G_AHRENDT@VAXA.CC.UWA.OZ.AU (Gunter Ahrendt) (08/29/90)
From: G_AHRENDT@VAXA.CC.UWA.OZ.AU (Gunter Ahrendt) >powerful US ships.) Even the submarine threat was discounted (prematurely; >Lt. Cmdr. Hashimoto was able to sink USS Indianapolis in August. Nonetheless, I read this was the 29-JUL-1945. Is it true that no rescue was mounted for the survivors due to the vessel being on a 'secret' mission?
hmueller@wfsc4.tamu.edu (Hal Mueller) (08/31/90)
From: hmueller@wfsc4.tamu.edu (Hal Mueller) In article <1990Aug29.014602.7783@cbnews.att.com> G_AHRENDT@VAXA.CC.UWA.OZ.AU (Gunter Ahrendt) writes: >I read this was the 29-JUL-1945. Is it true that no rescue was mounted for the >survivors due to the vessel being on a 'secret' mission? If memory serves it was delayed due to oversight. The US Naval Institute published a book on the sinking a few years back; can't check the reference right now, but I'll try to find it tomorrow. -- Hal Mueller Surf Hormuz. hmueller@cs.tamu.edu n270ca@tamunix.Bitnet
olorin@wam.umd.edu (David John Schuetz) (08/31/90)
From: olorin@wam.umd.edu (David John Schuetz) In article <1990Aug29.014602.7783@cbnews.att.com> G_AHRENDT@VAXA.CC.UWA.OZ.AU (Gunter Ahrendt) writes: > > >From: G_AHRENDT@VAXA.CC.UWA.OZ.AU (Gunter Ahrendt) >>powerful US ships.) Even the submarine threat was discounted (prematurely; >>Lt. Cmdr. Hashimoto was able to sink USS Indianapolis in August. Nonetheless, >I read this was the 29-JUL-1945. Is it true that no rescue was mounted for the >survivors due to the vessel being on a 'secret' mission? The version I read said that they were keeping radio traffic to a minimum, for obvious reasons, and that somehow the American command managed not to notice one of their battleships was missing for three days. Of course, this led to the deaths of many of the initial survivors. So the Navy, in its usual glorious logic, courtmartialed the battleship captain, instead of the idiots who mounted rescue operations too late. What was the charge, "failure to zig-zag in moonlight" or something like that? Laura Burchard [mod.note: The USS Indianapolis was a heavy cruiser, not a battleship. - Bill ]
budden@trout.nosc.mil (Rex A. Buddenberg) (08/31/90)
From: budden@trout.nosc.mil (Rex A. Buddenberg)
The rescue mission was not mounted promptly for the survivors of the USS
Indianapolis because it was several days before she was noted
as missing.
Indianapolis was one of the 'treaty cruisers' whose tonnage was limited
by the Washington Naval Treaty and therefore not considered a heavy
like the post-Treaty CGs. Her nickname was Swayback Maru due to the
topside configuration that was somewhat influenced by the Treaty.
Commonly used as a flagship and as a dispatch boat for these reasons.
Indy had just delivered the atomic bomb to Tinian -- the heat was off
mission-wise. She was dispatched to the Philippines, did not have any
escort (CGs commonly had no organic ASW in WWII), and was told to
proceed at economic speed (~16 knots, no zig-zag). In short, fleet
ops judged that there was no submarine threat in the sector.
When the ship was torpedoed, no distress call was dispatched (don't
recall why). Tacloban was a pretty busy anchorage so a lone ship
not appearing was simply not noticed -- the Navy had no formal
movement reporting scheme at the time. The people in the water were
spotted by a chance encounter with a PBY some days after the sinking.
That brought in a substantial search for those few left.
The Indianapolis sinking led directly to the Navy's movement reporting
system which is supposed to attract attention to overdues. It
also spawned the US Merchant Ship reporting system (USMER) which was
supposed to do the same for the merchant fleet. Independently, the
Coast Guard has put in place the AMVER (automated merchant vessel report)
system which had a lot of similar functionality, although it's focus
was on notifying potential aid when notified of distress. AMVER is
also international rather than just US flag.
In the late 70s, the US merchant vessel Poet was lost carrying wheat across
the Atlantic to Egypt. One of the findings was that the USMER system
wasn't working and the overdue was not flagged promptly. As a
result, the USMER system was discontinued entirely and AMVER was
expanded (didn't take much) to meet the USMER requirements and
remove a duplicate reporting burden from US flag ships (one of the
probable contributing causes).
Rex BuddenbergFQV@PSUVM.PSU.EDU (jim bowers) (09/02/90)
From: jim bowers <FQV@PSUVM.PSU.EDU> In article <1990Aug29.014602.7783@cbnews.att.com>, G_AHRENDT@VAXA.CC.UWA.OZ.AU (Gunter Ahrendt) says: > >From: G_AHRENDT@VAXA.CC.UWA.OZ.AU (Gunter Ahrendt) >>powerful US ships.) Even the submarine threat was discounted (prematurely; >>Lt. Cmdr. Hashimoto was able to sink USS Indianapolis in August. >Nonetheless, > >I read this was the 29-JUL-1945. Is it true that no rescue was mounted for the >survivors due to the vessel being on a 'secret' mission? I read a very interesting book that hypothosized about this. The scenereo was: the Russians new from thier intelligence that the bomb was on the Indianapolis. They alerted the Japanese to sink the Indianapolis because they did not want a premature end to the pacific war. The Russians did not know the bombs destination (they assumed the Phillipians). Several overzealous army intelligence folks were on board who cut the Indianapolis's radio antennas after the bomb was delivered because radio silence was no longer an order and they wanted it continued. Ship torpedoed. No way to send distress message.