crowl@cs.rochester.edu (Lawrence Crowl) (11/29/90)
From: crowl@cs.rochester.edu (Lawrence Crowl) There was much discussion in this group about the US Air Force's apparent indifference to close air support. In particular, posters assert that the A16 is an attempt to sneak more fighters in while giving lip service to close air support. I asked my father, a retired navigator/bombadier/weapons officer, about this. His response was that the Air Force's belief is that you cannot do close air support without air superiority. So, you want to be able to devote all resources to achieving air superiority (including bombing airfields), and once achieved, you can convert to close air support and striking supply lines. Converting from air superiority to close air support requires multi-role aircraft. Hence the choice of the A16 rather than a next-generation A10. The argument for multi-role aircraft works under either of two situations: when the cost effectiveness of a single multi-role aircraft is better than that of two single-role aircraft; and when the number of aircraft is limited (by space in carriers, by treaties on land). If neither of these situations holds, then the air force could produce separate planes, but it need not. On the other hand, if the army controlled close air support, the planes would always be separate, and probably less cost-effective. I contend that supporters of army control of close air support must prove that two single-role aircraft are cheaper than a single multi-role aircraft; that the number of aircraft is not limited by treaty, maintenance, supply, or space; *and* that these situations will hold over the long term. (It makes little sense to shuffle close air support between the services.) Do you buy my argument? What are other arguments for and against air force control of close air support? -- Lawrence Crowl 716-275-9499 University of Rochester crowl@cs.rochester.edu Computer Science Department ...!rutgers!rochester!crowl Rochester, New York, 14627
emery@linus.mitre.org (David Emery) (11/30/90)
From: emery@linus.mitre.org (David Emery) The explanation I've heard from the USAF folks is slightly different. True, multi-purpose aircraft do help you win the air campaign, but the A-16 is supposed to be an attack plane primarily, and not a air-superiority fighter. The reasons I've heard for the A-16 have to do with survivability. The argument is that A-10's are just too slow, and as a result they'll be easier to acquire and shoot down. The Air Force wants a fast-mover for CAS. I'm still not convinced. If I had my druthers, I'd go for the Harrier rather than A-16. But I still like Warthogs, mostly because of how easy it is to control them, and their effects on target. dave emery
khearn@uts.amdahl.com (Bug Hunter) (11/30/90)
From: khearn@uts.amdahl.com (Bug Hunter) In article <1990Nov29.002224.18476@cbnews.att.com> crowl@cs.rochester.edu (Lawrence Crowl) writes: } }Do you buy my argument? What are other arguments for and against air force }control of close air support? Don't forget that "cost-effective" means more than just cost. If a dual-role plane can't deliver weapons on target, or provide a sufficient loiter time, it isn't cost-effective, no matter how little it costs. An F16 to clear the air, then an A10 to clear the ground works. An A16 which will probably clear the air, but misses the ground targets because it can't go slow enough, or stick around long enough is only doing half the job. Air-superiority, and Close Air Support are to very different jobs, and I doubt that one plane will be very good at both. If I have to drive the Indy 500, then the Baja 500, I'm not going to run the same car in both of them. I'll get an Indy car and a 4WD truck. Sure it costs more than one Jeep Cherokee, but at least I'll have a chance in each race. Keith "the right tool for the right job" Hearn -- Keith Hearn \ khearn@amdahl.com \ If you can't remember, Amdahl Corporation \ the claymore is pointed at you (408)737-5691(work) (408)984-6937(home)\