crowl@cs.rochester.edu (Lawrence Crowl) (11/29/90)
From: crowl@cs.rochester.edu (Lawrence Crowl)
If we accept the range principle of weapon command as valid (see my posting
"Range Principle of Weapon Command"), then aircraft, which have a range of
several hundred miles, should be commanded at the theater level. When
commanding aircraft at the theater level, it makes little difference in terms
of command and control whether the aircraft are part of the air force or part
of the army. However, in terms of training, maintenance, and operations it
makes a lot of sense to have the air power organized separately. The labels
"Army Air Corps" and "Air Force" make little practical difference.
>From this, I conclude that the air force should command *all* aircraft,
including all helicopters. This includes the air units currently in the army,
navy, and marine corps. (I am assuming the US structure, adjust as needed for
other countries.) The approach has a number of advantages.
- There is less incentive to place functionality inappropriately in
helicopters. The US Army appears to spend extraordinary effort to place
capability in helicopters that might be better placed on fixed-wing
aircraft. (They can't have fixed-wing aircraft so they make helicopters
that cost as much as jets.)
- There is likely to be less unproductive duplication in the development of
aircraft. The US Air Force and US Navy insist on ignoring the aircraft
developed by the other, which means production runs are short and expensive.
- There is more integration of training and maintenance efforts. Flying and
fixing helicopters is probably much closer to that of fixed wing aircraft
than that of tanks or frigates.
- Better coordination of air assets than the current multi-force structure
provides.
With this approach you get naval air power by attaching naval-qualified air
force units to various ships, just as the air force attaches units to land
bases.
Is placing all aircraft in a single service the best approach? What are the
other arguments for and against? (I'm presuming that since this is
SCI.military, we can discuss force structures that may not be politically
feasible.)
[mod.note: It pushes the envelope a bit, but I think it's worth
considering here. - Bill ]
--
Lawrence Crowl 716-275-9499 University of Rochester
crowl@cs.rochester.edu Computer Science Department
...!rutgers!rochester!crowl Rochester, New York, 14627xrtnt@amarna.gsfc.nasa.gov (Nigel Tzeng) (11/30/90)
From: xrtnt@amarna.gsfc.nasa.gov (Nigel Tzeng) In article <1990Nov29.002331.18628@cbnews.att.com>, crowl@cs.rochester.edu (Lawrence Crowl) writes... ^ ^If we accept the range principle of weapon command as valid (see my posting ^"Range Principle of Weapon Command"), then aircraft, which have a range of ^several hundred miles, should be commanded at the theater level. ^ ^>From this, I conclude that the air force should command *all* aircraft, ^including all helicopters. I am assuming that you refer to Apaches with this statement and not the "utility" choppers. I disagree here. There is a lot of flexibility is you allow units to have organic movement (and firepower) capability. Putting these at the "theater" level is counter-productive. Move the unit if you have to...not shift 10 choppers here to there. Yes, you buy a little streamlining at the cost of a lot of felixibility. The conceptual use of CAS and Helicopter assets is very similar to the deployment of other artillery assets and land transport. In concept an Apache is more similar to a M1 than a F16. A Blackhawk is more similar to a M113 than a C130. Anyway I digress and am arguing a slightly different concept anyway (Air Mobile). The Apache is one of the best tank killing aircraft of any type in our inventory. Your arguement that the role that Apache plays on the battlefield can more cheaply be filled by a fixed wing aircraft is debatable. For one you can stage Apaches closer to the front on makeshift fields. This leads to better overall response time. It also uses terrain much better than fixed wing aircraft. Add the fact that any high-tech aricraft costs lots of money I hardly see how you're going to save cash by replacing an Apache by an A16. Especially when they fill different niches. ^- There is likely to be less unproductive duplication in the development of ^ aircraft. The US Air Force and US Navy insist on ignoring the aircraft ^ developed by the other, which means production runs are short and expensive. They have different design ideas AND missions. The Air Force wants dogfighters and the Navy wants to kill Backfires before they reach 250nm. They should use the same basic designs but they sure cant use the same exact aircraft. Naval variants of aircraft are much heavier than their land versions. You also run into the problem of objectives. When the Navy looks at the problem of air assets they are limited by how many aircraft a carrier can carry. So you buy the best you can because the cost of the carrier and supporting ships outweighs the cost of buying that extra bit. The Air Force is looking at (in some cases) quantity and wants a high low mix of aircraft. Lots of cheap (relatively) F16s and far fewer F15s. ^- There is more integration of training and maintenance efforts. Flying and ^ fixing helicopters is probably much closer to that of fixed wing aircraft ^ than that of tanks or frigates. Maybe. But conceptually a helicopter is closer to a tank than an airplane (in use). And the helicopter is merely a form of a standoff weapon to a frigate. You don't want to group assets on the basis of maintenance and training. You want to group them with commanders who know how to use them. ^- Better coordination of air assets than the current multi-force structure ^ provides. No. Sorry, but we already have problems with coodination with ground units and ships. Are you seriously proposing to put ASW helicoptors under Air Force control? Why? How does this coordinate air assets better? ^ ^With this approach you get naval air power by attaching naval-qualified air ^force units to various ships, just as the air force attaches units to land ^bases. No...this way you get a mess. I'd really like to see you chain of command here. How does a FFG captain rate against the air force cmdr? Does he have to "request" an attack on a possible contact? Given your earlier statement that these units should be under "theater" control does he have to request launching authority from some Air Force command center? "Sorry...launch denied. Your aircraft have been designated to fly our General in from Washington." Not a happy situation ;-). ^ ^Is placing all aircraft in a single service the best approach? What are the ^other arguments for and against? (I'm presuming that since this is ^SCI.military, we can discuss force structures that may not be politically ^feasible.) ^ ^[mod.note: It pushes the envelope a bit, but I think it's worth ^considering here. - Bill ] Yep. NT -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- // | Nigel Tzeng - STX Inc - NASA/GSFC COBE Project \X/ | xrtnt@amarna.gsfc.nasa.gov | Amiga | Standard Disclaimer Applies: The opinions expressed are my own.
thornley@uunet.UU.NET (David H. Thornley) (11/30/90)
From: plains!umn-cs!LOCAL!thornley@uunet.UU.NET (David H. Thornley) In article <1990Nov29.002331.18628@cbnews.att.com> crowl@cs.rochester.edu (Lawrence Crowl) writes: > > >From: crowl@cs.rochester.edu (Lawrence Crowl) >[Arguments in favor of concentrating all aircraft, including helicopters, > under the USAF.] > >With this approach you get naval air power by attaching naval-qualified air >force units to various ships, just as the air force attaches units to land >bases. > To the best of my knowledge, this has never worked. The air force concentrates on land-based planes and the carriers get screwed. Consider the Fleet Air Arm approach tried by the British between the wars, where the Royal Air Force was responsible for developing the Royal Navy's aircraft. The main result of this was that the Royal Navy was heavily dependent on U.S. naval aircraft designs for most of the war. The only navies with dominant carrier forces have been the USN and the Japanese navy (before 1945, of course). Each of these controlled their own aircraft. I would be very hesitant to change a system that largely works to one that has been unsuccessfully tried based on arguments from principle. In fact, it might be nice to try a system where the Army gets to run its own ground-support fixed-wing aircraft. This would at least end the current system where helicopters are asked to do things that fixed-wing aircraft are much better at. Whether it would ensure that the Army got decent support is another matter. (Historical note: For the invasion of Sicily in WWII, Patton asked the Navy for carrier support, despite the fact that Sicily was well within the range of airbases in Tunisia and Pantelleria. Patton claimed that the Army Air Corps was out to win the war its way, and paid no attention to the ground troops, while the Navy pilots would do anything the soldiers asked them to.) The Marines seem to like the system, although they fly Navy planes. To take the Marine example to an extreme: 1. The Air Force retains ICBMs, strategic bombers, and air defense fighters. 2. The Navy is responsible for all other aircraft design. 3. The Army gets to use whatever it wants for its own purposes, and perhaps can get a few aircraft designed for its own use. DHT