mrchards@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu (Matt Richards ) (12/27/89)
From: mrchards@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu (Matt Richards ) Ed Luttwak was on the MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour the other night. He said that we had learned a few things from Grenada. In Grenada, we used a "Normandy" style invasion, landing at the edges and fighting our way to the middle. In Panama, we conducted a coup de main, in which one strikes "everywhere" instantaneously in overwhelming force. We still get low marks for not knocking out the radio station right away. There was no agreement on whether Noriega should have been captured prior to the start of the invasion. Some feel that this would not have been possible while maintaining any element of surprise. There were also comments to the effect that special forces should get more of a say in the planning of these operations. Mr. Luttwak makes a strong case for reforming the structure of the US military, as he feels that unified commands force too much compromise. At this point, it appears that at least a passable job was done in planning and preparations for this mission. -- Matt Richards WILL-AM/FM/TV Urbana, IL Center for Trivial Systems Research, University of Illinois mrchards@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu "That's not a mistake, that's our system!"
terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (01/02/90)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12601@cbnews.ATT.COM> mrchards@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu (Matt Richards ) writes: > [stuff deleted about Luttwak and Panama] > >Mr. Luttwak makes a strong case >for reforming the structure of the US military, as he feels that >unified commands force too much compromise. At this point, >it appears that at least a passable >job was done in planning and preparations for this mission. There is already information leaking that Panama may have been as much as a fiasco as Grenada, we just made different mistakes. The biggest failing once again was the lack of good intelligence. All the satellites and recon pictures in the world can only tell you so much. It appears that the Panamanians had better intelligence than the US forces. For example apparently 20 Navy SEALs landed at a supposedly lightly or not defended airfield. There were at least 3 APCs waiting at the airfield. Needless to say the SEAL platoon was shot up badly (their heaviest weapon was a machine gun). Apparently Noriega stayed just ahead of the American troops trying to capture him because he got word of the troops movements. Under those conditions the only way we could have killed or captured him was if he had a heart attack from all the running:-) Another indication of the lack of planning and/or foresight. The US went in and conducted a good military operation. Appaerntly none of the planning even considered any measures to control the political and social chaos that would be caused by an abrupt removal of the de facto government. There have been other incidents, but the point is that the US made much better *military* perparations and didn't consider all the factors of the operation. In addition it seems that it is yet another failure of the US intelligence community. (Maybe with peristroika we can get the KGB to give us some pointers on running HUMINT operations:-) -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
emery@aries.mitre.org (David Emery) (01/02/90)
From: emery@aries.mitre.org (David Emery) One thing I noticed about Panama right away was this was NOT a joint operation. The Army was in control, unlike Grenada, where every service had to get their piece of the pie. This shows in the consistency of planning and particularly execution. In general, I'm not a big supporter of the Marines, but this is the kind of operation that Marines should be good at. In the case of Panama, however, since the Army already has lots of troops (a complete brigade) and a major headquarters (Southern Command), then Panama should be an Army operation. If we did something in the Phillipines, for instance (or Cuba), there the Marines are the people on the ground, and they should run the operation. I hope the debacles in Grenada and in Iran have convinced the Joint Staff that the ground commander should run a ground operation. dave emery emery@aries.mitre.org
sampson@attctc.Dallas.TX.US (Steve Sampson) (01/04/90)
From: sampson@attctc.Dallas.TX.US (Steve Sampson) In article <12694@cbnews.ATT.COM>, terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) writes: > >There is already information leaking that Panama may have been as much >as a fiasco as Grenada, we just made different mistakes. The biggest >failing once again was the lack of good intelligence. All the >satellites and recon pictures in the world can only tell you so much. Bull. What does anyone from Oregon know about the military, they don't even have any active-duty bases :-) I long for Keno... >It appears that the Panamanians had better intelligence than the US >forces. For example apparently 20 Navy SEALs landed at a supposedly >lightly or not defended airfield. There were at least 3 APCs waiting >at the airfield. Needless to say the SEAL platoon was shot up badly You're saying then that the guys in the APC knew a SEAL platoon was coming. Somehow this sounds funny. You can't blame the nation for an operational failure. I'm always ashamed when the President forgives a commander for his failure, and takes responsibility. Hogwash, Court Marshal them and take their pension away (USS Stark comes to mind). >Apparently Noriega stayed just ahead of the American troops trying to >capture him because he got word of the troops movements. Yea, he saw them orbiting overhead :-) >Another indication of the lack of planning and/or foresight. The US >went in and conducted a good military operation. Appaerntly none of >the planning even considered any measures to control the political and >social chaos that would be caused by an abrupt removal of the de facto >government. Are you kidding? That's what war is! Soldiers don't give one hoot about politics or social behavior. That's the job for the diplomats and lawyers. A military operation is usually planned to secure certain objectives. What the locals do behind the lines is of no concern to a soldier. If we were invading a totally hostile country, I would think that looters would be shot on site. The fact we don't want to alienate these people requires that we let them run around for awhile. You only have to starve once during war to learn that food received under any method is appropriate. They didn't know how long this was going to last. Hell, Vietnam took 30 years. >In addition it seems that it is yet another failure of the US intelligence >community. What Intelligence community? Carter had them all killed years ago. Nobody wants to join the CIA anymore. One thing I like about this operation is the news media was kept out and they didn't even complain. Also the stories that did make the press show how well the security lid has been kept on the whole operation. I had to laugh actually when some parents told of their sons calling home and releasing information about where they were going. I feel sorry for them when I get ahold of their neck. MSgt Sampson A.K.A. "drool"
jgd@gatech.edu (John G. De Armond) (01/04/90)
From: rsiatl!jgd@gatech.edu (John G. De Armond) In article <12694@cbnews.ATT.COM> terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) writes: > > >From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) > >There is already information leaking that Panama may have been as much >as a fiasco as Grenada, we just made different mistakes. The biggest >failing once again was the lack of good intelligence. Au contraire. It appears to me that we did an exceptionally good of intelligence. Read on. >All the >satellites and recon pictures in the world can only tell you so much. >It appears that the Panamanians had better intelligence than the US >forces. For example apparently 20 Navy SEALs landed at a supposedly >lightly or not defended airfield. There were at least 3 APCs waiting >at the airfield. According to the newspaper, the reason appears to be a matter of common treason and not lack of intelligence. It was reported that the reason the SEALs were met by PDF forces AND why Noriega managed to elude capture is because someone (media speculation: state department) made a phone call to Noriega a couple of days before the attack and warned him of the impending invasion. Seems to me that the gallows need to be dusted off instead of criticizing this mission. >Another indication of the lack of planning and/or foresight. The US >went in and conducted a good military operation. Appaerntly none of >the planning even considered any measures to control the political and >social chaos that would be caused by an abrupt removal of the de facto >government. Again, based on news reports, just the opposite seems to be true. CNN did a special a few days ago on the social side of the invasion. They noted the extremely GOOD job the military has done to win and keep the loyality of the population. Several soldiers interviewed reported to have received welcomes like they read about the Allies receiving in liberated France. If your comments about "lack of foresight" refer to the looting and riots that happened the first day or so, my comment would be that concern for this HAD to be of low priority in the beginning. Securing the country, protecting the Canal and capturing Noriega had to take priority. And quite frankly (and being very nationalist here), I'd hate to think American military lives had been risked exclusively to protect Panamanian assets from Panamanians. >In addition it seems that it is yet another >failure of the US intelligence community. (Maybe with peristroika we >can get the KGB to give us some pointers on running HUMINT operations:-) You should note that the evidence of the treasonous phone call was provided by intelligence intercepts. Even without that consideration, I think they did damn well, especially considering the Carter administration sponsored dismantling of our intelligence community. (Sorry about that political interjection, Bill. I just get real mad every time I think about Carter and the fact he came from MY state.) And finally, I'll say that we all should remember that in times of war, mistakes ARE made. After all, the enemy is doing all he can to help us along in that area. The difference between, say WWII or Korea and now is that back then we lacked a agressive and treasonous media in WWII. Now, whenever someone gets shot, there are 20 camera lenses in the guy's face recording his suffering. I was working late and had CNN on the night of the invasion. The behavior of CNN was abhorrent. By 2 o'clock, they were out trolling trying to find someone to say something bad about the invasion. No one from Congress (!) would say anything bad. About the best they could do was to interview other journalists who were very free with criticism. I also watched as the anchors of CNN tried to find a Congresscritter who could be tricked or induced to reveal aspects of the secret briefings. I wonder what CNN and Teddy-boy would have said had some critter leaked something that cost lives? To me, that we moved 20k troops into a foreign country in an invasion and took control with only 20 odd casualties is a miracle. Though I feel sadness for those killed or wounded, the small number is a first rate testamonial for our planning and intelligence. Sure, let's slam the military when they buy $600.00 hammers but let's be fair when the system works. John -- John De Armond, WD4OQC | The Fano Factor - Radiation Systems, Inc. Atlanta, GA | Where Theory meets Reality. emory!rsiatl!jgd **I am the NRA** |
waltm@maxzilla.encore.com (Walt Mattison) (01/04/90)
From: Walt Mattison <waltm@maxzilla.encore.com> In article <12694@cbnews.ATT.COM> terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) writes: : :In article <12601@cbnews.ATT.COM> mrchards@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu (Matt Richards ) writes: :> :>Mr. Luttwak makes a strong case :>for reforming the structure of the US military, as he feels that :>unified commands force too much compromise. At this point, :>it appears that at least a passable :>job was done in planning and preparations for this mission. : :There is already information leaking that Panama may have been as much :as a fiasco as Grenada, we just made different mistakes. The biggest :failing once again was the lack of good intelligence. All the :satellites and recon pictures in the world can only tell you so much. The armchair commando will always claim that an operation could have been done in a better manner, however in reality the commander of an operation has to act on data that is coming to him from various sources at various rates he does not have the luxury of hind sight intell. Like the old adage " any landing you can walk away from is a good one" any time a military operation is completed with all or most of its goals attained it is a good one. Grenada was a fiasco? I thought all those medical students came away alive... :It appears that the Panamanians had better intelligence than the US :forces. For example apparently 20 Navy SEALs landed at a supposedly :lightly or not defended airfield. There were at least 3 APCs waiting :at the airfield. Needless to say the SEAL platoon was shot up badly It's never easy to conduct operations in our system of government with every politician willing to sacrafice American soldier's blood for votes or press coverage. I would think that any intell that Panama had of the operation would have come from one of our Faithful public servants 8 ) 8 ).... :(their heaviest weapon was a machine gun). Apparently Noriega stayed :just ahead of the American troops trying to capture him because he got :word of the troops movements. Under those conditions the only way we :could have killed or captured him was if he had a heart attack from :all the running:-) Noriega could have been captured or killed ( much better solution) if the US didn't care about public opinion, but since we do. we couldn't risk the extra loss of life that a gamble like that would have entailed, we were forced into the type of operation that was executed. : :Another indication of the lack of planning and/or foresight. The US :went in and conducted a good military operation. Appaerntly none of :the planning even considered any measures to control the political and :social chaos that would be caused by an abrupt removal of the de facto :government. The military was given the job of taking Noriega out of power. The State Dept has the responsiblity of handling the loss of control. This is not to say that the military would not have been used to keep order, but that was not their call. : :There have been other incidents, but the point is that the US made :much better *military* perparations and didn't consider all the :factors of the operation. In addition it seems that it is yet another :failure of the US intelligence community. (Maybe with peristroika we :can get the KGB to give us some pointers on running HUMINT operations:-) : The only reason that the KGB can be successful is a total control of the media, which allows them to operate without concern for how much force or how many bodies get cold during the operation. Walt Mattison USA ( Ret) Infantry/Airborne/Ranger/SF Qualified
terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (01/05/90)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) This topic has generated losts of flame. It was a successful operation, moreso since Noriega was finally scared out of Panama by the lynch mob being held back by the US Army. But success doesn't not mean that an operation was well run. Success shouldn't prevent us from taking a critical look to see if things can be better next time. Many of the problems made apparent by Grenada have not been apparent in Panama, so maybe we have learned something. Kneejerk, it was a success, blame the problems on the media discussion will not help. So Bill will post this on to more substantive comments. My main point is that all the information about the invasion is not available, and because the media was successfully excluded, we may never know some things. The operation met its goals, but there still could be massive problems. Most of the operation met apparently little organized resistance. The fate of the SEAL platoon was simply a sample of what could have happened if organized resistance was more prevalent. Some foresight (yes I know hindsight is 20/20, but when I was planning such operations I worked with worst case assumptions) would have provided at least rudimentary anit-armor capability. The airfield was a very important objective, so it was likely to be more heavily guarded. A "traitor" may have been responsible for tipping off Noriega, and he was caught, after the fact. Treason has long been a part of human affairs, and their is no easy solution. Suffice it to say that counter-intelligence is also part of intelligence. To blame the Carter administration for dismantling the intelligence community has no bearing on this discussion. There is still an intelligence community, and we are using it to plan operations. So Bush and the currant administration and them alone bear the responsibility for success or failure of the community. If was dismantled and poorly functional, them why on earth would we depend upon that information to support our troops?!? If it was, and we risked lives on it, then those responsible are the ones that should be shot. Consequently, I don't think that the intelligence community is considered dismantled by those in power. Some analysis of the US intelligence community indicates that the problems arise from a dependence upon technology (how many times have we heard something like this? :-). If that is the case the decline started well before Carter. Let's stop looking for scapegoats and discuss the situation as it is today, and see how it can be better. Speaking of scapegoats, the military's favorite has sprung up in this discussion. I don't know if the media is traitorous. I don't know if they are any worse now than in WWII. In WWII a newspaper reporter printed a story about how US submarines fooled the supposedly crafty Japanese by diving below the depths that Japanese depth charges were usually set. After publication, the depth charges fell right on top of the subs (I no longer remember where I read this, so I will only grant it urban legend status if challenged, but given time I could probably find the source). Is that treason? In WWII? The USNI Proceedings has published several articles about the military-media relation, and there are some interesting problems. For some reason it is an adversarial one. This might be an outgrowth of Vietnam. Ironically, the media was fully on the bandwagon supporting MACV's view of reality. Only when they realized that that view was distorted did the media assume an adversarial position. For the sake of the men dying in Vietnam it was probably good that they did. If the media seems to "not buy the party line" then they have some justification. To blame them for problems with a military operation is ludicrous. All they can do is provide information about what happened, which helps all of us. Few reporters realy object to notification after the start of the operation, they realize some things must be kept from them. But to restrict access after an operation is something else. It does make it easier for the military to hide mistakes. If that is what is meant by treason, I certainly don't want to be in the next invasion. I don't knock the success of the operation in achieving its objectives, and I am glad only 20 or so died doing it. But lets not let that success prevent us from looking at the invasion as seeing its flaws as well as its strengths. Next time there might be organized resistance. -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
smb@ulysses.homer.nj.att.com (Steven M. Bellovin) (01/06/90)
From: smb@ulysses.homer.nj.att.com (Steven M. Bellovin) [mod.note: I think this covers both sides of the topic, "What were our objectives in Panama ?" With that, let's keep replies to email, unless someone can figure out how to work technology back into this. - Bill ] In article <12762@cbnews.ATT.COM>, rsiatl!jgd@gatech.edu (John G. De Armond) writes: > If your comments about "lack of foresight" refer to the looting and > riots that happened the first day or so, my comment would be that > concern for this HAD to be of low priority in the beginning. Securing > the country, protecting the Canal and capturing Noriega had to > take priority. And quite frankly (and being very nationalist here), I'd > hate to think American military lives had been risked exclusively to > protect Panamanian assets from Panamanians. This is a classic example of how not to think about operations of this type. Without getting at all into the question of whether or not we should have gone into Panama -- I will *not* discuss that in this newsgroup, and I hope the moderator doesn't permit anyone else to -- the *long-range* purpose of such an operation has to be to create a stable environment -- where the Canal isn't endangered, where the alleged drugs don't flow through, and where the population is ``sympathetic'' to the U.S. Now, the latter will never happen if the population doesn't agree with your basic goals, in which case you either maintain an army of occupation or install a more-or-less repressive government that will do what you want. Both of these can work for a while -- the Soviets did both in Eastern Europe 40 years ago, and it's only fallen to pieces this year. If the population is inclined to support you -- and there's reasonable evidence that a large portion of the Panamanian people are happy Noriega is gone -- then it is *vital* that you maintain that support. Anything negative that happens as a result of such military actions is attributable to you, whether it's civilian casualties or mass looting triggered by a breakdown in law and order. Pretending otherwise may be sound tactical thinking, but it's lousy strategy. And remember that this is a part of the world where the U.S. has a long history of intervening against the wishes of the population; any military moves in Latin America will generate a lot of ill will simply by their existence, regardless of the merits of the operation or even the previous sympathies of the people. Again, this is not to say that such operations are right or wrong (though I of course do have my own opinions) -- but you cannot ignore the larger picture and pretend it doesn't exist. Now, if you're planning an operation and the President tells you that you must do X, Y, and Z to ensure the proper popular response, you are not just entitled but morally and professionally obligated to say ``OK, but that will require T more troops, cost $M million more, and result in C more casualties.'' Then let the President make the decision. War, after all, is not violence for its own sake, but violence in pursuit of an objective. And most people (though not everyone, obviously) would agree that at some point you must fight; the major question is where one draws that line. Liberals, if you will, draw it much further away -- but when Pearl Harbor was attacked, there was only one vote in Congress against declaring war, the large isolationist sentiment notwithstanding. .... > The difference between, say WWII or Korea and now > is that back then we lacked a agressive and treasonous media in WWII. > Now, whenever someone gets shot, there are 20 camera lenses in the guy's > face recording his suffering. I very strongly object to the word ``treasonous'' in this context. Whether or not the media should report errors -- or phrased another way, whether or not it should obey its own ethical imperatives and tell the truth, be it ever so painful -- is a political question. Your inflammatory language does not belong in this digest. I heard enough such epithets 20 years ago, when some members of the public (and especially politicians) thought that criticizing aspects of American foreign policy was ``treasonous''. More or less by definition of constitutionally-guaranteed liberties, that charge is nonsense. If you want to discuss the issue in this forum, you can say something like ``public support today is less because of increased media coverage''. I may not agree that that's the cause, but it's a way to say it that doesn't violate the charter of this newsgroup. > I was working late and had CNN on the night of the invasion. The > behavior of CNN was abhorrent. By 2 o'clock, they were out trolling trying > to find someone to say something bad about the invasion. No one from > Congress (!) would say anything bad. About the best they could do was > to interview other journalists who were very free with criticism. It is the responsibility of journalists to report all sides of a story. They would have been remiss had they not searched around. As for why some other journalists might be freer with criticisms -- journalists live closer to the center of power, and hence are much more skeptical of the reasons given. And the announced reasons are often very far from the truth, though depending on the situation it may take more or less digging to find out what's really going on. (For an example of what I mean, I suggest reading ``The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Program''. It's an excellent book -- it won the Pulitzer Prize, as well as tenure for the author -- and does an excellent job of documenting how the real reasons for the early space program were very different from the publicly-stated ones. Much of the real reason, for example, was to be able to launch spy satellites -- a goal that was first articulated by the Rand Corporation in 1950. There's also evidence that while the U.S. didn't try to ``lose'' to Sputnik, Eisenhower and his advisors didn't care much who won, because they perceived geopolitical benefits to the Soviets setting the precedent of overflight by orbiting bodies.)
pwilcox@paldn.UUCP (Peter McLeod Wilcox) (01/09/90)
From: pwilcox@paldn.UUCP (Peter McLeod Wilcox) In article <12860@cbnews.ATT.COM>, smb@ulysses.homer.nj.att.com (Steven M. Bellovin) writes: > There's also evidence that while > the U.S. didn't try to ``lose'' to Sputnik, Eisenhower and his > advisors didn't care much who won, because they perceived geopolitical > benefits to the Soviets setting the precedent of overflight by > orbiting bodies.) The Atlas ICBM was well into its operational flight testing when Sputnik was launched. Convair was instructed, and compliance was verified, not to run the fuel tanks dry - i.e. the missle was instructed to shut the motors down early. The result of this was that the missle stayed suborbital. Lest there be any doubt of its orbital capability remember that it was one of the missles in this test sequence which carried Eisenhowers Christmas greeting recording onto orbit. After Sputnik. There are several possible reasons for this, the performance of Atlas was highly classified, Atlas was strictly a military operation and Vanguard was a more scientific oriented project, take your choice. But the US certainly had orbital capability before the Soviets demonstrated it with Sputnik. -- Pete Wilcox ...gatech!nanovx!techwood!paldn!pwilcox
major@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Mike Schmitt) (01/09/90)
From: ssc-vax!shuksan!major@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Mike Schmitt) > :There is already information leaking that Panama may have been as much > :as a fiasco as Grenada, we just made different mistakes. The biggest > :failing once again was the lack of good intelligence. All the > :satellites and recon pictures in the world can only tell you so much. > > The armchair commando will always claim that an operation could have > been done in a better manner, however in reality the commander of an operation > has to act on data that is coming to him from various sources at various rates > he does not have the luxury of hind sight intell. Like the old adage " any > landing you can walk away from is a good one" any time a military operation > is completed with all or most of its goals attained it is a good one. > Grenada was a fiasco? I thought all those medical students came away alive... Don't let 'sci.military' fool you. Combat Operations are not an exact science. First, it's a profession (the profession of arms), secondly, its an art. Orchestrating a large operations or a small firefight takes initiative, adjustment, and improvisation - something that American soldiers are very good at accomplishing. Once the first bullet is fired, plans may be thrown out the window. Rigid adherence to a "OPORD" written in the safety of a garrison headquarters is very dangerous. Once on the ground, small unit leaders accomplish their missions/objectives through fire and manuever and react to 'combat information' (not intelligence). Operations can always be 'done better'. That's why extensive after action reports and debriefings and studies are made after an operation. I would guess that the success of Panama is due, in part, to 'lessons learned' from Grenada. (and what makes you think Grenada was a fiasco?) The airborne drop of Rangers at 500' in Grenada was not 'planned'. It was 'improvised' by the Battalion Commander (a classmate of mine) to avoid suspected anti-aircraft weapons. The succes of the 500' drop allowed the 'planning' of a 500' foot drop into Panama. > :It appears that the Panamanians had better intelligence than the US > :forces. For example apparently 20 Navy SEALs landed at a supposedly > :lightly or not defended airfield. There were at least 3 APCs waiting > :at the airfield. Needless to say the SEAL platoon was shot up badly Well, there is no such thing as perfect intelligence. And small unit leaders should always expect the unexpected. (I have to question why 'SEALS' were sent in, in the first place - and not troops better equiped/armed for ground combat????). But, I don't think the PDF had 'better intelligence'. > :Another indication of the lack of planning and/or foresight. The US > :went in and conducted a good military operation. Appaerntly none of > :the planning even considered any measures to control the political and > :social chaos that would be caused by an abrupt removal of the de facto > :government. Well, the combat troops did conduct a good military operation. Their mission was not a 'good political and social operation' though from all reports it looks like the 'front-line' troops acquitted themselves very well in their contact with the civilian population. Combat troops are not equipped nor trained in political/civil operations. After troops secure their objectives/area - then it's safe to bring in support troops and Civil Affairs units (Reserve and National Guard?), and Military Police units.. These units are equipped/trained in establishing population control, re-establishing civilian government. > :There have been other incidents, but the point is that the US made > :much better *military* perparations and didn't consider all the > :factors of the operation. In addition it seems that it is yet another > :failure of the US intelligence community. Here we go again! Another 'Pearl Harbor' syndrome of "Who shot John". Well, I'm sorry, I don't buy that. Most 'failures' attributed to the 'US intelligence community' are really a failure to 'act' on known information rather than a 'lack' of information. 'Intelligence' is provided to the commander(s). (what is known and what is not known). The commander must weigh this information with his mission objectives and decide on the tradeoffs. The fact that 3 APCs were at the airfield may very well have been known. And someone may have decided to go ahead as planned. The SEAL Team leader(s) may have said, "We'll take care of 'em." He may have asked for more firepower support and been told, "I can't give you any more - you'll have to take 'em out yourself." No one knows at this point. But, you certainly can't make such a negative comment that there were any intelligence failures. > :(Maybe with peristroika we > :can get the KGB to give us some pointers on running HUMINT operations:-) Actually the KGB is notorious for failures in the arena of gathering intelligence for military operations. Matter of fact, historically, they are so inept, that the military GRU was formed for gathering of military intelligence. The KGB, then, is more akin to the CIA. Its the GRU that conducts military intelligence operations. -------------------- Two comments: First, having served with the 7th Lt Inf Div, I was pleased to see elements of the Bayonet Division deployed to Panama. (The 7th hasn't seen combat since Korea). We deployed on numerous training exercises to Alaska, Korea, Florida, and Central America - and conducted plenty of training in MOBA (Military Operations in a Built-up Area := city fighting!) - glad to see it all pay off. The 7ID trains a lot at Hunter-Ligget with Marines. If the Marine Contingent at Panama came from California (???), then these Army and Marine forces were used to operating side-by-side, as they did in Panama - now, there's some smart planning for you. Second. The last couple days have seen some media coverage of the women soldiers deployed to Panama. Especially noteworthy is the female MP captain that led her company into a firefight against some PDF elements. This will certainly stir up some controversy about the role of women in combat. IMHO: I think it's great. What do you'all think? mike schmitt
haydon@arrakis.nevada.edu (Haydon) (01/09/90)
From: Haydon <haydon@arrakis.nevada.edu>
The suggestion has been made that a traitor gave advanced notice to
Noriega about he US invasion, thus giving him the time he needed to get away.
While I agree that for some people money speaks louder than patriotic
feelings, there is a possibility that has been overlooked. Please correct me
if I'm wrong, but C-130's were delivering troops into Panama for hours, if not
longer, before the actual attack began. Noriega had to know about this
increased US military activity and put two and two together. Looking for a
traitor seems to me to be a way of turning attention away from one of the
mistakes that creeps up in one of these situations, the military lost the
element of surprise needed to pin down Noriega. On the other hand, if I
see hard proof that there was a traitor, then I'll believe it.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
James P. Willey willey@arrakis.NEVADA.EDU
Disclaimer: I'm now employed, but I'm responsible for my employers opinions,
not vice versa.
Kraneberg, an oldtime historian of [North] American technology, once said-
in the form of a First Law- "Technology is neither positive, negative,
nor neutral."
Indeed. It is all three.
And omnipresent.
(Robotech)gwh%sandstorm.Berkeley.EDU@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (George William Herbert) (01/10/90)
From: gwh%sandstorm.Berkeley.EDU@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (George William Herbert) In article <12694@cbnews.ATT.COM> terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) writes: > >There have been other incidents, but the point is that the US made >much better *military* perparations and didn't consider all the >factors of the operation. In addition it seems that it is yet another >failure of the US intelligence community. (Maybe with peristroika we >can get the KGB to give us some pointers on running HUMINT operations:-) > Don't ask the Spetznaz. Last time They tried a Coup-de-main [the technical name for the decapitative overwhelming strike used in Panama] it left them in the Afghanistan fiasco... :-) **************************************************************************** George William Herbert | UCB Naval Architecture [On schedule? at UCB? Yes!] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- gwh@ocf.berkeley.edu ||||||||| "And What if I Don't?" "Then, You Die, gwh@soda.berkeley.edu ||||||||||||||| the Girl dies, Everybody Dies..." maniac@garnet.berkeley.edu |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| -Heavy Metal
joel@peora.ccur.com (Joel Upchurch) (01/10/90)
From: joel@peora.ccur.com (Joel Upchurch)
I was wondering if is possible that the failure to control looting
in Panama during the first few days of the invasion was not an
oversight, but a policy decision. It seems to me that to control
the looting in Panama City, without shooting a lot of looters
would have needed over 50 thousand troops. I doubt that the
US Army has that many troops trained for riot control duty and
the logistics of getting them to Panama in the necessary time
frame would have been difficult if not impossible.
Trying to control the looting with fewer troops would probably
have involved shooting several hundred more Panamanian civilians.
Considering the extent of the looting, it is probable that
many or even most of those people would not have been habitual
criminals. The PR damage among the Panamanian people would
have been enormous. Letting the looting run its course probably
angered a lot of businessmen, but that afterall is property
damage, and the economic aid and renewed trade will go a long
way toward compensating any uninsured losses.
The whole strategy the US used in Panama seemed to place a high
priority on minimizing US inflicted civilian casulties.
--
Joel Upchurch/Concurrent Computer Corp/2486 Sand Lake Rd/Orlando, FL 32809
joel@peora.ccur.com {uiucuxc,hoptoad,petsd,ucf-cs}!peora!joel
Telephone: (407) 850-1040 Fax: (407) 857-0713terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (01/10/90)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12937@cbnews.ATT.COM> haydon@arrakis.nevada.edu (Haydon) writes: > > The suggestion has been made that a traitor gave advanced notice to >Noriega about he US invasion, thus giving him the time he needed to get away. > Actually, it appears that there was a phone call to Noriega. I haven't heard specifics on the source. In at least one account it was attributed to a state dept employee. I've seen enough independent references to the phone call that to believe it was made. According to the latest FYEO, however, the call was largely ignored by Noriega except to move APC(s) to guard his private planes. -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) (01/11/90)
From: att!utzoo!henry >From: pwilcox@paldn.UUCP (Peter McLeod Wilcox) >The Atlas ICBM was well into its operational flight testing when Sputnik >was launched... >...the US certainly had orbital capability before the Soviets demonstrated >it with Sputnik. One need not invoke Atlas to demonstrate this; in fact, invoking Atlas to demonstrate it is a bit silly. Wernher von Braun's Army team had proven capability to orbit a satellite well before Sputnik. The launch of Explorer 1, the first US satellite, was almost identical to a Jupiter C test flight flown a year or so earlier. The difference was that for the test flight, WvB had specific orders that there were to be no, repeat no, "accidental" satellites, and the fourth-stage rocket motor was therefore to be a dummy, no excuses allowed. He followed orders, but carefully put the backup booster into protected storage in case there was sudden need for it. Which is how he got a satellite up on 90 days' notice when the politicians finally let him. >There are several possible reasons for this, the performance of Atlas >was highly classified, Atlas was strictly a military operation and >Vanguard was a more scientific oriented project, take your choice. Again, there isn't really any secret about this. Vanguard was the project designated to launch the first US satellite, pure and simple. Since that decision was meant to resolve a long and bitter battle among the Army, Navy, and Air Force, it was final and debate was closed. The semi- civilian nature of Vanguard was considered appropriate for something as momentous as the first satellite launch, especially under Eisenhower (who, despite his background, wanted the military kept in its place), but the ban on competition was simply a matter of who won the turf battle. In the end, of course, Vanguard was persistently under-funded and the technical difficulties were persistently minimized, and when it was asked for an immediate response to Sputnik, it couldn't deliver and the Army could. (Almost nobody remembers that Vanguard became a fairly successful program once it was given a bit more time and money to debug the hardware.) The ultimate resolution to the turf battles over spaceflight was, of course, to transfer most of it to a new fully-civilian agency, NASA. Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu