pwilcox@paldn.UUCP (Peter McLeod Wilcox) (06/05/90)
From: pwilcox@paldn.UUCP (Peter McLeod Wilcox) In article <16039@cbnews.ATT.COM>, G_AHRENDT@vaxa.uwa.OZ.AU writes: >The Focke-Wulf 200 Condor long-range bomber, which in various versions was also >used for reconnaissance, anti-shipping and originally passenger transport. >One of these became hitler's personal aircraft. The anti-shipping version was >capable of holding 1.75t of bombs and armed with 3 MG's & 1 Cannon. Other >versions were equipt to carry two Hs 293 air to surface missiles. Actually the Condor should probably be listed as a failure in everything except the reconnaissance role. It was a converted passenger liner and did not have the structural strength to carry the armament load. There are a LOT of pictures of the Condor after it has broken in two during landing, they tended to snap just behind the wings. Also, to the best of my knowledge, the Germans never even attempted to use it in a strategic bombing role. Hmm, come to think of it, I can't think of an instance on either side where high or medium altitude level bombing destroyed or even seriously damaged a ship under way. Anybody have some good examples? [mod.note: The German Fritz-X bombs... but they really don't count. - Bill ] -- Pete Wilcox ...gatech!nanovx!techwood!paldn!pwilcox
bxr307@csc.anu.oz (06/05/90)
From: bxr307@csc.anu.oz <G_AHRENDT@vaxa.uwa.OZ.AU>> writes: >>I would not say Germans had the best weapons in World War II. It might be >>true they did have the best in most weapon categories but I can think of >>a few where they were definitely behind the allies. What about bombers ? >>The Germans didn't have anything like the B17 or the B24. If they did >>I think the outcome of the Battle of Britain would definitely be different. >The Focke-Wulf 200 Condor long-range bomber, which in various versions was >also used for reconnaissance, anti-shipping and originally passenger transport. >One of these became hitler's personal aircraft. The anti-shipping version was >capable of holding 1.75t of bombs and armed with 3 MG's & 1 Cannon. Other >versions were equipt to carry two Hs 293 air to surface missiles. This was a >very rare 4 engine German plane, unfortunatly due to Hitler's short-sightedness >and preference for dive-bombers no major efforts were made in the strategic >area. It wasn't so much Hitler's short-sightedness as that of the OKL's (Ober der Kommand Luftwaffe - Luftwaffe High Command) which did not have the concept of strategic bombing as its main raison de'entre as did the RAF and the USAAF. The whole reason and justification for the existance of the RAF as put forward by General Jan Smuts in his report in 1917 was the need for an independent force which was capable of carrying the fight to the enemy's homeland directly, to attack his economy and infrastructure. Such a concept grounded in the Italian theorist Duhet's writings and followed up by Hugh Trenchard and the American Billy Mitchell, ensured that when war came in 1939 the Allies were prepared to carry the attack to the enemy's homeland and economy by air. What was needed was not so much initially the technical means, but the doctrine around which the actual aircraft and forces could then be moulded. The OKL on the other hand, while having experience of strategic bombing in WWI in the form of the Zeppelins and the Gotha heavy bombers, was subordinate to the Army in nearly all matters. It was a relatively new arm and had been designed to help the army to achieve its objectives on the battlefield, in other words tactical bombing. Only during the brief reign of Generalleutnant Wever as commander of the Luftwaffe staff, who died in 1936 in an aircrash, did the Luftwaffe have a champion of the strategic bombing concept or dedicate any effort to attempting to attain some form of long range strategic bomber. He instigated the so-called, `Ural Bomber' project (the DO19 was the only example built). With his death though, the Ural Bomber project was abondoned by his successor, Kesselring, who believed that the `Bomber-A' heavy bomber programme was a more realistic idea. Bomber-A evolved into the HE177. However it was a technical failure for several reasons. Perhaps the most important of these was the attempt to use coupled engines, instead of individual powerplants, and the truly idiotic idea that all bombers, no matter how large should be able to be used as divebombers. The result was an aircraft that committed to service well before all the development problems were ironed out. The aircraft was particularly prone to engine fires and when crews attempted to practice dive bombing runs the planes would break up in flight. Several other aircraft were designed and prototypes produced to the so called `Amerika-bomber' concept after the entry of the USA into the war in 1941 (such as the ME264, the FW300 and Ta400). However these were not actually produced (prototypes of the ME264 were built but the others only existed in model form at war's end) and were not being particularly successful. The FW-200 Condor, on the otherhand was in fact a very poor bomber, being the adaption of a pre-war airliner design. It carried a small bomb load and was structurally weak (continually breaking their backs due to the stress involved in wartime flying). Its defensive armament was inadequate and its speed and operating altitude low. In fact after the provision of merchant convoys with air protection, initially with CAM (Catapult Armed Merchantment) ships with a single catapult launched Sea Hurricane, and later with Escort Carriers, the succeses of the Condor became few and far between. If anything the JU390 was a better maritime recce aircraft but it was not produced in large enough numbers to have any bearing of the outcome of the war. While the Western Allies (the Soviets also believed in the tactical uses of air power rather than the strategic) had a doctrine for the strategic uses of airpower and the Germans did not, I will now put forward a contentious comment (he types as he climbs into his asbestos suit :-). Strategic bombing, as employed by the Allies failed in its objective of disrupting the German economy as quickly as desired. Why? Because the Allies concentrated on the wrong targets. The Americans believed that by bombing German heavy industry they would destroy the armament producing factories. However the bombs used were designed to destroy by blast and unless a direct hit was achieved on the machines used by the factories, then all that was destroyed was the buildings housing them. Quite often then after an air raid on a factory, the factory was back in business quite quickly once temporary accomodation had been built. The British policy, on the other hand, of bombing the towns in an attempt to kill the workers, also backfired. By doing so they normally only destroyed the other buildings (including residential) of the cities they attacked. This meant that people who normally were employed in other businesses (such as cafes, hotels, etc.) were forced to seek work in other areas, such as armaments. As a consequence armament production actually increased as the war went on as more labour became available. Hence also the British bombing effort failed to achieve its aims. This concentration on the wrong targets produced inadequate results then until much later in the war when raw material shortages and transportations disruptions finally begun to bite into the German economy. Perhaps instead the Allies should have concentrated on certain key targets and industries earlier on. The ones that immediately spring to mind are, Oil and synthetic fuels (no fuel no aircraft,tanks,etc), and perhaps even more importantly railways and shipping. By disrupting the communication infrastructure more fully than they did, then the German economy would ground to a halt much earlier, perhaps forcing a German surrender earlier. What do the other readers of the group think? >>Also the Germans didn't have the Magnetron so their radar technology was >>definitely behind the British. As for tanks, the Tiger didn't have sloped >>armour, >The same applies to the area of radar, the official side's inabilities to >further prospective projects resulted in many very ingenious and promising >areas being ignored. e.g. Dr Esau's 4.4mm wave radar set, which was by 1944 >capable of detecting Allied bombers taking off from Norfolk (too late). If this >had been properly funded when it was proposed in 1938, it would have been... >Further ignorance on behalf of the nazi's prevented amateur radio enthusiasts >and inventors from furthering their hobby. But do not forget that Hitler ordered in 1940 that all development on weapons which could not be finished by 1942 was to be stopped as the war would be sure to be over. Now that is one piece of foresight that Hitler can be blamed (or thanked) for. Basically the Germans failed to consider the possiblity of a long war until it was too late. >>the Germans only adopted sloped armour on the Pather when they saw the >>Russian using them on their T34s. What about unguided rocket launchers, the >>Russian certainly beat the Germans in that too. >Maybe not the Panzerkampfwagen Tiger 1 but the Tiger 2 was the most formidable >tank of the war. If you could find a bridge to carry it. It weighed 60 tons all up. Very few bridges in Europe were designed with that sort of load in mind. While such vehicles are formidable when encountered, their tactical usefulness is limited when attempting to carry an attack beyond the first river obstacle encountered. The Tiger I and Panthers had difficulties enough and they were much lighter. >And oh yes, the Stalin's Organ, that's about all they did have in rocket >technology that the Germans didn't. Need we start talking about the V's? Forgeting of course the advances in guided weapon technology such as the `Fritz-X' glide bomb and numerous other projects which never quite reached fruition. While the Germans also copied the `Katyusha' multiple rocket launcher, and improved on it, with the 15cm Nebelwerfer (which placed the rocket motor in front of the warhead so that it contributed to the destructive potential of the weapon, rather than being simply blown off as what normally happened with most artillery rockets of convential design). Brian Ross ============================================================================= bxr307@coombs.anu.oz |Snail Mail:- Sociology Dept., R.S.S.S, | Australian National University bxr307@csc.anu.oz | Canberra, Australia =============================================================================