank, with a larger turret bustle and without the commander's cupola-mounted machinegun. Field conversions of the M3 Stuart light tank were also effected, leading to cramped turrets. The French had the most difficult situation. All their tanks were designed with one-man turrets. The commander was thus responsible for loading, aiming, and firing the main gun, instructing his crew, and watching for orders from his platoon leader. If *he* was the platoon leader, he also had to operate the radio. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Bill Thacker Moderator, sci.military military-request@att.att.com (614) 860-5294 Send submissions to military@att.att.com
cew@venera.isi.edu (09/28/89)
From: cew@venera.isi.edu In article <27443@amdcad.AMD.COM> you write: >Note that the German Blitzkrieg of the 40s was influenced strongly by >the writings in the 20s of B.H. Liddell-Hart, a British military >historian and theorist. There were several developers of blitzkrieg tactics. In addition to those already mentioned, Charles De Gaulle comes to mind as I recall memories of what I learned of these things back when I had more time for them. He was the proponent of these tactics within the French military. (They ignored him.) I also recall that blitzkrieg was a synthesis of two developments coming out of WWI. The British contribution, tanks, has already been mentioned. The other was a German change in infantry tactics. Instead of days and days of artillery followed by mass movement of troops, they used a short artillery barrage followed by a rather quick advance of what they called "shock troops." (From what I read, these tactics worked rather well and Germany would likely have won the war if it were not for the arrival of large numbers of fresh American troops to stiffen the line of the exhausted French and British.) What became blitzkrieg was a combination of shock troops, armor and aircraft. ARPA: Craig E. Ward <cew@venera.isi.edu> PHONE: (213)822-1511 ext. 111 USPS: USC Information Sciences Institute 4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 1100 Marina del Rey, CA 90292 Slogan: "nemo me impune lacessit"
cperlebe@encad.Wichita.NCR.COM (Chris Perleberg) (09/28/89)
From: cperlebe@encad.Wichita.NCR.COM (Chris Perleberg) In article <27493@amdcad.AMD.COM> mimsy!oddjob.uchicago.edu!uokmax!jeffm%uokmax@uunet.UU.NET (Jeff Medcalf) writes: >When an >effective new offense WAS developed (tanks by the British), the battle that >followed (at Cambrai), went the way of the attacker for the first time I personally think Cambrai (and the battles in August 1918 leading to the "Black Day of the German Army") were strategic defeats for the Allies. They learned the wrong lessons. They won, and thought they were right. They should have been studying Caporetto, or the Kaiserschlachten in March 1918, or even the German counterattack at Cambrai. In each case, the Germans achieved breakthroughs without tanks. They developed a "software" solution -- the Stosstruppen ("storm troopers"). The Allies won the war, and had "tanks on the brain." They couldn't see that tanks were not an end in themselves, but only a means to an end, a tool to use with the proper tactics. The losers payed more attention. Perhaps that is typical. And, for the U.S., frightening. Chris Perleberg cperlebe@encad.wichita.ncr.com
adrian%cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk@NSFnet-Relay.AC.UK (Adrian Hurt) (10/03/89)
From: Adrian Hurt <amdcad!adrian%cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk@NSFnet-Relay.AC.UK> In article <27443@amdcad.AMD.COM> cdr@amdcad.amd.com (Carl Rigney) writes: > >Adrian Hurt <adrian%cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk@NSFnet-Relay.AC.UK> writes: >> The French (and everyone else, for that matter) couldn't make up defence >> plans against blitzkrieg until someone had shown them what it was. >Note that the German Blitzkrieg of the 40s was influenced strongly by >the writings in the 20s of B.H. Liddell-Hart, a British military >historian and theorist. Did Liddell-Hart mention anything about co-operation between air-force and land force? I was under the impression that one of the key principles of blitzkrieg was in getting, then using, air superiority; e.g. using Stukas as airborne artillery. The Germans' first move was always to try to knock out the enemy air force, preferably on the ground. They could then knock out communications and transport, e.g. railways; attack vehicles on the move; and attack cities; as well as use aircraft in direct battlefield support. The Germans failed to wipe out the R.A.F. (only just, but they didn't know that), therefore would not have had unchallenged air superiority over Britain, therefore did not invade. (They weren't totally unchallenged over France, either, but they did have things pretty much their own way.) "Keyboard? How quaint!" - M. Scott Adrian Hurt | JANET: adrian@uk.ac.hw.cs UUCP: ..!ukc!cs.hw.ac.uk!adrian | ARPA: adrian@cs.hw.ac.uk
tjc@ecs.soton.ac.uk (Tim Chown) (10/03/89)
From: tjc@ecs.soton.ac.uk (Tim Chown) In article <27529@amdcad.AMD.COM>, cew@venera.isi.edu writes: > other was a German change in infantry tactics. Instead of days and days of > artillery followed by mass movement of troops, they used a short artillery > barrage followed by a rather quick advance of what they called "shock troops." > (From what I read, these tactics worked rather well and Germany would likely > have won the war if it were not for the arrival of large numbers of fresh > American troops to stiffen the line of the exhausted French and British.) > What became blitzkrieg was a combination of shock troops, armor and aircraft. Doesn't the effectiveness of blitzkrieg depend on the superiority of the attacking forces in quality/number - it works well enough initially, but not against a hardened, well-equipped enemy (which was lacking in Europe in 39/40). By the time the US got round to entering the war Europe was occupied, but hadn't the Germans already started their decline by deciding to invade Russia? Blitzkrieg didn't help them much there ... And why wasn't the concept of blitzkrieg applied to aerial attacks on England by the Germans - instead they lost the Battle of Britain by overstretching vast unprotected bomber squadrons. More speedy raids on fighter airfields would have worked wonders, but Hitler sent his bombers "over the top" to bomb London and they were cut to shreds. Surely little was learnt from WWI or blitzkrieg there? Also, what lessons were learnt from the early war years when the Americans were later being carved up in the Japanese island conflicts, where it seemed that the battles more resembled the bloodbath of WWI? Tim.
hwt@watmath.waterloo.edu (Henry Troup) (10/03/89)
From: amdcad!bnr-fos!.uucp!hwt@watmath.waterloo.edu (Henry Troup) In article <27442@amdcad.AMD.COM> adrian%cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk@NSFnet-Relay.AC.UK (Adrian Hurt) writes: > >That's an example of what I mean. The Germans formulated a whole new theory >of war (blitzkrieg). The French (and everyone else, for that matter) couldn't >make up defence plans against blitzkrieg until someone had shown them what it >was. Well, actually Basil Liddell-Hart invented blitzkrieg - or at least modern mobile warfare. Also, a careful observation of the Spanish Civil War would have given a lot of information about WWII tactics - ahead of time. But no one did listen/see until their noses were rubbed in it. So add me to the party that says armies don't learn until forced to it. I believe it was to do with the age of the generals, and the wars that they fought in. utgpu!bnr-vpa!bnr-fos!hwt%bnr-public | BNR is not | All that evil requires hwt@bnr.ca (BITNET/NETNORTH) | responsible for | is that good men do (613) 765-2337 (Voice) | my opinions | nothing.
bash@cbnewsd.ATT.COM (thomas.w.basham) (10/03/89)
From: bash@cbnewsd.ATT.COM (thomas.w.basham) >>There was an article in Signal magazine some years ago - the author suggested >>the reason for the rapid success of Germany in tank warfare against France >>was possible because every German tank had radio, whereas the French tank >>forces relied on messengers on motorcycles. >True and false... >Many nations, however, emphasized alternate means of communications... >The earliest was the use of signal flags, in a sort of semaphore system. >Each commander carried a card explaining the meanings of various colors >and positions; for example, one set might mean "form column", another >"form line abreast", a third "halt", etc. These, of course, required >the commander to expose himself to fire. There was an article about 2 to 3 months ago in Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review about the use of signal flags withing the Soviet Army. It seems that they have quite an extensive flag communication that isn't just limited to tanks. If there's interest, I'll dig out the article and summarize it. Tom -- Tom Basham AT&T Bell Laboratories (312) 979-6336 att!ihlpb!bash bash@ihlpb.ATT.COM If you can't beat 'em, infiltrate and destroy them from within.
beckerd@grover.cs.unc.edu (David Becker) (10/03/89)
From: beckerd@grover.cs.unc.edu (David Becker)
In article Chris Perleberg writes:
"
"The losers payed more attention. Perhaps that is typical. And, for the
"U.S., frightening.
"
The Axis countries are not a threat military-wise(maybe economically).
The Allies did learn from WWI not to leave a loser around. Russia would be
as succeptable as America to not learning from WWII defeats.
Also, as another posting pointed out, the US military has learned from
Viet Nam how the lessons needed to prevent another such disaster. The
American military remembers Viet Nam better than WWII I suspect.
David Becker beckerd@cs.unc.edufiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) (10/05/89)
From: fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) In article <9864@cbnews.ATT.COM>, amdcad!bnr-fos!.uucp!hwt@watmath.waterloo.edu (Henry Troup) writes: > > > From: amdcad!bnr-fos!.uucp!hwt@watmath.waterloo.edu (Henry Troup) > > In article <27442@amdcad.AMD.COM> adrian%cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk@NSFnet-Relay.AC.UK (Adrian Hurt) writes: > > > >That's an example of what I mean. The Germans formulated a whole new theory > >of war (blitzkrieg). The French (and everyone else, for that matter) couldn't > >make up defence plans against blitzkrieg until someone had shown them what it > >was. > > Well, actually Basil Liddell-Hart invented blitzkrieg - or at least modern > mobile warfare. Also, a careful observation of the Spanish Civil War would > have given a lot of information about WWII tactics - ahead of time. But > no one did listen/see until their noses were rubbed in it. Some younger French officers read Liddle-Hart and others, were convinced, and wrote on the subject themselves. Charles de Gaulle was one of them. They had little or not influence on French war policy, unfortunately. In the U.S., a fellow named Patton, among others, also was a strong proponent of fast armored warfare. He *did* get a chance to use his theories. As for Germany, their main strength, applying Blitzkrieg, also hobbled them. They treated offensive airpower during almost all the war simply as tactical artillery. ------------ "...I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing: and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress, while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization." - Petronius Arbiter, 210 B.C.
zenon@chopin.llnl.gov (Maciej Zenon Pindera) (10/11/89)
From: zenon@chopin.llnl.gov (Maciej Zenon Pindera) In article <9928@cbnews.ATT.COM> fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) writes: > >As for Germany, their main strength, applying Blitzkrieg, also hobbled them. >They treated offensive airpower during almost all the war simply as tactical >artillery. > The whole idea behind Blitzkrieg (a name, incidentally, coined by the allies), precluded the development of big bombers. From the economic and political point of view, it was decided that Germany could not support a protracted war. In a long war where the opposing country can bring its whole economic resources to bear, a big four engined, long range bomber would have been more suitable. And as it turned out, the Germans did have an acute need for such a bomber, especially on the eastern front. (in order to get at the Soviet installations in the Urals, for example). For a short war however, a kind of war that Germany was preparing for, a dive bomber was much more preferable since as you have pointed out, it could be used as very accurate 'tactical artillery'. maciej [mod.note: To throw in my 2 cents, I would posit another reason for the limited nature of the Luftwaffe; interservice rivalry. In Germany, the Army was top dog; everybody who was anybody was associated with it. Goering's close association with Hitler enabled to Luftwaffe to reach as far as it did, but I wonder how much additional funding was cut by Army machinations, in their desire to remain the premier arm of the state. The Navy, obviously, never received more than token interest compared to the other branches. And let's not forget, Germany did develop a few long-range bombers; specifically, the He 177 "Greif" (Griffon) comes to mind. But until late in the war, these were hobbled with the requirement that they be capable of dive-bombing, as well. This smacks of similar compromises in the US military which resulted from interservice rivalries; such as the nuclear barges mentioned in another posting today. - Bill ]
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (10/13/89)
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) >mod.note... The [WW2 German] >Navy, obviously, never received more than token interest compared to the >other branches. While there is a certain element of truth in this, remember also that the Navy was told to expect war no sooner than 1944. Five more years of peacetime preparation would have made quite a difference. Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu