randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) (02/06/90)
From: Randy Appleton <randy@ms.uky.edu> Well, here is the latest idea for efficient cost reduction for the U.S. military. I got this from a friendly soul by e-mail, but the argument is my own. Instead of having our 13,000+ stategic nuclear weapons, all of them waiting from various unlikely scenerios from some Nuclear Doom, lets have a smaller and more effective nuclear deterent force. First, some facts. In the 1960's, a DoD study showed that about 600 EMT (effective megatones) would destroy 1/3 of the Soviet population and 2/3 the Soviet industry, which they defined as "destroying" the Soviet Union. This did not include EMP, or Nuclear Winter (which they hadn't even thought of in the 1960's) or even *fallout*, 'cause you couldn't assume any perticular sort of wind patterns on D-day and probably because there methods of analysis (re:computing power) was to weak. I assume that the data, like urban/rural population ratios,hasn't changed much over the years. Well, anyhow, it would seem that to "destroy" the Soviet Union would take about 600 EMT delivered on target (give or take some reasonable amount). So why have such a large strategic force structure? 13,000 warheads at about .4 EMT each is too many! How about having say 4000 warheads: At .5 readyness 2000 warheads At .9 releyabilty 1800 warheads At .4 EMT each 900 EMT (50% more seemed like a good fudge factor) So where does the savings come in: in NOT buying more strategic nuclear weapons. In not buying the B-2, the mobile based MX, or the Migetman. All are still on the budget. Can anyone remember when SO MANY strategic nuclear weapons systems were all on the budget at once? Also, the savings come in in NOT having to pay for the upkeep, and manning of so many weapons systems. That is proably not inconsequential. (BTW an effective megaton is a normal megaton^.6666666 power. The idea is that an effective megaton, weather in one big bomb or many small ones, destroys the same land area. This means that a bomb SMALLER that 1MT counts as MORE than you would think, and visa versa) (BTW again: I know that I am going back to Mutually Assured Destruction, and leaving Warfighting. But do you think we ever really LEFT MAD?) Randy -- _______________________________________________________________________________ "Tiger gotta hunt, bird gotta fly, man gotta sit, sit and wonder why. Tiger gotta sleep, bird gotta land, man gotta tell himself that he understand" -Bokonon [Address:Randy@ms.uky.edu]
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (02/12/90)
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) >From: Randy Appleton <randy@ms.uky.edu> >Well, anyhow, it would seem that to "destroy" the Soviet Union would take >about 600 EMT delivered on target (give or take some reasonable amount). >So why have such a large strategic force structure? 13,000 warheads at about >.4 EMT each is too many! The point of the large forces is being able to deliver those 600 EMT, or however many one thinks are required for one's vision of the worst-case war, after a devastating surprise attack has destroyed a large fraction of those forces on the ground. Force planning has to be done with an eye on the extreme worst case, not the best case or the average case. All that being said, I tend to agree that the US and USSR have more than they need. It could be worse. The original Minuteman deployment plans envisioned several thousand missiles, until MacNamara decided that one thousand was plenty and called a halt. (It's been said, with considerable justice, that a nation's military establishment tends to be haunted by its last big screwup. The US preoccupation with devastating surprise attacks is less surprising if one remembers that their last big screwup was Pearl Harbor. Similar lines of reasoning go a long way to explaining France's insistence on an independent nuclear deterrent [vs. the humiliating collapse in 1940], Britain's nuclear deterrent [vs. having to withdraw from Suez because the Soviets rattled their bombs and said "out!", with the US off in a snit and not willing to intervene], and the USSR's attack-oriented postwar military doctrine [vs. retreating to the gates of Moscow in 1941 and then fighting a long, devastating war mostly on Soviet soil].)
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (02/21/90)
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) In article <14126@cbnews.ATT.COM> I wrote: >... I'd be very surprised if 50% is the on-station percentage; >the Brits find it difficult to maintain 33% (one sub on station at all times >out of a total fleet of three)... Oops, my mistake. The number they find difficult to maintain is 25%, i.e. one on station out of a fleet of *four*, not three. (The fleet was meant to be five, which would have worked all right, but the politicians killed the fifth sub and said "do the full job anyway".) Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
johnhall@microsoft.UUCP (John HALL) (02/25/90)
From: johnhall@microsoft.UUCP (John HALL) >From: Randy Appleton <randy@ms.uky.edu> >Well, anyhow, it would seem that to "destroy" the Soviet Union would take >about 600 EMT delivered on target (give or take some reasonable amount). >So why have such a large strategic force structure? 13,000 warheads at about >.4 EMT each is too many! I have heard, on the other hand that the military has identified over 40,000 targets in the USSR and warsaw pact. It doesn't have nearly enough warheads to take all of them out.