[sci.military] Bf 109 vs. Fw 190; "Flying Tigers" and aircrew quality

military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) (10/14/89)

From: brspyr1.brs.com!miket (Mike Trout)
In sci.military Digest  Wednesday, 04 October, 1989  Volume 3 : Issue 11
A Military Hist. Major <JDO103@PSUVM.PSU.EDU> writes:

> I have read accounts by pilots who have flown the '190 and the '109 and
> nearly all said the '190 was the superior aircraft by far.

This should come as no surprise, since the Fw 190 was a considerably newer
plane than the Bf 109.  The Bf 109 first saw combat in the Spanish Civil War,
while the Fw 190's blooding took place three or four years later.  At least
some of the lessons of the Bf 109's success (the importance of speed and
firepower and the limited value of maneuverability) were incorporated into 
the design of the Fw 190.  And don't forget the improvement in technology 
during the war; the Bf 109's first engine had 610 horsepower, while engines 
of 2,000 hp and more were installed in many fighters (including the Fw 190) 
by the end of the war.  Comparing the Bf 109 and the Fw 190 isn't really 
fair; it's like comparing the F-4 Phantom and the F-15 Eagle.  They come 
from different times.

>   To whoever wrote about the pilot training being as significant as the
> aircraft being flown.  You are correct in this insight.  Take the Flying
> Tigers for example.  The flew against the Japanese "Zero" in old P-40's...
> and yet had an incredible kill ratio for the planes they flew.
> The "Zero" was faster and more maneuverable, yet were knocked down more
> often than the Tiger's.

While your basic point is correct, this isn't a very good illustrative 
example.  Japanese pilots, both of the Army and Navy, were the best in the 
world (until the massive losses at Midway and Guadalcanal).  Japanese 
fighter pilots operating in China were better pilots than the "Flying 
Tigers" pilots.  The reasons why the "Tigers" did so well were not really 
related to crew quality--although it is true that the "Tigers" were the best 
pilots the Japanese had ever faced up to that time.  There's not enough 
bandwidth to really get into an analysis of the "Tigers'" success, but 
suffice it to say that a superb ground warning system, brilliant deception 
methods, and Japanese failure to take the "Tigers" seriously were more 
important than the "Tigers" crew quality, which really didn't compare well to 
the Japanese anyway.  When P-40s and Zeros tangled later on more even terms, 
such as in the early fighting around New Guinea, the P-40s were slaughtered, 
despite the American use of "Tigers"-type flying tactics.  The price of
inferiority runs high. 

A better example of air crew importance would be combat between MiG-15s and
F-86s in the Korean War.  The two planes were extremely well matched; in fact,
they represent one of the few times in history when there was virtually 
nothing to choose between two adversarial aircraft (although some would grant 
a very slight edge to the MiG-15).  Despite this, F-86s shot down MiG-15s at a 
ratio of 15 to one.  The reason for this was the superb quality of US pilots 
(many of them battle-tested in WW2) and the dismal quality of North Korean and 
Chinese pilots (of whom many barely knew enough to pilot a biplane, much less 
a jet).

-- 
NSA food:  Iran sells Nicaraguan drugs to White House through CIA, SOD & NRO.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Michael Trout (miket@brspyr1)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BRS Information Technologies, 1200 Rt. 7, Latham, N.Y. 12110  (518) 783-1161
"Who watches the watchmen?" --Epigraph of the Tower Commission Report, 1987 

bob@uunet.UU.NET (Bob Boulanger) (10/18/89)

From: vrdxhq!verdix.com!bob@uunet.UU.NET (Bob Boulanger)

In article <10235@cbnews.ATT.COM> military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) writes:
>
>
>While your basic point is correct, this isn't a very good illustrative 
>example.  Japanese pilots, both of the Army and Navy, were the best in the 
>world (until the massive losses at Midway and Guadalcanal).  Japanese 
>fighter pilots operating in China were better pilots than the "Flying 
>Tigers" pilots.  The reasons why the "Tigers" did so well were not really 
>related to crew quality--although it is true that the "Tigers" were the best 
>pilots the Japanese had ever faced up to that time.  There's not enough 
>bandwidth to really get into an analysis of the "Tigers'" success, but 
>suffice it to say that a superb ground warning system, brilliant deception 
>methods, and Japanese failure to take the "Tigers" seriously were more 
>important than the "Tigers" crew quality, which really didn't compare well to 
>the Japanese anyway.  When P-40s and Zeros tangled later on more even terms, 
>such as in the early fighting around New Guinea, the P-40s were slaughtered, 
>despite the American use of "Tigers"-type flying tactics.  The price of
>inferiority runs high. 
>
General Claire Chennault might debate the point with you.  When the Flying
Tigers were originally formed, and known as the AVG, they had no virtually
no ties to the American military.  The pilots were "on loan" to Chennault,
and were not required to answer to U.S. military authorities.  Chennault
was also free to teach his radical methods of air engagment, which
accounted for many of the AVG victories over the Japanese.  This
progression can be seen from when the AVG first started and were routinely
beat up on to the point where Chennaults tenets started being believed in
and used by the pilots.  Their kill ratios improved considerably.

When the American military finally absorbed the Tigers and took over the
mission, many of Chennaults policies and practices re: air combat
engagement were thrown out the window and we returned to the old "tried and
true" methods.  Which in large part accounted for the slaughtering of our
P-40s.

Bob Boulanger