GA.CJJ@Forsythe.Stanford.EDU (Clifford Johnson) (07/24/90)
From: "Clifford Johnson" <GA.CJJ@Forsythe.Stanford.EDU> > DefCon 1, and it stands for Defense Condition 1, a nuclear war. > DefCon 2 , I believe, is a conventional War > DefCon 3 , an Alert condition (Hostilities Imminent) [sp?] > DefCon 4 is a standard condition..(you know, peace) Not quite. There are five basic levels of U.S. military alert, called DEFCON (DEFense readiness CONdition) 1 through 5. DEFCON 5 (code-named "Fade Out") corresponds to normal peacetime, DEFCON 1 ("Cocked-Pistol") to general war. SAC is routinely maintained at DEFCON 4 ("Double Take"). DEFCON 3 ("Round House") is an advanced alert in which war is deemed possible, and DEFCON 2 ("Fast Pace") is a full alert signifying that war is imminent. To: MILITARY@ATT.ATT.COM
GA.CJJ@Forsythe.Stanford.EDU (Clifford Johnson) (07/31/90)
From: "Clifford Johnson" <GA.CJJ@Forsythe.Stanford.EDU> In article <1990Jul26.015319.2602@cbnews.att.com>, ssc-vax!wanttaja@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Ronald J Wanttaja) writes: >If an announcement said "We >are now at an Exercise DEFCON One" and some poor 2d John caught only >the last two words.... >Instead, they use a term which cannot be mistaken for >the real thing. Of course, if the *real* DEFCON had been declared, we would have been PART of >the light show... :-) >there was the time we fed the exercise tape into the live system... NORAD may be different from SAC, and times may have changed, but my understanding is that, notwithstanding the greatly diminished Soviet threat, SAC's MX/Minuteman chain of command is perpetually at the real DEFCON 4, the missiles being, in CINCSAC's own words, "ready for the turn of a key at a moment's notice." (Air Force magazine, July 1990.) There are absolutely no plans I know of to reduce this real level of alert. Moreover, unlike NORAD's DEFCON exercises, SAC missile crews are reportedly subject to launch exercises that differ from the real thing only by virtue of lacking authentication codes. Thus, in Managing Nuclear Operations (1987), ex-CINCSAC General Dougherty wrote (pp.412-3): Training in a nuclear command is intense. Training scenarios and missions are designed to be as rigorous, realistic, and demanding as they can be made in peacetime, even if such training exacts penalties and incurs hazards -- and it does . . . There is no room for deception or make-believe within the nuclear commands; their weapons systems are real, their crews are capable and experienced; they must and will respond to proper authority, as will their commanders. A training scenario for some weapons is designed so that an actual execution is distinguishable from a practice one only by the authorized release and enabling codes. And the scenarios are being repeated, practiced, and evaluated constantly. An interview with a Minuteman launch corroborated this (Armed Forces Journal, Sep 1981, p.37): [Launch crews] are never sure whether they are drills or not, until well into the procedure... Had it ever happened that while on duty, a situation developed that they thought was the real thing? The two crew members smiled at each other. "Yes, it has happened," says Clark "but when it does you react - you don't think. That's what we are trained to do." As part of such rehearsals, each month the military generates some forty "end-to-end" test Emergency Action Messages (EAMs), or launch orders. (1985 testimony.) Thus, the "real thing" and "exercises" are not far apart. Incidentally, the perpetual flights of Looking Glass were discontinued last week. The New Tork Times reported that Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, gave Chain (CINCSAC) the order to discontinue flights. But 10 U.S.C. 155(e) and 163(b) categorically provide that the JCS chairman cannot issue orders to CINCSAC. Under 10 USC 162(b) only Cheney and Bush can command CINCSAC. The New York Times was technically wrong, it seems. Also, I saw no report mentioning the more prolific perpetual flights of TACAMO aircraft (Navy planes for relaying EAMs to the subs., at any time) over the Atlantic and Pacific. I presume these continue. To: MILITARY@ATT.ATT.COM