siyt@cbnewsl.ATT.COM (p.jayne) (11/07/89)
From: siyt@cbnewsl.ATT.COM (p.jayne) When the subject of small carriers comes up, everyone assumes they need to perform the same missions as big ones. What about convoy escort? A small carrier with a few escorts ought to do just fine when it comes to escorting a small to medium size merchant convoy. Wasn't this the purpose of the Jeep carriers in WWII? Paul Jayne
terryr@ogccse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (11/08/89)
From: terryr@ogccse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <11197@cbnews.ATT.COM> siyt@cbnewsl.ATT.COM (p.jayne) writes: > > >From: siyt@cbnewsl.ATT.COM (p.jayne) > >When the subject of small carriers comes up, everyone assumes they need >to perform the same missions as big ones. Actually, very few people in the decision making loop make that assumption. The problem with small carriers is deciding what missions can be safely sone with them. Yes jeep carriers were used for convoy escort and amphibious support, but under limited conditions. The problem is the usual question about the applicability of yesterday's war for today's combat. In WWII, the allied convoys did not have to face a serious air threat. Today, in the North Atlantic they might have to face massed bomber attacks. Look at the British performance off the Falklands. Even with all the advantages the Argentines faced, they still damaged a large part of the British fleet. There are other examples; air support off Korea and Vietnam. In these situations the carriers never faced a serious threat to their security, so smaller carriers may have been sufficient. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know if the defensive ability of the carrier battle groups deterred any attacks. The arguments go on and on. A related discussion is the cost of operating the ships. Smaller carriers would not probably be nuclear powered. In a simple analysis, this results in cheaper operating costs. But after considering all the support requirements (less time on station for refueling, more support vessels to carry the extra fuel, more escorts for the oilers, etc) they may cost much more. In view of a shrinking defense budget, where is this money going to come from? It is particularly difficult to justify small carriers to congress when everyone admits they have less capability. Added to which, there is no clear cut mission for which they are capable, and a better choice than a supercarrier. This position pains me. As I was a surface sailor, I don't like carriers :-). -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogc.edu
jln@portia.Stanford.EDU (Jared Nedzel) (11/08/89)
From: jln@portia.Stanford.EDU (Jared Nedzel) In article <11197@cbnews.ATT.COM> siyt@cbnewsl.ATT.COM (p.jayne) writes: > > >From: siyt@cbnewsl.ATT.COM (p.jayne) > >When the subject of small carriers comes up, everyone assumes they need >to perform the same missions as big ones. >What about convoy escort? >A small carrier with a few escorts ought to do just fine when it comes >to escorting a small to medium size merchant convoy. I must disagree with this. In order to adequately protect itself (and it's) convoy from air, sea, and sub attack, a carrier must be able to carry a large number of specialized planes. To deal with an air attack, it needs to carry a number of AWACS planes and a number of interceptors. To deal with a submarine attack, it needs to carry a number of anti-submarine aircraft (such as S-3 Trackers). To deal with a surface attack, it needs to carry attack aircraft (such as A-6 Intruders). For search and rescue, it needs to carry helicopters. Before long, you're talking about quite a few aircraft and you'll need a large ship to hold them. There are many other constraints that deal with the design of a carrier (some of which were discussed here some time ago) such as: - number of catapults - length of catapults - number and position of elevators - size of the hangar deck - size of type of powerplant - required speed As these variables get reduced, the effeciency of aircraft carrier is greatly reduced. As was seen in the Falklands war, a small carrier with VTOL aircraft and no AWACS capability cannot attain air superiority, which is necessary to protect a convoy. As a result, the Royal Navy lost a number of ships (and could have lost a few more if the Argentine planes had had more retarded bombs). > Paul Jayne -- Jared L. Nedzel --------------------------------------------------------------------- e-mail: nedzel@cive.stanford.edu jln@portia.stanford.edu
mcgrew@topaz.rutgers.edu (Charles) (11/08/89)
From: mcgrew@topaz.rutgers.edu (Charles)
Paul Jayne writes:
When the subject of small carriers comes up, everyone assumes they
need to perform the same missions as big ones. What about convoy
escort?
Hmm... assuming that the role would be similar to WWII-era jeeps
(whose role was actually more that of ferrying planes to the big boys,
'escort' carriers did convoy duty, as I recall) - that of subhunting
and long-range (against FW-200's, He-111's, like that) anti-air; a
helicopter carrier (why use F-18's?) would probably be more in order.
Most ships these can do anti-air duty (just give the merchantmen
hand-held infantry AA weapons, if nothing else).
I think the big/little carrier debate now raging is over
fleet-carrier role, since that's what little carriers would be doing.
Charleshenry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (11/17/89)
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) >From: jln@portia.Stanford.EDU (Jared Nedzel) >As was seen in the Falklands war, a small carrier with VTOL aircraft and >no AWACS capability cannot attain air superiority, which is necessary >to protect a convoy. As a result, the Royal Navy lost a number of ships... Note that the British carriers do now have AWACS capability, using radar helicopters. They would have been in use in the Falklands if the war had lasted a month or two longer. They're not as good as fixed-wing aircraft, but on the other hand they can operate from the flight deck of a destroyer in a pinch. The British *had* air superiority in the Falklands whenever they had aircraft in the right place. The Harriers worked just fine as fighters; the big problem was the lack of early warning, which made it difficult to put them in the right place at the right time. Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
terryr@ogccse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (11/18/89)
From: terryr@ogccse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <11495@cbnews.ATT.COM> henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes: > > >From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) > >The British *had* air superiority in the Falklands whenever they had >aircraft in the right place. The Harriers worked just fine as fighters; >the big problem was the lack of early warning, which made it difficult >to put them in the right place at the right time. The issue of Harrier performance is not so cut and dried. I have read claims (maybe from Argentine Apologists) that the Skyhawks and Mirages didn't have time on station for aerial combat. For most of their missions they had barely enough time for one run and turning around. The Mirages (Daggers) had to use large drop tanks that precluded supersonic flight. So you have a delta-winged fighter with its high wing loading, not able to use the primary advantage of its design, high speed. Given all that, you are right when the Harriers were in position they had air superiority. But that doesn't make them air superiority fighters. --- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogc.edu
frank0@ibmpcug.co.uk (Frank Dunn) (11/21/89)
From: Frank Dunn <frank0@ibmpcug.co.uk> The Skyhawks were attack aircraft. The Mirages and Daggers , with a greater unrefuelled range, were the fighters. Supposedly providing cover for the Skyhawks. Often they stayed high and didn't mix it with the Sea Harriers. Of course its a fallacy to assume air superiority is the ability to dominate airspace constantly. Its time and area limited. Most times the RN managed to provide it when it was required. When they couldn't the Skyhawks proved their worth. -- Automatic Disclaimer: The views expressed above are those of the author alone and may not represent the views of the IBM PC User Group.
military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) (11/23/89)
From: att!utzoo!henry >From: terryr@ogccse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) >>The British *had* air superiority in the Falklands whenever they had >>aircraft in the right place. The Harriers worked just fine as fighters... > >The issue of Harrier performance is not so cut and dried. I have read >claims (maybe from Argentine Apologists) that the Skyhawks and Mirages >didn't have time on station for aerial combat... They were, by and large, operating near the limits of their range. The Harriers were operating at quite considerable range too, however, since the carriers were being held as far east as possible to keep *them* out of easy range of the mainland. >The Mirages (Daggers) had to use large drop tanks that precluded >supersonic flight. So you have a delta-winged fighter with its high >wing loading, not able to use the primary advantage of its design, high >speed... The Harrier wing loading is considerable, too. And supersonic speed is of virtually no use in air combat, which is why modern fighters are increasingly giving low priority to maximum speed. *Sustained* high speed would be useful, but only a few specialized interceptors like the Foxbat can do that. Certainly the Mirage and Dagger can't. More to the point, after a few air-combat engagements very early on, the Harriers were facing mostly aircraft configured for, and pilots trained for, ground attack rather than air combat. This had a lot to do with the very lopsided kill ratio. Actually, the British pilots were not too worried about the supersonic speed of their opponents; dealing with that is just a matter of attacking where the other guy is weak, not where he's strong. What *did* worry them was a war of attrition against superior numbers, a prospect that never materialized. >Given all that, you are right when the Harriers were in position >they had air superiority. But that doesn't make them air superiority >fighters. Actually, if you talk to the USMC, they'll tell you that Harriers make dandy air-superiority fighters. They are small and have relatively smoke-free engines, which makes them hard to see. They are reasonably maneuverable -- the powerful engine makes up for high wing loading to a considerable extent -- and accelerate quickly. The lack of supersonic speed is largely irrelevant. The current Harriers are not terribly good *interceptors*, but that's a different issue. For that they would need better range (difficult), better radar and missiles (in the works), and better AWACS support (partially done). Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
shafer@drynix (Mary Shafer) (11/28/89)
From: Mary Shafer <shafer@drynix>
Henry Spencer writes:
They [the Argentinian aircraft] were, by and large, operating near the
limits of their range. The Harriers were operating at quite
considerable range too, however, since the carriers were being held as
far east as possible to keep *them* out of easy range of the mainland.
I had the pleasure of hearing a Harrier driver who was in the
Falklands War speak to the Society of Experimental Test Pilots and
also had a chance to discuss the range question with him.
The Harriers used "Forward Ground Loitering" with great success. The
Harriers flew from the carriers to forward air strips on the Islands
themselves. These forward air strips were just steel mats and rubber
fuel tanks, dropped off by helicopter. The Harriers could carry a
heavy ordnance load since they refueled on the ground and could make
short, rather than vertical, takeoffs.
They'd sit in alert status and take off when incoming aircraft were
reported. After they sortied, they'd come back and refuel. I believe
that rearming also occurred, but on a limited basis. (I can't refer
to the Proceedings, because there's no written version.)
The British also had the advantage of being over "home" territory.
He felt that this was an important psychological advantage.
BTW, the aircraft capacity of a carrier is determined by what's called
the "spotting factor" which is a measure of the deck real estate
occupied by a particular aircraft. The standard is an A-7, with a
spotting factor of 1.0, and all other aircraft are measured in
reference to this. I vaguely remember that the F-14's spotting factor
is about 1.6-1.8 and the F-18's is somewhat lower. Spotting factors
are measured with wings folded or swept. The F-8 Oblique Wing
Aircraft that was seriously proposed a few years ago had a spotting
factor of 0.7, which was very important to the Navy. The hangar deck
is always too small.