willner@cfa.harvard.edu (Steve Willner) (11/01/89)
From: willner@cfa.harvard.edu (Steve Willner) > From: miket@brspyr1.brs.com (Mike Trout) [Regarding British strategy and whether Germany could actually have invaded. Remember that an invasion seriously worried the British public and even the highest levels of the American government, which favored the British though the U.S. was still technically neutral.] > At this time, the Royal Navy had a gigantic number of ships. They can > send enough ships into the Channel to do the job, regardless of > Luftwaffe-caused losses. The issue here is the survival of the UK, and > Churchill would have been more than willing to sacrifice the Royal Navy > to save England. Churchill summarized this strategy as "Drown most of them [German troops] on the way over, and knock the survivors on the head as they crawl ashore." He, at least, seems to have been genuinely unworried by the possibility of invasion (as opposed to merely acting unworried to keep morale high). The only thing that I can see that could have defeated Britain - not just prevented their taking offensive action - would have been an effective blockade. Indeed, that was at least a part of the German naval strategy. Adm. Doenitz (commander of U-boats at the time) advocated a "tonnage war," in which he calculated that sinking 750,000 gross registered tons per month of shipping capacity would effectively isolate Britain. (I believe, but have not gone back to verify, that this figure was for after the U.S. entered the war.) In fact, in not a single month of the war was Doenitz' goal attained, although German estimates of Allied losses were often much higher. Further, the strategy itself was flawed, because it did not distinguish between full ships going east and empties going west, for example. (And there were other flaws.) Finally, the 750,000 tons per month rate was probably too low, because the U.S. probably could have produced ships even faster than that. Nevertheless, I suspect that a properly executed blockade strategy could eventually have forced a British surrender. Germany would probably have had to refrain from attacking the Soviet Union in order to have sufficient resources to devote to the struggle, and the strategy would have taken years rather than showing quick results. Fortunately, we'll never know for sure whether this kind of strategy would have worked, but I would welcome further discussion of the subject. The same strategic questions seem to apply to U.S. participation in any future European war. [Sources: official U.S. and British naval histories, Doenitz' and Churchill's memoirs; all read several years ago, so memory errors are entirely possible.] ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Willner Phone 617-495-7123 Bitnet: willner@cfa 60 Garden St. FTS: 830-7123 UUCP: willner@cfa Cambridge, MA 02138 USA Internet: willner@cfa.harvard.edu [mod.note: I find this topic as fascinating as anyone, I'm sure... but I'm afraid I'm going to have to curtail it. The volume of history postings is becoming, to my mind, too large, especially given that there's a good deal of more appropriate (i.e., technical) volume in the newsgroup at the moment. My policy has been to allow historical postings in moderation, volume permitting. Perhaps we can find another home for these discussions (including, BTW, the 50 Years Ago series). Suggestions, anyone ? - Bill ]