military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) (01/10/90)
From: oresoft.uu.net!richard (Richard Johnson) One of the items discussed in regard to weapons systems to keep or to toss was the transport capability of the Air Force (USAF I presume). I am not affiliated with the military, and presently have little access to the appropriate references, so please bear with me. It seems that the ability of the air force to deliver ground forces on station when needed is adequate. Consider the following cases: 1. Small-scale conflict or anti-terrorist action They seemed to get enough men and material to Panama to do the job. Likely they would be able to repeat the act, so long as they don't have to ship armor around. 2. Full-scale war (e.g. Soviets invade Germany) Then the civil air transports would overnight be "nationalized" and pressed into service. In the short run, there would be plenty of transport for just about anything except armor. Please notice - I agree completely with the earlier comments about armor needing to be fairly close to where it is needed, *before* it's needed. We may never be able to adequately carry tanks in airplanes...
marsh@linus.UUCP (Ralph Marshall) (01/11/90)
From: marsh@linus.UUCP (Ralph Marshall) Disclaimer: I have worked on a project for MAC while at MITRE, but I do not intend to make any official statements here; just random musings from an interested observer. Also, none of this information is classified (obviously, I think... :-)) >From: oresoft.uu.net!richard (Richard Johnson) > >2. Full-scale war (e.g. Soviets invade Germany) > Then the civil air transports would overnight be "nationalized" > and pressed into service. In the short run, there would be > plenty of transport for just about anything except armor. > There is a plan for the Civilian Air Reserve Force (CRAF, although the 'F' could mean Fleet) which includes most airplanes owned by US-flag carriers. The problem is that they usually require some refitting, so "overnight" is somewhat of an exaggeration. Also, many interesting bits of military cargo are difficult to fit into a civilian cargo plane; in particular trucks, tanks, large artillery, etc., require special loading doors, reinforced floors, and wide fuselages. The planners at MAC have ~100 C-5s to carry all of the really big stuff; it won't fit on ANY other plane. Thus, the CRAF only really helps move the guys, their ammo, etc., but no heavy equipment. > >Please notice - I agree completely with the earlier comments about >armor needing to be fairly close to where it is needed, *before* >it's needed. We may never be able to adequately carry tanks in >airplanes... However, that is the plan! We have some armored units with equipment close to the expected problem areas (where possible due to friendly countries), but not much, and not everywhere. Moving a single armored division requires most of the heavy-lift capacity that we have, considering that an Abrams tank fills a C-5 (in the sense that you can't get a second one on; there is some residual room for small-sized objects). They have to load, fly to the destination, unload, fly back empty, and repeat the cycle. This takes very nearly 24 hours PER TANK, and ignores combat losses, required maintenance, fatigue of crews, etc. As noted in previous postings, we have many more heavy divisions than we can move quickly by air. Ralph Marshall marsh@linus.mitre.org
ae219dp%prism@gatech.edu (Devon Prichard) (01/16/90)
From: ae219dp%prism@gatech.edu (Devon Prichard)
Concerning the difficulty of airlifting a heavy infantry/armored
division;
to counter an armored foe somewhere, a quick 'n dirty solution
may be to create a airborne division (parachute) which is basically
foot soldiers armed with shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles. with
lots of available rounds, special training and tactics, and
appropriate terrain, such a critter may slow/stop an armored
assault long enough to allow airlift of heavier brigades.
the experience of the Israelis recently has been to clear a battlefield
with infantry to knock out nests with the shoulder-fired SAM missiles,
then send in the Cobras to take out fortifications.
possibly an analogous situation could occur with missiles denying
the use of armor (assuming that one's infantry holds).
--
DEVON PRICHARD
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta Georgia, 30332
uucp: ...!{allegra,amd,hplabs,seismo,ut-ngp}!gatech!prism!ae219dp
ARPA: ae219dp@prism.gatech.eduterryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (01/17/90)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <13186@cbnews.ATT.COM> ae219dp%prism@gatech.edu (Devon Prichard) writes: > > >Concerning the difficulty of airlifting a heavy infantry/armored >division; > >to counter an armored foe somewhere, a quick 'n dirty solution >may be to create a airborne division (parachute) which is basically >foot soldiers armed with shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles. with >lots of available rounds, special training and tactics, and >appropriate terrain, such a critter may slow/stop an armored >assault long enough to allow airlift of heavier brigades. > The advantage of "heavy" mechanized/armor forces is not just their anti-tank capabilities, it is also their mobility. 'Leg' units simply do not have the tactical mobility to stay with an mechanized unit. Even air lifting a mechanized division could take upwards of a monthe. Yes, individual battalions/brigades couled be commited as they arrive, but then you lose to affect of mass, one of armor's strong suits. There has been at least one proposal to use the light divisions in a similiar fashion, just deployed to great depth (on the order of 100 miles), what the Germans living in that 100 miles think about the idea wasn't mentioned :-) The bottom line is that no mater how you address it, 'heavy' units take too long to get there, and 'light' units don't have the staying power to slow things up until the 'heavies' can arrive. Note that I haven't even addressed the issue of where we would get airlift to make a division sized airdrop. -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
moshe@cbnewsc.ATT.COM (Moshe Yudkowsky) (01/17/90)
From: moshe@cbnewsc.ATT.COM (Moshe Yudkowsky) In some article, Richard Johnson writes: > >Please notice - I agree completely with the earlier comments about >armor needing to be fairly close to where it is needed, *before* >it's needed. We may never be able to adequately carry tanks in >airplanes... Charles Fair wrote a really suberb book several years ago, called _From the Jaws of Victory_. Dedicated to Ambrose Burnside, it was about bad generals throughout the ages. In a footnote, Mr. Fair relates something a German officer who participated in _Barbarossa_ told him. _Barbarossa_, the invasion of Russia by Germany, took place during the late summer of 1941(?). It seems that as the German forces rolled unopposed through the Russian border, they found vast stocks of prepositioned Russian hardware, from bullets to tanks. The Russians had decided on prepositioning their equipment, but neglected to mobilize in time. Prepositioning equipment, let's say for use in a fight with supporting our NATO dependents, is an open invitation for a preemptive strike with chemical weapons. In fact, the hardware on Diego Garcia probably isn't too safe either. I doubt that Iran, Iraq, or Libya would have any compunctions about a strike against a fortress on an island. Moshe Yudkowsky moshe@ihnet.att.com att!ihnet!moshe "Here's to our friends, the good guys.""And here's to our enemies, the bad guys.""And here's to the hope that we can tell the difference." -- Keith Laumer -- Moshe Yudkowsky moshe@ihnet.att.com att!ihnet!moshe "Here's to our friends, the good guys.""And here's to our enemies, the bad guys.""And here's to the hope that we can tell the difference." -- Keith Laumer