blaak@csri.toronto.edu (Raymond Blaak) (10/28/89)
From: blaak@csri.toronto.edu (Raymond Blaak) I recently asked Mike Trout about an article he posted where he mentioned German fighters having a kill ratio of about 1.4 to 1 in the Battle of Britain. I was interested in reasons for Britain having won that battle in light of superior German aircraft. Here is his reply: ----- From: miket@brspyr1.brs.com (Mike Trout) Subject: Battle of Britain Organization: BRS Information Technologies In article <8910191908.AA09438@yorkmills.csri.toronto.edu> you write: > It is interesting to hear your discussion about the superiority of the > Luftwaffe aircraft. It goes against the standard praising of the British > planes. > My question is, given this, what would you say the factors were that won the > Battle of Britain, in spite of the superior kill ratios of the German > fighters? Fighter kill ratios normally have little relevance to the grand scheme of things...I can't think of too many historical instances where kill ratios decided anything important. The same goes for a lot of other things that get a lot of attention in sci.military, such as pistols and fighting knives. In fact, I think you could triple or quadruple the Luftwaffe kill ratios, and the British would still have won. Why did the UK win the Battle of Britain? The Dupuy brothers give four reasons in their _Encyclopedia_of_Military_History_, and it so happens that I agree with them quite strongly on this. I find the Dupuys to be excellent analysts; their evaluations of warfare from 5000 B.C. all the way up to WW2 are brilliant. They do some good work on modern stuff, too; I loved their evaluation of the Yom Kippur War in which they contended that the Arabs won. The only problem I have with them is in some of their WW2 work, but when it comes to the Battle of Britain I think they're right on the mark. Here are their four reasons, and I'll follow up with my own comments: 1. The unshakeable British will to win. 2. Radar. 3. A flexible and authoritative ground control system. 4. German errors that dispersed Luftwaffe strength. 1. The British people were simply NOT going to let the Germans win this battle. You could remove the other three reasons and this one alone would be enough to ensure a British victory. Churchill knew that this was the most powerful weapon at his disposal. Although (statistically speaking) Britain was actually not bombed all that heavily compared to many other places during WW2, the important factor was that the more the Luftwaffe bombed, the more pissed off the British people became. While this factor seems to be true for aerial bombing in general, the British (and Viet Namese) seem especially good at defying death from above. I would also argue that even had this action taken place in some other venue, such as on land or sea, the British would have still prevailed--thanks to Churchill's undying hatred of Hitler and his ability to lead his nation into the ultimate crusade against evil. 2. The British advantages gained by radar have been well documented. When you have a fair idea of the offensive team's actions, you can adopt your defense to meet them. This allowed the British to do more with less. 3. British ground control gave orders to operational units, allowing quick changes to meet local conditions. Although the British ground control system is often overlooked, without it the radar advantage would have been meaningless. Spitfire and Hurricane units could be instantly ordered to exactly where they were needed, and could be quickly withdrawn from battle if things looked too dangerous. British commanders at the Battle of Britain possessed a flexibility almost unheard of in military history, before or since. 4. The numerous German errors have been discussed frequently. The switch of targets from RAF bases to cities was disastrous, although probably inevitable given Hitler's attitudes. Luftwaffe bombers roamed all over the place, dropping bombs on multiple assigned targets, rather than concentrating on a single target until results were achieved. Stung by heavy bomber losses, the Luftwaffe modified their fighter escort tactics, to the detriment of the overall mission. The Luftwaffe never adopted some of the most basic of military tenets...such as "select a single objective and attack it with mass, concentrated force". Further, I contend that even had Germany won the Battle of Britain, things probably would have turned out the same in the end. Let's assume that the RAF is destroyed and the Luftwaffe has air supremacy over England (this was theoretically possible but extremely unlikely, as the RAF's defensive stance allowed them to simply withdraw fighter units further north). Remember that the German goal here is neutralization of Britain. This is achievable only through amphibious invasion and victory using panzer and infantry forces. Even though British ground forces were badly shattered after Dunkerque, there was certainly enough left--not to mention badly-equipped but extremely hostile militia--to require a major German ground effort. As Overlord showed, you need an awful lot of ampib transport just to get a modest force across the Channel. That's the vulnerable point. It wouldn't take many British destroyers to raise holy hell with all those landing craft. Sure, the Luftwaffe would send most (or even all) of those destroyers to the bottom, but that's a bottom line that doesn't count. The only thing that matters is whether the Germans can get ashore in strength. And I don't see any realistic way the Germans could do that. At this time, the Royal Navy had a gigantic number of ships. They can send enough ships into the Channel to do the job, regardless of Luftwaffe-caused losses. The issue here is the survival of the UK, and Churchill would have been more than willing to sacrifice the Royal Navy to save England. ================================= Feel free to send this to sci.military if you wish. There must be a lot of transmission difficulties, as I miss a lot of issues. I never saw most of the German fighter discussion that I guess I started, and I missed all the issues from Oct. 9 to Oct. 20. Also, I will be leaving BRS Nov. 3, losing my connection with the net. I will miss it, especially sci.military. As a part-time student at RPI, I may have net connection ability, but I'm not certain about that. Thanks for asking me about the Battle of Britain. I always enjoy writing these articles. -- NSA food: Iran sells Nicaraguan drugs to White House through CIA, SOD & NRO. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Michael Trout (miket@brspyr1)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ BRS Information Technologies, 1200 Rt. 7, Latham, N.Y. 12110 (518) 783-1161 "Who watches the watchmen?" --Epigraph of the Tower Commission Report, 1987 > Ray Blaak
hhm@cbnewsd.ATT.COM (herschel.h.mayo) (11/01/89)
From: hhm@cbnewsd.ATT.COM (herschel.h.mayo) > Remember that > the German goal here is neutralization of Britain. This is achievable only >through amphibious invasion and victory using panzer and infantry forces. Even > though British ground forces were badly shattered after Dunkerque, there was > certainly enough left--not to mention badly-equipped but extremely hostile >militia--to require a major German ground effort. As Overlord showed, you need > an awful lot of ampib transport just to get a modest force across the Channel. >That's the vulnerable point. It wouldn't take many British destroyers to raise > holy hell with all those landing craft. Sure, the Luftwaffe would send most The Invasion of Britain by Macksay is a theoretical scenario of an invasion of Britain which changes only the time of the invasion, moving it up to May of 1940. He uses statistical analysis accounting for virtually all weapons, land sea, and air available to both sides to make a convincing argument that an invasion of Britain in that time frame would have been inevitably successful. He deals with a number of myths about German inability to launch an amphibious invasion, as well as how German navel power would have been sufficient to protect the invasion force against the Royal Navy. It makes for good reading. Larry Mayo [mod.note: The book is _Invasion: The German Invasion of England, July 1940_ by Kenneth Macksey (1980, Book Club Associates, London). - Bill ]