smpod@csd.lerc.nasa.gov (Steve Podleski (Sverdrup)) (06/05/90)
From: "Steve Podleski (Sverdrup)" <smpod@csd.lerc.nasa.gov> In article <16134@cbnews.ATT.COM>, military-request@att.att.com (Bill Thacker) writes... >From: military-request@att.att.com (Bill Thacker) >muchow@ns.network.com (Jim Muchow) writes: ...............text deleted.................. >>The T34 should thus be considered a better tank in spite of the fact >>that it was technically inferior. > >Were I >in charge of a WWII army, I'd want the T-34 as my main tank. With >reliability thrown in, I might opt for an M-4 Sherman. Where do you get your information that says the T-34 was not a reliable tank when compared to the M-4. I do not have a source in front of me, but from what I've read, with its diesel engine, the T-34 was reliable (and very maneuverable for it's size and weight.) I would vote for the T-34/85 as the tank of choice for WW II ; it had the best compromise of speed, weight, armour, gun, range, maneuverability, reliability and ease of production. [mod.note: I can't cite a source, but I've heard that the serviceability of the T-34 was very bad. Apparently, the transmission was particularly bad, and tended to work itself loose after a hundred kilometers or so of driving, in addition to leaking fluid. I've also heard that the life of the drive train of a T-34 was relatively short. In short, I can't provide much concrete evidence of poor reliability, but I've certainly never read anything indicating reliability on par with a Sherman or Panzer IV. Another important factor we've all ignored so far is ergonimics. The T-34 was cramped and uncomfortable; little internal padding was provided; and only the latest versions provided a 3-man turret. Turret baskets were not provided, and as nearly all of the main ammo was stored beneath removable floor mats, the fighting compartment was a hazardous place to work during combat. - Bill ]
ap542@ztivax.siemens.com (Helmut Peisl) (06/05/90)
From: ap542@ztivax.siemens.com (Helmut Peisl) In article <16133@cbnews.ATT.COM> muchow@ns.network.com (Jim Muchow) writes: >The men operating the Panther (to a large extent, SS units) as well as >the officers commanding these units were excellent. The Panther was, To this you could add, the war on the western front 1940. The french tanks were generally superior to the Mk I and II, which mostly only had machine guns, and weaker armor. But only the Germans had at this time recognized the value of independent tank divisions, operating at strike forces. Guderian and Rommel earned their laurels here. And even they faced enmity from the more conservative members of the german High Command. The French only believed in tanks as infantry support until it was too late. So leadership and crews as well as advanced tactics showed their value. Mike -- Mike Hoffmann, Dept DI AP 542 Siemens AG, Munich, West Germany Disclaimer: none required in Germany, I think/hope/was told by my lawyer
scottmi@ncar.UCAR.EDU (SCOTT MICHAEL C) (06/05/90)
From: boulder!snoopy!scottmi@ncar.UCAR.EDU (SCOTT MICHAEL C) In addition to the poor transmission and two-man turret (a tank commander has better things to do than load a 76.2mm gun) the T-34's track shoes were too large. The great angular movement of each shoe as it rolled under the #1 road wheel and hit whatever hard surface lay below exposed the tracks to more wear than they could reasonably take. The T-34 inherited this feature, in addition to its suspension, from the earlier US-designed Christie tank. A fault (which could have only mattered when fighting the Germans) was that the overhang at the rear of the turret on the 76.2mm models was just the right size to accept any "Teller" mine that an enterprising grunt might chose to shove into said gap. Any attempt to traverse the turret would detonate the mine (which would throw the turret off of the tank.) According to my grandfather (who spent 20 years in the Soviet Army; 1935-1955), the Germans frequently made infantry counterattacks against Soviet armor, usually with disturbing (for my grandfather) degrees of success. --don't like snow, miss Deirdre, and wish I was still in Santa Cruz.
msmiller@gonzoville.East.Sun.COM (Mark Miller - Sun BOS Contractor) (06/05/90)
From: msmiller@gonzoville.East.Sun.COM (Mark Miller - Sun BOS Contractor) In article <16246@cbnews.ATT.COM> you write: |> |> |>From: "Steve Podleski (Sverdrup)" <smpod@csd.lerc.nasa.gov> |>In article <16134@cbnews.ATT.COM>, military-request@att.att.com (Bill Thacker) writes... |>>Were I |>>in charge of a WWII army, I'd want the T-34 as my main tank. With |>>reliability thrown in, I might opt for an M-4 Sherman. |> |> Where do you get your information that says the T-34 was not a reliable |>tank when compared to the M-4. I do not have a source in front of me, but |>from what I've read, with its diesel engine, the T-34 was reliable (and |>very maneuverable for it's size and weight.) I would vote for the T-34/85 as |>the tank of choice for WW II ; it had the best compromise of speed, weight, |>armour, gun, range, maneuverability, reliability and ease of production. |> |>[mod.note: I can't cite a source, but I've heard that the serviceability |>of the T-34 was very bad. Apparently, the transmission was particularly |>bad, and tended to work itself loose after a hundred kilometers or so of |>driving, in addition to leaking fluid. I've also heard that the life of |>the drive train of a T-34 was relatively short. In short, I can't provide |>much concrete evidence of poor reliability, but I've certainly never |>read anything indicating reliability on par with a Sherman or Panzer IV. |> Another important factor we've all ignored so far is ergonimics. |>The T-34 was cramped and uncomfortable; little internal padding was |>provided; and only the latest versions provided a 3-man turret. Turret |>baskets were not provided, and as nearly all of the main ammo was stored |>beneath removable floor mats, the fighting compartment was a hazardous |>place to work during combat. - Bill ] On paper, the T34/85 was great. But, as Bill points out, it had some serious shortcomings from a human-factors standpoint, as it were. As easrly as 1939, the Germans were proving that the crew of a tank was almost as important as the tank itself. The Russians didn't really catch on to this, and I don't know if they have yet. Some of the weird things they put into the T-62 and so on were pretty dumb and showed they had not learned their lessons from WW2. Also, one shouldn't confuse the Russian 85mm with a German 88mm. Shell size ain't the whole show. If memory serves, the Russian gun had a shorter barrel, worse munitions, and horrid optics. They still had to fight the Germans like they did in 1941 - get real real close and in big numbers. On the reliability issue, my impression was that the production standards for lots of Russian stuff was pretty bad. They prefered quantity to quality. Also consider that most tank crews were sent into action shortly after they learned where the escape hatches were (OK - I'm exagerating - but the crew training was far from Western standards). There isn't much point making the thing super reliable if it's not expected to last more than 10 minutes in combat anyway. -MSM
janf@nada.kth.se (Jan Frelin) (06/05/90)
From: janf@nada.kth.se (Jan Frelin) >>in charge of a WWII army, I'd want the T-34 as my main tank. With >>reliability thrown in, I might opt for an M-4 Sherman. > > > Where do you get your information that says the T-34 was not a reliable >tank when compared to the M-4. I do not have a source in front of me, but >from what I've read, with its diesel engine, the T-34 was reliable (and >very maneuverable for it's size and weight.) I would vote for the T-34/85 as >the tank of choice for WW II ; it had the best compromise of speed, weight, >armour, gun, range, maneuverability, reliability and ease of production. Sweden bought a lot of "war junk" like usable tanks from the victorious nations after the war. (the were bought in units like "road miles" and "hectares"...) My father had the opportunity to work with these (they were used to gather intelligence) as an technical NCO in the late fifties. At the time, they had shot all german tanks to garbage, but there were still som M4s and T34 around that they worked with. I dont remember the exact details, but he seemed to fairly impressed by both of them. (Should be, they were war-proven designs, after all). Specific comments I remember hearing from him was that the Sherman was remarkably reliable and "nice-to-drive" whereas the T34 was very rugged and easy to maintain on the field, no special tools or facilities were needed. I may be able to get some more info out of him, if anyone is interrested. Jan Frelin, Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden
cash%convex@uunet.UU.NET (Peter Cash) (06/05/90)
From: cash%convex@uunet.UU.NET (Peter Cash) In article <16133@cbnews.ATT.COM> muchow@ns.network.com (Jim Muchow) writes: >Any claim that the Germans had the best weapons on the planet during >WWII is irrelevant for three reasons. The first is that the men operating >the weapons must be trained to do so optimally. The second is that the >officers in command of the men must be capable of coercing and using >that optimal performance (not just the lower echelons of officers, but >also the higher ups). Thirdly, the weapon in question must be able to >be produced in sufficient numbers to actually make a difference >(victory or defeat). Well, yes...that was exactly my point (or the point I was trying to make, at any rate). The German military planners thought that mere technical superiority is enough to win a war; as Jim Muchow points out, reliability, quantity and trained operators are examples of other factors that are also crucially important. I also attempted to argue that our own military planners are making the same mistake (and Jim seems to agree with this also). But perhaps we should go a step further than saying that our military planning and procurement effort is mistaken and wrong-headed; perhaps we should say that it has nothing to do with military readiness at all. I think that the purchase of so many high-tech weapons systems that could never be put into production at the quantity levels required by a modern war can mean only one thing: our military planners are acting from purely economic motives, and do not really believe that any of this technology will be tested on the battlefield. I sure hope they're right. -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist. | Peter Cash | (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein) |cash@convex.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~