dxb105@csc.anu.oz.au (11/16/90)
From: dxb105@csc.anu.oz.au In article <1990Nov15.013229.1464@cbnews.att.com>, bcstec!shuksan!major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt) writes: > The weight and size of heavy divisions (4,700 vehicles, 100 helicoptors) > means they must go by sea. A Mech Inf Div requires 85,000 short tons > and an Arm Div requires 90,000 short tons (deployment weight). This was in reference to a desert shield type of scenario - a sudden decision to send a division to somewhere the US hadn't thought it needed to. How much could you trim off that if a lot of the gear was already in place (e.g. POMCUS in Western Europe) and all you needed to send was the grunts? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ David Bofinger AARNet: dxb105@phys.anu.edu.au Snail: Dept. of Theoretical Physics, RSPhysS, ANU, ACT, 2601 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ "To our friends, the good guys. And to our enemies, the bad guys. And to the hope that someday we will be able to tell the difference." - Keith Laumer
budden@trout.nosc.mil (Rex A. Buddenberg) (11/19/90)
From: budden@trout.nosc.mil (Rex A. Buddenberg) To complete the deployment record, there are indeed Coast Guardsmen involved in Sesert Shield. But many are not in organized USCG formations, so they don't show up in the reports. In CONUS, some of the reserve port security outfits were activated to do their mobilization thing at loadout ports, mostly on the east coast. We moved around a few patrol craft for port egress escort duty. In the middle east, there are a number (sorry, I don't know specifics), of subject matter experts working. Most (if not all) are boarding officers attached to Navy vessels performing blockade enforcement duties. Open figures within the service count 300-400 Coast Guardsmen involved in Desert Shield. How that spreads across the duties, isn't clear and I doubt if that includes any patrol boat crews chopped to CONUS escort duty for a couple weeks then back to drug patrols. Rex Buddenberg
cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) (11/20/90)
From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) >From article <1990Nov16.054727.24406@cbnews.att.com>, by dxb105@csc.anu.oz.au: > > From: dxb105@csc.anu.oz.au > In article <1990Nov15.013229.1464@cbnews.att.com>, bcstec!shuksan!major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt) writes: >> The weight and size of heavy divisions (4,700 vehicles, 100 helicoptors) >> means they must go by sea. A Mech Inf Div requires 85,000 short tons >> and an Arm Div requires 90,000 short tons (deployment weight). > > This was in reference to a desert shield type of scenario - a sudden decision > to send a division to somewhere the US hadn't thought it needed to. How much > could you trim off that if a lot of the gear was already in place (e.g. POMCUS > in Western Europe) and all you needed to send was the grunts? I think you have identified the crux of the problem, now becoming evident in the deployment to SA. The U.S. military was re-designed after Korea to fight a war against the USSR in central Europe. This was fine-tuned to the point that, in order to keep Iraq from going farther than Kuwait, we have to send damn near 50% of everything. And once they are in place, we have to leave them there in order to have a credible deterrent (with conventional forces). The NATO deployment plan assumed away the need for sealift by building the POMCUS sites, and requiring only airlift of the units from CONUS sans equipment. There were questions as to whether this was inded realistic; before the collapse of the Soviet empire, NATO strategy was sometimes characterized as "fight three days, then blow up the world". IMHO, "rapid deployment" capability (of large forces) does not really exist. In order to have a credible "rapid deployment", you must have either fully equipped forces in place, or have bases worldwide with sufficient forces "forward deployed" to get there "firstest with the mostest". It hasn't changed much since the days of Bedford Forrest. In a roundabout way, I think the answer to the question above is that sending troops without equipment can be done by airlift quickly, but is not a credible deterrent unless you are fighting an enemy similarly unequipped.
major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt) (11/29/90)
From: bcstec!shuksan!major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt) > The NATO deployment plan assumed away the need for sealift by building the > POMCUS sites, and requiring only airlift of the units from CONUS sans > equipment. There were questions as to whether this was inded realistic; > before the collapse of the Soviet empire, NATO strategy was sometimes > characterized as "fight three days, then blow up the world". I deployed with the 1st Infantry Division twice on REFORGER, drawing our POMCUS stocks. There is, stored in climate-controlled warehouses around Karlshruhe and Pirmasens, an entire mechanized division's rolling stock of tanks, APCs, self-propelled artillery, wheeled vehicles - a 'one-for-one' stockage of the division's TO&E, line item by line item. All on-board equipment is also stocked (radios, OVM, etc). Personnel deploy with personal baggage and personal weapons. For practical reasons, mechanics hand-carried their tool kits. Besides our 'carry-on baggage' TAT baggage (To Accompany Troops), a duffle bag and a foot locker, were put on the same C-141 as the troops. CONEX containers with 'other stuff' carried unit supplies (field desks, tentage, maps, documents, etc.) Once we arrived at our POMCUS site, we had exactly 24-hours to draw our equipment - install batteries - check fluid levels - form convoys - and convoy to a nearby (within 5Km) IUAA (Initial Unit Assembly Area). Within that 24-hour period the POMCUS site 'owned' the equipment and were responsible for any maintenance/repair/replacement. After 24-hours it was the unit's responsibility (and our organic maintenance folks). The division would be reinforced with its forward deployed 3d Brigade and usually with another NATO brigade - either a German Panzer/Panzer Grenadier Brigade or the 4th Canadian Brigade. Then we would conduct about a 10-day Manuever exercise against the 3d ID or the 1st AD - also reinforced with a NATO brigade. After the manuever phase - we would road march to Grafenwehr where the artillery and tanks would undergo live-fire gunnery. After that - we would load all our tracked vehicles on rail cars for the trip back to the POMCUS sites and the wheels would convoy back. We would then reverse the drawing process and prepare all vehicles for storage and turnback to POMCUS folks - and fly back to Fort Riley and begin planning next year's Reforger. It was a pure logistical exercise. The sole purpose was deployment and practice drawing POMCUS stocks and exercising them. Was it realistic? I believe it was. I've seen the major combat elements of the 1st ID deploy from CONUS by C-141, draw their POMCUS equipment, convoy into an assembly area and be ready to go on the offensive within 72 hours. Of course, to 'close' the entire division into Europe took about 10 days. I don't know the status of all that POMCUS today - and Reforger was being de-emphasized - and will probably not take place again, any time soon. But, having participated in 7 Reforger exercises - it was 'fun' while it lasted. mike schmitt