randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) (01/02/90)
From: randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) Whether or not you think there should be cuts in military spending, surely everyone will agree that there are programs that provide less "bang" per "buck" that we really want. So my question becomes, what do you think they are? Here is an personal example. The U.S. Army still has more than 100 OV-1's, and the Marines have many OV-10's. These are light turbo-prop aircraft used for battlefield recon. I wonder how long they would live in a world filled with sholder launched SAM's. Also, there function can be filled by helicopter, which has tha added advantage of being able to hide behind trees. A second example is the SR-71. The AF felt they could get similar intelligence from satelite, at much less cost. What ideas do "yall" in net.land have? P.S. If it were up to me, I would cut Army "heavy" divisions and strategic weapons first, and *NOT* air-mobile and naval forces. What do yall think on this? -- _______________________________________________________________________________ "Tiger gotta hunt, bird gotta fly, man gotta sit, sit and wonder why. Tiger gotta sleep, bird gotta land, man gotta tell himself that he understand" -Bokonon [Address:Randy@ms.uky.edu]
fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) (01/04/90)
From: fiddler@Sun.COM (Steve Hix) > From: randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) > Whether or not you think there should be cuts in military spending, surely > everyone will agree that there are programs that provide less "bang" per > "buck" that we really want. So my question becomes, what do you think they > are? > > Here is an personal example. The U.S. Army still has more than 100 OV-1's, and > the Marines have many OV-10's. These are light turbo-prop aircraft used for > battlefield recon. The OV-1 Mohawk fit the bill as primarily recon, but the OV-10 Bronco showed up as the implementation of the LARA (Light Armed Recon Aircraft) program: it can throw things at the ground, as well as snoop around. > I wonder how long they would live in a world filled with sholder launched SAM's. With luck, as long or longer than a helicopter. Depends on terrain, tactics, and abilities of the missile/user. > Also, there function can be filled by helicopter, > which has tha added advantage of being able to hide behind trees. The helicopter would have a slower transit speed, shorter loiter, smaller ordnance payload (than the OV-10, anyway), and would spend more time in the missile's threat envelope. There is a noticable lack of trees in most desert areas, which would be a likely arena for conflict. Both aircraft could use local hills, etc., for cover, however. > A second example is the SR-71. The AF felt they could get similar > intelligence from satelite, at much less cost. It may not be quite as clear-cut as that. Satellite recon can often be overcome since the things have pretty regular schedules. An aircraft may often be able to check on some new development before a satellite is in position to cover it, and the aircraft is more likely to able to be dispatched so as to suprise whoever is being spied on. As for the SR-71's mission being fully taken over by satellites, it may not actually happen. There have been for a couple of years rumblings of something called "Aurora", rumored to be a Mach 5 air-breather. It may be nothing more than rumors, but there are interesting reports of odd stuff out in the Nevada desert, as mentioned recently in AW&ST, among other places. The AF recce folks know quite well what the tradeoffs are between satellite and high and low aircraft intelligence gathering. ------------ "...Then anyone who leaves behind him a written manual, and likewise anyone who receives it, in the belief that such writing will be clear and certain, must be exceedingly simple-minded..." Plato, _Phaedrus_ 275d
tdrinkar@cosmos.acs.calpoly.edu (Terrell Drinkard) (01/04/90)
From: tdrinkar@cosmos.acs.calpoly.edu (Terrell Drinkard) In article <12686@cbnews.ATT.COM> randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes: > > >From: randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) >Whether or not you think there should be cuts in military spending, surely >everyone will agree that there are programs that provide less "bang" per >"buck" that we really want. So my question becomes, what do you think they >are? > >Here is an personal example. The U.S. Army still has more than 100 OV-1's, and >the Marines have many OV-10's. These are light turbo-prop aircraft used for >battlefield recon. I wonder how long they would live in a world filled with >sholder launched SAM's. Also, there function can be filled by helicopter, >which has tha added advantage of being able to hide behind trees. I would point out in these days of budget restraint that it costs about $1100/hr to operate a UH-1. The OV-1/10 class aircraft can operate for roughly 1/9 the cost per hour. I would also point out that the UH-1s tubine engines just as the OV-1/10s do. >P.S. If it were up to me, I would cut Army "heavy" divisions and strategic >weapons first, and *NOT* air-mobile and naval forces. What do yall think >on this? Strategic weapons? What strategic weapons? Only the Air Force has Strategic weapons. The Army *had* an IRBM (the Pershing) but it was sacrificed for world peace in the INF treaty (rightly so, IMHO). I would also be interested in your reasoning for disbanding a 'heavy' division. I'd also like to hear what a 'heavy ' division is. If you mean armor, then I submit that this is a foolish whim and that the US would be better served by disbanding B-52 wings. We might also do well by considering whether or not we really *need* 17 attack aircraft carriers (that was Reagan's touted goal, I'm unaware of how successful we've been in stopping that nonesense) and assorted numbers of nuclear missile boats. The Air Force has been incredibly successful in avoiding the purchase of appropriate logistics aircraft so that they could afford larger numbers of B-2 bombers and F-117 fighters (which so ably demonstrated precision vacant lot bombing in Panama :-) with which their officers could fly very fast and make rank quickly. Now, I love airplanes. I'm an aeronautical engineer. But there must come a time when we need to look at what we are spending our money on and the results we get from it. The US is looking at a long period of low-intensity warfare where it will be more important to be able to air-move a division or a brigade quickly than to bomb Moscow. The Air Force has not had the neccessary cargo aircraft to perform this kind of mission since WWII. They have consistently sold the Congress a line that goes "We have all the logistics aircraft we need to perform our mission, but we another wing of F-16s just in case the Albanians break through Greece with MiG-31s". In case you hadn't guessed, I'm not convinced. As a side-note, retiring the A-10 is not a good idea IMHO. Replacing it with the F-16 is ludicrous. Terry >-- >_______________________________________________________________________________ >"Tiger gotta hunt, bird gotta fly, man gotta sit, sit and wonder why. > Tiger gotta sleep, bird gotta land, man gotta tell himself that he understand" >-Bokonon [Address:Randy@ms.uky.edu] Disclaimer et la Signaturo: Hell no, I'm not responsible for what I say! If everyone were responsible for what they said, we'd have had a balanced budget in 1984.
military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) (01/04/90)
From: att!utzoo!henry >From: randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) >A second example is the SR-71. The AF felt they could get similar >intelligence from satelite, at much less cost. Well, no, not really. What happened is that the USAF is totally confused about what kind of recon it needs and how to get it, the *only* obvious element being the importance of satellites. People in Congress and elsewhere have been yelling at the AF for years to get its act together and come up with an overall recon plan. So far, no results. The USAF isn't sure whether it needs the SR-71s or not... and they are costly to run, making them an attractive target in a time of tightening money and lessening threats. This year, their number came up. Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (01/05/90)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12757@cbnews.ATT.COM> tdrinkar@cosmos.acs.calpoly.edu (Terrell Drinkard) writes: > > >>P.S. If it were up to me, I would cut Army "heavy" divisions and strategic >>weapons first, and *NOT* air-mobile and naval forces. What do yall think >>on this? > >I would also be interested in your reasoning for disbanding a >'heavy' division. I'd also like to hear what a 'heavy ' division >is. If you mean armor, then I submit that this is a foolish whim >and that the US would be better served by disbanding B-52 wings. > >We might also do well by considering whether or not we really >*need* 17 attack aircraft carriers (that was Reagan's touted goal, >I'm unaware of how successful we've been in stopping that >nonesense) and assorted numbers of nuclear missile boats. > >The Air Force has been incredibly successful in avoiding the >purchase of appropriate logistics aircraft so that they could >afford larger numbers of B-2 bombers and F-117 fighters (which so >ably demonstrated precision vacant lot bombing in Panama :-) with >which their officers could fly very fast and make rank quickly. > >Now, I love airplanes. I'm an aeronautical engineer. But there >must come a time when we need to look at what we are spending our >money on and the results we get from it. The US is looking at a >long period of low-intensity warfare where it will be more >important to be able to air-move a division or a brigade quickly >than to bomb Moscow. The Air Force has not had the neccessary >cargo aircraft to perform this kind of mission since WWII. They >have consistently sold the Congress a line that goes "We have all >the logistics aircraft we need to perform our mission, but we >another wing of F-16s just in case the Albanians break through >Greece with MiG-31s". In case you hadn't guessed, I'm not >convinced. > Your comments are somewhat contradictory. It is not possible to move a heavy division anywhere quickly. All of the heavy vehicles are difficult to airlift, and even with the fastest ships still take awhile to get there and even longer to load and unload. If you feel that the primary threat in the future is Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) then heavy divisions are not the way to go. That was one of the complaints about the US Army's readiness for Vietnam. All of the mech infantry had to be taken out of their tracs and trained to operate on foot. [mod.note: Of course, you're not going to stop a Soviet armored thrust with light infantry and air cav... clearly, "heavy divisions" are needed for that job. - Bill ] I agree that the AF has its priorities screwed up about transport aircraft. During the Granada operation, there wasn't a military transport available for anything but the highest priority airlift. If a small operation such as that soaks up all the aircraft, what happens when we realy need LOTS of them? As for carriers, the goal was 15, although I am sure there were lots of naval aviators that would like to see 17. That was an unrealistic goal because there never were enough planes to fill them all up. As it is I believe that there are 1 or 2 fewer air wings than carriers. Some individual aircraft are in particularly short supply. The S-3 Viking produciton line has been closed for years. The navy is now using the airframes for all kinds of ancillary missions, such as the ES-3. Now they are hurting for fixed wing carrier ASW aircraft. The original goal (hope? :-) was that the Osprey would take up the slack. With it almost gone, the navy is rushing around to find a replacement. As for carriers in general, they are admirably suited to supporting LIC, and operations such as Grenada and Panama. In some cases, such as Grenada, the operation is distant from supporting land based air. Or even worse it could be Southwest Asia where we have essentially no land based air. A carrier can simply park over the horizon and wait. When you need it, is simply launches an airstrike and presto! instant urban renewal. No problems with allied support. No problems with overflight rights. Air wings are flexible and can be adjusted to the situation. If you need more bombers, put bombs on the F-18's or trade them for additional A-6's. The one carrier selling point that most everyone agrees upon is that they are a mobile airfield with few political entangelements that can be moved to where they are needed. If you need more planes bring in another carrier. The argument is how many do we need? How many can we afford? For each carrier you need escorts, support, and some base to hold it all. Then you need support for the escorts, support for the base, and escorts for the supoort going to the carrier and its escorts........... -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) (01/05/90)
From: Randy Appleton <randy@ms.uky.edu> In article <12757@cbnews.ATT.COM> tdrinkar@cosmos.acs.calpoly.edu (Terrell Drinkard) writes: >I would point out in these days of budget restraint that it costs >about $1100/hr to operate a UH-1. The OV-1/10 class aircraft can >operate for roughly 1/9 the cost per hour. I would also point out >that the UH-1s tubine engines just as the OV-1/10s do. One can operate an OV-1/10 (or any aircraft) for $11/hour!!!??? Wow, really? >I would also be interested in your reasoning for disbanding a >'heavy' division. I'd also like to hear what a 'heavy ' division >is. If you mean armor, then I submit that this is a foolish whim >and that the US would be better served by disbanding B-52 wings. I agree with you about B-52's. I would probably disband MOST (but not all) of them, and use the spare ones for parts. If I was really worried about penetration (like I am) I would continue development on the Advanced Cruse Missile, and maybe even give some to the B-1's as well. Ya, heavy=armor. I'm sort of assuming (without evidence) that armor divisions have a lower firepower/pound ratio, and an average firepower/$$ ratio. Now that I look at it again, I guess if armored div's have a greater firepower/$$ than the other choices, it might be a good idea to keep a few of them around, already on station. In other words, if the politicians decide we should have 2 div's in Europe, then they might as well be armored. I wouldn't want to have too many hanging around the U.S. mainland, because they're so *darn* hard to move quickly. > >We might also do well by considering whether or not we really >*need* 17 attack aircraft carriers (that was Reagan's touted goal, >I'm unaware of how successful we've been in stopping that >nonesense) and assorted numbers of nuclear missile boats. I don't need 17. I need to be able to get ONE or TWO carrier quicly to any spot quickly. Depending on how long I want to wait, I guess I could do with MUCH less than 17! > >The Air Force has been incredibly successful in avoiding the >purchase of appropriate logistics aircraft so that they could >afford larger numbers of B-2 bombers and F-117 fighters The AF has 544 C130's, 250 C141's and about 700 tankers of various sorts, as well as all the C4's, etc... They did get everyone to Panama quickly. How much more do we need (major war in Europe excepted) >(which so ably demonstrated precision vacant lot bombing in Panama :-) I LOVE this line So what SHOULD one cut. I don't think there are to many completely useless weapons systems, but there are more and less cost effective ones? Or alternatively, what would you want to be SURE and KEEP?? -- _______________________________________________________________________________ "Tiger gotta hunt, bird gotta fly, man gotta sit, sit and wonder why. Tiger gotta sleep, bird gotta land, man gotta tell himself that he understand" -Bokonon [Address:Randy@ms.uky.edu]
wrf@mab.ecse.rpi.edu (Wm Randolph Franklin) (01/05/90)
From: wrf@mab.ecse.rpi.edu (Wm Randolph Franklin) In article <12686@cbnews.ATT.COM> randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes: > >A second example is the SR-71. The AF felt they could get similar >intelligence from satelite, at much less cost. Then what will the AF do in the 2 (or whatever number) years between when our satellites get blinded or shot down and when they can be replaced? -- Wm. Randolph Franklin Internet: wrf@ecse.rpi.edu (or @cs.rpi.edu) Bitnet: Wrfrankl@Rpitsmts Telephone: (518) 276-6077; Telex: 6716050 RPI TROU; Fax: (518) 276-6261 Paper: ECSE Dept., 6026 JEC, Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst, Troy NY, 12180
dkrause@orion.oac.uci.edu (Doug Krause) (01/06/90)
From: Doug Krause <dkrause@orion.oac.uci.edu> In article <12819@cbnews.ATT.COM> randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes: #In article <12757@cbnews.ATT.COM> tdrinkar@cosmos.acs.calpoly.edu (Terrell Drinkard) writes: #>I would point out in these days of budget restraint that it costs #>about $1100/hr to operate a UH-1. The OV-1/10 class aircraft can #>operate for roughly 1/9 the cost per hour. I would also point out #>that the UH-1s tubine engines just as the OV-1/10s do. # #One can operate an OV-1/10 (or any aircraft) for $11/hour!!!??? Wow, really? You think that 1/9 of 1100 is 11? Wanna buy some real estate or stock options I got for sale? #Organization: U of Kentucky, Mathematical Sciences P.S. Better change your major. :-) Douglas Krause One yuppie can ruin your whole day. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- University of California, Irvine Internet: dkrause@orion.oac.uci.edu Welcome to Irvine, Yuppieland USA BITNET: DJKrause@ucivmsa
terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (01/08/90)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12819@cbnews.ATT.COM> randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes: > >>We might also do well by considering whether or not we really >>*need* 17 attack aircraft carriers (that was Reagan's touted goal, > >I don't need 17. I need to be able to get ONE or TWO carrier quicly to any spot >quickly. Depending on how long I want to wait, I guess I could do with >MUCH less than 17! Actually, the navy uses the same criteria you use to end up with the figure of 15 (not 17) carriers. Consider that the Earth is about 24,000 miles around the equator, and a carrier task force can steam at about 20 knots. I know this is a gross simplification, but I want you to appreciate the magnitude of the problem. Also, all but one carrier is homeported in the US. If you only had a handful of carriers, then it could take weeks to deploy one from the US. Hence the policy of foward basing, i.e. deployments. The general figure used for planning these things is that you need 3 ships for every one that you need on station. 1 in refit/post-deployment activities, 1 on deployment, and 1 in pre-deployment/transit. You actually need maybe one more overall because of long term overhauls, i.e. SLEP (Service Life Extension Program). Since we have interests in the Eastern and Western Pacific, the Atlantic, the Med, and the Indian Ocean that would require a carrier on station, that gives us a minimum figure of 15 carriers (not counting carriers in SLEP). Since we don't have 15, we fudge, and the IO only gets an occasional carrier. If you think this is a rather slack schedule, the navy has problems maintaining personnel becasue of the separations it causes. For example the ship I was on had a solid 6/12 deployment. In the 12 non-deployment months we were underway for about 3 months (accumulative time). Add in schools, and duty days, you can see that this 3 for 1 policy places great demands on the personnel. It can't be stretched any further. By using your criteria, we need at least 15 carriers, and to be fair to the crews, it would be nice to have 17-8 carriers. Then we could get to ANY trouble spot within a week, likely trouble spots we could handle a little sooner:-) -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
freeman@decwrl.dec.com (Jay R. Freeman) (01/09/90)
From: argosy!freeman@decwrl.dec.com (Jay R. Freeman) > The general figure used for planning these things is that you need 3 > ships for every one that you need on station. [...] Would a fix for these problems be to have more than one crew trained for each carrier, and to rotate crews more often than ships? Isn't that done with ballistic missile submarines? (The original poster was discussing aircraft carriers.) -- Jay Freeman <canonical disclaimer -- all opinions are mine only>
major@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Mike Schmitt) (01/10/90)
From: ssc-vax!shuksan!major@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Mike Schmitt) In article <12818@cbnews.ATT.COM>, terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) writes: > Your comments are somewhat contradictory. It is not possible to move > a heavy division anywhere quickly. All of the heavy vehicles are > difficult to airlift, and even with the fastest ships still take > awhile to get there and even longer to load and unload. If you feel > that the primary threat in the future is Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) > then heavy divisions are not the way to go. That was one of the > complaints about the US Army's readiness for Vietnam. All of the mech > infantry had to be taken out of their tracs and trained to operate on > foot. First, deployment. You're right, a heavy division doesn't get moved anywhere quickly - until it's on the ground - and then armor and mech is pretty fast. The 'fastest' deploying are the Airborne Divisions, for obvious reasons. Then the 'Light Divisions' (foot-mobile). Airmobile Divisions (101st & 1st Cav) are not that deployable - as experienced in a 1976 Reforger when the 101st was deployed to Germany - it took forever for the helicoptors, which went by ship, to get to Germany. So, deployment is mission dependent. The 'mix' of divisions has to do with the variety of places the Army have to be ready to deploy to. For the most part - in Europe, it will be armor/mech vs armor/mech. There are some areas where 'Light' troops can operate - but they can't move around much. So, either Low- or High- conflicts - there must be a mix of capability to meet the threat. The Army has to be 'ready' to go anywhere. Second. APC and IFVs are really, only a 'taxi' to the objective. Any "good" mech infantryman will tell you that they must train to make the final assault 'on foot' - that their doctrine/training uses the APC/IFV as a safe means to get as close to the objective as possible - then dismount and make the final assault - which makes maximum use of their firepower and supporting arms. As such, in Vietnam, 'mech infantry' simply left their APCs at home - and fought as trained (arguably so) Now, I said 'good' mech infantry - it always seemed kinda difficult to kick the squads out of their APCs and get them to deploy on foot. But, good NCOs/Platoon Leaders would somehow manage. It probably had something to do with winter weather in Germany and the space heater in the Track. > > [mod.note: Of course, you're not going to stop a Soviet > armored thrust with light infantry and air cav... clearly, "heavy > divisions" are needed for that job. - Bill ] That could be argued, Bill. They probably *could* stop an armored thrust - ONCE! :-) mike schmitt
terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (01/10/90)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12926@cbnews.ATT.COM> argosy!freeman@decwrl.dec.com (Jay R. Freeman) writes: > > >From: argosy!freeman@decwrl.dec.com (Jay R. Freeman) > > >> The general figure used for planning these things is that you need 3 >> ships for every one that you need on station. [...] > >Would a fix for these problems be to have more than one crew trained for each >carrier, and to rotate crews more often than ships? Isn't that done with >ballistic missile submarines? (The original poster was discussing aircraft >carriers.) You could, but it would still be expensive. The manpower costs are among the highest in the military (at least the US military :-). For a carrier you'd be adding 5-6000 men for every extra crew. As it is the navy tends to keep crews on the small side and relies on shore side maintenance facilities. To increase the deployment cycle of the ships much more of the maintentance would have to be done by the crew, so each crew would have to be larger. That means you'd have to more than double the number of men. Increased operational activity would probably reduce the effective lifetime of the hull, so the replacement shipbuilding schedule would have to be shorter. Then where are you going to find the planes. They would need to shorten their cycle, unless we were going to buy several new air wings. I think you get the idea. Two crews might help in the short term, but the long term expenses would be prohibitive. -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
waltm@maxzilla.UUCP (Walt Mattison) (01/10/90)
From: waltm@maxzilla.UUCP (Walt Mattison) In article <12818@cbnews.ATT.COM> terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) writes: > > >In article <12757@cbnews.ATT.COM> tdrinkar@cosmos.acs.calpoly.edu (Terrell Drinkard) writes: >> >>>P.S. If it were up to me, I would cut Army "heavy" divisions and strategic >>>weapons first, and *NOT* air-mobile and naval forces. What do yall think >>>on this? >> >>I would also be interested in your reasoning for disbanding a >>'heavy' division. >> >>We might also do well by considering whether or not we really >>*need* 17 attack aircraft carriers Aircraft carriers are an important part of America's ability to project power, which is essential to protect vital interests and a valuable method of forcing the hand of some two bit dictator ( Moahmar, you listening buddy? )... The reason we need so many is that they are constantly being shuffled between on station, in port or in repair. >>The Air Force has been incredibly successful in avoiding the >>purchase of appropriate logistics aircraft so that they could >>afford larger numbers of B-2 bombers and F-117 fighters (which so >>ably demonstrated precision vacant lot bombing in Panama :-) with >>which their officers could fly very fast and make rank quickly. The Air Force has a caste system within its ranks, Fighter jocks on top, then the Trash-haulers and finally the non- flyers. It is a very nasty circle where the jocks make rank and then the descisions, of course they then support more exotic aircraft and this continues until they make stupid decisions like the A-16.... Find me a pilot that knows CAS and I'll show you an A-10 pilot. They also put little or no effort into Cargo aircraft. >Your comments are somewhat contradictory. It is not possible to move >a heavy division anywhere quickly. All of the heavy vehicles are >difficult to airlift, and even with the fastest ships still take >awhile to get there and even longer to load and unload. If you feel >that the primary threat in the future is Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) >then heavy divisions are not the way to go. That was one of the >complaints about the US Army's readiness for Vietnam. All of the mech >infantry had to be taken out of their tracs and trained to operate on >foot. Good point... Someone's thinking out there... This country has little or no Sealift capability any longer and our limited airlift capacity would not su suffice in a major conflict. "Heavy Divisions" and I assume you mean Armor and or Mech Inf. could not deploy to any Theater in a hurry, they are the knockout punch, not the opening jab. Because of this they should be sent by sea to the conflict and the LIDs should be airlifted quickly into the area to slow and tire the attackers. Example follows... A sudden attack of massive Warsaw Pact Armies across Europe. ( creative huh ) We deploy our LIDs by air into position to intercept the assault by placing t them defensively in depth ( about 100 klicks deep ) and allowing them to use a moving defense, very much like a retrograde operation, this causes the deployment of the mech inf of the attackers to protect the armor, and allows fresh troops of our side to be constantly added to the fray as our defense collapsed through our own lines. Snipers could keep the armor buttoned up to reduce visibility and anti-armor teams could be dep[loyed to take shots at the lead elements. This would effectively remove armor main advantage, the rout, since there is no real defensive line there can be no breakthrough and encirclement which is how armor should be used. Airborne and Ranger units could be dropped behind the lines to operate against rear areas and SF teams could organize overrun police and military units into a resistance behind the lines. Ask any tanker how long they want to stay buttoned up for protection and then you'll see why it would wear on the assualt element to attack a defense in depth like this. After several weeks of this we would have our heavy units in place and they would be fresh and recently maintained, ( the Pact would be in trouble cause the equipment would be unmaintained for several weeks ) now the knockout punch is delivered. Reasons this would work. 1. Since only Light Infantry is in FEBA enemy CAS is ineffective ( no hard hits) 2. Enemy could not focus force on any part of our defense. 3. Armor is not cost effective against infantry deployed in depth.. 4. Our own armor would be deployed fresh against a worn opponent. 5. Friendly CAS would not worry about hitting wrong targets. > [mod.note: Of course, you're not going to stop a Soviet >armored thrust with light infantry and air cav... clearly, "heavy >divisions" are needed for that job. - Bill ] I don't know, I think I'd take my chances on foot rather than in a coffin, Personal choice based on a lifetime as a groundpounder.. 8 ) 8 ) >As for carriers in general, they are admirably suited to supporting >LIC, and operations such as Grenada and Panama. In some cases, such >as Grenada, the operation is distant from supporting land based air. >Or even worse it could be Southwest Asia where we have essentially no >land based air. A carrier can simply park over the horizon and wait. >When you need it, is simply launches an airstrike and presto! instant >urban renewal. No problems with allied support. No problems with >overflight rights. Air wings are flexible and can be adjusted to the >situation. If you need more bombers, put bombs on the F-18's or trade >them for additional A-6's. The one carrier selling point that most >everyone agrees upon is that they are a mobile airfield with few >political entangelements that can be moved to where they are needed. >If you need more planes bring in another carrier. > Good point on the LIC situation, I believe that we will not be involved in anything but LIC for a long time. The political ramifications are also valid. Walt Mattison
military@cbnews.ATT.COM (William B. Thacker) (01/11/90)
From: att!utzoo!henry >The general figure used for planning these things is that you need 3 >ships for every one that you need on station... In fact, 4 or 5 is better. The objective of the British Polaris-sub program was to have one sub on station at all times, for which they figured they needed to build five. The politicians cut it to four and the RN has found it very difficult to maintain the standing patrol without the extra. Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
ferrill@milton.u.washington.edu (Arther Ferrill) (06/30/90)
From: Arther Ferrill <ferrill@milton.u.washington.edu> Has there been any discussion of military cuts in the budget? The last I read (NY Times, about April 1) the reporter was predicting max cuts of 17 billion, more likely 12-13 billion. What does it look like now? And what would a cut of that sort mean for the U.S. military, in weapons development and in troop deployment?