flak@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Dan Flak) (11/27/89)
From: mcgp1!flak@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Dan Flak)
LOW TECH WARFARE - PART I
Americans live in a robot society. Rather than do work ourselves,
we build machines to do the work for us. We fight wars with
machines rather than people. We often solve simple problems with
complex solutions and it's difficult for us to imagine what good
honest hard physical labor can do.
During the Vietnam conflict, a great deal of emphasis was spent
trying to interdict the maze of road networks know as the "Ho Chi
Minh" trail. The effort met with mixed results.
RF-4C aircraft gave interesting "before and after" pictures of
airstike missions. The expectation was that without heavy
equipment, which we knew the enemy didn't have*, the road could
not be repaired. About 2 hours after a road cut, reconnaissance
photographs showed a team of approximately two dozen workers with
shovels and rakes working with the gravel provided by the bomb to
fill in the crater. About 4 to 6 hours later, the road would be
completely repaired.
It appears that the local residents of the area paid part of
their "taxes" in labor. By day, they were farmers, when an
airstrike was in progress, they were gunners, when the airstrike
was over, they called in their neighbors from miles around (or
went to a neighbor down the street) to work on the road, when the
NVA came through they were inn keepers, when a convoy stopped by,
they operated a truck stop.
* At Diem Bien Phu, the French commander decided that encamping
in a valley surrounded by mountains was not a dangerous
situation. The Viet Minh did not have heavy artillery, and even
if they did, they didn't have the heavy equipment to get it up
into the hills. They did have the artillery, (U.S. surplus given
to them in WWII for use against the Japanese), and as film
documents showed, they used ropes, chocks and "coolies" to get
the artillery pieces up the mountains.
With this in mind I was still surprised when I asked my Korean
liaison for assistance in moving a stack of pallets (about 500
lbs) from one section of the ramp at a remote airfield to another
to make room for incoming aircraft. I expected him to scrounge up
a fork lift. Instead he got 10 ROK privates (5 per side) who
grabbed hold and "shuffled" the pallets into position.
--
Dan Flak - McCaw Cellular Communications Inc., 201 Elliot Ave W.,
Suite 105, Seattle, Wa 98119, 206-283-2658, (usenet: thebes!mcgp1!flak)wrf@mab.ecse.rpi.edu (Wm Randolph Franklin) (11/30/89)
From: wrf@mab.ecse.rpi.edu (Wm Randolph Franklin) In <11729@cbnews.ATT.COM> mcgp1!flak@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Dan Flak) writes: > LOW TECH WARFARE - PART I > >Americans live in a robot society. Rather than do work ourselves, >we build machines to do the work for us. We fight wars with >machines rather than people. We often solve simple problems with >complex solutions and it's difficult for us to imagine what good >honest hard physical labor can do. It would be interesting to compile a list of battles that were won by one side doing something the other thought was physically impossible. Besides Dien Bien Phu and the Ho CHi Minh trail, other examples include - Burgoyne getting guns up a mountain overlooking Ft. Ticonderoga, - some Mainers doing the same thing to Ft. Louisburg on Cape Breton Is. in the 17th century, - the Germans driving tanks through the Ardennes. - Patton moving so fast in the Battle of the Bulge. -- Wm. Randolph Franklin Internet: wrf@ecse.rpi.edu (or @cs.rpi.edu) Bitnet: Wrfrankl@Rpitsmts Telephone: (518) 276-6077; Telex: 6716050 RPI TROU; Fax: (518) 276-6261 Paper: ECSE Dept., 6026 JEC, Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst, Troy NY, 12180
terryr@ogccse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (12/04/89)
From: terryr@ogccse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <11823@cbnews.ATT.COM> wrf@mab.ecse.rpi.edu (Wm Randolph Franklin) writes: > >It would be interesting to compile a list of battles that were won by >one side doing something the other thought was physically impossible. >Besides Dien Bien Phu and the Ho CHi Minh trail, other examples include > It will be a long list. Almost by definition, such a list will include most battles where one side had surprise. I believe the intent was to describe a difference in mentality between industrialized people and less developed cultures. This is a more fundemental distinction than merely doing something the other side thought physically impossible. In working with third world militaries I have made the same observation, that in many cases where would simply wait for an available machine, these people just go and do it. On several occasions I did the same thing with my people. We needed to get something done and we just used human strength to do it. You should have seen the strange looks we got from other people. Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogc.edu
amos@decwrl.dec.com (Amos Shapir) (12/05/89)
From: nsc!taux01.nsc.com!amos@decwrl.dec.com (Amos Shapir) In article <11914@cbnews.ATT.COM> terryr@ogccse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) writes: >In >working with third world militaries I have made the same observation, that >in many cases where [ I ] would simply wait for an available machine, these >people just go and do it. On several occasions I did the same thing with >my people. We needed to get something done and we just used human strength >to do it. You should have seen the strange looks we got from other people. You have just hit upon the reason why US troop can never win a war in the Third World. Don't tell the Pentagon. -- Amos Shapir amos@taux01.nsc.com, amos@nsc.nsc.com National Semiconductor (Israel) P.O.B. 3007, Herzlia 46104, Israel Tel. +972 52 522261 TWX: 33691, fax: +972-52-558322 GEO: 34 48 E / 32 10 N
gary@uunet.UU.NET (Gary Corby) (12/05/89)
From: munnari!softway.oz.au!gary@uunet.UU.NET (Gary Corby) wrf@mab.ecse.rpi.edu (Wm Randolph Franklin) writes: >It would be interesting to compile a list of battles that were won by >one side doing something the other thought was physically impossible. >Besides Dien Bien Phu and the Ho CHi Minh trail, other examples include >[etc] The Persians at Thermopylae. They made a night climb up one side of the pass, thus enabling them to come down on the Greeks posted to cover the flank.
kiravuo@kampi.hut.fi (Timo Kiravuo) (12/05/89)
From: kiravuo@kampi.hut.fi (Timo Kiravuo) Finland is not exactly a low-tech country, but neither are we as machinebound as the US. A big difference is that we have a conscript army, so manpower is more plentiful and not as trained as in some professional armies. Transport is maybe most interesting thing. Each man is usually issued a bike and skis. At least in peacetime, when stores are plentiful. At winter you can go anywhere with skis and at summer a bike can get you to places where no four-wheeled machine will go. Also both are rather silent and simple to use. In case of war farm tractors are most likely to used for transport, trucks also. But those things are never counted on. They are used if available, but the war is supposed to go on without. Myself I was in coastal artillery, and though we sometimes had to transport heavy ammuniton, I can't remember ever seeing a forklift. If it is heavy, use two men, if it is really heavy, use more men. :-) A six-inhcers's grenade weighs about 100 lbs and those were loaded by hand, by one man. Especially strong men were selected for that job. It is faster that way, too. Some of our more modern guns have automatic loaders, but who can afford to modernize everything? These Russian (not Soviet, Russian really) guns have worked well for over half a century, no need to change something that works. Winter fighting is also quite low tech. Sleeping bags are too expensive and require too much care. Not to mention having individual tents. Just take one big tent and a wood burning stove. Wood is plentiful in most parts of the country and you need only a blanket for each man. (And hope that the enemy does not have infrared equipment.) Getting cold? Well, there are usually always old newspapers available, put those under your clothes. We is currently planning to renew our fighters. Every US fighter has palyed itself out by being too high-tech. We need a plane that can use country roads as airfield and does not require too much ground crew. Swedish JAS has about the right idea, but it won't be ready in time, I'm afraid. French Mirage (don't know the model) is quite likely to be selected. A small country with a limited budget and few professional people can not afford to be too technical. Also there are many advantages in that. Not as many things to break or cause trouble. If you stay low-tech, you don't have such a high fall, when everything breaks. -- Timo Kiravuo Helsinki University of Technology, Computing Center work: 90-451 4328, home: 90-676 076 kiravuo@hut.fi sorvi::kiravuo kiravuo%hut.fi@uunet.uu.net
ejp@uunet.UU.NET (Esmond Pitt) (12/06/89)
From: munnari!bohra.cpg.oz.au!ejp@uunet.UU.NET (Esmond Pitt) In article <11823@cbnews.ATT.COM> wrf@mab.ecse.rpi.edu (Wm Randolph Franklin) writes: >> LOW TECH WARFARE - PART I > >It would be interesting to compile a list of battles that were won by >one side doing something the other thought was physically impossible. How about: Hannibal brings elephants across the Alps Napoleon crosses the Alps in winter Lawrence takes Akaba from the rear by crossing the Nefu desert. -- Esmond Pitt, Computer Power Group ejp@bohra.cpg.oz
flak@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Dan Flak) (12/09/89)
From: mcgp1!flak@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Dan Flak)
LOW TECH WARFARE - PART III
Having determined that road cuts made with heavy bombs, and
seeding the roadway with CBU "bomblets" weren't always an
effective means of denying the enemy use of a road, the Air Force
put the wizards at Wright Patterson Air Force Base on the task.
The result, after millions of dollars of R&D funds, was the Air
Delivered, Magnetic Proximity Fuse Mine. Once again, F-4's would
fly over the trail. Once again, they would lay down a rectangular
pattern of ordinance. This time, the payload was designed to
destroy, rather than damage its target.
The mine worked on a magnetic principle. It armed when it
detected the approach of metal. It remained armed as long as the
magnetic attraction increased. As soon as the magnetic attraction
decreased, or if the mine were distrubed, the mine detonated. The
theory was that the mine would go off at the vehicle's closest
approach.
The countermeasure was simple. Charlie walked up to the mine,
wrapped a chain around it, and walked away. There they sit to
this very day waiting for the "truck" parked on top of them to
move away.
--
Dan Flak - McCaw Cellular Communications Inc., 201 Elliot Ave W.,
Suite 105, Seattle, Wa 98119, 206-283-2658, (usenet: thebes!mcgp1!flak)Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) (12/09/89)
From: Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz)
Its interesting to finally see someone in the US start to
recognise the over-reliance of the US military on the use of
technology to produce a solution to a military problem. In
Vietnam it was obvious that the US Army had a policy of pushing
its forces as far into enemy territory as possible. Using them
as bait to draw the enemy into combat and then attempting to
defeat them with superior firepower.
This sort of policy resulted in numerous ambushes and
attacks on the US patrols and positions producing very large
numbers of US casualties. Usually the Vietnamese were able to
make full use of their advantages of surprise and escape before
the superior US firepower could be brought to bear on them
(admittedly when it did catch them they did suffer similar sorts
of casualties). With the result that they usually inflicted far
more casaulties than they received.
Its interesting to contrast this sort of strategy with that
employed by the Australian forces in Vietnam. Whereas the US
Army would move in large formations noisily through the bush
alerting the Vietnamese to their presence and inviting
retaliation. The Australians on the other hand took a different
tack and made full use of their experience gained in WWII, Malaya
and Borneo fighting against the Japanese and other insurgent
movements. We went into the forest and attempted to fight in a
similar manner to the enemy and beat them at their own game. The
result was that the VC forces in Phuc Thui(?sp) province were
unable to operate effectively and by 1969 were no longer
considered a significant threat. When this was coupled with a
highly effective "hearts and minds" campaign the province was
considered so well pacified that it was possible for the
Australian task force to be deployed out of the province during
the Tet offensive to the north of Saigon. After the end of the
offensive they once more returned to their own province and
continued to control the area, denying it to the enemy by the use
of offensive patrolling until our final withdrawal in 1972.
When in the Army here in Australia we were always taught in
as to the superiority of these sort of tactics when compared to
those employed by the US Army. Which is why we are taught never
to have radios blaring on full volume. Always to move extremely
quietly and other similar little things which make sure you see
the enemy first and kill him before he sees you.
By my reading of military history it seems that the US has
always sought a technological solution to the problems of war and
this is becoming if anything even worse with the new emphasis on
the wonders of the silicon revolution. One wonders though what
would happen today if the US once more found itself embroiled in
another so-called, "low-intensity conflict," like Vietnam. Would
any of the lessons learned there about the political-military
interface be taken to heart, or would we have another war in
which soldiers would be seen saying on TV that, "we had to
destroy it to save it"? More scenes of free-fire zones which
only serve to alienate the local population and drive them into
the insurgent's arms? More "reconnaissance by fire" where its
believed if you carpet bomb an area it becomes pacified? Or
rather would we see the American soldiers abandoning all their
comforts of home, their ice-cream, their rations and clean
uniforms being delivered into the field whilst on operations, and
instead taking the battle to the enemy on his own terms and
trying to win the peoples, "hearts and minds," instead of killing
him in the belief that the, "only good commie is a dead one"?
I'd be interested to read the responses.
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|
Brian Ross |Snail Mail:-
"Bill Bracket the self-made man who came|
in a a packet" | Brian Ross
----------------------------------------| Sociology Dept.R.S.S.S.
E-Mail Addresses:- bxr307@coombs.anu.oz | Australian National University
| CANBERRA,A.C.T.,2601,
bxr307@csc.anu.oz | AUSTRALIA
|
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-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (12/12/89)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12150@cbnews.ATT.COM> Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) writes: > > >From: Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) > Its interesting to finally see someone in the US start to >recognise the over-reliance of the US military on the use of >technology to produce a solution to a military problem. In >Vietnam it was obvious that the US Army had a policy of pushing >its forces as far into enemy territory as possible. Using them >as bait to draw the enemy into combat and then attempting to >defeat them with superior firepower. Actually elements of the US military made that relization many years ago. Part of the problem was (is) that the militarty's reason for existence was a European war. Everything was justified in those terms, and much of the training was geared towards that end. It was only natural that commanders in Vietnam tried to adapt their training to the situation. That training emphasized firepower and destruction of the enemy. Obviously out of place in a low intensity conflict (LIC). Some elements of the military responded admirably to the demands of LIC. The original conception of the army special forces was certainly not high-tech. The original SEAL teams were low tech groups of individuals, although lately they seem to have been bitten by the high-tech bug. They used some high-tech equipment but the bulk of their work was done with weapons no more advanced than Stoners and rubber boats. The entirety of the USN riverine and coastal forces was low-tech and low budget. PBR's were based on a commercially available stock hull. PCF's were based on a commercial work boat. The only new keel up design was the ASPB, and it was admirably suited to riverine work. The air force also broke out of the European mold with the AC-47, AC-119, and AC-130 series of gunships. These airplanes are only usable where you have locally guarenteed control of the air, such as in most LIC. > By my reading of military history it seems that the US has >always sought a technological solution to the problems of war and >this is becoming if anything even worse with the new emphasis on >the wonders of the silicon revolution. One wonders though what The US has much company in seeking technological solutions to the problems of war. It seems that much of military history is highlighted by just that development; Greek fire, the Roman Corvus, heavy armored cavalry, the crossbow, the longbow, the musket, the bayonet, the machine gun, the tank, etc. I think you are refering to 2 separate phenomena. First, the US has relied on strategies of attrition and resource denial (hardly surprising for the great capitalistic nation :-). Hence the military's fascination with firepower and body counts (granted the body counts were a manifestation of the analytical managerial mindset introduced by MacNamara). Second is a reliance on the most advanced technology. When development cycles were shorter this wasn't a problem. It gave us such palnes as the P-51, P-38, and B-29 , and ships such as the Iowa class BB's in WWII. Today this reliance gives us the B-2, Aegis, and the DIVAD. Part of the problem is that technology is advancing so fast that the antiquated procurement system can't generate the requirements fast enough to keep pace with development. So weapons are developed in the blind (that is doctrine doesn't drive the development). When the weapons are delivered the services then have to find some use for them, or they have to spend years sorting out the bugs because the designers couldn't foresee every possibility. Your question is still valid, what affect will this mindset have if the US enters another LIC. For example, the USN SEALs needed a new long range boat. The ordered a high tech boat that was large, fast, and powerful. What they needed was something that was hard to find, so SEAL squads could be inserted covertly. They are still looking. Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
flak@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Dan Flak) (12/14/89)
From: mcgp1!flak@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Dan Flak)
LOW TECH WARFARE - PART IV
This story comes to me from a FAC friend of mine one of whose
jobs was to monitor the flow of traffic through his area. His
task was somewhat simplified by the fact that a lot of this
traffic had to go over a small wooden bridge. So, about once
every other week, he'd order an airstrike on the bridge, destroy
it, and wait until it was nearly rebuilt, and order another
airstrike.
His suspicions were aroused when construction on the bridge was
suddenly halted just short of completion. There was about a 10
meter gap in the bridge midstream. He could tell from other
indicators, that traffic flow was back up, so he ordered some IR
photos to be taken at night, and they told an interesting story.
It seems that the missing 10 meter section was stored under some
bushes downstream. At night, it was taken out from cover, moved
upstream and lashed into position. It was removed before dawn, and
hidden again.
He kept up his night surveillance of the bridge. Several nights
later, he caught a convoy on the bridge, and hit it with an
artillery strike.
--
Dan Flak - McCaw Cellular Communications Inc., 201 Elliot Ave W.,
Suite 105, Seattle, Wa 98119, 206-283-2658, (usenet: thebes!mcgp1!flak)fugate@roma.sw.mcc.com (Bryan Fugate) (12/15/89)
From: milano!fugate@roma.sw.mcc.com (Bryan Fugate) > >It would be interesting to compile a list of battles that were won by > >one side doing something the other thought was physically impossible. Zhukov's counteroffensive at the gates of Moscow on December 6, 1941 would have to rank as one of the world's greatest surprises. The winter conditions made it difficult for the Germans to conceive that such an event was possible. It did have a profound effect on the course of the war.
Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) (12/15/89)
From: Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) >From: terryr@cse.ogi.edu (Terry Rooker) >In article <12150@cbnews.ATT.COM> Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) writes: [My comments about US military incompetence in Vietnam deleted] > >Actually elements of the US military made that realization many years >ago. Part of the problem was (is) that the military's reason for >existence was a European war. Everything was justified in those >terms, and much of the training was geared towards that end. It >was only natural that commanders in Vietnam tried to adapt their >training to the situation. That training emphasized firepower and >destruction of the enemy. Obviously out of place in a low intensity >conflict (LIC). Some elements of the military responded admirably >to the demands of LIC. The original conception of the army special >forces was certainly not high-tech. The original SEAL teams were >low tech groups of individuals, although lately they seem to have >been bitten by the high-tech bug. They used some high-tech equipment >but the bulk of their work was done with weapons no more advanced than >Stoners and rubber boats. The entirety of the USN riverine and >coastal forces was low-tech and low budget. PBR's were based on a >commercially available stock hull. PCF's were based on a commercial >work boat. The only new keel up design was the ASPB, and it was >admirably suited to riverine work. The air force also broke out >of the European mould with the AC-47, AC-119, and AC-130 series of >gunships. These airplanes are only usable where you have locally >guaranteed control of the air, such as in most LIC. Yes thats true. However even those services that did "adapt" as you put it still grasped the wrong end of the stick. They attempted to make use of these new "low-tech" adaption as an end unto themselves. The US Govt. and military high command failed to realise that, while its all good and true to have gunships, air-cushion vehicles and other "adapted" items for use in Vietnam, they'd missed out two major important factors in a counter-insurgency campaign. First you must inhibit the enemy's ability to operate "at will". In counter-insurgency the only way to accomplish that is to find and close with the enemy and actually occupy the ground where he is operating. Second, you must attempt to win the "hearts and minds" of the local population. Attempt to show to them that your idealogy is better than his and that if the locals support you they will receive things that are not possible under the opposition's rule. This is the single most important factor the US missed. The civil aid programs they did attempt were looking, like their military programs, for results quicker than they could be achieved. In addition the South Vietnamese government was unwilling to make any concessions which were really the things required to win over the South Vietnamese population. The whole war was a mistake of attempting to apply a military solution to what was primarily a political problem. With both the civil and military aid programs, when they failed to produce quick results the US Govt. then decided to try something new. The result was a succession of "quick fixes" which failed to produce anything concrete which could be built on. On top of which the various civil-military agencies (eg the CIA) were also applying their own attempts at solutions with the result that chaos and confusion reigned as to what was actually working or not working. The US involvement in Vietnam basically lacked strategic direction. There was no real co-ordination or direction of the various agencies involved in the war. This is where the Australian approach in Phuc Thui province was superior. We had a strategic direction (eliminate the enemy and win the locals over to support the South Vietnam government) and the tactical training to accomplish it. Our forces had considerable experience in Jungle Warfare in WWII, in the Malayan emergency and in Borneo during the "confrontation" with Indonesia. Our troops also served a full tour of duty as a unit, not individuals. This meant Esprit de Corps was created and maintained during training in Australia and built upon during their tour in Vietnam. On top of this we were not afraid to go out into the forest and actually "take and hold the ground" the enemy was attempting to occupy. When co-ordinated with an effective "hearts and minds" campaign the result was that we had a pacified province in a decidedly unpacified country. The question then is who's strategy and tactics worked better? [stuff about US over-reliance on technology as a solution to war deleted] I am not questioning the US attempting to find a technical solution to war. Nor am I criticising the US reliance on a strategy of attrition and strategic denial in a conventional war. In a counter insurgency campaign it will basically not work. You are not so much fighting a person in counter-insurgency as an ideal. That ideal is, "that under the present regime (it does not matter the colour of that regime's politics. It works both ways if it is a corrupt unpopular regime) you, the locals, are oppressed. My different ideal (the insurgents) is better and if I win power I will make things much better for you." That is what must be defeated. It is basically a political problem to which a political solution must be applied (although the military are an aid in such a situation they cannot cure it by themselves). It is also one which takes considerable time. The Malayan insurgent "Emergency" has only just ended (a fortnight ago in fact according to the local TV news) 30 years after it started with the final surrender of the last Malayan Peoples' Communist party insurgents on the Thai- Malay border. What I am questioning is the basic over-reliance on technology which means that instead of actually putting people on the ground and occupying it. Showing to the local population that you have a real commitment to their well being. The US sends in fighters, bombers and helicopters, pounds the area flat and shoots innocent people in the fields, simply because they are wearing "black pyjamas" and live in an area where the insurgents are operating. Such "free- fire zones" do not win the "hearts and minds" of the local inhabitants. Nor do such things prevent the enemy from being able to operate when he/she wishes. The only way to do that is to move troops in on the ground and they try and outfight the enemy at his own game. It means establishing a base in the area. It also means aggressive, offensive patrolling. You must seek out the enemy and kill him. The only way your going to that in a counter-insurgency campaign is to train your troops to fight in the same way the enemy does. If you attempt to apply lessons learnt on the northern plains of Europe to the Jungles of SE Asia your asking for trouble. The question is, has the US military learnt this? Or can we see the same mistakes being applied in El Salvador? And if they knew that the training that was right for Europe was wrong for Vietnam why didn't they correct it? _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- | Brian Ross |Snail Mail:- "Bill Bracket the self-made man who came| in a packet" | Brian Ross ----------------------------------------| Sociology Dept.R.S.S.S. E-Mail Addresses:- bxr307@coombs.anu.oz | Australian National University | CANBERRA,A.C.T.,2601, bxr307@csc.anu.oz | AUSTRALIA | _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- -----------------------------------------------------------------
terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (12/18/89)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12361@cbnews.ATT.COM> Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) writes: > > [lots of discussion deleted] >way your going to that in a counter-insurgency campaign is to train > your troops to fight in the same way the enemy does. If >you attempt to apply lessons learnt on the northern plains of >Europe to the Jungles of SE Asia your asking for trouble. The >question is, has the US military learnt this? Or can we see the >same mistakes being applied in El Salvador? And if they knew that >the training that was right for Europe was wrong for Vietnam why didn't >they correct it? > First, I am not defending the American military system. I resigned my commission in disgust over many of the problems you mentioned. It doesn't appear that the military has learned its lesson. Even those elements that learned to adapt are now pursuing the high tech "dream". I served at one of the last riverine units and my training was conducted without any "gadgets". Two years later I was chasstised because I expected a patro of recently qualified crews to operate without night vision goggles, and radar. Look at all the high tech gear that the special forces are receiving. Even you specify a military solution to counter insurgencies. One of the most overlooked, and most important lessons of the response to the Malayan emergency was that the government took every step to prevent a military response. Most of the intelligence work was done by police (specially trained but police nonetheless). Most of the actions taken by the "hearts and minds" programs were done by non-military agencies. Yes there was military action in the jungles, but the intent was to avoid it as much as possible and when it was required to use the smallest force required. The tactics you describe were used to good effect. There were even RAF heavy bomber stikes when a communist Terrorist (CT) base was found and could not be neutralized by other means. But all of these military actions were of the last resort. Other methods were tried first. Curiously, the Malayan Emergency was used as an example for the American effort in Vietnam, after all it was (and is) one of the few examples of a successful counter-insurgency campaign in the post war period. We missed the main non-military point (probably because it was the military that was tasked with the counter-insurgency), and applied the other lessons in a thoroughly American way. For the record, the British in Malaya had several advantages that weren't in Vietnam. The government could trace its existence back before the war, where the RVN governemnt was largely a late 1950's fabrication. The people of Malaya truly liked the government. There was not rampant corruption. The bulk of the populace was Muslim, and therefore appropriate harsh measure were possible. The CT's were largely Chinese, and the Chinese representation in the overall population while large is not overwhelming. -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
msb@sq.sq.com (Mark Brader) (12/18/89)
From: Mark Brader <msb@sq.sq.com> > ... battles ... won by > one side doing something the other thought was physically impossible. Plains of Abraham, September 13, 1759... a principal battle of the Seven Years' War (1754-1763, officially 1756-1763), which essentially eliminated French colonies from North America. The French in Quebec City had defenses set up only to face the St. Lawrence River, as there are high cliffs and nobody could get from the river to the land above to attack them from the rear. British forces under Gen. James Wolfe did just that, landing two miles away at Anse au Foulon (now Wolfe's Cove) and following an existing trail up the cliff. The French attacked them before they entered the city, but lost. Wolfe was killed. Mark Brader, SoftQuad Inc., Toronto "... pure English is de rigueur" utzoo!sq!msb, msb@sq.com -- Manchester Guardian Weekly
bxr307@csc.anu.oz (12/20/89)
From: bxr307@csc.anu.oz From: Geoff Phipps <phipps@solitary> >Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) >has been writing about the differing strategies pursued by US and >Australian Forces in Vietnam. I can't claim to be an expert, I wasn't >there and I have only read a few books on the subject, but I do see >things a little differently from him. While I would agree that a hi-tech >solution to such a war is impossible (unless you have the political >support for genocide), I don't think the Australian strategy would have >worked either. As usual comparisons have been made to the Malayan >Emergency. If you look at the two wars I think you will see that the >strategies available to the Commonwealth in Malaya were simply not >available to the US in Vietnam. >For example: [...] A masterly analysis of the basic differences between the situations in Malaya and Vietnam. However while I was holding up Malaya as an example of a successful counter-insurgency campaign I was not, as the various Commonwealth advisors the Americans imported into Vietnam did not, say that it was the "be all and end all" of how to conduct such a campiagn. You have though, Geoff hit the nail on the head in saying that basically only a political solution was what would have won the situation in Vietnam (as it did in Malaya) or in any counter-insurgency campiagn. In addition you have recognised the point that I was trying to make that yes, the military side is only an adjunct to the political reforms that must be made. However I have realised that this discussion has started to digress from what my original posting was about. That was a question as to whether the US military had learnt any lessons from Vietnam (like the need for joint political-military action)? And if so what where they and were they applying them in other places like El Salvador? From my reading and viewing of the nightly TV news the answer was no. However I could be wrong. Is anyone willing tell me so? I was attempting to use the Australian successes in Vietnam as a comparision of what the US military could have learnt, not as an anti-American bludgeon (although sometimes I admit that I think they need one. ;-). _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- | Brian Ross |Snail Mail:- "Bill Bracket the self-made man who came| in a packet" | Brian Ross ----------------------------------------| Sociology Dept.R.S.S.S. E-Mail Addresses:- bxr307@coombs.anu.oz | Australian National University | CANBERRA,A.C.T.,2601, bxr307@csc.anu.oz | AUSTRALIA | _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-
bxr307@csc.anu.oz (12/20/89)
From: bxr307@csc.anu.oz From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12361@cbnews.ATT.COM>> Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) writes: >> >> [lots of discussion deleted] >>way your going to that in a counter-insurgency campaign is to train >> your troops to fight in the same way the enemy does. If >>you attempt to apply lessons learnt on the northern plains of >>Europe to the Jungles of SE Asia your asking for trouble. The >>question is, has the US military learnt this? Or can we see the >>same mistakes being applied in El Salvador? And if they knew that >>the training that was right for Europe was wrong for Vietnam why didn't >>they correct it? >> >First, I am not defending the American military system. I resigned my >commission in disgust over many of the problems you mentioned. It >doesn't appear that the military has learned its lesson. Even those >elements that learned to adapt are now pursuing the high tech "dream". >I served at one of the last riverine units and my training was >conducted without any "gadgets". Two years later I was chasstised >because I expected a patro of recently qualified crews to operate >without night vision goggles, and radar. Look at all the high tech >gear that the special forces are receiving. Good! I am glad that there is (or was :-( ) at least one American officer with some sense! My experience of exercising with US Forces (while admittedly limited to only the Marines) has left me wondering for a long time as to whether of not any of them had any intelligence. Most seemed rather seduced by the images presented by Hollywood's worst efforts like "Rambo". I was in particular disappointed by the poor discipline in basic matters like camouflage and cleanliness of personal equipment. They seemed to either completely over do it or not bother at all. There seemed to be no uniform application of orders concerning, what admittedly are, very small matters but which point to what I percieve was basic problems in the US military system. I will though take my hat off to you for serving in Riverine forces. Those boys in Vietnam where unusual in that they actually attempted to go where the enemy was (in perhaps the most difficult country in Vietnam) and prevent him from being able to operate undisturbed. And going by my limited reading on the topic you achieved considerable success, didn't you? >Even you specify a military solution to counter insurgencies. One of >the most overlooked, and most important lessons of the response to the >Malayan emergency was that the government took every step to prevent a >military response. Most of the intelligence work was done by police >(specially trained but police nonetheless). Most of the actions >taken by the "hearts and minds" programs were done by non-military >agencies. Yes there was military action in the jungles, but the >intent was to avoid it as much as possible and when it was required to >use the smallest force required. The tactics you describe were used >to good effect. There were even RAF heavy bomber stikes when a >communist Terrorist (CT) base was found and could not be neutralized >by other means. But all of these military actions were of the last >resort. Other methods were tried first. Curiously, the Malayan >Emergency was used as an example for the American effort in Vietnam, >after all it was (and is) one of the few examples of a successful >counter-insurgency campaign in the post war period. We missed the >main non-military point (probably because it was the military that was >tasked with the counter-insurgency), and applied the other lessons in >a thoroughly American way. >For the record, the British in Malaya had several advantages that >weren't in Vietnam. The government could trace its existence back >before the war, where the RVN governemnt was largely a late 1950's >fabrication. The people of Malaya truly liked the government. There >was not rampant corruption. The bulk of the populace was Muslim, and >therefore appropriate harsh measure were possible. The CT's were >largely Chinese, and the Chinese representation in the overall >population while large is not overwhelming. While I discussed only the military side of the solution to a counter-insurgency it was because of the nature of the newsgroup, not becasue I ignored the political side. In fact if you go back and read my original posting you will see that I mention it several times. The problem is (and I am sure that Bill, the moderater will agree) is that I have attempted to post politico-military matters before and been prevented from posting. So I have as much as possible limited myself to only the military aspect of the Australian vs US efforts in Vietnam. I could, if you desire, go into long postings on the failures of Australian, and for that matter, US Foreign policy in relation to Vietnam. However that lies outside this newsgroup as does any discussion about the "legality" or the "morality" of foreign involvement in what was basically a civil war. I am glad though, that you have brought up some of the differences between the situation in Vietnam and Malaya/sia (depending on which in time we are talking about. :-). Anyway, what I was trying to get at was that the US military effort in Vietnam was totally out of proportion to the problem presented. The US Army in particular lost sight of what I called in my previous posting that you must "First you must inhibit the enemy ability to operate `at will'." The only way to do that is by the use of your military forces to initially isolate and protect the local inhabitants (that is those who don't want to help the enemy! :-) ). This is to remove, what Mao called the "sea" of the population from the "fish", the guerrillas, would swim in. After that had been achieved the military would then be used to force outwards and attempt to inhibit the enemies ability to move around the countryside. While the main role of the military is to provide protection to the civic-aid teams it also a secondary role of basically providing labour to help in the "hearts and minds" campaign. It builds and staffs things like clinics, food warehouses, sanitation systems. That is the main reason why the Australian army in most of its overseas deployments (other than Vietnam) provides Engineers rather than infantry. They build roads and other public works which the local government has neither the money nor the expertise to do. While in Vietnam it was difficult to segregate the VC from the civilians. It was possible. The strategic hamlet program was based upon the experience of the British in Malaya. However while in Malaya it was easier because of the ethnic differences between the native Malays and the Communist Chinese. In Vietnam they all came from the same stock. However the strategic hamlet program was applied half- heartedly at best and because of considerable corruption was prevented from working by the failure to follow up with an effective hearts and minds campaign. If it had been applied sensibly and sensitively it would have ensured that the VC had been isolated from its "sea" of population. In addition the US Army was unable to see that while Malaya was an example it was not the "be all and end all" of how to run a sucessful counter-insurgency campiagn. The differences between the two situations have already been detailed (and very well too) by Geoff Phipps <phipps@solitary> in his posting. However even the various British and Australian advisors employed by the US aid team in Vietnam all said that as well. What they advised the South Vietnam Government and the US was that basically the only way to defeat an insurgency is to let it win! That is, give in to the basic political demands of the insurgents. Make reforms in your government, force changes in society. This will rob the insurgents of the support that they have in the population. Remember I said it was an idea, not men you are fighting. This was how the British won in Malaya. It promised independence. It gave the population benefits like land ownership. It introduced better health care. It gave them and their children free education. Basically they robbed the insurgents of the very ground they were standing on! That plus the basic antipathy felt between the Malays and the Chinese ensured that the insurgency would fail. In Vietnam however the very nature of the South's government prevented that from happening. It was a corrupt legacy of outside interference by first the French and then the US in the 1950's. While the US had basically created it, the US did not control it. That is the crux of the matter. The US could not (or would not) force the South's Goverment to institute real reforms. What was needed was a rvolution and that was what was happening. Not an invasion by another country as the US Government liked to justify its involvement. Instead they just kept on shoring the government up (under the old belief that while, "he's a son of bitch. At least he's our son of a bitch!). This is where the US failed. It was not only a failure of the military solution. It was a failure to find a realistic political one for the South Vietnamese Government which caused the US defeat in Vietnam. It was obviously a replay of the military maxim of "pick your ground to fight on." A failure to recognise that meant the defeat of the US was on the cards from the very beginning. However that digresses from the purpose of my original posting. My question was whether the US military had learnt the lessons from its experience in Vietnam. Terry seems to think not. Are there any other takers out there? _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- | Brian Ross |Snail Mail:- "Bill Bracket the self-made man who came| in a packet" | Brian Ross ----------------------------------------| Sociology Dept.R.S.S.S. E-Mail Addresses:- bxr307@coombs.anu.oz | Australian National University | CANBERRA,A.C.T.,2601, bxr307@csc.anu.oz | AUSTRALIA | _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-
schloss@marlin.nosc.mil (Tom Schlosser) (12/21/89)
From: schloss@marlin.nosc.mil (Tom Schlosser) > However I have realised that this discussion has started to >digress from what my original posting was about. That was a question as to >whether the US military had learnt any lessons from Vietnam (like the need >for joint political-military action)? And if so what where they and were >they applying them in other places like El Salvador? From my reading and >viewing of the nightly TV news the answer was no. However I could be >wrong. Is anyone willing tell me so? Let me first say that although I work for the Navy, I'm no expert on these matters. Having issued that caveat, I'll take the bait. I think the US learned *alot* from Vietnam. I think this whole discussion is in the wrong orbit entirely. The war wasn't won or lost in Vietnam, it was lost the day Johnson took office. With him in office, the goal of our involvement in Vietnam seemed to be 1) don't lose and 2) don't get hurt. There wasn't the Al Davis attitude we needed (Just win, baby.). The war was extraordinarily minor as wars go, but the politics of it were huge. That's where I think we learned. We haven't sent in troops to help El Salvador, and that's a good thing for two reasons. The first is that we really don't care what happens to these little pipsqueak countries. Certainly not enough to go and get killed for it. We'll supply them with weapons and train them, but it's up to them to do the dirty work. The second lesson was that as long as American troops aren't being killed, the government can really support whomever it chooses. Certainly the Kennedy wing of the Democratic party will have conniptions over the moral aspects of what we're doing, but they always do that no matter who we support. The American people just want to be left alone to earn their money and pursue their hobbies. Just look at the results of this latest rebel offensive. They shot up alot of expensive ammunition, took some casualties and now have to go off and try to regroup. The government forces get resupplied by the US and have their casualties tended in better hospitals. There were a few protests in the US, but certainly nothing politically significant. The Super Bowl is coming up and Nortre Dame finally lost a game, so who cares what happened in (where was that place, honey? Hondurica? El Nicador? Pass the peas.) El Salvador. As a final note, I read recently that it takes about 20 (40?) acres of arable land in El Salvador to make a go of a family-owned farm. There is only 1/4 as much arable land in the country as they would need to successfully carry out a land-grant-based reform package. Their problem is too many people and too few resources. A 'reform' solution will be hard to come by. By the way, how come there has been no mention of the bombing of Hanoi? Seems like the NVA came to the negotiating table pretty quick after their capitol started getting hit. Maybe that was the problem. If I were president, I think I would have told the North Vietnamese that the VC were *their* problem and if they wanted to have two bricks sticking together in their cities, they'd best keep the VC on a short leash. TWS ---------------------------------------------------------- You realize, of course, that this means war. -- Daffy Duck Tom Schlosser schloss@nosc.mil
terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (12/22/89)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12458@cbnews.ATT.COM> bxr307@csc.anu.oz writes: > > >posting. My question was whether the US military had learnt the >lessons from its experience in Vietnam. Terry seems to think not. >Are there any other takers out there? > Actually my answer is more complex, so I'll state it more explicitly. The US military learned many lessons, unfortunately they tend to filter the lesson through a political lens, or they simply implement the "easy" parts of the lesson. For example, river operations in Vietnam were liable to ambush by heavily armed land based forces. This forced the use of haevier, more heavily armed boats, at the some expense of speed. In many current applications these boats are too large for many rivers. The Thais needed boats to patrol the upper parts of the Mekong, but the river wasn't navigable throughout its length. To get the boats in they had to be airlifted or trailered in. The PBRs are too heavy. The Thais bought a conversion of a small outboard powered boat. Many of the boat weapons in the current inventroy are short ranged, reflecting the riverine and boarding operations conducted in Vietnam. There is now a requirement for coastal and wide bay engagements and these weapons are too short ranged. Note this is a doctrinal issue also since traing for a board and search is not at all what you need for a long range engagement. -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
bxr307@csc.anu.oz (12/22/89)
From: bxr307@csc.anu.oz From: schloss@marlin.nosc.mil (Tom Schlosser) >> However I have realised that this discussion has started to >>digress from what my original posting was about. That was a question as to >>whether the US military had learnt any lessons from Vietnam (like the need >>for joint political-military action)? And if so what where they and were >>they applying them in other places like El Salvador? From my reading and >>viewing of the nightly TV news the answer was no. However I could be >>wrong. Is anyone willing tell me so? >Let me first say that although I work for the Navy, I'm no expert on >these matters. Having issued that caveat, I'll take the bait. I think >the US learned *alot* from Vietnam. I think this whole discussion is >in the wrong orbit entirely. The war wasn't won or lost in Vietnam, it >was lost the day Johnson took office. With him in office, the goal of >our involvement in Vietnam seemed to be 1) don't lose and 2) don't get >hurt. There wasn't the Al Davis attitude we needed (Just win, baby.). >The war was extraordinarily minor as wars go, but the politics of it >were huge. That's where I think we learned. We haven't sent in troops >to help El Salvador, and that's a good thing for two reasons. Granted that it was a major failure of political will at home to accomplish the task that prevented the US from winning. However it was not as is so often portrayed in the American cinema and media a case of "betrayal" by the people and politicians at home. Rather it was a failure of the military-politico policies of the US system has a whole which was to blame. Attempting to pin the blame on one group as so often been done since Vietnam (particularly by the iconographers of Hollywood) is a futile effort and achieves only resentment. To also say that the only major political lesson was, "not to send in the troops" seems rather silly to me. What I would hope to see as political lessons learnt from Vietnam are that there is no such thing as monolithic Communism, that reform is better than oppression and decay, and perhaps finally, other countries in the world do have a right to determine their own direction without US interefence. Unfortunatly those political lessons don't seem to have been learnt by the US government. :-( >The first is that we really don't care what happens to these little >pipsqueak countries. Certainly not enough to go and get killed for it. >We'll supply them with weapons and train them, but it's up to them to >do the dirty work. The second lesson was that as long as American >troops aren't being killed, the government can really support whomever >it chooses. Certainly the Kennedy wing of the Democratic party will >have conniptions over the moral aspects of what we're doing, but they >always do that no matter who we support. The American people just want >to be left alone to earn their money and pursue their hobbies. Just >look at the results of this latest rebel offensive. They shot up alot >of expensive ammunition, took some casualties and now have to go off >and try to regroup. The government forces get resupplied by the US and >have their casualties tended in better hospitals. There were a few >protests in the US, but certainly nothing politically significant. The >Super Bowl is coming up and Nortre Dame finally lost a game, so who >cares what happened in (where was that place, honey? Hondurica? El >Nicador? Pass the peas.) El Salvador. If this is true. Then why is the US government interested in these countries? Is it because they are more interested in protecting US commercial interests than in encouraging the concept of freedom for these small countries? I see a dicotomy of interest here. Ah! Well just another example of real politic. As to the idea that as long as US troops are not getting killed the US government can support whom it likes. We've seen the result of that sort of policy many times and none more fully than in the last few days in Pananma. Rather faustian I think. Noriega was a creation of Bush's policies in the late seventies when he was head of the CIA, now he has to destroy him at the cost of US (and lets not forget Panamanians') lives. >As a final note, I read recently that it takes about 20 (40?) acres of >arable land in El Salvador to make a go of a family-owned farm. There >is only 1/4 as much arable land in the country as they would need to >successfully carry out a land-grant-based reform package. Their >problem is too many people and too few resources. A 'reform' solution >will be hard to come by. However if they made the *effort* and were seen to be making the effort to reform things (and land ownership is just one aspect of this) then the insurgents would have less appeal to the peasants. In addition if instead of oppressing the peasants (by such marvelous tactics as free-fire zones, death squads, rape, burning and pillaging) they made some attempt to help them, then once more the insurgents would have one less leg to stand on. If would appear that the El Salvadorian government is following the same tactic employed by the US in Vietnam. A belief that, "if you have them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow!" Unfortunatly just as in Vietnam it is failing in El Salvador. If the only real serious alternative to what the government is doing to you is a guerrilla movement, whom would you support? >By the way, how come there has been no mention of the bombing of Hanoi? >Seems like the NVA came to the negotiating table pretty quick after >their capitol started getting hit. Maybe that was the problem. If I >were president, I think I would have told the North Vietnamese that the >VC were *their* problem and if they wanted to have two bricks sticking >together in their cities, they'd best keep the VC on a short leash. That is because the bombing of Hanoi was a patently useless strategy. The Vietnamese had been given several years to get used to the idea of war from the air. The US government's idea of "slowing turning the screws" by a "progressive" bombing campiagn was patently a failure of the military dictum that you must escalate to the maximum use of force immediately in war time. Failure to do so decreases the value of that maximum force when it is finally applied. This is why the US bombing of the north failed to achieve its objective of inhibiting the North's ability to wage war. In addition the US Air Force's belief in the all empowering nature of strategic airpower failed to recognise that while you can bomb someone's factories, their fuel stocks and ports. It is the insurgent on the ground who must really be destroyed and the only way to do that is to go in and find him with ground forces which are willing to fight it out on the ground in the same manner that he is: surriptiousely. However, even in saying that, you betray that you still fail to grasp that Vietnam was not an invasion of one country by another. The VC was not controlled from the North (at least not until after 1968 when they had lost most of their local forces during the Tet offensive and were forced to bring down NVA troops to reinforce the war). The VC was by and large an embodiment of the South's dissatisfaction with its government and the US intervention in their country. It was basically a civil war. US intervention simply prolonged a revolutionary process begun in 1945 and finally completed in 1975. This does again once more digresses into the region of politics more than military affairs which is what we are meant to be discussing (apologies Bill). I was not so much interested in what the US learnt politically as what it had learnt militarily. We have been seeing for the last 15 years that the US government failed to learn any real lessons from it Vietnam experience. What I was trying to find out was whether the US Army in particular, and the rest of the US military in general, had learnt any *tactical* lessons from Vietnam. If the US becomes involved in another war in the third world. Will it train their troops to fight jungle warfare with its unconventional nature, or will it once more attempt to deploy large numbers of US troops still which have been taught to fight on the plains of Europe? Has the US army learnt that in jungle warfare you do have to sneak around and attempt to find the enemy and kill him quietly or do they instead continue to believe that by making their troops "bait" they can destroy the enemy through "superior firepower"? Can an insurgent hiding in the jungle can be destroyed by some type of high-tech wizardry or that you have to go out and find him personally? Do your troops have to walk over the ground they are traversing, not fly by helicopter if you're going to find the enemy? Those are the sort of questions I'd like answered or is it rather a case that the US military would just much rather forget about Vietnam as an unfortunate episode of its history? _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- | Brian Ross |Snail Mail:- "Bill Bracket the self-made man who came| in a packet" | Brian Ross ----------------------------------------| Sociology Dept.R.S.S.S. E-Mail Addresses:- bxr307@coombs.anu.oz | Australian National University | CANBERRA,A.C.T.,2601, bxr307@csc.anu.oz | AUSTRALIA | _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-
pmorriso@uunet.UU.NET (Perry Morrison MATH) (12/22/89)
From: munnari!gara.une.oz.au!pmorriso@uunet.UU.NET (Perry Morrison MATH) In article <12509@cbnews.ATT.COM>, schloss@marlin.nosc.mil (Tom Schlosser) writes: > > > From: schloss@marlin.nosc.mil (Tom Schlosser) > > By the way, how come there has been no mention of the bombing of Hanoi? > Seems like the NVA came to the negotiating table pretty quick after > their capitol started getting hit. Maybe that was the problem. If I > were president, I think I would have told the North Vietnamese that the > VC were *their* problem and if they wanted to have two bricks sticking > together in their cities, they'd best keep the VC on a short leash. Hmm. Last I heard, the rolling thunder campaign 0f '68 (?) was counterproductive in that there really wasn't all that much to hit and that in terms of penetration of the air defence and subsequent losses, it really wasn't worth it. i.e. in cost-benefit terms the NVA won the propaganda war by jumping all over downed B-52s and their economy was so primitive that bombing it didn't have much effect. As I heard, truck numbers and other indicators showed that their losses were quickly replaced by the Chinese and that the Ho Chi Minh trail kept quietly ferrying those rockets-in-pieces etc. My memory is hazy and I would gladly stand corrected. Any comments?
jhamilto@ics.UCI.EDU (John Scott Hamilton) (12/23/89)
From: John Scott Hamilton <jhamilto@ics.UCI.EDU> In article <12539@cbnews.ATT.COM> bxr307@csc.anu.oz writes: [Much fine argument deleted] > >I was not so much interested in what the US learnt politically as what >it had learnt militarily. We have been seeing for the last 15 years that >the US government failed to learn any real lessons from it Vietnam experience. >What I was trying to find out was whether the US Army in particular, and the >rest of the US military in general, had learnt any *tactical* lessons from >Vietnam. What I find incredibly ironic about this tactics issue, is that Americans fought their Revolutionary War based on guerilla tactics. Even though outnumbered and outequipped by a highly regimented British Army, the wanabee Americans managed to win. I don't think the original question should be how much has the US learned from Vietnam, but how much has it forgotten from its past, and how much has it learned from fighting in two world wars. Now the question in my mind is, why are we trying to engage in warfare with the wrong tactics and equipment? As the drug war in Colombia has pointed out, the US military does not even comprehend the needs of small scale conflict (by sending equipment that was of little use to the Colombian effort). Is this not only a serious flaw in military policy, but a basic ignorance of the "art of war" (ala Sun Tzu).
terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (12/23/89)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12539@cbnews.ATT.COM> bxr307@csc.anu.oz writes: [stuff deleted] > >I was not so much interested in what the US learnt politically as what >it had learnt militarily. We have been seeing for the last 15 years that >the US government failed to learn any real lessons from it Vietnam experience. >What I was trying to find out was whether the US Army in particular, and the >rest of the US military in general, had learnt any *tactical* lessons from >Vietnam. There are some indications that the military is trying to absorb these lessons. The army has been trying to form light infantry divisions. These divisions would train from the beginning as light infantry and wouldn't have to retrain for use in an insurgency. They are also getting specialized training for different types of terrain. They also have more strategic mobility so they are quicker to deploy in an emergency. For the army they also have the advantage that they are cheaper to maintain. Ironically, many of the same critics of the army in Vietnam, now criticize the army for having 4 (5 if you count the 9th) divisions that aren't usable in a European conflict. For the troop's sake I would hope they were trained to not rely on firepower since these divisions are notorious for their lack of firepower. The army is also changing its emphasis on air assault. People have finally realized that launching an infantry attack from a helicopter isn't the wisest thing in the world. I think the army's shift is as much because of expense as facing the reality of increased decentralized anti-air weapon systems. The army is wisely maintaining the capabilities and training, but they don't seem as enamored of the idea as they were. Helicopters provide a fast flexible intra-theater transport vehicle. When used as such they, they are great. I don't think we will see large scale use of helicopters to insert troops directly into a firefight. This doesn't mean that the troops will learn to go after the insurgents, but the decreased reliance on copters will force the development of different tactics. -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
schloss@marlin.nosc.mil (Tom Schlosser) (12/23/89)
From: schloss@marlin.nosc.mil (Tom Schlosser) Great apologies to all concerned for not being clearer on my posting. Latrine duty for me this week! from Perry: (the bombing of Hanoi) >really wasn't worth it. i.e. in cost-benefit terms the NVA won the propaganda >war by jumping all over downed B-52s and their economy was so primitive that >bombing it didn't have much effect. Is that really true? They must have had some centralized government and industrial installations. Even medieval civilizations had that. Perhaps the real problem was to get them, you had to get civilians too, and that was politically infeasible. from Bill: I am greatly indebted to Bill for his thrashing of the 'Rolling Thunder' campaign. However, I was speaking more of the later campaigns (Linebacker and Linebacker II was it?). The book 'Summons of the Trumpet' (I forget the author) seemed to think these were effective. >However if they made the *effort* and were seen to be making the effort to >reform things (and land ownership is just one aspect of this) ... Whether they do or not may be immaterial when no matter how they slice it, 75% of the population will end up impoverished. Juan next door may have gotten some land in the reform, but if you're still starving, do you really care whether or not Juan got some land? Maybe if you got a gun and shot a few mayors, you'd get some land, too. My point is that IMHO, such a country is *always* on the verge, or in the middle of an insurgency. If that is true then the goal of counter-insurgency is not so much to utterly defeat them as to reduce the amount of damage they can do to the infrastructure of the country, so the country can try to develop economically and get out of the insurgency cycle. Militarily (ignoring reform and the like for the time being), whether or not this can be done by applying force to their arms suppliers, or by blockades is the question I present to you. To avoid the political flame-war that might result from this question, let's make it: Are there historical examples of this? Got to go clean latrines now. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Fortunately, I keep my feathers numbered for just such an occasion. -- Foghorn Leghorn after being flamed. Tom Schlosser schloss@nosc.mil
terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (12/27/89)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12572@cbnews.ATT.COM> jhamilto@ics.UCI.EDU (John Scott Hamilton) writes: > >I don't think the original question should be how much has the US >learned from Vietnam, but how much has it forgotten from its past, and >how much has it learned from fighting in two world wars. > This is an important point, especially in view of the pending defense spending cuts. Capabilities of marginal utility tend to be the first items that the US military will drop to save money. Unfortunately, marginal utility is usually calculated relative to a major European war scenario. The Marines are an excellant example of how to successfully buck the trend. They use the argument that we never know when we will need an amphibious capability, and once it is lost you can't recreate it overnight. To broaden their appeal they have begun to drop the appearance of maintaining a capability to fight in a Central European war and have begun to specialize on fighting in low intensity situations, i.e. as an expeditionary force. Once again the argument is that it is a capability that can't be developed overnight. They have about a 10 year jump on the army. The USMC even has BLTs (battalion landing teams) trained for hostage rescue. Although I think a BLT might be a bit pnderous for such an operation, at least they working on more realistic situations. >Now the question in my mind is, why are we trying to engage in warfare >with the wrong tactics and equipment? As the drug war in Colombia has >pointed out, the US military does not even comprehend the needs of >small scale conflict (by sending equipment that was of little use to >the Colombian effort). Is this not only a serious flaw in military >policy, but a basic ignorance of the "art of war" (ala Sun Tzu). When pressed on the issue, the Bush administration admitted that the materiel sent was not appropriate for the intended application, but that some visible sign of support was better than promises of future aid. The Columbians apparently have found the key to winning that type of war; you have to want to win more than the other guy. -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
peregrin@usenet.INS.CWRU.Edu (News Feed) (12/27/89)
From: pyrite!peregrin@usenet.INS.CWRU.Edu (News Feed) In article <12572@cbnews.ATT.COM> jhamilto@ics.UCI.EDU (John Scott Hamilton) writes: > > >From: John Scott Hamilton <jhamilto@ics.UCI.EDU> >In article <12539@cbnews.ATT.COM> bxr307@csc.anu.oz writes: >>it had learnt militarily. We have been seeing for the last 15 years that >>the US government failed to learn any real lessons from it Vietnam experience. >>What I was trying to find out was whether the US Army in particular, and the >>rest of the US military in general, had learnt any *tactical* lessons from >>Vietnam. > >What I find incredibly ironic about this tactics issue, is that >Americans fought their Revolutionary War based on guerilla tactics. >Even though outnumbered and outequipped by a highly regimented British >Army, the wanabee Americans managed to win. > > Hmmm...My understanding was that the Revolutionary War in America was not as guerrilla war. According to the limited reading I have done recently - Legends, Lies and Cherished Myths of American History, and various of John Keegan's books - the conduct of battles and strategic manuevering was quite traditional. This is true of Bunker Hill and Monmouth, for example. In addition, the British are reputed to have had much experience fighting against guerrillas, and could have been expected to put down such a rebellion easily. Is it really true that we don't learn from the past? In the Rev. War, if the rebels had fought in the manner of say, the French Indian wars, they would have faced lack of popular support, a lessened capability to fight decisive battles (due to the usage of small, dispersed units) and a lack consequently of political support from other countries (France in particular). I would argue that they did learn from the past, and used the lessons well. Perhaps we are too quick to provide pat analyses of current events, without examining all the evidence available. >Now the question in my mind is, why are we trying to engage in warfare >with the wrong tactics and equipment? As the drug war in Colombia has >pointed out, the US military does not even comprehend the needs of >small scale conflict (by sending equipment that was of little use to >the Colombian effort). Is this not only a serious flaw in military >policy, but a basic ignorance of the "art of war" (ala Sun Tzu). Is it really true to describe the US armed forces as incompetent bumblers who have no idea of what to do in a given situation? I find that hard to swallow. David Pipes
khun@cd.chalmers.se.chalmers.se (Peter Wennerholm) (12/27/89)
From: khun@cd.chalmers.se.chalmers.se (Peter Wennerholm) In article <11970@cbnews.ATT.COM> munnari!softway.oz.au!gary@uunet.UU.NET (Gary Corby) writes: >>It would be interesting to compile a list of battles that were won by >>one side doing something the other thought was physically impossible. >>Besides Dien Bien Phu and the Ho CHi Minh trail, other examples include >>[etc] > >The Persians at Thermopylae. They made a night climb up one side >of the pass, thus enabling them to come down on the Greeks posted >to cover the flank. You are right. And frankly, I think the Greek defense at Thermopylae qualifies for the list too, even though they "lost" the battle. Peter =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Who: Peter Wennerholm Pen: Engelbrektsgatan 26 | ...and I am MUCH At : khun@cd.chalmers.se S-411 37 Gothenburg | better than my Phn: +46 +(0)31 812108 Sweden | reputation...
willey@arrakis.nevada.edu (James P. Willey) (12/27/89)
From: James P. Willey <willey@arrakis.nevada.edu> In article <12539@cbnews.ATT.COM> bxr307@csc.anu.oz writes: [stuff deleted] > >I was not so much interested in what the US learnt politically as what >it had learnt militarily. We have been seeing for the last 15 years that >the US government failed to learn any real lessons from it Vietnam experience. >What I was trying to find out was whether the US Army in particular, and the >rest of the US military in general, had learnt any *tactical* lessons from >Vietnam. A recent example of how the US military is how the armed forces in Panama are dealing with the "Dignity Battalions". In Vietnam, the military didn't go out of its way to protect the civilian population. The military policy towards civilians usually was to the detriment of the civilians. In Panama however, the US military is going out of its way not to harm the civilians. When all is said and done down there, there may well be proof of American soldiers shooting several innocent civilians. This can't be helped because the "Dignity Battalions" don't wear uniforms and hide among the civilians to snipe at US soldiers. For the most part, the US soldiers surround the sniper and wait him out. There was an interview with a sniper in the 82 Airborne on either ABC or CBS in which he said that when confronted by one of these snipers, they surround him and then a US sniper tries to get a shot at him without hitting a civilian. If he can't get the shot, then they just wait until he runs out of ammo. This is NOT the way the military would have handled this problem in Vietnam. Because of this change of tactics, the US military has won over the Panamanian civilians, who are even helping the invaders. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- James P. Willey willey@arrakis.NEVADA.EDU Disclaimer: I'm now employed, but I'm responsible for my employers opinions, not vice versa. It was just a case of overcompensation again: We went from having no plan to too much plan! (Robotech)
pmorriso@uunet.UU.NET (Perry Morrison MATH) (01/02/90)
From: munnari!gara.une.oz.au!pmorriso@uunet.UU.NET (Perry Morrison MATH) In article <12603@cbnews.ATT.COM>, pyrite!peregrin@usenet.INS.CWRU.Edu (News Feed) writes: > > Commentary on rev war etc. > Is it really true to describe the US armed forces as incompetent bumblers > who have no idea of what to do in a given situation? I find that hard to > swallow. > > David Pipes Well, I'm not sure that this discussion has expressed this view. However, I think that the effectiveness of the U.S. military has been questioned after a decade or more of embarrassing bungling. The Iranian hsotage rescue for example used choppers to fly a mission that exceeded their mean-time-before-failure. In other words, it was beyond the design limits of these particular helicopters (Ch-47s?). I believe that each service wanted a piece of the action and the result was a mish-mash of decision making. I guess we could contrast this with the Israelis who rarely put a foot wrong in covert operations. Didn't they steal an Egyptian radar unit during one of the Arab-Israeli conflicts ('67?). Entebbe and several other operations were also class acts.
reddy@uts.amdahl.com (T.S. Reddy) (01/02/90)
From: reddy@uts.amdahl.com (T.S. Reddy) In article <12610@cbnews.ATT.COM>, willey@arrakis.nevada.edu (James P. Willey) writes: > > In article <12539@cbnews.ATT.COM> bxr307@csc.anu.oz writes: > > > >What I was trying to find out was whether the US Army in particular, and the > >rest of the US military in general, had learnt any *tactical* lessons from > >Vietnam. > > A recent example of how the US military is how the armed forces in > Panama are dealing with the "Dignity Battalions". There's absolutely no comparision between any military opposition (there was none) in Panama and Vietnam. In Vietnam, the Vietcong were a battle hardened group whose tactics, policies and plans were well honed even before the arrival of American troops. The Panamanian defence forces including the dignity battalions were akin to a bunch of street hoodlums whose prior experience was in terrorizing the local populace. -- T.S.Reddy Arpa: reddy@uts.amdahl.com uucp:...!{ames,decwrl,uunet,pyramid,sun}!amdahl!reddy
khun@cd.chalmers.se.chalmers.se (Peter Wennerholm) (01/02/90)
From: khun@cd.chalmers.se.chalmers.se (Peter Wennerholm)
In article <12610@cbnews.ATT.COM> willey@arrakis.nevada.edu (James P. Willey) writes:
:In Panama however, the US military is going out of its way not to harm the
:civilians. When all is said and done down there, there may well be proof
:of American soldiers shooting several innocent civilians. This can't
:be helped because the "Dignity Battalions" don't wear uniforms and hide
:among the civilians to snipe at US soldiers. For the most part, the
:US soldiers surround the sniper and wait him out. There was an interview
:with a sniper in the 82 Airborne on either ABC or CBS in which he said that
:when confronted by one of these snipers, they surround him and then a
:US sniper tries to get a shot at him without hitting a civilian. If he
:can't get the shot, then they just wait until he runs out of ammo. This
If this is true, then the US army deserves our heartfelt respect! Well done.
Peter
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Who: Peter Wennerholm Pen: Engelbrektsgatan 26 | ...and I am MUCH
At : khun@cd.chalmers.se S-411 37 Gothenburg | better than my
Phn: +46 +(0)31 812108 Sweden | reputation...tdrinkar@cosmos.acs.calpoly.edu (Terrell Drinkard) (01/02/90)
From: tdrinkar@cosmos.acs.calpoly.edu (Terrell Drinkard) willey@arrakis.nevada.edu (James P. Willey) writes: >... For the most part, the >US soldiers surround the sniper and wait him out. There was an >interview with a sniper in the 82 Airborne on either ABC or CBS in >which he said that when confronted by one of these snipers, they >surround him and then a US sniper tries to get a shot at him without >hitting a civilian. If he can't get the shot, then they just wait >until he runs out of ammo. This is NOT the way the military would have >handled this problem in Vietnam. Because of this change of tactics, >the US military has won over the Panamanian >civilians, who are even helping the invaders. > >James P. Willey willey@arrakis.NEVADA.EDU A short historical note, these are the same sorts of tactics and rules of engagement that US ground forces used during the Philipine Insurrection of 1900-03. This was the only successful counter-guerilla war we had ever waged. Oddly enough, the Philipine Insurrection was commanded and fought primarily by the younger officers (colonels and below) who were full of all manner of ideals and ideas. The senior officers fought the Cuban part of the War, and you see how far they got. It's nice to see that the Army is once again requiring a reading of military history Terry Drinkard Lt AR Disclaimer et la Signaturo: Hell no, I'm not responsible for what I say! If everyone were responsible for what they said, we'd have had a balanced budget in 1984.
terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (01/02/90)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12603@cbnews.ATT.COM> pyrite!peregrin@usenet.INS.CWRU.Edu (News Feed) writes: > >> >>What I find incredibly ironic about this tactics issue, is that >>Americans fought their Revolutionary War based on guerilla tactics. >>Even though outnumbered and outequipped by a highly regimented British >>Army, the wanabee Americans managed to win. >> >> >Hmmm...My understanding was that the Revolutionary War in America was >not as guerrilla war. According to the limited reading I have done recently >- Legends, Lies and Cherished Myths of American History, and various of >John Keegan's books - the conduct of battles and strategic manuevering >was quite traditional. This is true of Bunker Hill and Monmouth, for >example. In addition, the British are reputed to have had much >experience fighting against guerrillas, and could have been expected to >put down such a rebellion easily. There is a problem with accepted usage. Partisan, guerilla, and irregular are all used somewhat interchangeably. They have a common element in that they all avoid main force actions. When used to describe this common element then interchanging is probably alright. Each also implies some other things, and that is where the problem starts. In essence you are correct, none of them applies to the American Revolution. After the first defeats, Washington tried to avoid engaging the main British force, and only fought isolated detachments. They abided by the guerilla principle of attack weakness, but that is also included in other conventional military doctrines. For the most part, the operations of the Rev War were conventional actions. There is an interesting article to that affect in the current Military History Quarterly. -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
allen%codon1.Berkeley.EDU@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (Edward Allen;345 Mulford;x2-9025) (01/02/90)
From: allen%codon1.Berkeley.EDU@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (Edward Allen;345 Mulford;x2-9025) In article <11970@cbnews.ATT.COM> munnari!softway.oz.au!gary@uunet.UU.NET (Gary Corby) writes: >>It would be interesting to compile a list of battles that were won by >>one side doing something the other thought was physically impossible. The Isrealis made a critical advance in the 1948 war down an ancient Roman road through the desert between two Egyptian strongpoints. One of the Isreali officers of an archeological bent remembered the road being there under the sand and a major effort of engineers and civilians worked at night to clear sand and repair the road to be able to carry a motorized formation. The Egyptians were surprised because they believed (reasonably) that motorized formations would get bogged down in the sand in that area. My father-in-law has the book with the reference right now, so I can't cite it but 1948 was in the title. Desert marches have long been a staple of surprise movements that the enemy didn't believe possible. The early Arab conquests are full of examples. A British cavalry column made an important one in WWI in Palestine in an attack that broke the Turkish defense line. (Beersheba?) Wish I could remember the pertinent names and dates. Ed Allen (allen@enzyme.berkeley.edu)
brt@cbnewsh.ATT.COM (benjamin.reytblat) (01/04/90)
From: brt@cbnewsh.ATT.COM (benjamin.reytblat) In article <12705@cbnews.ATT.COM>, allen%codon1.Berkeley.EDU@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (Edward Allen;345 Mulford;x2-9025) writes: > > > From: allen%codon1.Berkeley.EDU@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (Edward Allen;345 Mulford;x2-9025) > Desert marches have long been a staple of surprise movements that the enemy > didn't believe possible. The early Arab conquests are full of examples. A > British cavalry column made an important one in WWI in Palestine in an attack > that broke the Turkish defense line. (Beersheba?) Wish I could remember the > pertinent names and dates. > It was indeed at Bersheeba (sp.?). The march was made by at least two regiments (there may have been more, but I don't remember). [mod.note: According to my maps, "Beersheba" is correct. - Bill ] One, a British Cav. and the other the Australian Light Horse. While the main British force of about 60K assaulted Bersheeba from the west, the cavalry made a forced march to the south of the city, and at dusk, the Aussies assaulted from the East. The German commander on the scene recognized the Aussies and assumed that they would dismount before attacking, as they were basically a mounted infantry regiment. But the Aussies charged on horseback, and by the time the german artilley opened fire, they were mostly under the guns. Although the casualties were heavy, the Aussies were able to penetrate the german/turkish positions and capture the strategically important water wells intact. This encouter was the subject of a movie shown recently on cable. Ben Reytblat brt@homxc.att.com
tdrinkar@cosmos.acs.calpoly.edu (Terrell Drinkard) (01/04/90)
From: tdrinkar@cosmos.acs.calpoly.edu (Terrell Drinkard) In article <12687@cbnews.ATT.COM> munnari!gara.une.oz.au!pmorriso@uunet.UU.NET (Perry Morrison MATH) writes: >From: munnari!gara.une.oz.au!pmorriso@uunet.UU.NET (Perry Morrison MATH) >However, I think that the effectiveness of the U.S. military has been >questioned after a decade or more of embarrassing bungling. The Iranian >hsotage rescue for example used choppers to fly a mission that exceeded their >mean-time-before-failure. In other words, it was beyond the design limits of >these particular helicopters (Ch-47s?). I believe that each service wanted a No, these were Navy Sea Stallions, not the Army CH-47. The '47 had been suggested as the appropriate machine, but was squashed because the planners felt that the Iranians *might* get word that a few Chinooks had been moved and would therefore be tipped off about the mission. Pretty thin in my book, but then I'm not a cloak-and-swagger type. I would also point out that Oliver North commanded the ground forces in the aborted Iranian raid under Carter, and ended up in a very high ranking civilian job under Reagan. >piece of the action and the result was a mish-mash of decision making. > I guess we could contrast this with the Israelis who rarely put a >foot wrong in covert operations. Didn't they steal an Egyptian radar >unit during one of the Arab-Israeli conflicts ('67?). Entebbe and >several other operations were also class acts. I agree, the Israelis do very nice military operations. They play to win, not to get the most political points. Terry Disclaimer et la Signaturo: Hell no, I'm not responsible for what I say! If everyone were responsible for what they said, we'd have had a balanced budget in 1984.
fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) (01/04/90)
From: fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) > From: munnari!gara.une.oz.au!pmorriso@uunet.UU.NET (Perry Morrison MATH) > > However, I think that the effectiveness of the U.S. military has been > questioned after a decade or more of embarrassing bungling. The Iranian > hsotage rescue for example used choppers to fly a mission that exceeded their > mean-time-before-failure. In other words, it was beyond the design limits of > these particular helicopters (Ch-47s?). CH-53E's. Part of the reason for using them was that the plan called for assembling the hostages in a soccer stadium in Tehran, and then lifting them out from there. C-130's wouldn't have fit. (This would have been a good place for something like the V-22 Osprey.) > I believe that each service wanted a piece of the action and the > result was a mish-mash of decision making. The whole affair showed what happens when you try to pull off a complex operation on the cheap, too quickly, and micromanage from a distance. It was, from the start, a political operation, misrun by politicians. > I guess we could contrast this with the Israelis who rarely put a > foot wrong in covert operations. Didn't they steal an Egyptian radar unit > during one of the Arab-Israeli conflicts ('67?). Entebbe and several other > operations were also class acts. They aren't afraid to put adequate resources in place for the desired results, and they aren't afraid to let the on-scene people have the authority to do the job as they see fit. (Not being afraid to step on somebodies toes if need be.) If you're going to pull off a military operation, you should let the military plan it and execute it. The politician's role should end, utterly, after having made the decision to use the military, and after giving the military the goal(s) of the mission. The pol's should also be prepared to share the blame if things go wrong, in addition to their almost universal propensity to want to take the credit when things go right. ------------ "...Then anyone who leaves behind him a written manual, and likewise anyone who receives it, in the belief that such writing will be clear and certain, must be exceedingly simple-minded..." Plato, _Phaedrus_ 275d
chidsey@smoke.brl.mil (Irving Chidsey) (01/04/90)
From: Irving Chidsey <chidsey@smoke.brl.mil> In article <12572@cbnews.ATT.COM> jhamilto@ics.UCI.EDU (John Scott Hamilton) writes: < < <From: John Scott Hamilton <jhamilto@ics.UCI.EDU> <In article <12539@cbnews.ATT.COM> bxr307@csc.anu.oz writes: <[Much fine argument deleted] <> <>I was not so much interested in what the US learnt politically as what <>it had learnt militarily. We have been seeing for the last 15 years that <>the US government failed to learn any real lessons from it Vietnam experience. <>What I was trying to find out was whether the US Army in particular, and the <>rest of the US military in general, had learnt any *tactical* lessons from <>Vietnam. < <What I find incredibly ironic about this tactics issue, is that <Americans fought their Revolutionary War based on guerilla tactics. <Even though outnumbered and outequipped by a highly regimented British <Army, the wanabee Americans managed to win. < Not really so! The militia tended to break and run under fire! The farmers were used to shooting birds with shotguns! etc. The imported Gen Steuben from Germany, learned to fight like Europeans, and beat the Brittish at their own game! They were greatly helped by short supply lines and Brittish officers who had inherited their positions. The Brits finally decided it wasn't worth the trouble and packed up and went home. At the start of the war, the population was divided just about equally, 1/3 for rebellion, 1/3 loyalist, 1/3 indifferent. The Brits quartered their troops in private homes ( by force ), etc., and converted the indifferent 1/3 the wrong way. We didn't learn anything from that either, because we forgot it! Irv -- I do not have signature authority. I am not authorized to sign anything. I am not authorized to commit the BRL, the DOA, the DOD, or the US Government to anything, not even by implication. Irving L. Chidsey <chidsey@brl.mil>
pmorriso@uunet.UU.NET (Perry Morrison MATH) (01/05/90)
From: munnari!gara.une.oz.au!pmorriso@uunet.UU.NET (Perry Morrison MATH) > In article <11970@cbnews.ATT.COM> munnari!softway.oz.au!gary@uunet.UU.NET (Gary > Corby) writes: > >>It would be interesting to compile a list of battles that were won by > >>one side doing something the other thought was physically impossible. > > Desert marches have long been a staple of surprise movements that the enemy > didn't believe possible. The early Arab conquests are full of examples. A > British cavalry column made an important one in WWI in Palestine in an attack > that broke the Turkish defense line. (Beersheba?) Wish I could remember the > pertinent names and dates. > > Ed Allen (allen@enzyme.berkeley.edu) Ahem! I believe it was the Australian Light Horse (mounted infantry) who accomplished this. Many ozzies would become aploplectic at the thought of it being attributed to the British. They were under a British high command but the unit (about 800 men) was Australian and completed a long desert march to Beersheba. Apparently the horses were just about pooped when the charge was made at around sunset. I'm not sure whether they could be classed as cavalry and whether it is regarded as the last cavalry charge in history (well...who doesn't make this claim!?). I could check, but only if there was sufficient interest.
waltm@maxzilla.encore.com (Walt Mattison) (01/06/90)
From: Walt Mattison <waltm@maxzilla.encore.com> n article <12754@cbnews.ATT.COM> tdrinkar@cosmos.acs.calpoly.edu (Terrell Drinkard) writes: > > >From: tdrinkar@cosmos.acs.calpoly.edu (Terrell Drinkard) >I would also point out that Oliver North commanded the ground >forces in the aborted Iranian raid under Carter, and ended up in a >very high ranking civilian job under Reagan. > Just a minor note of correction, North was not the commander of this operation "Chargin Charlie" Beckwith was. He is one of the better known SF commanders. He also ran the Ranger section for a while down in Fla. North is more of a political player and handled operations like this from afar. Walt Mattison
kyoung@uunet.UU.NET (Ken Young) (01/06/90)
From: auspex!kyoung@uunet.UU.NET (Ken Young) [mod.note: Followups to soc.misc, please, this topic having become purely history. - Bill ] Excerpt from conversation on American Revolution: > > They imported Gen Steuben from Germany, learned to fight like Europeans, >and beat the Brittish at their own game! They were greatly helped by short >supply lines and Brittish officers who had inherited their positions. The >Brits finally decided it wasn't worth the trouble and packed up and went home. > > Irving L. Chidsey <chidsey@brl.mil> Important point not mentioned: General Washington was generally renown at the start of the war by the Americans, British, and French as being one of the finest generals anywhere. He repeatedly proved this during the next 5 years. He was also experienced in fighting in the area, which is why the instigators of the rebellion considered his support so critical. Ken Young uunet!auspex!kyoung
major@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Mike Schmitt) (01/09/90)
From: ssc-vax!shuksan!major@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Mike Schmitt) [mod.note: followups to soc.history - Bill ] In article <12767@cbnews.ATT.COM>, chidsey@smoke.brl.mil (Irving Chidsey) writes: > > > From: Irving Chidsey <chidsey@smoke.brl.mil> > > In article <12572@cbnews.ATT.COM> jhamilto@ics.UCI.EDU (John Scott Hamilton) writes: > < > < > <From: John Scott Hamilton <jhamilto@ics.UCI.EDU> > <In article <12539@cbnews.ATT.COM> bxr307@csc.anu.oz writes: > <What I find incredibly ironic about this tactics issue, is that > <Americans fought their Revolutionary War based on guerilla tactics. > <Even though outnumbered and outequipped by a highly regimented British > <Army, the wanabee Americans managed to win. > Not really so! The militia tended to break and run under fire! The > farmers were used to shooting birds with shotguns! etc. > > The imported Gen Steuben from Germany, learned to fight like Europeans, > and beat the Brittish at their own game! They were greatly helped by short > supply lines and Brittish officers who had inherited their positions. The > Brits finally decided it wasn't worth the trouble and packed up and went home. Not until von Steuben taught/drilled the Americans in European-like drills, tactics, and discipline - did the they begin achieving measurable success against the British on the battlefield. British officers didn't inherit their positions as much as purchase their commissions. And, as much as this method seems repugnant today, from Marlborough to Haig (WWI) this method saw a British Army unequalled in the world for discipline under fire, sense of duty, and regimental esprit'. The American Revolution was a 'side-show' as far as the British were concerned - what with major land and sea battles in Europe and the Carribean going on. They (British) were unable to send large troop contingents to the American Colonies. > At the start of the war, the population was divided just about > equally, 1/3 for rebellion, 1/3 loyalist, 1/3 indifferent. The Brits quartered > their troops in private homes ( by force ), etc., and converted the indifferent > 1/3 the wrong way. The British formed the Royal American Regiment consisting of 3 active battalions from the American loyalists, which fought against the American Continental Army. (normally a British Regiment had one 'deployed' battalion and one 'home' [recruiting depot] battalion). mike schmitt
military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) (01/11/90)
From: att!utzoo!henry >From: ssc-vax!shuksan!major@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Mike Schmitt) > British officers didn't inherit their positions as much as purchase their > commissions. And, as much as this method seems repugnant today, from > Marlborough to Haig (WWI) this method saw a British Army unequalled in > the world for discipline under fire, sense of duty, and regimental esprit'. This worked, however, only because of an Army made up of professional soldiers and mostly run by very professional non-commissioned officers. The twits with the commissions, at least at the lower levels, were mostly just expected to inspire the men with conspicuous bravery. If they got killed doing so, too bad -- they weren't very important to tactical operations. Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu