gsneal@c00011-118dan.eos.ncsu.edu (GORDON SCOTT NEAL) (09/18/90)
From: gsneal@c00011-118dan.eos.ncsu.edu (GORDON SCOTT NEAL) The A-10 is an awesome tank killer and will be one of the decisive combat multipliers in the upcoming war with Iraq. I have had an opportunity to live in Iran for three years (pre 1979) and I have worked with A-10's for three years while assigned to the US Army Liaison Group in northern Germany. A proper weapons mix combined with the ruthless audacity of America's HOG drivers will allow us to get into Saddam Huissen's decision cycle and make him react. Of course, the A-10's will not work alone. The synergy with a good fighter cap, good communications jamming mixed with a fixed array of the electronic order of battle will allow the A-10 to fight and win in the desert. I do not suggest that the A-10's should be "saved" until after the air-defenders finish their work. Rather, the A-10's should be used in a large package force that will oversaturate the air defence network already in place. The EF-111's can do an excellent job of defeating the radar guidance systems for the radar SAM's over a norrow front, allowing for the conserrvative use of these strategic assets. WILD WEASEL teams can also be used to send some anti-radiation missles right down their throats. COMPASS CALL assets can look at the VHF and UHF spectrum and jam the appropriate air to air and air to ground freq's. AWAC's will of course be orchastrating the entire thing but the theatre air commander must not rely solely on AWAC's to ensure combat focus and correct integration of combat power. The pilots themselves need to coordinate face to face in a good pilot brief, identifying control measures and decision points. These packages then will be developed and rehearsed to ensure problems are identified and worked out. The Air Force must not do this alone. This has to be a coordinated effort of all the services. The Navy should be ready provide command for all search and rescue efforts. The Navy also has some comm and radar jam assets that should be integrated. And, if the Iranians and the Iraqis are in such a posture to not realize the introduction of a battleship group through the Straits of Hormuz until it is too late to readjust and if Navy planners have the guts to commit such a force so far up into the soft underbelly of the enemy then the battleship can use its massive firepower to provide a screen for this large attack package. And of course the Army will coordinate the use of Apaches and artillery to focus either on a feint along another area of the front or, if comfortable with working with different fighter units, could allow some Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) tactics to be employed. Part II to this saga will be a thrilling and patriotic conclusion.