HARPER%ccvax.ucd.ie@pucc.PRINCETON.EDU (08/28/90)
From: HARPER%ccvax.ucd.ie@pucc.PRINCETON.EDU Most of the recent postings concerning the deployment of US air forces in the gulf explicitly suggest that air superiority is tactically equivalent to military victory. There is no precedent for this claim among the wars of the last fifty years. The land war in Vietnam demonstrated that if a nation was willing to endure tremendous casualties caused by air warfare and continually bolster the land army that a winnable war could be fought. My question, and doubtless an anxiety to US general staff, is whether the modern US armed land forces are capable of fighting a sustained land war? A survey of US forces in Germany, published in the Sunday Times some four years ago, produced evidence of (a) gross unfitness, (b) unfamiliarity with complex battlefield weaponery and (c) poor sense of tactics in 20% of the forces studied. While airpower may be a deciding factor in the outcome of any eventual gulf war, it is unlikely to be the deciding one in the absence of major infantry engagements. Jerry Harper: Computer Science Dept, University College Dublin, Dublin 4, IRELAND harper@ccvax.ucd.ie
bakken@cs.arizona.edu (Dave Bakken) (08/31/90)
From: bakken@cs.arizona.edu (Dave Bakken) In article <1990Aug28.042628.28858@cbnews.att.com> HARPER%ccvax.ucd.ie@pucc.PRINCETON.EDU writes: >From: HARPER%ccvax.ucd.ie@pucc.PRINCETON.EDU > The land war in Vietnam demonstrated that if a >nation was willing to endure tremendous casualties caused by air warfare >and continually bolster the land army that a winnable war could be fought. There are a lot of places to hide in the jungle, and the Ho Chi Minh trail was a faithful supply line. There are no places to hide from air power in the desert, and Iraq will have almost no external supply lines, and internal ones would get hammered by air. A potential war against Iraq has very few valid comparisons to those in Vietnam or Afghanistan. -- Dave Bakken Internet: bakken@cs.arizona.edu Dept. of Comp. Sci.; U.of Ariz. UUCP: uunet!arizona!bakken Tucson, AZ 85721; USA Bitnet: bakken%cs.arizona.edu@Arizrvax AT&T: +1 602 621 4976 FAX: +1 602 621 4246
cyclist@hubcap.clemson.edu (Barry Johnson) (09/02/90)
From: cyclist@hubcap.clemson.edu (Barry Johnson) >From article <1990Aug28.042628.28858@cbnews.att.com>, by HARPER%ccvax.ucd.ie@pucc.PRINCETON.EDU: > > > of the last fifty years. The land war in Vietnam demonstrated that if a > nation was willing to endure tremendous casualties caused by air warfare > and continually bolster the land army that a winnable war could be fought. But does the obvious differences in terrain between Vietnam and Saudi Arabia not play a part? Granted, I'm not very knowledgable on the subject, but isn't a land war in the desert a tacticly completely different animal than a land war in the jungle? Would CAS be more or less difficult in a desert terrain as opposed to a jungle terrain? -- Barry Johnson cyclist@hubcap.clemson.edu Consulting & Technical Services Standard disclaimer about me, my Clemson University employer, beliefs, etc...
arie@midway.uchicago.edu (ariel berschadsky) (09/02/90)
From: arie@midway.uchicago.edu (ariel berschadsky) In article <1990Aug28.042628.28858@cbnews.att.com> HARPER%ccvax.ucd.ie@pucc.PRINCETON.EDU writes: > >Most of the recent postings concerning the deployment of US air forces in >the gulf explicitly suggest that air superiority is tactically equivalent >to military victory. There is no precedent for this claim among the wars >of the last fifty years. The land war in Vietnam demonstrated that if a >nation was willing to endure tremendous casualties caused by air warfare >and continually bolster the land army that a winnable war could be fought. I would like to point out that Vietnam is covered with tropical jungle and makes it relatively easy for guerrilla groups and even small armies to "fade away." It is almost impossible to hide major troop movements in open desert, and therefore such movements are more easily detectible, and stoppable, from the air.
cerebus@bucsf.bu.edu (Tim Miller) (09/02/90)
From: cerebus@bucsf.bu.edu (Tim Miller) On 31 Aug 90, bakken@cs.arizona.edu (Dave Bakken) said: D> There are a lot of places to hide in the jungle, and the Ho Chi Minh trail D> was a faithful supply line. There are no places to hide from air D> power in the desert, and Iraq will have almost no external supply lines, D> and internal ones would get hammered by air. A potential war against D> Iraq has very few valid comparisons to those in Vietnam or Afghanistan. But, so far as air superiority goes, I still have my doubts. HE bombs and shells historically have had a lesser than anticipated effect on infantry that has had the foresight to dig in and dig deep. The battles across Normandy during WWII are a classic example; despite constant hammering by air and by Allied artillery, the Wehrmacht was still able to maintain adequate supply lines, move tanks and men, and still keep Allied forces bottled up for more than 2 months *despite* the total Allied control of the air. Granted that the German infantryman was a vastly superior fighter than the average Allied soldier, the lesson still stands; when attempting to clear out prepared infantry, air superiority alone is insufficient. Supplies, intelligently organized, can still flow despite constant air attacks, and one still needs men prepared to take each strongpoint. These lessons seem to have been lost upon the American military in the last 50 years. Iraq may not stand a chance in hell in the long run, but if such thinking continues, Hussein (sp?) can make a war damn expensive in lives in the short haul. Timothy J. Miller cerebus@bucsf.bu.edu