willner@cfa.harvard.edu (Steve Willner, OIR) (06/27/90)
From: willner@cfa.harvard.edu (Steve Willner, OIR) I was going to post anyway, but the USS Midway fire makes this more topical. In reading Keegan's book (The Price of Admiralty, reviewed a few days ago), I realized for the first time how badly protected were the Japanese carriers sunk at the Battle of Midway. Keegan criticizes the construction of the British battleships employed at Jutland, but fails to say a word about the Japanese carriers. In brief, all four carriers succumbed to uncontrollable fires after being hit by typically three or four bombs from dive bombers. Admittedly three of the four carriers were caught while refueling and rearming aircraft, but carriers ought to be designed to conduct those operations in combat without gross hazards. And Hiryu caught fire and was sunk after being hit by four bombs in no special circumstances. By contrast, the USS Yorktown was hit by three (or four? Rats! I left the book at home.) bombs, including one down the funnel, and was ready to launch planes again within two hours! Then she was hit by two torpedoes (from aircraft), which wiped out all power and gave her a 26 degree list. She was abandoned but did not sink. Next morning she was taken under tow and probably would have made it back to Pearl Harbor but for two submarine-delivered torpedoes, which finally sank her. At no point was the ship endangered by fire. In reference to the recent explosion/fire on the USS Midway, terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) writes: > Basically there are fire and explosions on > navy ships on a regular basis (no they don't happen everyday, but > there are several a year). Usually they get little or no press > coverage, even in the local press. Certainly correct. What bothers me is not so much that a fire occurred but rather that it (reportedly) took 10-12 hours to put it out. And apparently the fire was in a storage area, not an ammunition or fuel compartment. This sounds a lot more like Hiryu's experience than like Yorktown's. Was the delay in putting out the fire the result of bad luck? Or peacetime careless practices? Or is there a fundamental problem? Or have the facts been reported incorrectly? I realize it may take some time to know for sure, but I would be glad if people kept these questions in mind and let us all know what they find out. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Willner Phone 617-495-7123 Bitnet: willner@cfa Cambridge, MA 02138 USA Internet: willner@cfa.harvard.edu
cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) (06/28/90)
From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) >From several articles about Midway fire: > In brief, all four carriers succumbed to uncontrollable fires after > being hit by typically three or four bombs from dive bombers. > ... > > By contrast, the USS Yorktown was hit by three (or four? Rats! I left > the book at home.) bombs, including one down the funnel, and was ready > ... > In reference to the recent explosion/fire on the USS Midway, > terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) writes: >> Basically there are fire and explosions on >> navy ships on a regular basis (no they don't happen everyday, but >> there are several a year). > > ... rather that it (reportedly) took 10-12 hours to put it out. And > apparently the fire was in a storage area, not an ammunition or fuel > compartment. This sounds a lot more like Hiryu's experience than like > Yorktown's. Was the delay in putting out the fire the result of bad > luck? Or peacetime careless practices? Or is there a fundamental > problem? Or have the facts been reported incorrectly? I realize it > may take some time to know for sure, but I would be glad if people > kept these questions in mind and let us all know what they find out. General comments about fires on Navy ships: 1. At the end of WWII, the USN had developed (of necessity) a combination of ship design principles (compartmentation, reserve buoyancy), operating practices (readiness conditions) and damage control doctrine which was certainly effective and practical. All of these have been relaxed since, and are not stringently applied to "modern" ships (which will never suffer damage because we have high-tech defenses, or will simply get nuked). 2. One wartime practice was to remove anything that would burn. This meant removing paint, deck tile, curtains, wood, and most of the stuff that make ships more habitable. In peacetime, there is usually a LOT of combustible material around; paint and deck coverings are big contributors to shipboard fires. 3. Since the end of the draft, the Navy has had problems getting people to stay in seagoing engineering ratings. These include the DCs who maintain the damage control equipment, run the training, and are the key people in the repair parties. 4. The DCO/DCA job on a ship was never a particularly attractive or high prestige position leading to quick promotion. Usually high turnover job for some JO on his/her way to EO or 1st LT. 5. The emphasis on fire fighting training seems to have declined; not as many people are sent, not as many firefighting schools (no direct observation of this for several years, though). A quick related sea story: I was on a ship that had a "mad fire lighter" for a period of about 6 months. This guy would light off a trash fire in the middle of the night while underway - leading to some intense moments. It definitely changed the attitude of the roving engineering watch and the BMOW toward looking in every compartment and sniffing the air. I seem to remember about 6 fires with no major damage or injuries. Nothing like GQ at 0230 to get the blood pumping. He was finally caught and sent to a USMC day-care center. Pat Kauffold AT&T Bell Labs, Naperville (708) 713-4726
terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (06/28/90)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <1990Jun27.021023.1370@cbnews.att.com> willner@cfa.harvard.edu (Steve Willner, OIR) writes: > >In brief, all four carriers succumbed to uncontrollable fires after >being hit by typically three or four bombs from dive bombers. >Admittedly three of the four carriers were caught while refueling and >rearming aircraft, but carriers ought to be designed to conduct those >operations in combat without gross hazards. And Hiryu caught fire and >was sunk after being hit by four bombs in no special circumstances. > Refueling and rearming is a bad time, but for the Japanese it was even worse. They were in the process of reloading anti-shipping weapons after those weapons had been removed. In their haste the weapons, both going on and those going off the planes were not stowed, but simply left laying on the hangar deck. >By contrast, the USS Yorktown was hit by three (or four? Rats! I left >the book at home.) bombs, including one down the funnel, and was ready >to launch planes again within two hours! Then she was hit by two >torpedoes (from aircraft), which wiped out all power and gave her a 26 >degree list. She was abandoned but did not sink. Next morning she was >taken under tow and probably would have made it back to Pearl Harbor >but for two submarine-delivered torpedoes, which finally sank her. At >no point was the ship endangered by fire. > There is an assumption here that weapon detonation automatically causes a fire. I would have to re-read references, but it is conceiveable that no major fires were started. [stuff about Midway fire] > >Certainly correct. What bothers me is not so much that a fire occurred >but rather that it (reportedly) took 10-12 hours to put it out. And >apparently the fire was in a storage area, not an ammunition or fuel >compartment. This sounds a lot more like Hiryu's experience than like >Yorktown's. Was the delay in putting out the fire the result of bad >luck? Or peacetime careless practices? Or is there a fundamental >problem? Or have the facts been reported incorrectly? I realize it >may take some time to know for sure, but I would be glad if people >kept these questions in mind and let us all know what they find out. Actually the fire would have probably been out sooner in an ammo or fuel compartment. Most of those spaces have installed firefighting equipment, such as sprinklers and smothering systems. Storerooms usually don't. In addition a storeroom is usually densely packed with cases and cartons. I can't imagine a much worse location for a fire. 10 hours still seems long, but then I don't know if that is the time to extinguish, or includes the cleaning up and looking for smouldering embers. Firefighting on board a ship is a difficult and challenging evolution. It is a lot harder than it might seem at first. The shipboard compartments are small, and usually have limited access. If access is only through a scuttle, then access is both limited, and difficult. You basically have to go in the compartment to fight the fire. You can't simply knock holes in the roof and walls like in a house fire. In the meantime the metal of the ship is radiating the heat of the fire so precautions are required in the adjacent compartments. --
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (06/29/90)
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) >From: willner@cfa.harvard.edu (Steve Willner, OIR) >... This sounds a lot more like Hiryu's experience than like >Yorktown's. Was the delay in putting out the fire the result of bad >luck? Or peacetime careless practices? Or is there a fundamental >problem? ... I don't know details of the Midway incident, but in Friedman's book "Carrier Air Power" (I think that's the correct title, it's not handy), he comments that many losses of warships were due to minor oversights and human errors rather than major design flaws. Controlling a major fire on board is a particularly unforgiving task. Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
fred@uunet.UU.NET (Fred Brooks) (06/29/90)
From: sma2!fred@uunet.UU.NET (Fred Brooks) In article <1990Jun27.021023.1370@cbnews.att.com> willner@cfa.harvard.edu (Steve Willner, OIR) writes: >In reference to the recent explosion/fire on the USS Midway, >terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) writes: >> Basically there are fire and explosions on >> navy ships on a regular basis (no they don't happen everyday, but >> there are several a year). Usually they get little or no press >> coverage, even in the local press. > >Certainly correct. What bothers me is not so much that a fire occurred >but rather that it (reportedly) took 10-12 hours to put it out. And >apparently the fire was in a storage area, not an ammunition or fuel >compartment. This sounds a lot more like Hiryu's experience than like >Yorktown's. Was the delay in putting out the fire the result of bad >luck? Or peacetime careless practices? Or is there a fundamental >problem? Or have the facts been reported incorrectly? I realize it >may take some time to know for sure, but I would be glad if people >kept these questions in mind and let us all know what they find out. My personal experince says 10-12 hours is good for this type of fire. On my old ship USS Okinawa we had a fire that started in a store room (GSK). Most store-rooms are placed in lower areas, usually below the waterline. Unluckly for us this one contained lots of paper, plastic and flammable liquids. It started late at night in a locked room so nobody spotted it until it had been burning for about a hour. To stop a fire you have to remove at least one part of the fire triangle (fuel, heat, oxygen) . It took several hours to contain it by moving everything that could burn out of every room near it. Steel walls concentrate heat and start fires in adjacent rooms by thermal radiation. All the walls around this thing were glowing cherry red as was the floor. The tile was burning off the floor as our crews started hozing down the fire. We had people watering down the fire fighters and fire hozes to keep our shoes from burning off our feet and the water hozes from burning in half. There was so much toxic smoke that everyone had to wear OBA's (a device to generate air) and it was impossible to see more than a few feet from your face. As we poured water into the fire we also ran pumps to get the water out so we didn't sink. We finally pluged all sources of oxygen and sealed all the water-tight doors around it. We then pumped water into the spaces for about 12 hours until it had cooled down. Shipboard fires are very hard to fight and take a long time to handle correctly. Most peace-time fires start in regular storage spaces due to electrical wiring. I don't know all the facts of the Midway but I'd bet that's what happened. -- Defend your 2nd amendment rights. Fred Brooks (503) 255-3990 Portland Oregon
turner@blackbird.afit.af.mil (Bob Turner) (06/30/90)
From: udecc!turner@blackbird.afit.af.mil (Bob Turner) In article <1990Jun27.021023.1370@cbnews.att.com> willner@cfa.harvard.edu (Steve Willner, OIR) writes: >From: willner@cfa.harvard.edu (Steve Willner, OIR) > >In brief, all four carriers succumbed to uncontrollable fires after >being hit by typically three or four bombs from dive bombers. >Admittedly three of the four carriers were caught while refueling and >rearming aircraft, but carriers ought to be designed to conduct those >operations in combat without gross hazards. And Hiryu caught fire and >was sunk after being hit by four bombs in no special circumstances. > One thing about Midway and the sinking of the Soryu, Akagi and Kaga was because of either Genda or Nugamo's indecision. They couldn't make up their minds about rearming the returning bombers from the strike on Midway and switched between (I am really reaching in to the depths of memory here ) torpedoes and bombs. Apparentlly when Wade McClusky and Bombing 8 and friends showed up the armaments had not been properly stored in their magazines. Talk about fireworks! As for the Hiryu, I don't know. >By contrast, the USS Yorktown was hit by three (or four? Rats! I left >the book at home.) bombs, including one down the funnel, and was ready >to launch planes again within two hours! Then she was hit by two >torpedoes (from aircraft), which wiped out all power and gave her a 26 >degree list. She was abandoned but did not sink. Next morning she was >taken under tow and probably would have made it back to Pearl Harbor >but for two submarine-delivered torpedoes, which finally sank her. At >no point was the ship endangered by fire. > Not to mention having been hit hard just the week before at Coral Sea. The Naval Ship Yard at Pearl worked a major miracle getting the Yorktown battle worthy and is as much responsible for the success at Midway as any one else. -- ==================================================================== Bob Turner Network Manager, School of Engineering 513-229-3171 turner@udecc.engr.udayton.edu Univ. of Dayton, Engineering Computing Center-KL211, Dayton OH 45469
esmythe@ANDREW.dnet.ge.com (Erich J Smythe) (06/30/90)
From: Erich J Smythe <esmythe@ANDREW.dnet.ge.com> >From: willner@cfa.harvard.edu (Steve Willner, OIR) > [ ... ] > >In brief, all four carriers succumbed to uncontrollable fires after >being hit by typically three or four bombs from dive bombers. >Admittedly three of the four carriers were caught while refueling and >rearming aircraft, but carriers ought to be designed to conduct those >operations in combat without gross hazards. [ ... ] [ ... ] >By contrast, the USS Yorktown was hit by three (or four? Rats! I left >the book at home.) bombs, including one down the funnel, and was ready >to launch planes again within two hours! The Japanese and American carriers were not exactly under the same conditions. The Japanese were not as well prepared for the attacks as the Americans, although they had been subject to numerous unsuccessful attacks prior to the divebombing. The Americans (including Capt. Buckmaster of the Yorktown) had warning of the Japanese attack and took precautions. There were virtually no aircraft on the Yorktown, while the Japanese carriers had at least the strike force from midway, and were re-arming at the time. Buckmaster ordered all fuel lines on the carrier cleared and filled with CO2, to reduce the fire hazard. The Japanese, as you pointed out, were refueling, and had fuel carts and bombs on the flight deck at the time of the attack. This is not to detract from the damage control done on Yorktown, it was spectacular. -erich smythe GE Advanced Technology Labs Moorestown, NJ 08057 esmythe@atl.dnet.ge.com
wrf@mab.ecse.rpi.edu (Wm Randolph Franklin) (07/05/90)
From: wrf@mab.ecse.rpi.edu (Wm Randolph Franklin) Some naive questions from someone who's never been in the Navy: 1. Standards for buildings on land often require a heat detector in every storeroom. Why don't ships do this? Would the extra wiring pose a greater threat than the earlier notice? Would there be too many false alarms? 2. Why isn't Halon used? It's used in computer rooms on land. It's supposed to quench most fires at a concentration not (immediately?) fatal to people? If it's a war, the immediate danger of the ship sinking is greater than the danger of future cancers (the Agent Orange argument). Note that I'm not certain that Halon is a long term hazard to people. (Please email as well as posting.) -- Wm. Randolph Franklin Internet: wrf@ecse.rpi.edu (or @cs.rpi.edu) Bitnet: Wrfrankl@Rpitsmts Telephone: (518) 276-6077; Telex: 6716050 RPI TROU; Fax: (518) 276-6261 Paper: ECSE Dept., 6026 JEC, Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst, Troy NY, 12180
terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) (07/06/90)
From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <1990Jul5.020444.14132@cbnews.att.com> wrf@mab.ecse.rpi.edu (Wm Randolph Franklin) writes: > > >Some naive questions from someone who's never been in the Navy: > >1. Standards for buildings on land often require a heat detector in >every storeroom. Why don't ships do this? Would the extra wiring pose >a greater threat than the earlier notice? Would there be too many false >alarms? > Such detectors are possible, and are used in critical spaces. To supplement such protection there are a lot of watches on board a naval vessel, part of whose job is to watch for fire/damage. Every time you run a wire through a deck or bulkhead you increase the difficulty of the damage containment problem. A single compartment burning or flooding does not threaten a ship. It is the progression of the fire/flooding that will sink it. So the general rule has been to limit cable runs and piping as much as possible. >2. Why isn't Halon used? It's used in computer rooms on land. It's >supposed to quench most fires at a concentration not (immediately?) >fatal to people? If it's a war, the immediate danger of the ship >sinking is greater than the danger of future cancers (the Agent Orange >argument). Note that I'm not certain that Halon is a long term hazard >to people. > Halon is used more often. Before that there were CO2 smothering systems. Due to the nature of ship construction there are numerous small compartments. For damage containment reasons, it is not practical to have a central station with connections to every compartment. Weight and space reasons preclude equiping every compartment with its own smothering system. The compromise is to equip high risk compartments (ammo spaces, engineering spaces, etc) with installed fire detection and extinguishing equipment. General storerooms are not considered high risk. -- Terry Rooker terryr@cse.ogi.edu
aoki@postgres.Berkeley.EDU (Paul M. Aoki) (07/06/90)
From: aoki@postgres.Berkeley.EDU (Paul M. Aoki) wrf@mab.ecse.rpi.edu (Wm Randolph Franklin) writes: >1. Standards for buildings on land often require a heat detector in >every storeroom. Why don't ships do this? Would the extra wiring pose >a greater threat than the earlier notice? Would there be too many false >alarms? Newer ships, e.g., the DD-963 class and the classes derived from it, have such detectors all over the place. I have no idea whether relics like MIDWAY have been retrofitted with them. >2. Why isn't Halon used? It's used in computer rooms on land. It's >supposed to quench most fires at a concentration not (immediately?) >fatal to people? If it's a war, the immediate danger of the ship >sinking is greater than the danger of future cancers (the Agent Orange >argument). Note that I'm not certain that Halon is a long term hazard >to people. Halon *is* used on just about every Navy surface combatant. On the DD-963 class, Halon is used to protect the main engineering spaces and the flam-storage spaces. Cancer isn't the problem, it's the fact that the fumes from Halon at high temperature are toxic. (It's pretty exciting in a main space when someone activates Halon -- a flashing, rotating, police-style red light goes on, as well as an ear-splitting klaxon, the point being "YOU HAVE SIXTY SECONDS TO GET OUT OF THE SPACE" ..) Unfortunately, Halon isn't a panacea; it may work wonders on a Class C fire in a computer room with the power secured, but it isn't always effective in blazing-hot metal boxes (rooms) filled with paint, fuel oil, or what have you. Most fires wind up being fought by the E-3 with an OBA and a fire hose, spraying seawater or foam. Disclaimer: I don't speak for DOD, DON, or anyone else. Nor am I a DCA. -- Paul M. Aoki | aoki@postgres.Berkeley.EDU | "Nice girls don't explode."
shafer@skipper.dfrf.nasa.gov (Mary Shafer) (07/08/90)
From: Mary Shafer <shafer@skipper.dfrf.nasa.gov>
Another tidbit on ships and fires--_every_ person stationed on a
carrier has to go to firefighting school regularly. They spend a lot
of time in a mockup, with hoses and fires.
I assume that this is true for other ships, but I heard about it from
a pilot, so can only speak about carriers.
This ties into the small magazines that some weapons have. They want
to minimize the amount of explosives that are in more vulnerable
locations. Powder monkeys at Trafalgar, for example.
--
Mary Shafer shafer@skipper.dfrf.nasa.gov ames!skipper.dfrf.nasa.gov!shafer
NASA Ames Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA
Of course I don't speak for NASA
"A MiG at your six is better than no MiG at all"--Unknown US fighter pilotmlfisher@ohstpy.mps.ohio-state.edu (07/10/90)
From: mlfisher@ohstpy.mps.ohio-state.edu In article <1990Jul8.053350.7681@cbnews.att.com>, shafer@skipper.dfrf.nasa.gov (Mary Shafer) writes: > Another tidbit on ships and fires--_every_ person stationed on a > carrier has to go to firefighting school regularly. They spend a lot > of time in a mockup, with hoses and fires. > > I assume that this is true for other ships, but I heard about it from > a pilot, so can only speak about carriers. Not just every person on a carrier. Fire fighting school (2 days where you get to put out all kinds of fires in a shipboard environment), is required for all hands every three years. Ask a pilot about planes, not ships. They know the former quite well but haven't a clue about the latter. Mike
cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) (07/10/90)
From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) >From article <1990Jul5.020444.14132@cbnews.att.com>, by wrf@mab.ecse.rpi.edu (Wm Randolph Franklin): > > 1. Standards for buildings on land often require a heat detector in > every storeroom. Why don't ships do this? Would the extra wiring pose > a greater threat than the earlier notice? Would there be too many false > alarms? > Commercial passenger vessels are required to have smoke/heat detectors, plus automatic doors. These work reasonably well, and have been around for at least 30 years. Warships, however, don't have to comply with these standards, and usually don't. The primary reason is that warships have a lot of people on board to run around and check on each and every space. Common practice is to have a "roving watch"; usually the Deck Dept. has one, and the Engineering Dept. has one; together, they manage to cover each and every space on the ship. During the day (when people are working in the spaces), the watches only go into the uninhabited spaces (voids); at night, each space is supposed to be visited on every watch (4 hours), and some are visited hourly (for readings, like reefer spaces, etc.). So you have (probably) more safety and reliability with a "people" system. Recent construction has included electronic smoke detection equipment, but the traditional roving watch system remains. > 2. Why isn't Halon used? It's used in computer rooms on land. It's > supposed to quench most fires at a concentration not (immediately?) > fatal to people? If it's a war, the immediate danger of the ship > sinking is greater than the danger of future cancers (the Agent Orange > argument). Note that I'm not certain that Halon is a long term hazard > to people. > Halon is in use on some of the newer ships. Older ships have CO2 flooding systems, principally in machinery spaces where oil fires might be expected. I have seen some salt-water sprinkler systems for store rooms which would be subject to class I fire hazard, but they are not popular because they require a lot of maintenance and they have a nasty habit of going off by themselves due to shock, corrosion, etc. Pat Kauffold AT&T Bell Labs Naperville, IL (708) 713-4726
schweige@cs.nps.navy.mil (Jeffrey M. Schweiger) (07/16/90)
From: schweige@cs.nps.navy.mil (Jeffrey M. Schweiger) In article <1990Jul10.024753.9969@cbnews.att.com> mlfisher@ohstpy.mps.ohio-state.edu writes: | |Ask a pilot about planes, not ships. They know the former quite well but |haven't a clue about the latter. | |Mike This is an overgeneralization. There are many aviators with ship's company experience. A sizable number of the carrier ship's company officers are aviators. I've known several officers with both aviation and surface warfare qualifications. I would not necessarily expect a carrier aviator to be extremely familiar with destroyer operations (but this, too, would not be unheard of as aviators have served on destroyer squadron staffs), but I would not categorize any officer community as not having a clue about the work done by another officer community. Jeff Schweiger -- ******************************************************************************* Jeff Schweiger Standard Disclaimer CompuServe: 74236,1645 Internet (Milnet): schweige@cs.nps.navy.mil *******************************************************************************