ae219dp%prism@gatech.edu (Devon Prichard) (02/10/90)
From: ae219dp%prism@gatech.edu (Devon Prichard) from Chris Thompson [ christ@sci.ccny.cuny.edu (Chris Thompson) ], >I see in Saturday's paper that the Air Force has decided to ground the SR-71 >fleet. The rationale is that it costs too much ($200-$300 million/year for >the fleet) and that the KH-12 satellites being sent up now will replace the >planes admirably. Any thoughts? the USAF is supposed to have a new project called Aurora, which probably is a supersonic or hypersonic (3-6 Mach) manned or unmanned recon aircraft. the problem with KH-12's is the unit cost, vunerability from ASAT missiles, and diffficulty in getting launch dates from NASA. True enough that the SR-71 has an excruciatingly high operation cost (after all, they're 25 year-old birds which stretched the limits of their technology). IMHO, recon is the most important of military activities; hopefully, we aren't giving up too much by retiring the Blackbird. But, with the current DoD budget woes, guns and people will survive, but the less visible activities may suffer (naval mine warfare, amphibious assault, recon ...). From: James P. Willey <haydon@nevada.edu> >1) The Air Force doesn't seem too enthusiastic about its job of providing >close air support for the army. This role could be turned over to the >Army. This would allow the Air Force to concentrate on what its good at, >air superiority over the battlefield. >2) The Army could develop a closer working relationship between air >and armored units since they would be under the same command. Additionally, >the Army does not have a fast, sleek image to uphold, so it may opt out >on obtaining turbo-prop aircraft for CAS roles. These would have a longer >loiter time than the A-10. I love the A-10, but the Army could probably >do a better job than the Air Force did. Turbo-props may also be cheaper >to acquire, but someone out in net.land must know more about this. hear, hear!! give the job to someone who will get it done! after all, if the CAS guys answer to the Corps commander, I bet he won't worry about politics before chewing them out for a poor job! I expect a mix of helicopters and fixed-wing would do nicely. special emphasis on targeting/optical sensors to improve accuracy and prevent fratricide. >3) The Army is best at preparing for armored combat. The Army should >release its light forces (airborne, air-cav, light mechanized[?] ) forces to >the Marine Corps. The Army could then concentrate on fulfilling the needs >of a medium to large scale conflict. >4) The Marine Corps is best at developing light, rapid deployment >forces. The Marines would be able train these light units to be more >effective in low intensity conflicts. >5) #3 and #4 would create a bit of a problem if light forces were to be >used in conjunction with heavy forces, so there should be co-operation and >joint training exercises between the Army and the Marine Corps. This would >probably require that the Marine Corps receive more autonomy from the Navy. Hmm, I'm not sure about this. Several of the Army's roles require light infantry, in places where the Marines would be "fishes out of ..."; for example, mountain ops. However, I'm all for keeping the Marines light and fast, especially since they're lacking in organic transport capabilities. In fact, the Marines themselves lately have been claiming to be the dedicated LIC (Low Intensity Conflict) force. in general (oops), I'd rather have lots of guys carrying rifles, than one Aegis-class cruiser in an LIC with all of its transmitters turned off to avoid anti-radiation Exocets from taking an unhealthy interest in them. our requisition/procurement system is what needs drastic measures; to wit, all of our recent naval ship designs have had an extremely high radar signature, due to the size of the superstructure above deck. considering that any Banana Republic can purchase Silkworm, Exocet ..., we should be concerned with the amount of use we are going to get out of such ships. -- |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| | Devon Prichard making the world safe for helicopters ... | | ae219dp@prism.gatech.edu | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (02/12/90)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <13849@cbnews.ATT.COM> ae219dp%prism@gatech.edu (Devon Prichard) writes: > > [stuff deleted] > >Hmm, I'm not sure about this. Several of the Army's roles require >light infantry, in places where the Marines would be "fishes out of ..."; >for example, mountain ops. However, I'm all for keeping the Marines >light and fast, especially since they're lacking in organic transport >capabilities. In fact, the Marines themselves lately have been claiming >to be the dedicated LIC (Low Intensity Conflict) force. in general (oops), >I'd rather have lots of guys carrying rifles, than one Aegis-class >cruiser in an LIC with all of its transmitters turned off to avoid >anti-radiation Exocets from taking an unhealthy interest in them. > >our requisition/procurement system is what needs drastic measures; >to wit, all of our recent naval ship designs have had an extremely >high radar signature, due to the size of the superstructure above deck. >considering that any Banana Republic can purchase Silkworm, Exocet ..., >we should be concerned with the amount of use we are going to get >out of such ships. > I agree with your comments about the value of keeping the Marines, however, there are lots of reasons for keeping Aegis cruisers in a LIC environment. How do you think the Marines are going to get ahore? Without the protection of carriers and AAW platforms, those same missiles will have an even easier time sinking the transports. They will also sink any ships trying to support an air delivered army unit, support that will be reuired for any long term presence. No matter how good those men with rifles are they cannot escort tankers or merchants, counter opposing naval forces, or interdict seaborme supplies. All are viable LIC missions. It is easy to forget the naval side of LIC, those ships are so far out to sea. Unfortunately, LIC at sea is not very low intensity. There are few civilian targets close to the combatants, so any conflict is nearly the same as a full scale shoooting war. Look the Royal Navy experience off the Falklands. They would have welcomed capable units such as the Ticonderogas. I agree we should forego a couple of Ticonderogas and spend that money to reinstitute a coastal interdiction force. Presently we have only a handful of patrol boats for that mission, and they are distracted by special warfare support. They would also help to protect the Aegis cruisers against nuisances like the Iranian motor boats (a contributing fact or to the Iranian airbus incident). -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu