mike@siemens.siemens.com (Mike Hoffmann) (07/12/90)
From: ap542!mike@siemens.siemens.com (Mike Hoffmann) Hi! Can anyone give me information about the allied attempt at an invasion at Dieppe in 1942? I can sum up the references I have in one sentence: "all that is known about Dieppe is, that an allied invasion failed here" Thanks Mike
jpulliam@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Jacqueline Pulliam) (07/16/90)
From: jpulliam@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Jacqueline Pulliam) >From: ap542!mike@siemens.siemens.com (Mike Hoffmann) > >Can anyone give me information about the allied attempt at an invasion >at Dieppe in 1942? I know of two sources of information for the raid: Anthony C. Brown's _Bodyguard_of_Lies_, and David Eisenhower's _Eisenhower_at_War: __1943-1945_. Here's a summary of what the second source has to say: (The political mood among the Allies was at a low point. For more about the politics surrounding the action, get the book; it's enough to say here that Stalin was pushing to get Brits and Americans onto the continent in '42, while the Western powers were reluctant to move too hastily. The TORCH-SLEDGEHAMMER debate was just winding down.) ". . . on August 18 [1942], Combined Operations under Lord Louis Mountbatten hurled the Canadian 2nd Division against the French coastal port at Dieppe. Except for consultations between Mountbatten and Eisenhower in July, the "Dieppe raid" was a purely Commonwealth action, independent of ETO. Officially the British government would call the Dieppe raid a "reconnaissance in force," a probe to test German reaction time and defensive techniques, and to rehearse for the eventual invasion against northwest France. Another stated purpose was to draw the German Luftwaffe away from Russia. "In 1975, however, Anthony Cave Brown, in _Bodyguard_of_Lies_ drew upon newly opened British Special Intelligence files to build a persuasive case that the Dieppe raid had, in fact, been a planned failure, a sacrificial expenditure of 3,000 lives to embarass opponents of North Africa . . . ." (This is followed by a consideration of some of the possible political motivations of the raid. Then:) "The objective set for the raid was hazardous: a frontal assault on a coastal city held by the German 110th Field Infantry Division, with confirmed knowledge that the 10th Panzer Division nearby at Amiens was capable of reinforcement within a matter of hours. According to Brown, British deception measures drew attention to the Dieppe area instead of away from it, as would routinely be expected. Commando raids were launched in the vicinity of Dieppe ninety-six hours before the scheduled attack, ensuring that the defending 110th Division would be at maximum alert when the attack came. "In the late evening and early morning of August 18-19, 1942, the Canadian 2nd Division, consisting of six battalions, attacked seven points along the beach, including the Dieppe Casino. The assault force encountered a fully prepared enemy. The Canadian 2nd was quickly pinned down under hostile fire at the breakwater, and most units never reached the beaches. Hundreds died aboard landing craft, and of 6,150 men who landed, 3,500 were killed or captured in the six-hour engagement. "The raid would influence techniques and tactics chosen for the OVERLORD plan presented to Eisenhower on January 17, 1944. The raid also impressed planners with the efficiency of German defenses, the dangers of frontal assault on a port city "and the consequent need for concentrating the greatest possible weight on the initial assault." But evidently the main point of Dieppe was not to test techniques for 1944 but to demonstrate the futility of further argument over SLEDGEHAMMER in August 1942." (all the above from pp. 95-96 of _Eisenhower_at_War:__1943-1945_, by David Eisenhower. New York: Random House, 1986) By the way, 50 U.S. Army Rangers did take part in that raid. Hope this helps! John Pulliam
dps@otter.hpl.hp.com (Duncan Smith) (07/17/90)
From: dps@otter.hpl.hp.com (Duncan Smith) It wasn't an invasion, it was a raid. It cost Britain quite heavily; lessons were, however, learned that were worked into the D-Day plans. Basically, a small force was landed under air cover but faced ferocious opposition. Casualties were very high, losses of equipment substantial. The British (and Canadian?) forces didn't make it further inland than the beach. Duncan
de@cs.rochester.edu (Dave Esan) (07/19/90)
From: moscom!de@cs.rochester.edu (Dave Esan) In article <1990Jul12.025658.19017@cbnews.att.com> ap542!mike@siemens.siemens.com (Mike Hoffmann) writes: >Can anyone give me information about the allied attempt at an invasion >at Dieppe in 1942? I won't argue over whether it was an invasion or not, but rather add this tidbit. William Stevenson in "The Man Called Intrepid" discusses that one of the objectives of the Dieppe raid was to learn more about German radar. He notes that an important radar expert was sent, along with a bodyguard who was there to make sure he did not fall into German hands. Apparently the information gathered was important for the direction of future Allied research. A previous poster noted that some think it was a planned failure. I think that the use of Canadian troops could support that thesis. Some Canadians I have talked to feel that British commanders would use the Commonwealth troops in situations that high casulaties were expected, simply because they were not British but from "out there." This certainly seems supported by other British actions (Gallipoli jumps to mind). -- ______________________________________________________________________________ --> David Esan {rutgers, ames, harvard}!rochester!moscom!de ______________________________________________________________________________
davecb@nexus.yorku.ca (David Collier-Brown) (07/24/90)
From: davecb@nexus.yorku.ca (David Collier-Brown) dps@otter.hpl.hp.com (Duncan Smith) writes: >Basically, a small force was landed under air cover but faced ferocious >opposition. Casualties were very high, losses of equipment substantial. The >British (and Canadian?) forces didn't make it further inland than the beach. Well, it was a larger force than that. Three batallions up, plus armour. Basically the forward elements of 1 CDN DIV. Support was air and naval (and immediate support by own armoured vehicles), against a prepared defensive position at a port city. The results were unimpressive. We got off the beach, but not far into the city, and at a very high cost in troops killed and captured. My regiment, the Essex Scottish, managed to evacuate a reinforced company at the end of the operation. The rest of the batallion went into the bag. Said company eventually got used in a mildly famous formation later (1 CASF), but its members had a poor opinion of frontal attacks on prepared positions ever thereafter. The lessons learned led to a "beach" landing well away from german reserves, the creation of the "Mulberry" artificial harbours to make the beachhead worthwhile, and different uses of air power, notably for dropping blocking forces behind the front lines and interdiction of troops and ammunition flowing toward the beachhead. --dave c-b 1 CASF was the First Canadian-American Special Service Force, who were supposed to be used as ski/mountain troops to destroy a certain heavy water plant. They actually got used as light and mountain troops in Italy. They're one of the "fathers" of the american green berets. They're certainly the source of the silly hats (:-)). references: second-hand, filtered through a faulty memory. real references would be welcomed. -- David Collier-Brown, | davecb@Nexus.YorkU.CA, ...!yunexus!davecb or 72 Abitibi Ave., | {toronto area...}lethe!dave Willowdale, Ontario, | "And the next 8 man-months came up like CANADA. 416-223-8968 | thunder across the bay" --david kipling
rickl@adapt.net.com (Rick Lowe) (07/24/90)
From: Rick Lowe <rickl@adapt.net.com> In article <1990Jul19.030607.29070@cbnews.att.com> you write: : : :From: moscom!de@cs.rochester.edu (Dave Esan) : :In article <1990Jul12.025658.19017@cbnews.att.com> ap542!mike@siemens.siemens.com (Mike Hoffmann) writes: :>Can anyone give me information about the allied attempt at an invasion :>at Dieppe in 1942? : : :I won't argue over whether it was an invasion or not, but rather add this :tidbit. William Stevenson in "The Man Called Intrepid" discusses that one :of the objectives of the Dieppe raid was to learn more about German radar. :He notes that an important radar expert was sent, along with a bodyguard who :was there to make sure he did not fall into German hands. Apparently the :information gathered was important for the direction of future Allied :research. : I think James Slessor wrote a book called "Green Beach" that talks more about the raid, and about using it as a cover plan for ransacking German radar installations. I think the British wanted to know what kind of radar technology the Germans were using. Rick
scottmi@ncar.UCAR.EDU (SCOTT MICHAEL C) (07/24/90)
From: boulder!snoopy!scottmi@ncar.UCAR.EDU (SCOTT MICHAEL C) Much of the suffering was done by the Canadians. Not only didn't they get any farther than the beach, the armor support they brought along (Churchill infantry tanks) didn't even get up over the seawall (they just spun their tracks in the loose gravel on the beach.) --don't like snow, miss Deirdre, and wish I was still in Santa Cruz.
MJackson.Wbst@Xerox.COM (07/25/90)
From: MJackson.Wbst@Xerox.COM > 1 CASF was the First Canadian-American Special Service Force, who were > supposed to be used as ski/mountain troops to destroy a certain heavy > water plant. I assume you mean the plant in Vemork, actually taken out by Norwegian commandos operating from Great Britain on 27 February 1943. If so, can you provide some additional details about the projected 1 CASF operation? Thanks. . . Mark