budden@manta.nosc.mil (Rex A. Buddenberg) (11/24/89)
From: budden@manta.nosc.mil (Rex A. Buddenberg) The bad firing mechanism story is a classic case of the torpedo designers <knowing> their work was good and not wanting to be confused by the facts. So a great deal of the reports coming from PacFlt were ignored at the SysCom (then BuWepss) level. It is quite likely that the cork getting pried out of the bottle came from the intel community -- specifically the codebreakers in Hawaii. The Japanese kept insisting on using ships that submarines had claimed sunk. They were also referring to the torpedo failures in the message traffic which was decoded by Rochefort, Layton et al. The signals intelligence stuff gets read at the CNO level, so with a bit of finishing of the intel, the case was put before Adm King. Suddenly, the Emperor's clothes came off and the problem got solved. Rex Buddenberg
johnhall@microsoft.UUCP (John Hall) (11/27/89)
From: johnhall@microsoft.UUCP (John Hall) In the book _Submarine Commander_ by Schwartz (I think I got it right) he has several comments on the bum WWII torpedos. He refused to maintain the torpedo engines (which were reliable) and had his crew look at the control / fuse mechanisms instead (a strict no-no by regulations.) The primary modification he made was increasing the tension on one of the components from 15# to about 50#. He had been told infomally that the tension had been wound up to 70# without breakage. He believed that the increased tension prevented sea water from entering the mechanism, and his ships had few problems. He also mentioned that most submariners like himself thought that testing the A bomb in the desert was a waste of beautiful scenery when the Naval torpedo station was available ...