budden@trout.nosc.mil (Rex A. Buddenberg) (01/06/90)
From: budden@trout.nosc.mil (Rex A. Buddenberg)
Upon returning from a month's leave, I see there has been some discussion
of how to implement what the politicians are currently calling the
peace dividend. My backlog only goes back a few days, so I'm without
any discussion that took place in December, forgive any repeats.
60% of the DoD (and the Coast Guard's portion of the DoT) budget goes to
people, not hardware or hardware development. This 60% includes
paychecks, chow, pensions, training and education, ... Therefore, if
you need to tighten a budget, cutting obsolescent or obsolete hardware
is really only incidental to cutting the people costs.
So, to use one of the mentioned examples, aircraft carriers are expesnive
because they carry 5-6000 people fully loaded. The steel is cheap by
comparison, and that cost is sunk anyway. Further, carriers come in
battle group sized packages so when you cut a carrier, you also cut a
cruiser or two, a desron and a logistics ship or two (except that log ships
and destroyers are chronically in short supply anyway). Each of these
other ships in the battle group has a crew that costs the same per person
as the CV. Same logic applies to the battleship battle groups.
The argument runs out of steam when you try to apply the same
economics to the shoreside support structure -- a school tends to cost
about the same to keep operating whether it is running two classes a year
or two dozen. A shipyard that builds CVs will require essentially the
same national investment to keep intact whether or not it is fully
employed.
The third component of the logistics/training part of the picture
is whether or not you can cutt ALL of a particular item. The training and
logistics structures to support carriers must remain in place whether
we operate one, 17 or 33 (what the Navy really wanted) flattops. Put
in a real scenario: when the INF treaty was going to leave us with 100
Pershings, we were not going to get the (side effect) logistic cost
avoidances, but when we cut all of them in the final treaty, we cut the
requirement for a Pershing missile repair and maintenance school entirely.
Meat axe budget cutting is bad. Deliberate economic changes need to be done
with a couple points in mind:
- it appears that our containment policy, and ensuing force structure
that has endured from 1947 is indeed up for major revision. We can't work
out the right force structure until we understand the next generation
of policy and strategy.
- a deterrent requirement still remains. You have potentially
desparate men in the Kremlin, a real possibility that their intra-USSR
empire will come down around their ears, and those folks still have the
keys to enough firepower to blow us all away.
Like to hear some more thoughtful discussion....
Rex Buddenberg
[usual disclaimer]randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) (01/11/90)
From: Randy Appleton <randy@ms.uky.edu> In article <12854@cbnews.ATT.COM> budden@trout.nosc.mil (Rex A. Buddenberg) writes: >60% of the DoD (and the Coast Guard's portion of the DoT) budget goes to >people, not hardware or hardware development. This 60% includes >paychecks, chow, pensions, training and education, ... Therefore, if >you need to tighten a budget, cutting obsolescent or obsolete hardware >is really only incidental to cutting the people costs. Certainly. But then the question remains, "which people?". It seems to me the answer could be "the OV-1 crew and support people" if one decides that the OV-1 is a weapon system not worth the cost. The point is, if I were going to cut costs, I would look for weapons systems to eliminate. Here is my (new) list of things to cut: 1) All the Battleships, and whatever support ships I can toss with them. They did LOUSY in Lebanon, don't seem very cost-effective in a real *naval* war, and there function (delivering 1000lb warheads, etc) can be taken over by other systems (CV's and subs carrying SLCM's, etc..) 2) One of the 3 Marine divisions. Why do we need 3? IMHO, Marine divisions should do what they do best, anphib landings. If we need lasting land- based firepower, we should look to the army, and if the Army isn't doing it right, that should be fixed. I figure we need 2 Marine divisions. We have one in Korea (it might be politically hard to switch an Army div in there) and one divided into Marine Ready Battalions (or whatever they call them) to be ready to go. 3) Most (if not all) of the Marine Air Force. If the Marines want air power, let them get it from the CV's. If there fighting it out on land SOO FAR from the ocean they can't get naval air, why are we using Marines? In Vietnam didn't we in fact do this? It seems naval air wuld be available, can you imagine an anphib invasion in contested waters? 4) 170 of the B-52's. That would leave us with 100 (I think). Rex's point about eliminating *all* of a weapons system to receive the full economic benifits is well taken, but I figure we need more bombers than just the 75 ready B-1's we have, and the B-2 seems to expensive to your's truely. If we build the B-2, then the B-52 should be eliminated entirely. 5) Seven Army divisions. That should leave us with 10 ready divisions. There would be 1 airborn, 1 air-mobile, 1 light inf, and 7 regular divisions: 3 for Europe, 1 for "the Pacific" (along with one of the Marine div's) and 2 regular divisions to go where there needed. And of course the 10 reserve divisions if the going *really* got hot. Why would we need more than 20 divisions? 6) Maybe 10 of the Posiden SSBN's. Let's convert then to SSN's. The Navy says we need more SSN's, and for that matter ASW ships, and most people (at least most right-thinking people |-) feel we have AT LEAST ENOUGH strategic nuclear warheads. Historically, this was done in the past, by pouring concrete into Polaris missile tubes and some serious paperwork. The savings here is the need to build fewer new SSN's. 7) Couldn't the Coast Guard be more closely integrated with the military? Didn't they just order some new AEW aircraft? Why couldn't they use some of the Navy or AF's stuff? (If an E-1 won't do, THAT would be weird). I mean, the crews are just sitting there, they need the practice, etc... Could the training be integrated? Does the Coast Guard need its own pilot school, or could they use someone elses? 8) I haven't said much about the AF. What can be cut there? Maybe some of the older tankers (especially with fewer B-52's????) What else? Any Other Ideas??? Randy -- _______________________________________________________________________________ "Tiger gotta hunt, bird gotta fly, man gotta sit, sit and wonder why. Tiger gotta sleep, bird gotta land, man gotta tell himself that he understand" -Bokonon [Address:Randy@ms.uky.edu]
terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (01/12/90)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <13033@cbnews.ATT.COM> randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes: > >In article <12854@cbnews.ATT.COM> budden@trout.nosc.mil (Rex A. Buddenberg) writes: [stuff deleted] > >The point is, if I were going to cut costs, I would look for weapons systems >to eliminate. > >Here is my (new) list of things to cut: > >1) All the Battleships, and whatever support ships I can toss with them. >They did LOUSY in Lebanon, don't seem very cost-effective in a real *naval* >war, and there function (delivering 1000lb warheads, etc) can be taken over >by other systems (CV's and subs carrying SLCM's, etc..) > The function of delivering 1000lb warheads can't be taken over by anyone else. With nine barrels firing at a rate of 1 RPM each, they can deliver an impressive quantity of explosive. They are surprisingly accurate when firing at land targets. The problems in Lebanon were with identifying the targets in the first place. A cruise missile wouldn't have been more accurate, and more expensive to make a miss. There are other reasons to mothbal the BBs again, but the assigned missions are one of them. The primary reason is the cost of maintaining the 1000+ crew. We can man 3-5 other ships for the same money. >2) One of the 3 Marine divisions. Why do we need 3? IMHO, Marine divisions >should do what they do best, anphib landings. If we need lasting land- >based firepower, we should look to the army, and if the Army isn't doing >it right, that should be fixed. I figure we need 2 Marine divisions. >We have one in Korea (it might be politically hard to switch an Army div in >there) and one divided into Marine Ready Battalions (or whatever they call them) >to be ready to go. > First, the Marine divisions are now largely administrative headquarters. We simply lack sufficient amphibious lift for even a single division, so the Marines have reorganized their tactical elements and the largest employable entity is the brigade. The Pacific division is actually in Okinawa, and three contribute units to the afloat MEUs (Marine Expeditionary Units). Your comments are somewhat out of date as the Marines have been adjusting their forces for years. In acknowledgement of their inability to fight in a European scenario they have been deemphaizing the mechanized type forces. The have been acquiring LAVs to provide some armor support in a low intensity situation. They still keep tanks as the primary tank killers. The MEUs have been reorganized to be more self sufficient. They receive special training in special operations such as hostage rescue and evacuation. The Marines have been cutting their manpower by reducing the number of battalions, not divisions. >3) Most (if not all) of the Marine Air Force. If the Marines want air power, >let them get it from the CV's. If there fighting it out on land SOO FAR from >the ocean they can't get naval air, why are we using Marines? In Vietnam >didn't we in fact do this? It seems naval air wuld be available, can you >imagine an anphib invasion in contested waters? > Marines are expedtionary troops. As such they must be self-sufficient. Nowadays that includes airpower. The CV is tasked with providing the initial air cover, but it will eventually have to go on to other missions, such as protection the sea lines of communication to the landing. When it leaves the Marines need some air power. Marine air units are optimized for CAS. Look at previous postings on this newsgroup and see how no one else wants this mission. The Marine air land units are arguably one of the best integrated teams in the world. They have little requirement for deep strike, or air superiority. They just need enough air control to get the strike planes to the target. I've heard they are going to replace older harder to maintain A-6s with new production F-18s. Whatever other problems the Hornet has it has a great uptime record, with minimal maintenance requirements. The need for Marine air is well documented. They are already doing what they can to cut costs. Remember the Marines, by necessity, are the ultimate Pentagon warriors. Someone is always crying for their elimination, reduction, or transfer to the Army. They are very adept at anticipating trends, and justifying their existence. [I'll leave discussion of army-air force issues to others] >6) Maybe 10 of the Posiden SSBN's. Let's convert then to SSN's. The Navy >says we need more SSN's, and for that matter ASW ships, and most people >(at least most right-thinking people |-) feel we have AT LEAST ENOUGH >strategic nuclear warheads. Historically, this was done in the past, by >pouring concrete into Polaris missile tubes and some serious paperwork. >The savings here is the need to build fewer new SSN's. > Unfortunately where do you get the idea that a SSBN is a good ASW platform? They are quiet. That's it. Their sonar suites are largely defensive in nature. Earlier boats had a mission of anti-shipping torpedo attack after the missiles were gone, but I don't know how serious any training was. The SSBNs are slow compared to most SSNs. In the USN no SSBNs were converted to SSNs. 2 have been converted to special warfare support platforms the remainder have been scrapped. The concrete was poured into missile tubes to prevent their later use as SSBNs. I thought we were discussing cost sutting? Converting the SSBNs requires major modifications. The tubes should be removed, or at least they could be converted to magazines. But then you get into verification problems. The hulls are old. Most of the boats are at the end of their useful life anyway. Remember these aren't surface ships that simply can't wait for a split seam to make the scrapping decision. The newer Poseidon boats have 5 maybe 10 years of service left. Is it worth the money and extra maintenance costs? -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) (01/14/90)
From: dsac!dcscg1!atownsen ( Armand R Townsend ) 1. The nearest MARINE Division to Korea is stationed on Okinawa. There were only 435 Squids and Jarheads stationed with me in Korea (1984 - 1986). As one of the Squids, I felt outnumbered as did all of us sea-going types. 2. The Division that you might be referring to is the 2ND Infantry Division of the U.S. ARMY. You might desire to change your WISH LIST accordingly. -- Randy Townsend Def Const Supp Center, Columbus, Ohio osu-cis!dsac!dcscg1!atownsend Internet: atownsend@dcscg1.dla.mil
military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) (01/15/90)
From: att!utzoo!henry >From: Randy Appleton <randy@ms.uky.edu> >2) One of the 3 Marine divisions... >3) Most (if not all) of the Marine Air Force. ... I'm afraid these cuts strike me as poor ideas. If one has faith in the permanence of recent developments in Europe, then the US is much more likely to have to fight small interventions at random places than all-out wars in Europe. The Marines are the US's real Rapid Deployment Force; they are not just amphibious-invasion specialists. They are also some of the finest infantry units the US has, head and shoulders above most of the US Army. Cutting them is a mistake. So is removing their integral air support -- the US needs more surface units with well-integrated close air support, not fewer. >... If the Marines want air power, let them get it from the CV's. Where do you think most of the USMC aircraft fly from? About the only major exceptions are the Harriers, which are a unique asset and another entry in the "need more, not fewer" column. >7) Couldn't the Coast Guard be more closely integrated with the military? >Didn't they just order some new AEW aircraft? Why couldn't they use some >of the Navy or AF's stuff? ... As I understand it (not well), in the US there are serious legal problems with involving the military in law enforcement. If the Coast Guard is really supposed to interdict a large percentage of the airborne drug flow into the US, they're going to need their own AEW, and lots of it. Military experience indicates that getting more than a modest attrition of attacking aircraft takes massive resources... and fighting a war of attrition against opponents with effectively unlimited resources is futile. This comes under the heading of "you get what you pay for". I'm glad I'm not paying for it. :-) >Any Other Ideas??? Yeah. Get rid of the short-range tactical nuclear weapons. All of them. They are stupid weapons, dangerous and destabilizing, relics of the bygone days of Massive Retaliation, useful only in scenarios that NATO will never be involved in now. They make sense only for (a) a nuclear-backed surprise offensive or (b) a hair-trigger nuclear defence, with warheads flying the instant the Soviets put tanks over the border. Both of these are insane, and there is not the slightest chance of political approval for either. In reality, there would be enormous pressure to avoid any form of nuclear use, and the short-range nukes would be overrun before approval is given. The only tactical nuclear weapons that make any post-INF sense are those carried by aircraft that can be based well in the rear. This would *not* be popular, either in Europe (which still bases its NATO strategy on nuclear first use, to avoid the cost of stronger conventional forces) or in the Pentagon (for one thing, it would take the Army completely out of the nuclear business), but it would be a considerable budget savings and a positive step toward world peace. Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
ae219dp%prism@gatech.edu (Devon Prichard) (01/17/90)
From: ae219dp%prism@gatech.edu (Devon Prichard)
in article <13033@cbnews.ATT.COM>, Randy Appleton discusses
several avenues for defense budget cuts. the two
towards which which I reply are elimination of Marine airpower,
and conversion of missile subs to attack subs.
the _only_ true CAS the U.S. military has is from the Marines. the
Air Force places CAS somewhere behind volleyball in its list of
priorities. a good reference is "The Korean War" by Max Hastings.
one of the lessons expounded in this excellent book is that organic
(i.e. integrated) CAS and artillery support is the only effective
use of these `force multipliers'. the lack of a direct ground-air
radio link between Army ground troops and Air Force jets, as well as
lack of interunit training etc. reduces the Air Force's usefulness
in CAS ops (I recall the JTIDS system was conceived for this problem,
but I don't remember hearing that it went through; anybody?).
in fact, the recent decision by Gen'l Colin Powell
(Chairman, JCS) to allow the AF to retain the CAS mission is not much
short of treason, in my book. A-16s are simply going to be used
for interception, air defense, and interdiction, so the blue-suiters
can keep their silk scarves clean. once again, the ground pounders are
left without adequate support (note the lack of self-propelled artillery
in the upcoming budgets).
also, converting boomers (SSBNs) to attack boats would not only be
horribly ineffective, but would run the defense budget up substantially
(recall the hassles with the LA-class attack boat built by GD-Electric
Boat; the Navy changed the design specs faster than Electric Boat
could re-weld, then the Navy tries to punish GD for running up costs!).
SSBNs are designed to carry a high-volume payload slowly, but _very_
quietly, while attack boats are designed to be fast and maneuverable.
excuse the flames, but the places to cut the defense budget are
elsewhere, I think;
1) Pentagon - the world's most security leak prone institute, as well as
the source of some truly stupid procurement policy...
2) General staff - we have more generals than some countries have
privates! each general costs untold amounts of support
staff as well.(here I refer to Navy as well as others;
supposedly the Navy has 1 officer for every 3 enlisted)
3) the B-2 project - I don't imagine us getting our money's worth in
a low intensity conflict ... and the strategic
nuclear mission is amenable to simpler aircraft
carrying air-launched cruise missiles.
hope this sparks some discussion, as defense reforms are inevitable
and we need to ensure they are not overly fatal to our troops.
--
DEVON PRICHARD
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta Georgia, 30332
uucp: ...!{allegra,amd,hplabs,seismo,ut-ngp}!gatech!prism!ae219dp
ARPA: ae219dp@prism.gatech.eduae219dp%prism@gatech.edu (Devon Prichard) (01/17/90)
From: ae219dp%prism@gatech.edu (Devon Prichard)
in article <13033@cbnews.ATT.COM>, Randy Appleton discusses
several avenues for defense budget cuts, including
using military aircraft for detection of drug runners.
Note that there is federal law preventing use of the regular
military in execution of civil law (I believe it is referred
to as the Posse Comitatus Act. any lawyers out there ??)
How this relates to the Bush administration's policies
I don't know; the Coast Guard certainly seems to have gotten
around the usual search and seizure laws lately.
A note towards using military personnel in law enforcement;
a substantial amount of training seems to be needed to allow
effective use of troops in a civil situation. recall the
Israeli Army trying to deal with rioters.
Mr. Appleton makes one good point about using military flight schools
to train the Coasties. while a lot of Coast Guard work is unique
to their mission, there may be room for improvement here. I imagine
the limiting factor would be the Navy's reluctance to outsiders
receiving Navy training.
One final comment; the Coast Guard is the most-utilized, least funded
of the services. their required missions include; law enforcement,
rescue/life saving, aids to navigation, support to the Navy in time
of war, and certification of men and materiel. they need our
support in Washington more than ever.
--
DEVON PRICHARD
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta Georgia, 30332
uucp: ...!{allegra,amd,hplabs,seismo,ut-ngp}!gatech!prism!ae219dp
ARPA: ae219dp@prism.gatech.edujdnicoll@watyew.waterloo.edu (Brian or James) (01/17/90)
From: jdnicoll@watyew.waterloo.edu (Brian or James) Another, perhaps more serious problem than Mr. Spencer's legal difficulty with combining police organisations with military ones is that the training that produces effective police forces may be incompatable with the training needed to achieve military goals. I think this came up during the recent case in Ontario where the Tactical Rescue Units were involved in a fairly unproductive attempt to deal with a depressed and potentially dangerous teenager who had threatened suicide. (The teenager got wounded, I believe and a farmer got killed by the TRU.) The TRU are analogous to American SWAT teams. A point was made that the training the TRU recieve is not appropriate to the problem they were handed. (At this point, I'd like to make it clear that this note shouldn't be taken as a judgement on just -who- was at fault in the death.) It would be interesting to hear from anyone who has served in both the military and the police. Are there contradictions between the needs of a police force and those of a military one? James Nicoll Ps: A Further disclaimer: Don't take my definition of the TRU as canonical, as I working from my feeble memory.
randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) (01/19/90)
From: Randy Appleton <randy@ms.uky.edu> In article <13220@cbnews.ATT.COM> ae219dp%prism@gatech.edu (Devon Prichard) writes: [In trying to argue for the Marines Devon says] > >the _only_ true CAS the U.S. military has is from the Marines. the >Air Force places CAS somewhere behind volleyball in its list of >priorities. That may be true. The obvious solution is to "fix" the air force. A second obvious solutions is to give the army some CAS ability, like they have in there AH-64's. The Marines do some things very well, one of the things I like most about the Marines is that they have some good ideas that the other branches should adopt. But let's NOT keep the Marines at their present strength just because the AIR FORCE hates CAS. The solution is to fix the AF. [Against my idea of converting SSBN's to SSN's Devon writes] >also, converting boomers (SSBNs) to attack boats would not only be >horribly ineffective, but would run the defense budget up substantially. >SSBNs are designed to carry a high-volume payload slowly, but _very_ >quietly, while attack boats are designed to be fast and maneuverable. I guess I always ASSUMED that SSBN's and SSN's had the same sonar fit. I just looked it up, and I read that an Ohio class has the same passive sonar BQQ-5 as a Los Angles SSN. Both have a towed array, but I don't know the type for the Ohio. (The Los Angles has a BQR-15). I assume that if todays SSBN's have the sonar fit of todays SSN's, that that would be true for yesteryear. A SSBN is NOT slow, I read 30+ knots. Both a Benjermin Frankiln and a Los Angles have the same number (4) of Torpedo Tubes, but a Los Angles also hase the SLCM's that a converted SSBM would not. In the past they DID convert some Polaris SSBN's to SSN's by pouring concrete into the missile tubes for ballast. I beleive the whole conversion was <$1,000,000. I'm not saying that the result would be a Los Angles quality SSN, I'm saying that the cost effectiveness would be higher than that foe either a newly built (read expensive) SSN, and that our nuclear deterence forces could use a little tightening. By the way, the ability to move slow and quiet couyld be very useful for an attack sub. Imagine saling to a point about 200 miles down the coast from Murmask. And then waiting. I bet you wouldn't have to wait long before you life became FILLED with targets. >excuse the flames, but the places to cut the defense budget are >elsewhere, I think; > >1) Pentagon - the world's most security leak prone institute, as well as > the source of some truly stupid procurement policy... Probably true. > >2) General staff - we have more generals than some countries have > privates! each general costs untold amounts of support > staff as well.(here I refer to Navy as well as others; > supposedly the Navy has 1 officer for every 3 enlisted) Yep. I bet this is somehow connected to #1. > >3) the B-2 project - I don't imagine us getting our money's worth in > a low intensity conflict ... and the strategic > nuclear mission is amenable to simpler aircraft > carrying air-launched cruise missiles. I fully agree. Randy -- _______________________________________________________________________________ "Tiger gotta hunt, bird gotta fly, man gotta sit, sit and wonder why. Tiger gotta sleep, bird gotta land, man gotta tell himself that he understand" -Bokonon [Address:Randy@ms.uky.edu]
deej@bellcore.bellcore.com (David Lewis) (01/20/90)
From: nvuxr!deej@bellcore.bellcore.com (David Lewis) In article <13033@cbnews.ATT.COM>, randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes: > > > From: Randy Appleton <randy@ms.uky.edu> > > Here is my (new) list of things to cut: And here are some comments... > 1) All the Battleships, and whatever support ships I can toss with them. > They did LOUSY in Lebanon, don't seem very cost-effective in a real *naval* > war, and there function (delivering 1000lb warheads, etc) can be taken over > by other systems (CV's and subs carrying SLCM's, etc..) However, there are definite advantages to BBs. "Startup" cost is very reasonable -- I recall that the cost of bringing the Iowa BBs up to their current standard was equivalent to the cost of an FFG-7 (Oliver Hazard Perry class Frigate). Although, I grant, that operational costs are likely significantly higher (he understated). In addition, a BB is a very effective fighting platform in a "real *naval* war." I don't have the exact stats in front of me, but in addition to the 16" guns, you've got Harpoon and Tomahawk launchers for standoff capability. The 16" guns have a significant advantage over SLCMs and aircraft in that there ain't no point defense weapons system that's going to shoot down a 16" shell -- and the range (~20 mi.) is up there with many SSMs. The armor is also a significant edge -- a single missile hit is less likely to take a BB out of action than to take out a missile cruiser or destroyer. > 3) Most (if not all) of the Marine Air Force. If the Marines want air power, > let them get it from the CV's. If there fighting it out on land SOO FAR from > the ocean they can't get naval air, why are we using Marines? In Vietnam > didn't we in fact do this? It seems naval air wuld be available, can you > imagine an anphib invasion in contested waters? I suspect any gains here wouldn't be from eliminating weapons systems as from transferring them from the Marine Corps to the Navy. Naval air is optimized for maritime strike, air defense, and ASW. The F/A-18 and A-6 are fairly capable ground attack planes, but you gotta admit, the AV-8B Harrier has got some capabilities that neither can match... Plus, you've got to add a whole pile of helicopter transport. > 6) Maybe 10 of the Posiden SSBN's. Let's convert then to SSN's. The Navy > says we need more SSN's, and for that matter ASW ships, and most people > (at least most right-thinking people |-) feel we have AT LEAST ENOUGH > strategic nuclear warheads. Historically, this was done in the past, by > pouring concrete into Polaris missile tubes and some serious paperwork. > The savings here is the need to build fewer new SSN's. Unfortunately, there's no way a converted Poseidon is going to be anywhere near as capable as a Los Angeles class SSN without a lot of investment. SSBNs are optimized to do two things -- hide, and launch ballistic missiles. SSNs are optimized to find and kill other submarines (and, to some extent, surface ships). Different sensors (particularly sonar), different weapons, different electronics... OK, you're probably not going to spend as much as you would on a brand-new 688, but you're not going to *get* a 688 either. -- David G Lewis ...!bellcore!nvuxr!deej (@ Bellcore Navesink Research & Engineering Center) "If this is paradise, I wish I had a lawnmower."
stevew@wyse.wyse.com (Steve Wilson xttemp dept303) (01/22/90)
From: stevew@wyse.wyse.com (Steve Wilson xttemp dept303) In article <13221@cbnews.ATT.COM> ae219dp%prism@gatech.edu (Devon Prichard) writes: >From: ae219dp%prism@gatech.edu (Devon Prichard) > stuff deleted... >using military aircraft for detection of drug runners. > >Note that there is federal law preventing use of the regular >military in execution of civil law (I believe it is referred >to as the Posse Comitatus Act. any lawyers out there ??) >From what I understand this wasn't law, but a long standing(like 100 year) Executive order. The Bush administration revised this order, and the one dealing with assasination of political figures just before the invasion of Panama. This opened the way for the invasion being legal under US codes. Steve Wilson
schweige@cs.nps.navy.mil (Jeffrey M. Schweiger) (01/22/90)
From: schweige@cs.nps.navy.mil (Jeffrey M. Schweiger) In article <13317@cbnews.ATT.COM> randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes: > >In article <13220@cbnews.ATT.COM> ae219dp%prism@gatech.edu (Devon Prichard) writes: > >>excuse the flames, but the places to cut the defense budget are >>elsewhere, I think; >> >>1) Pentagon - the world's most security leak prone institute, as well as >> the source of some truly stupid procurement policy... >Probably true. > Please don't forget that procurement rules & regulations, and subsequesnt policy might have their roots in Congressional action. Congress has included weapons systems in the DoD Budget that DoD did not want. Also a significant amount of time is spend in the Pentagon just answering questions from members of Congress, or their staffers, or completing Congressionally mandated reports. >> >>2) General staff - we have more generals than some countries have >> privates! each general costs untold amounts of support >> staff as well.(here I refer to Navy as well as others; >> supposedly the Navy has 1 officer for every 3 enlisted) >Yep. I bet this is somehow connected to #1. > I don't have the most recent statistics handy, but the above estimate of the officer to enlisted ratio is off significantly. According to the 1989 edition of the Uniformed Services Almanac, the 30 September 1988 numbers were as follows (numbers from the almanac, ratios are my calculations): US Army: Officers: 107964 Enlisted: 668410 Total: 776374 Ratio: 1 officer for every 6.19 enlisted US Navy: Officers: 72038 Enlisted: 510208 Total: 582246 Ratio: 1 officer for every 7.08 enlisted US Marine Corps: Officers: 20047 Enlisted: 179478 Total: 199525 Ratio: 1 officer for every 8.95 enlisted US Air Force: Officers: 107338 Enlisted: 495244 Total: 602582 Ratio: 1 officer for every 4.61 enlisted DoD Total: Officers: 307387 Enlisted: 1853340 Total: 2160727 Ratio: 1 officer for every 6.03 enlisted Also approximately 2/3 of DoD officers are at the grade of O-3 (Army/Air Force/Marine Corps Captain/Navy Lieutenant and below. The number of generals and admirals in DoD is a little over 1000, or about 0.3% of all officers. [ mod.note: Let me point out that peacetime armies are always officer-heavy. It's important to have "excess" trained officers to allow for rapid growth of the military should a major war begin. The classic example of this would be the German Army under the Versailles treaty; they were only allowed 100,000 men, who then became the cadres for new units when the treaty was abrogated. - Bill ] Jeff Schweiger -- ******************************************************************************* Jeff Schweiger CompuServe: 74236,1645 Standard Disclaimer ARPAnet (Defense Data Network): schweige@cs.nps.navy.mil *******************************************************************************
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (01/24/90)
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) >From: nvuxr!deej@bellcore.bellcore.com (David Lewis) >... there ain't no point defense weapons system >that's going to shoot down a 16" shell ... Britain's Seawolf system has demonstrated the ability to shoot down a 5-inch shell under favorable conditions. It shouldn't have any trouble hitting one of those 16-inch monsters. Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu [mod.note: I've heard the same thing about the Phalanx CIWS. On the other hand, it takes more effort to "shoot down" a ton plus projectile, and they tend to arrive in salvoes, complicating matters. - Bill ]