cmr@cvedc.prime.com (Chesley Reyburn) (07/27/89)
From: cmr@cvedc.prime.com (Chesley Reyburn) This just in from US News & World Report: B-2 B-1B B-52 B-29 Last Purchased 1988-? 1986 1962 1946 Number built (132 proposed) 100 744 3,960 Cost Per Plane $532 Mil. $434 Mil. $56 Mil. $8 Mil. Range 8,800 miles 6,400 miles 10,000 miles 3,300 miles Note: Figures are (allegedly) adjusted for inflation at min-1990s prices. Basic Data: U.S.AirForce, congressional Research Service, Defense Budget Project. Is this more bang for our bux? I get nervous thinking about being 'defended' by a diminishing number of planes that carry an increasing cost per plane. What is there about the bat plane that warrants such cost? Inquiring minds want to know. cmr ============================================================= Chesley Reyburn ...tektronix!ogccse!cvedc!cmr ECAE Software, Prime Computer, Inc. ...sun!cvbnet!cvedc!cmr 14952 NW Greenbrier Parkway ...sequent!cvedc!cmr Beaverton, OR 97006 Phone 503/645-2410 =============================================================
cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn) (01/06/90)
From: cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn)
I swore that I was gonna stop posting to this group but this
is too good to keep to myself:
I love the B-2. It looks so... well, deadly. I am, however, quite
amazed at the price of the thing. I have been thinking about just
how in the heck $532 million is getting used. Herewith I submit my
first approximation:
NUMBERS:
Airframe $124,000,000.00
Computers $10,000,000.00
Communications gear $250,000.00
Electronic Warfare gear $150,000.00
Other Avionics $1,500,000.00
development cost per production unit $130,100,000.00
Mark up (profit) of %50 $266,000,000.00
Base price $532,000,000.00
METHODOLOGY:
Airframe
I figured that the B-2 is about as big as a 737 airliner.
I also figured that choosing the largest airliner that I
know of would give some decent fudging. So I called Boeing
and asked what the ball-park price for a generic 747-400
just off of the line was. The guy said $116 to $132
million a pop. I used the average of the two prices.
Computers
What could be more powerfull than a Cray X-MP? I heard
that the ball park on them was about $5 million. The B-2
is very smart so it gets two.
Communications gear
I looked in the latest DAC catalog and found the Uniden
Bearcat 200-Channel Programmable 800 Mhz Rechargable
Scanner at $249.00 per. I rounded to $250 and applied
a multiplier of 1000.
Electronic Warfare gear
The latest DAC catalog also lists a Maxon RD-XL Super-
heterodyne Micro Radar Detector for $299 each. I rounded
to $300 and applied a multiplier of 1000.
Other Avionics
I was in the local warehouse discount store (Costco)
yesterday and noticed that they had a full bore TV Satellite
receiver set up for $1399. this included dish, actuator,
receivers and tuners. I rounded to $1500 and applied a
multiplier of 1000.
CONCLUSION:
I take the remainder to be actual development costs. This means
that only about 25% of the price for each production unit is
going for actual iron with the rest going for incentive (profit)
and development costs. This seems about right dosen't it?
Chesley Reyburn ...tektronix!ogicse!cvedc!cmr
ECAE Software, Prime Computer, Inc. ...sun!cvbnet!cvedc!cmr
14952 NW Greenbrier Parkway ...sequent!cvedc!cmr
Beaverton, OR 97006-5733 Phone 503/645-2410jons@oscsunb.osc.edu (Jon Steinbach (ST)) (01/09/90)
From: jons@oscsunb.osc.edu (Jon Steinbach (ST)) In article <12850@cbnews.ATT.COM> cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn) writes: > > >From: cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn) >I swore that I was gonna stop posting to this group but this >is too good to keep to myself: > >I love the B-2. It looks so... well, deadly. I am, however, quite >amazed at the price of the thing. I have been thinking about just >how in the heck $532 million is getting used. Herewith I submit my >first approximation: > >NUMBERS: > Airframe > I figured that the B-2 is about as big as a 737 airliner. > I also figured that choosing the largest airliner that I > know of would give some decent fudging. So I called Boeing > and asked what the ball-park price for a generic 747-400 > just off of the line was. The guy said $116 to $132 > million a pop. I used the average of the two prices. Comparing the airframe of a 747 with that of a stealth bomber is like comparing the 747 with a kite. The skin itself is at least 3 times as complex. Stealth technology incorporates a hexagonal surface which by bouncing radar waves internally disipates the signal returned, at the same time it must be much lighter than the 747 skin but stronger considering it's unique shape. It also uses special radar absorbent paint. This could at least double your airframe price. > Computers > What could be more powerfull than a Cray X-MP? I heard A Cray Y-MP. We just had one installed here last summer and it cost over $20 million. It weighs about 9 tons, most of it involved in cooling the unit. Now imagine making one which is powerful enough to do stealth bomber problems like stable flight, probably approaches Y-MP (note weight), but which is light enought to fit in a small area in B-2. Multiply 10 by some coefficient. > Communications gear > I looked in the latest DAC catalog and found the Uniden > Bearcat 200-Channel Programmable 800 Mhz Rechargable > Scanner at $249.00 per. I rounded to $250 and applied > a multiplier of 1000. Don't forget about complex NSA type scrambler, this is supposed to be Stealth, not Voice of America. >CONCLUSION: > I take the remainder to be actual development costs. This means > that only about 25% of the price for each production unit is > going for actual iron with the rest going for incentive (profit) > and development costs. This seems about right dosen't it? I agree that it's price is greatly inflated, but not by a factor of two. Also include all the high salaries of workers. Technological items in the military do not rely on cheap labor, you have to pay enough to keep them from spilling their guts to the Russians. Also for companies like this, it may be their only source of income other than maintenance of old equipment. Boeing also has alot of competitors trying to sell planes too, while there will only be one company building the B-2. Everything we buy has an inflated price, not just military planes. I wonder how much it costs to build a tv or vcr and look at how much they charge. Jon Steinbach Ohio State Computer Science steinbac@cis.ohio-state.edu Ohio Supercomputer Center jons@oscsunb.osc.edu
animal@isis.rice.edu (Carl Rosene) (01/10/90)
From: animal@isis.rice.edu (Carl Rosene) In article <12850@cbnews.ATT.COM> cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn) writes: > >I love the B-2. It looks so... well, deadly. I am, however, quite >amazed at the price of the thing. I have been thinking about just >how in the heck $532 million is getting used. Herewith I submit my >first approximation: > >NUMBERS: > Airframe $124,000,000.00 > Computers $10,000,000.00 > Communications gear $250,000.00 > Electronic Warfare gear $150,000.00 > Other Avionics $1,500,000.00 > development cost per production unit $130,100,000.00 > Mark up (profit) of %50 $266,000,000.00 > > Base price $532,000,000.00 > Sec. of Defense Cheney, on one of those Sunday-morning-news-ghetto shows indicated that the incremental cost for a B-2 is 300 million dollars. That puts your development cost per production unit at 232 million. Actually, I think it's quite remarkable that they are able to build a B-2 for only about twice the cost of a 747. Looks like a bargain to me. When Congressmen(and women) debate the 532 million price tag they are perpetuating a little lie. Mainly, that they (or, rather, you) have already paid roughly 200 million per plane (assuming 100 planes) for the production line. Which brings up another point. The B-2 is, to my knowledge, the only military plane for which the prototypes came off of the production line. This was done because of the tremendous confidence placed in the computer simulations of the aircraft. This allowed a greatly sped-up and cheaper program. (Now this fits into sci.military.) Of course, that means you have a LOT of confidence in that software... Carl Rosene Rice University-Home of the 1990 Economic Summit.
cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn) (01/11/90)
From: cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn)
First of all, let me draw your attention to the fact that I published a
FIRST APPROXIMATION of the cost. I also had to make some assumptions.
Based on how the numbers came out I would say that my assumptions were
not that far off. Admittedly, it was kind of flip on my part to use
the DAC catalog, but again, the numbers seem to come together.
My goal was to give a rational explanation for the cost. I think that I
have made a good start. Another way of describing my results would be
like this:
Construction cost per airplane 133,000,000.00
Development cost per airplane 133,000,000.00
Profit per airplane 266,000,000.00
>In article <12850@cbnews.ATT.COM> cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn) writes:
>>Herewith I submit my first approximation:
>>
>> know of would give some decent fudging. So I called Boeing
>
> Comparing the airframe of a 747 with that of a stealth bomber is
>like comparing the 747 with a kite. The skin itself is at least
>3 times as complex. Stealth technology incorporates a hexagonal
>surface which by bouncing radar waves internally disipates the
Didn't this class of skin get started on the B-70 (Valkyre) project? I thought
also that the SR-71 also used a variant on this. Where did you get the
multiplier of three?
>> Computers
> A Cray Y-MP. We just had one installed here last summer and it cost
>over $20 million. It weighs about 9 tons, most of it involved
A Cray Y-MP is exactly what I had in mind when I described two X-MPs.
My technique was to plug in some quasi-rational number. In fact,
the categories that I used were suggested by what I found in the
catalogs. Our society posesses the ability to make something like
a Y-MP in a bread-box. The incentive simply has not been shown to
exist, yet.
> I agree that it's price is greatly inflated, but not by a factor
>of two. Also include all the high salaries of workers. Technological
I DON'T KNOW if the price is inflated or not. I WANT to know but have
no way other than rude guesses and this news group.
Also, I don't think that I am overpaid, far from it. I don't work
for a direct defense contractor, but I think that they don't pay
much more.
Chesley Reyburn ...tektronix!ogicse!cvedc!cmr
ECAE Software, Prime Computer, Inc. ...sun!cvbnet!cvedc!cmr
14952 NW Greenbrier Parkway ...sequent!cvedc!cmr
Beaverton, OR 97006-5733 Phone 503/645-2410wyatt@cfa.harvard.edu (Bill Wyatt) (01/12/90)
From: wyatt@cfa.harvard.edu (Bill Wyatt) >>I love the B-2. It looks so... well, deadly. I am, however, quite >>amazed at the price of the thing. [...] >>NUMBERS: [...] >> Base price $532,000,000.00 [...] > per production unit at 232 million. [...] > When Congressmen(and women) debate the 532 million price > tag they are perpetuating a little lie. Mainly, that they > (or, rather, you) have already paid roughly 200 million > per plane (assuming 100 planes) for the production > line. I'm not quite sure who you're saying is lieing. I think it's the DOD (after all, how many future cost overruns are there going to be?). I love it when the various media stories cover the test flights of the `500-million dollar plane'. In fact, until and unless the entire production run is built without any more cost overruns, THE B-2 IS A 22 BILLION DOLLAR PLANE! That is, the cost of the entire development effort up to now has built only one plane. Think about how nervous they must be about crashes! Bill Wyatt, Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (Cambridge, MA, USA) UUCP : {husc6,cmcl2,mit-eddie}!harvard!cfa!wyatt Internet: wyatt@cfa.harvard.edu SPAN: cfa::wyatt BITNET: wyatt@cfa
berman-andrew@YALE.ARPA (Andrew P. Berman) (01/12/90)
From: "Andrew P. Berman" <berman-andrew@YALE.ARPA> >From: animal@isis.rice.edu (Carl Rosene) >Sec. of Defense Cheney, on one of those Sunday-morning-news-ghetto >shows indicated that the incremental cost for a B-2 is >300 million dollars. That puts your development cost >per production unit at 232 million. Actually, I think >it's quite remarkable that they are able to build a B-2 >for only about twice the cost of a 747. Looks like a >bargain to me. I've seen the comparison between the cost of a B-2 and the cost of a 747 before. Each time I see it, it bothers me. A 747 gets used thousands of hours a year. I can't believe that there is any possible war scenario in which the entire fleet of B-2 bombers would get more than a couple of hundred hours of use, total. A 747 generates income for it's owners, a B-2 does not. The point is that one is built for economic purposes, one is built for military purposes. The real question, I think, is, are those couple of hundred hours of usage worth the continued investment in the B-2? Note that if we are going to restrict the use of the B-2 to quick actions against smaller countries, then we'd probably only need a few of them in the air at any time. Even given turnaround time, it seems that a full complement of 70 would only be needed for a major, long-term war with a superpower. This is pure speculation on my part, I'd be interested in an informed response. >Carl Rosene >Rice University-Home of the 1990 Economic Summit. Andrew P. Berman
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (01/12/90)
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) >From: animal@isis.rice.edu (Carl Rosene) >it's quite remarkable that they are able to build a B-2 >for only about twice the cost of a 747... Uh, don't you mean "twice the *price* of a 747"? It's common knowledge that the profit margin on the 747 is... large. It has no competition and demand consistently exceeds supply, so Boeing charges all the market will bear. Very handy that was, too, when the 757 was deep in the red and the 767 was only barely holding its own. >Which brings up another point. The B-2 is, to my knowledge, >the only military plane for which the prototypes came off >of the production line... This is a pervasive myth. Building prototypes with production tooling has been normal practice since the 50s. How a part is built influences its properties; you *cannot* build a realistic prototype of a modern aircraft without using production processes and tooling. The normal practice is to try hard to get things right, push the first prototype through as quickly as possible, and hold up further production until an intensive test program has (you hope) turned up any major flaws. Sometimes it works. The USAF is probably cutting corners on the B-2, however, since "the computers" say the design is right... Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) (01/15/90)
From: Ian Wood <uw-beaver!ssc-vax!uvicctr!iwood> In article <12981@cbnews.ATT.COM> you write: ... >Which brings up another point. The B-2 is, to my knowledge, >the only military plane for which the prototypes came off >of the production line. This was done because of the >tremendous confidence placed in the computer simulations of >the aircraft. This allowed a greatly sped-up and cheaper >program. (Now this fits into sci.military.) Of course, >that means you have a LOT of confidence in that software... > >Carl Rosene >Rice University-Home of the 1990 Economic Summit. The AVRO Arrow was also prototyped on the production line. This aircraft was the basis for all sorts of projects and ideas that followed. Its demise also was the basis for the great tradition of ripping the guts out of a world leading technology industry. Ian Wood Systems Operator UUCP : iwood@uvicctr.uvic.ca University of Victoria BITNET : CCIAN@UVVM C eh N eh D eh (It's a Sierra, Eric) Disclaimer (noun) : An heinously vulgar concept perpetuated by bureaucrats and lawyers. =-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-= "And what if I should refuse to get this Loc-Nar?" "You die. She dies. EEEVERBODY dies." =-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=+=-=
louis@asterix.drev.dnd.ca (Louis Demers) (01/15/90)
From: louis@asterix.drev.dnd.ca (Louis Demers) berman-andrew@YALE.ARPA (Andrew P. Berman) writes: >From: "Andrew P. Berman" <berman-andrew@YALE.ARPA> >I've seen the comparison between the cost of a B-2 and the cost of >a 747 before. Each time I see it, it bothers me. A 747 >gets used thousands of hours a year. I can't believe that >there is any possible war scenario in which the entire fleet of >B-2 bombers would get more than a couple of hundred hours of use, total. >A 747 generates income for it's owners, a B-2 does not. The point >is that one is built for economic purposes, one is built for military >purposes. The real question, I think, is, are those couple of >hundred hours of usage worth the continued investment in the B-2? Only on technical grounds, I don't think the comparison is complete, while 747 technology is not as sophisticated ad B-2's, it works and is (I would guess) much more reliable and that should put a damper on the notion that, if it is less advanced it should be less expensive. What they have shown so far is that it flyes, not that it works. -- | Louis Demers | DREV, Defence Research Establishment,Valcartier | | louis@asterix.drev.dnd.ca | POBox 8800, Courcelette,Quebec, CANADA, G0A 1R0 | | (131.132.48.2) | Office: (418) 844-4424 fax (418) 844-4511 | +---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn) (01/17/90)
From: cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn) In article <12981@cbnews.ATT.COM> animal@isis.rice.edu (Carl Rosene) writes: >Sec. of Defense Cheney... >...indicated that the incremental cost ... is 300 million dollars. >...you) have already paid roughly 200 million per plane Wait a minute... Your assertions may work in Washington, but where I live all of the money spent on a project is charged against that project. If I spend $200 million designing and developing something I would expect to include that cost in the total project cost. Chesley Reyburn ...tektronix!ogicse!cvedc!cmr ECAE Software, Prime Computer, Inc. ...sun!cvbnet!cvedc!cmr 14952 NW Greenbrier Parkway ...sequent!cvedc!cmr Beaverton, OR 97006-5733 Phone 503/645-2410
animal@isis.rice.edu (Carl Rosene) (01/19/90)
From: animal@isis.rice.edu (Carl Rosene) You know, I hadn't realized that I'd said anything so *controversial*. Since I am waiting for my thesis to print, I will reply... In article <13218@cbnews.ATT.COM> cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn) writes: > >From: cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn) >In article <12981@cbnews.ATT.COM> animal@isis.rice.edu (Carl Rosene) writes: >>Sec. of Defense Cheney... >>...indicated that the incremental cost ... is 300 million dollars. >>...you) have already paid roughly 200 million per plane > >Wait a minute... > >Your assertions may work in Washington, but where I live all of the money >spent on a project is charged against that project. > >If I spend $200 million designing and developing something I would >expect to include that cost in the total project cost. > My comment concerning the quality of debate in Congress on whether to build the B2 was meant to highlight the fact that much of the money on the B2 has already been spent. In debating whether to buy additional aircraft I think the proper number to consider is the incremental cost of each aircraft--regardless of the project cost. We have already spent the rest of the money(at this point in the project). It is gone. I do not think that it is completely honest to quote the price of a single B2 as 500 million. We do not avoid spending 500 million dollars by buying one less B2. This is true regardless of the accounting, or where the accounting is done. Perhaps Mr. Reyburn and I could reach common ground by separating the costs of buying the ability to build a B2 and the costs of building B2s. Whether an additional B2 is worth 300 million is another question. Whether we should ever have embarked on the project is still another. My comments do not reflect on these questions at all. In my original posting I stated my belief that the B2 was the first military prototype off the production line. Mr. Spencer stated that, in fact, most prototypes actually come off a production line. I'll concede the point and blame my mistake on the media. But, I believe he might agree that it has not been common practice to put the production line at full production before a flight test program can be completed. And I think Mr. Spencer would agree that this has been done with the B2. Again, it indicates a whole lot of confidence in a pretty complex piece of software. I am not at all sure I would do it. Carl Rosene Rice University
animage%sandstorm.Berkeley.EDU@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (Cal-Animage Club) (01/20/90)
From: animage%sandstorm.Berkeley.EDU@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (Cal-Animage Club) In article <13218@cbnews.ATT.COM> cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn) writes: >From: cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn) >In article <12981@cbnews.ATT.COM> animal@isis.rice.edu (Carl Rosene) writes: >>Sec. of Defense Cheney... >>...indicated that the incremental cost ... is 300 million dollars. >>...you) have already paid roughly 200 million per plane >Wait a minute... >Your assertions may work in Washington, but where I live all of the money >spent on a project is charged against that project. >If I spend $200 million designing and developing something I would >expect to include that cost in the total project cost. I don't believe that the problem in DOD spending money is the problem. Cutting systems will NOT, I repeat, NOT solve the budget problems. The real spending problems in the DOD are really NOT in the DOD. The US Congress is the body that controls where all the money goes. All the DOD can do is to give a list of recommendations as to where to cut. Remember that all these Senators and Representatives have constituents to worry about. If jobs are lost in their district, they may lose their seat in congress. As a result, you better believe that these politicians are going to lobby like hell to make sure that their constituents are affected as little as possible or not at all. As a result, congressmen get together with other congressmen and make deals like "if you vote for my bill, I'll vote for yours." More than a few times have congressmen spent money on systems and bases that the military has decided are obsolete and not practical or necessary to maintain. In fact, quite a few times, congressmen have spent more money to keep bases open in clear defiance of military recommendations. But the DOD is not blameless in all of this. Many times, companies which are required (say the case of Northrop and the MX missile) by the Air force to have the guidance system by a certain day, often cannot reasonably comply since the parts companies are not coordinated with the final guidance system assembley at Northorp. Required by contract, Northrop is caught in a bind and must comply with the contract and deliver on time. As a result, Nortrop cannot afford to wait for the parts and send their employees to Radio Shack around the corner to buy the parts needed. Needless to say, these parts do not meet the requirements for durability and toughness that the proper parts that go in the guidance system should. As a result, when the completed guidance systems are sent off, they contain cheap substandard parts. Months later, ALL the guidance systems are returned after all of them flunked the military tests and Northorp is told to repair the problem. This circle costs the tax-payers several million dollars per batch that is returned. Nortrop, however, is not blameless in all this either, since it throws away the good parts when they come in, though they came in late. The cycle repeats itself and pretty soon you get a problem. Parts are reordered, the military wants them by a deadline, the deadline is not practical, etc. Some of the guidance systems have the good parts, but since the military doesn't test EVERY single one, small batches are returned if a representative one is found defective. Otherwise, if the representative unit is good, the whole batch is kept. This is because, the military assumes that only the good parts were used. Now THIS, not only wastes OUR money, but doesn't exactly do miracles to our nuclear program either. I'd rather have a guidance system that works and nukes that work 60% of the time, than nukes that are guaranteed to work and a guidance system that works 60% of the time. Here is where I believe we have the REAL problem. The Daimyo wang@ocf.berkeley.edu
cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn) (01/20/90)
From: cmr@cvedc.Prime.Com (Chesley Reyburn) >of each aircraft--regardless of the project cost. We have already spent >the rest of the money(at this point in the project). It is gone. I do not ^^^^ Carl, did you ever hear about that fine old tradition of killing the messenger that brings bad news? >think that it is completely honest to quote the price of a single >B2 as 500 million. We do not avoid spending 500 million dollars by buying one >less B2. This is true regardless of the accounting, or where the accounting >is done. Perhaps Mr. Reyburn and I could reach common ground by separating >the costs of buying the ability to build a B2 and the costs of building B2s. It is easier for people to talk about one number than two. When using one number in your discussion you include both construction and development costs. When using two numbers in your discussion you are talking about a per unit construction cost AND a lump sum that has already been spent on development. Admittedly using two numbers makes entirely clear the fact that some money has already been spent, but my observations of the media and political worlds tell me that only one of the numbers will be used. The second number will be forgotten. Further, my observations tell me that the number that will be dropped will be the number that has already been spent. Within the above context I would prefer to keep the whole amount (development and production costs) in some form before the attention of the people who pay the bills. OK, so I maintain that my numbers still work. I estimated about $130 million for actual construction costs per unit. A %100 mark-up for incentive gives us $260 million, or very close to the $300 million amount mentioned by Secretary Cheney. Now, let me tell you about my stealth 747. By employing recent developments in stealth technology it will allow financially pressed airlines to avoid meddlesome FAA regulation at congested hub airports... Chesley Reyburn ...tektronix!ogicse!cvedc!cmr ECAE Software, Prime Computer, Inc. ...sun!cvbnet!cvedc!cmr 14952 NW Greenbrier Parkway ...sequent!cvedc!cmr Beaverton, OR 97006-5733 Phone 503/645-2410
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (01/22/90)
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) >From: animal@isis.rice.edu (Carl Rosene) >In my original posting I stated my belief that the B2 was the first military >prototype off the production line. Mr. Spencer stated that, in fact, most >prototypes actually come off a production line. I'll concede the point and >blame my mistake on the media. But, I believe he might agree that it has not >been common practice to put the production line at full production before >a flight test program can be completed... It's not usually considered good practice, but it has been done occasionally. The results generally have not been good. The two cases I can remember are the F-100 and F-111. Several F-100s and pilots were lost before a flight- test aircraft went violently out of control (killing the pilot) in a worst- case test, and analysis of the wreckage and instrumentation records finally led to understanding of a nasty stability problem. And roughly half of the total F-111 production run were too far down the line to incorporate the definitive fix for the intake-engine compatibility problems, when it turned out that significant structural changes were needed. The B-2 program is being very optimistic. Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu