amoss%BATATA.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU (Amos Shapira) (10/25/89)
From: Amos Shapira <amoss%BATATA.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU>
One of the advantages of the German fighters was the fuel injection. The
Brits lacked it, and if a negative-G was applied to the plane (start of
dive), the engine would stutter or stop. This caused the British to develop
the invert/roll and dive technique.
A problem that confronted all of the Luftwaffe was continuous political
interference. Erhard Milch was one of the main backers of the Me-110.
In fact another fighter of a similar type (FW-187 Falke) was MUCH preferred
by the pilots of the squadron to which 7 planes of this type were given for
testing. Milch, upon hearing of the 'heresy', had the planes returned to
the plant.
The German offensive on Britain was badly conducted. Again, because of
political interference. In addition, some very peculiar decisions were
taken from time to time by the more immediate command echelons. A number
of British aircraft factories were bombed. However, they were not destroyed
completely, and often the higher command marked the plants as 'destroyed'
after only a single bombing sortie against them.
In fact, the Luftwaffe was NOT the proper tool for strategic bombing. It
lacked the planes to do the jobs. He-177 Grief and FW-200 Condor were either
not very reliable (He-177 was a flying torch cum casket) or too few.
As for the other side- for a very long time the Fighter Command (British)
demanded of its pilot to fly in close formations. The Germans used tactics
developed in the fighting in the Spanish civil war, and caused mayhem in the
British formations. Especially vulnerable were the 'Tail-end Charlies'.
Question: does anyone have access to the _claim_ and _credit_lists of both
sides? Every book I have access to states that the German PUBLIC claims were
high (for propaganda purposes), but the actual credits were extremely
accurate. On the other hand, the British, French and (especially) Italians
overclaimed both publicly and in the lists. The Brits in the Battle for
Britain overclaimed actual German losses by 100%.
Marc A. Volovic, Sgt (res.) amoss@batata.huji.ac.il
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+
The opinions contained herein are mine. The data contained herein is either
public knowledge or hearsay. Nothing I say is condoned by anyone. It is not
my fault. I wasn't here. IBM was.
+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+msmiller@gonzoville.East.Sun.COM (Mark Miller - Sun BOS Contractor) (10/28/89)
From: msmiller@gonzoville.East.Sun.COM (Mark Miller - Sun BOS Contractor)
In article <10574@cbnews.ATT.COM> you write:
:
:
:From: Amos Shapira <amoss%BATATA.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU>
:
: One of the advantages of the German fighters was the fuel injection. The
:Brits lacked it, and if a negative-G was applied to the plane (start of
:dive), the engine would stutter or stop. This caused the British to develop
:the invert/roll and dive technique.
The split-S move was not really a reaction to the lack of fuel
injection. Bunting over the way the Me109 would have to to gain an
edge would involve pulling negative-G's - jamming more blood into the
head. The human body can take less of this than it can of positive, so
a split-S into a dive is more physically posible. Also, the plane is
much happier pulling into a manouever than pushing into it. The escape
move the Germans used to take advantage of their fuel injection was
very unnatural to plane and pilot.
: A problem that confronted all of the Luftwaffe was continuous political
:interference. Erhard Milch was one of the main backers of the Me-110.
:In fact another fighter of a similar type (FW-187 Falke) was MUCH preferred
:by the pilots of the squadron to which 7 planes of this type were given for
:testing. Milch, upon hearing of the 'heresy', had the planes returned to
:the plant.
There was also the He-100 (or something like that) which could pull
almost 400mph in 1937. Did they go with that design? Hell no.
: The German offensive on Britain was badly conducted. Again, because of
:political interference. In addition, some very peculiar decisions were
:taken from time to time by the more immediate command echelons. A number
:of British aircraft factories were bombed. However, they were not destroyed
:completely, and often the higher command marked the plants as 'destroyed'
:after only a single bombing sortie against them.
When the Germans did actually hit primary airdromes, they had no idea
of the importortance of these targets. When they found out about these
targets later, they couldn't believe that primary air defense centers
would be housed in above-ground shacks.
: In fact, the Luftwaffe was NOT the proper tool for strategic bombing. It
:lacked the planes to do the jobs. He-177 Grief and FW-200 Condor were either
:not very reliable (He-177 was a flying torch cum casket) or too few.
The Condor was a comercial airliner reworked into a shipping raider.
It was very good in the role as long as nothing shot back.
: As for the other side- for a very long time the Fighter Command (British)
:demanded of its pilot to fly in close formations. The Germans used tactics
:developed in the fighting in the Spanish civil war, and caused mayhem in the
:British formations. Especially vulnerable were the 'Tail-end Charlies'.
:
: Question: does anyone have access to the _claim_ and _credit_lists of both
:sides? Every book I have access to states that the German PUBLIC claims were
:high (for propaganda purposes), but the actual credits were extremely
:accurate. On the other hand, the British, French and (especially) Italians
:overclaimed both publicly and in the lists. The Brits in the Battle for
:Britain overclaimed actual German losses by 100%.
:
:
: Marc A. Volovic, Sgt (res.) amoss@batata.huji.ac.il
:
I haven't seen actual lists, but I have seen copies of the paperwork
that Luftwaffe pilots needed to fill out to be awarded a kill. Very
detailed, witnesses needed - a real pain from the look of it.
-MSMhenry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (10/30/89)
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) >From: msmiller@gonzoville.East.Sun.COM (Mark Miller - Sun BOS Contractor) >... When they found out about these >targets later, they couldn't believe that primary air defense centers >would be housed in above-ground shacks. In particular, this played a considerable part in the German decision not to mount major attacks on British radar stations. The radar antennas themselves were difficult to attack. These were transmitting-tower types, not dishes, and the latticework towers were almost immune to anything but a direct hit. Direct hits required dive-bombing, which was hazardous in areas thick with towers and guy wires. And the Germans were positive that the electronics and operators would be deep underground and well protected, not in flimsy shacks on the surface (where they actually were). This mistaken impression was strengthened when some early attacks took the stations off the air only briefly; the Germans interpreted this as evidence that no significant damage was being done, when in fact the stations were being hurt seriously and the repair crews were improvising desperately. Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
shafer@drynix (Mary Shafer) (10/31/89)
From: Mary Shafer <shafer@drynix>
Another element in the British success in the Battle of Britain is the
"home field advantage".
When a British airplane was shot down over Britain, the crew was
frequently saved. It's a great deal easier to produce a new airplane
than to produce a new crew.
When Luftwaffe airplanes were shot down over Britain, both the
airplane and the crew were lost to the Germans.
Of course, the tables were turned when the Allies started bombing
Europe.
This same effect worked to the US's disadvantage in Viet Nam.
BTW, my uncle was a B-17 navigator who was shot down over Ploesti (in
_the_ raid) and smuggled out by the Resistance. When he rejoined the
US forces, he went back to flying almost immediately. Air crew were
very valuable.
--
Mary Shafer shafer@elxsi.dfrf.nasa.gov ames!elxsi.dfrf.nasa.gov!shafer
NASA Ames-Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA
Of course I don't speak for NASA