tobin@ncar.ucar.edu (Mike Tobin) (08/08/90)
From: raven!tobin@ncar.ucar.edu (Mike Tobin) Anybody have any thoughts (or better yet, knowledge) on whether or not the absence of the SR-71 has made any difference in what we've known about Iraq's activities?
DJBQC@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU (David Bressler) (08/16/90)
From: David Bressler <DJBQC@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU> I've got no knowledge except what I've read in books and the newspapers over the past few years about the SR-71 and its missions. I believe the reason that we were surprised in Iraq was because the Blackbird was not operational. Sattelites are good but not flexible enough for the type of lightning attack that Iraq used on Kuwait. As an additional note, there was a small comment in the NY Times soon after the Iraqi attack the the DOD was requesting money to have some of the retired Blackbirds put on stand-by for the future. Anybody else???
richk@tera.com (Richard Korry) (08/19/90)
From: richk@tera.com (Richard Korry) In article <1990Aug16.030636.15921@cbnews.att.com> DJBQC@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU (David Bressler) writes: > > >From: David Bressler <DJBQC@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU> >I've got no knowledge except what I've read in books and the newspapers >over the past few years about the SR-71 and its missions. I believe the >reason that we were surprised in Iraq was because the Blackbird was not >operational. Sattelites are good but not flexible enough for the type >of lightning attack that Iraq used on Kuwait. -- From what I have read and listened to, I disagree. The intelligence was that the Iraqis were poised to move into Kuwait. All sides knew this. The problem was that the Iraqis had moved their forces upto the border and rattled sabers many times before. The Kuwaitis were told *not* to mobilize as this would give the Iraqis an excuse to invade. Mubarak of Egypt was told by Pres. Hussein of Iraq that he would not attack. Thus, the problem was not a technical one, it was one of interpreting the intelligence - what would Hussein do *this* time. Having good intelligence means having the raw data AND the ability to correctly interpret it. In this case, the data was there but the interpretation was incorrect. rich
DJBQC@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU (David Bressler) (08/19/90)
From: DJBQC@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU (David Bressler) [stuff deleted] > >reason that we were surprised in Iraq was because the Blackbird was not >operational. Sattelites are good but not flexible enough for the type >of lightning attack that Iraq used on Kuwait. >As an additional note, there was a small comment in the NY Times soon >after the Iraqi attack the the DOD was requesting money to have some of >the retired Blackbirds put on stand-by for the future. > [remainder deleted] Back when the SR71 made its record-setting flight west-to-east, I read an AP-article that stated (from an Air Force spokesman) the U.S. Air Force had some 34 SR71s......only 9-10 were being retired; however, he/she wouldn't comment about the remaining 24-25. I don't know how factual this is/was, but would the U.S. be dumb enough to put all 'its eggs in one basket' --- like, spy-sats for instance (they've done stranger things before, who knows)?? Comments? -- Mark Aldo UUCP: (osu-cis)!dsacg1!waldo INTERNET: waldo@dsac.dla.mil Defense Logistics Agency Systems Automation Center | 614-238-8111 DSAC-ZTB, P.O.Box 1605, Columbus, Ohio (USA) 43216 | AV 850-8111 I'm not authorized to have an opinion....;-)
smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) (08/19/90)
From: smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) In article <1990Aug16.030636.15921@cbnews.att.com>, DJBQC@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU (David Bressler) writes: > > > From: David Bressler <DJBQC@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU> > I've got no knowledge except what I've read in books and the newspapers > over the past few years about the SR-71 and its missions. I believe the > reason that we were surprised in Iraq was because the Blackbird was not > operational. Sattelites are good but not flexible enough for the type > of lightning attack that Iraq used on Kuwait. I don't agree. Iraq had been massing troops on the border for weeks beforehand; they were able to attack for at least a substantial portion of that time. The decision to go was a political one, and SR-71s wouldn't have helped. > As an additional note, there was a small comment in the NY Times soon > after the Iraqi attack the the DOD was requesting money to have some of > the retired Blackbirds put on stand-by for the future. > Anybody else??? I saw a long AP article on the subject; the upshot is that you can't really do that. Being able to fly SR-71s requires a lot of infrastructure -- trained pilots, mechanics, repair facilities, probably large and varied sets of sensors, etc. Keeping all of this functional, without even flying the planes, is too expensive. In particular, the skills of the personnel involved will atrophy, as it were, and the units will no longer be together -- they'll be dispersed throughout the Air Force. Some senior folks may even use the cutback as an opportunity to retire -- and given the projected cutbacks in service strength, they'd probably be encouraged to if their skills were too specialized.
jost@uunet.UU.NET (Patrick Jost) (08/22/90)
From: wiley!jost@uunet.UU.NET (Patrick Jost) In article <1990Aug18.182952.25373@cbnews.att.com> richk@tera.com (Richard Korry) writes: > >-- The intelligence was that the Iraqis were poised to move into Kuwait. > All sides knew this. The problem was that the Iraqis had moved their > forces upto the border and rattled sabers many times before. The Kuwaitis > were told *not* to mobilize as this would give the Iraqis an excuse to >invade. Mubarak of Egypt was told by Pres. Hussein of Iraq that he would > not attack. Thus, the problem was not a technical one, it was one of >interpreting the intelligence - what would Hussein do *this* time. >Having good intelligence means having the raw data AND the ability to > correctly interpret it. In this case, the data was there but the > interpretation was incorrect. > rich I couldn't agree more. This shows one of the major shortcomings of putting too much emphasis on intelligence collection, and not enough on interpretation. Vast sums of money are spent on increasingly sophisticated collection systems, and less and less attention is paid to the analysis aspect of intelligence. It is sad that analysts aren't paid much...that's the main reason I'm here at a contractor instead of at an analyst's job, which I am much better qualified for, but I can't live in D.C. on a GS-12 salary! PJ | Patrick Jost | "I'm the thirteenth at the table, | I'm the uninvited guest" jost@coyote.trw.com | -Marillion