mrchards@uxe.cso.uiuc.edu (Matt Richards) (11/28/89)
From: Matt Richards <mrchards@uxe.cso.uiuc.edu> I have just finished reading the book _Military_Incompetence: Why_the_American_Military_Doesn't_Win by Richard A. Gabriel. Has this book been discussed in this forum before? For those who have not read the book, it consists of seven chapters. The first describes the problems Gabriel sees with the American military. The next five chapters each deal in depth with one of the following operations: the attempt to rescue POW's at Sontay, the Mayaguez incident, the Iranian rescue attempt, the Marines in Beirut, and the invasion of Grenada. The last chapter makes some specific recommendations for reform, including fewer officers, reinstating the draft, less "turbulence" in assignments (moving people around less), slower promotions, and moving retirement from 20 to 30 years of service. Has there been movement towards any of these ideas? He also mentions that one needs a 3 to 1 ratio when attacking an enemy in prepared defense. I readily admit that my only battle experience was a long time ago, one-on-one on the playground. However, I thought that this 3 to 1 ratio had long been dismissed as an over simplification. Another interesting number: "Experience suggests that a corps that ranges between 3 and 6 percent of total strength is the most effective in battle." By corps, he is referring to the officer corps. Comments?
flak@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Dan Flak) (12/01/89)
From: mcgp1!flak@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Dan Flak) In article <11763@cbnews.ATT.COM>, mrchards@uxe.cso.uiuc.edu (Matt Richards) writes: > > > From: Matt Richards <mrchards@uxe.cso.uiuc.edu> > I have just finished reading the book _Military_Incompetence: > Why_the_American_Military_Doesn't_Win by Richard A. Gabriel. > > Another interesting number: "Experience suggests that a corps > that ranges between 3 and 6 percent of total strength is the > most effective in battle." By corps, he is referring to the > officer corps. Comments? It depends upon the mission of the unit. Most of my background has been with flying units. To be a pilot or navigator, you must be an officer. (I won't argue why/why not here). Therfore, flying units are officer "heavy". Indeed, fighter units which only have pilots (and possibly navigators) will be almost 100% officer with a few enlisted administative personnel. For units with enlisted crew positions (e.g. Airlift, Bomber, Refueling, etc.) the ratio is about 50-50. I also did an active duty tour at AF Systems Command, Electroics Systems Division (ESD), at Hanscom AFB. The main job there was acquiring Electronics Equipment for Air Force use. Most of the positions there required an Electrical Engineer degree. It's hard to fill enlisted ranks with E.E.'s. (Not too many E.E.'s are willing to settle for E-4 pay). The breakout there was 67% civilian 33% officer. Now, I'm in the Air National Guard. I am part of a non-flying unit which engineers and installs communications and navigation factilites world wide. Our "mix" is 1 full time officer, 17 full time enlisted, 9 "weekend" officers and 213 "weekend" enlisted. My personal perception is that Guard units have a higher quality NCO than their active duty counterparts. This may be due to several reasons: They stay put. Some of our NCOs have been in the same career field for 20 - 30 years. Some of them have been with the unit that long! They are there because they want to be there. There are other weekend jobs, so why pick one that may send you to Korea in the middle of the winter? They get the latest training from their civilian employer in related fields. Since a lot of our work is telephone, it's not surprising that many of our Guardspersons have "day jobs" with AT&T, Pacific NW Bell, etc. They are froced to be better (higher expectations). My "full timer" (Air Technician) is the guy who keeps things going between drill weekends. Even if I were the type of manager who didn't like to delegate, I am forced to do so. I have to give him a very "long leash" and trust him. (This experience, alone, has made me a better civilian manager). On the drill weekend, there is simply too much going on to even monitor it all in "real time". I find out about most of my "problems" after they've been fixed. If you don't empower your people, you don't get things done. The key to military success is the same as the one for civilian success: Get good people. Train and equip them. Give them a job to do, and get out of the way and let them do it. Too many military "leaders" (particularly Army) are unwilling to relinquish control. Let people do things on their own and they make mistakes -- they also make progress. DANIEL J. FLAK, Maj., WAANG OIC Engineering also (Former FAC, C-141 Pilot, ESD Program Manager, C-130 Aircraft Commander) -- Dan Flak - McCaw Cellular Communications Inc., 201 Elliot Ave W., Suite 105, Seattle, Wa 98119, 206-283-2658, (usenet: thebes!mcgp1!flak)
bobtl%toolbox.wv.tek.com@RELAY.CS.NET (12/01/89)
From: bobtl%toolbox.wv.tek.com@RELAY.CS.NET >From: Matt Richards <mrchards@uxe.cso.uiuc.edu> >I have just finished reading the book _Military_Incompetence: >Why_the_American_Military_Doesn't_Win by Richard A. Gabriel. >Has this book been discussed in this forum before? I read this book, very interesting. Actually, the implications can be quite terrifying. However, I had to take it with a grain of salt. Forgive me, it has been too long since I read it to remember specifics, but I am uncomfortable with several pieces of his analysis. The symptoms described in these missions could have different causes than what he derives. > The last chapter makes some >specific recommendations for reform, including fewer officers, >people around less), slower promotions, and moving retirement >from 20 to 30 years of service. > >Has there been movement towards any of these ideas? I have seen movement to stabilize command tours, but little else within the last ten years. The army seems to be reducing its selection rate (forcing officers out of the service) to keep the time required for promotion constant. However, maybe somebody closer to the subject (still on active duty) could better answer this question. I can see two ways of causing such change 1) Convince the flag officers that grew up with the current system that the benefits justify the change. My current cynical belief is "I wish you lots of luck". Gabriel raised this issue in an earlier book, "Crisis in Command". 2) Force change through civilian control of the military. I can see this happening, particularly considering the budget reductions looming on the horizon. A real useful measure here is the percentage of officer, with emphasis on flag officer, slots lost vs. total force reduction.
rdd@cs.utexas.edu (Robert Dorsett) (12/04/89)
From: walt.cc.utexas.edu!rdd@cs.utexas.edu (Robert Dorsett) In article <11861@cbnews.ATT.COM> bobtl%toolbox.wv.tek.com@RELAY.CS.NET writes: >> The last chapter makes some >>specific recommendations for reform, including fewer officers, >>people around less), slower promotions, and moving retirement >>from 20 to 30 years of service. >> >>Has there been movement towards any of these ideas? > >I have seen movement to stabilize command tours, but little else within >the last ten years. The army seems to be reducing its selection rate >(forcing officers out of the service) to keep the time required for >promotion constant. However, maybe somebody closer to the subject >(still on active duty) could better answer this question. Officer-purges are cyclic in all the services. The bean counters occasionally discover that they have too many officers, and start incentive programs to get rid of them (this aside from the automatic dismissals when officers fail to get promoted within certain time constraints). Then when they do get rid of the surplus, they usually find they overdid it, leaving them with few officers, and go into panic mode--resulting in quick promotions (this is particularly absurd in military aviation--during all the carping about a military pilot shortage the past couple of years, a couple of these "purges" were launched by the bean counters. It's hard to reconcile these patterns with Gabriel's thesis that fewer officers result in an optimized military force--I doubt that's what the military has in mind. :-) As for retirement, screwing around with that is a Bad Idea. Retirement (and associated benefits) are a MAJOR carrot in inducing people to remain with the military. Screw with it even ONCE, and it'd take years to recover. Increasing the term of service before retirement would require that the payoff be increased considerably (say, retirement at full salary), or you'll find people that won't try. Increasing the service-time before retirement would also discourage people from long service periods (it is, for example, conceivable that a military pilot could be hired by an airline while in his late 30's/early 40's and still have a productive civil life, but not if he's in his late 40's/early 50's). In all, Gabriel's book, as described, doesn't sound very realistic. Qualified people are not going to enter into situations that are high-risk/ low-reward, which means that people who CAN be recruited will be of lower calibre. Robert Dorsett Internet: rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu UUCP: ...cs.utexas.edu!rascal.ics.utexas.edu!rdd