terryr@ogicse.ogi.edu (Terry Rooker) (04/11/90)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogi.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <15390@cbnews.ATT.COM> eric@snark.uu.net (Eric S. Raymond) writes: > > >Soviet operational doctrine does things this way; they burn up whole >formations, dissolve them and use the few survivors for cadre or repple-depple. >By contrast, U.S. and NATO doctrine is (when possible) to rotate a formation >out when it's taken 40%-60% casualities and rebuild it. > >My source for this was an article on the armies of Europe in an S&T years back. >They didn't speculate on the reasoning behind the Soviet policy, but my guess >is that it reflects 1) the higher cost of transport, and 2) Soviet need to >minimize command-and-control complexity due to the relatively poor quality >of their troops and officers. There are other advantages to the soviet doctrine of treating units like rounds of ammunition. Pulling a unit out of line and briefing its replacement takes time, and coordination. If you push a unit until it burns up, then the next unit is simply assigned objectives based on the performance of the first unit. The units are more homogeneous. In the Western system you will have units that have half combat veterans and half green troops. The expertixe may help the green troops, but their inexperience may kill more of the experienced troops. In the Soviet system the initial quality is uniform within a unit (I am aware of the Soviet 6 month rotation cycle). When the cadres are reformed into a unit they will all be combat veterans. So the Soviet system would tend to place very experienced units against the units of mixed experience in the Western armies. There is another interpretation to Soviet doctrine that explains this policy, but the rationale for it is also that it speedsup the Soviet advance. Most Western analysis assumes that Soviet second and third line divisions are mobilization cadres like Western counterparts. At least one analyst believes that these units will NOT wait for mobilization before moving to the front. They will fill out using the men and equipment from the burned out units. This will result in a mix of experience and euqipment, but remember the fixed soviet doctrine doesn't allow much latitiude. It doesn't matter that there are T64s and T80s in the same platoon. Can you imagine trying to run a mixed platoon of M60s and M1s? If this is the rationale for soviet doctrine it would allow them to concentrate their forces much quicker than the Western forces. The first line units start the attack, and the second line units immediately move to marshalling areas. As units are burned out, they fill out the second line units. Mobilized forces would also probably be used. Then when the first line units get burned out, the second line units assume the attacke. The first line units wait in place to be filled out by thirde line units. Compare this to NATO deploying first line units, then waiting for the second line units to mobilize. Then you have the complicated turnover so the first lines units can replenish. The overall sustainable pace by the Soviet system is much greater. The question is then whether their infrastructure can support all of this activity. There is one further advantage to the Soviet system that the Germans encountered in WWII. By not rebuilding units it complicates the intelligence operations of your enemy. What was the 54th MR regiment, may now be the 76th MR regiment. The 23rd Tank regiment is now the tank battalion (due to losses) in the 41st MR regiment. The mix of equipment would also cause confusion. "I thought the 41st MR regiment was a BTR regiment, we do they have T80s? The Soviets may be hampered with a conscript army and poor C2 facilities (at least compared to the West), but that doesn't necessarily make them disadvantages. -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu