white_ca@lrc.uucp (11/14/90)
From: white_ca@lrc.uucp
As many people already know, inactive reserve members of the U.S. Military are
recieving letters placing them on alert and some are even going to be deployed
soon. My question is when a draft would be put into place to ensure troop
strength if these inactive reserve troops are called into active duty and if
the military and congress has any other alternitives to maintain troop
strength?
chuckles TX#1dvo@unix.cis.pitt.edu (David Voight) (11/15/90)
From: David Voight <dvo@unix.cis.pitt.edu> white_ca@lrc.uucp writes: >As many of you already know, inactive reserve members are recieving letters.. I ask: Does inactive mean: Reservists not currently on active duty, or members of the IRR, the Inactive Ready Reserves? Curious.... Dave. -- This is my test signature file dvo@unix.cis.pitt.edu Bill Mason eats spaghetti upside down while watching old Star Trek Re-Runs.
yun@eng.umd.edu (Dragon Taunter) (11/16/90)
From: yun@eng.umd.edu (Dragon Taunter) In article <1990Nov14.010810.15256@cbnews.att.com> white_ca@lrc.uucp writes: >From: white_ca@lrc.uucp >My question is when a draft would be put into place to ensure troop >strength if these inactive reserve troops are called into active duty and if >the military and congress has any other alternitives to maintain troop >strength? Depends on if and how long the fighting lasts. No doubt Bush and other military planners are hoping for a quick and overwelming solution if diplomancy fails so the question of a draft need not enter. The draft is a political question. Before any fighting starts, for Bush to declare a draft is political suicide. In strict terms of tactics and logistics, one needs to rotate troops. If combat does not commence soon then that means that some of these forces would have been on station for half a year come January or so. Also, during peace time units are not kept at combat strength levels and more personnel are need to fully staff all positions. Besides, who would you want to fight a harsh desert war? Middle aged, out of condition reservists or less experienced but younger men (this is _draft_ so no shouts of sexism please) in prime physical condition? -- yun@wam.umd.edu zwy0c@scfvm.gsfc.nasa.gov (code 926) yun@eng.umd.edu zwy0c@charney.gsfc.nasa.gov 5 hrs 10' 39" W 39 deg 2' 9.7" N A milihelen is the amount of beauty required to launch one ship.
ghcommod@eos.ncsu.edu (GORDON HERBE COMMODORE) (11/19/90)
From: ghcommod@eos.ncsu.edu (GORDON HERBE COMMODORE) From what I've heard from some Lt.'s, that if their is draft, college students could be drafted at the end of their semester. The only ones that would be allowed to continue would be in the ROTC Programs. Don't ask me why, that's what they said. herbster "Life is but a matter of patience"
randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) (11/22/90)
From: Randy Appleton <randy@ms.uky.edu> In article <1990Nov16.052603.22130@cbnews.att.com> yun@eng.umd.edu (Dragon Taunter) writes: > >Besides, who would you want to fight a harsh desert war? Middle aged, out of >condition reservists or less experienced but younger men (this is _draft_ >so no shouts of sexism please) in prime physical condition? Pretty damming, if you ask me. Are you saying that the resuve system doesn't work? This is exactly the type of thing the reserves was supposed to do, provide extra troops after some notice. Well, the crisis has beem building, amd will continue to build. We need some more troups. I say either the reserves have to handle this, or we should disband them as a waste. Actually, I'd trust the trained and prepared reserves much more than people drafted off the street, who don't want to be there. Also, there is something more ethical about sending people off to fight who volenteered than those that did not! Do you have some evidence describing why the reserves are inadaquate? >A milihelen is the amount of beauty required to launch one ship. This is cute. I *LIKE* it! -Randy -- ============================================================================= My feelings on George Bush's promises: "You have just exceeded the gulibility threshold!" ============================================Randy@ms.uky.edu==================
cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) (11/27/90)
From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) > > From: Randy Appleton <randy@ms.uky.edu> > > In article <1990Nov16.052603.22130@cbnews.att.com> yun@eng.umd.edu (Dragon Taunter) writes: >> > Pretty damming, if you ask me. Are you saying that the resuve system doesn't > work? This is exactly the type of thing the reserves was supposed to do, > provide extra troops after some notice. Well, the crisis has beem building, > amd will continue to build. We need some more troups. I say either the > reserves have to handle this, or we should disband them as a waste. > > Actually, I'd trust the trained and prepared reserves much more than people > drafted off the street, who don't want to be there. Also, there is something > more ethical about sending people off to fight who volenteered than those > that did not! > > Do you have some evidence describing why the reserves are inadaquate? The Reserve system, don't forget, was designed to support a war in Europe against the Soviet Union. It assumed that there would be a gradual escalation of tension over, say, 1 year, during which time the armed forces would be expanded in an orderly fashion. This was modified somewhat when NATO planners assumed away the need for sea lift (POMCUS, air lift, rapid deployment). It isn't just the Reserves that are having to adapt to a different mission; the Regulars are having a difficult time, too. For example, note that there are a bunch of Marines dug in in the sand - not really their mission specialty. Even if the draft had been activated in August, the first troopers would not be ready for combat deployment for another 6 to 8 months; technical people would take another 6-8 months after that. So the draft is really not going to help much. The reality is that a "limited" war (like the one in the Gulf) is pretty much going to be a "come-as-you-are" party. That means you will make do with the people and equipment on hand. The major problem with the Reserves, IMHO, is age. Many units (not all) have a lot of older, senior people who are career-oriented (E-6 and up). Lots of experience, lots of good judgement, and motivated. They will tend to have more difficulty with the stress, though. Reservists are supposed to pass physical fitness tests periodically, designed to measure against mission requirements. However, these tests are not by any means physical conditioning programs, so it is a hit-or-miss proposition. The post-WWII Reserve was designed to back-fill Regular units as they deployed. Using this model, the age and experience would be a definite benefit, as these folks would be training the new guys as the deployment ramped up. But the organizations now have Reserve units as part of Regular units (total force concept), meaning that a Reserve division should be just as ready and fit as a Regular combat division, it that is their mission. What you are seeing now is how the AVF/Reserve system will really work (or now work, as the case may be). Note that (1) the AVF is not adequate to handle deployment of a .5million person combined force, and (2) the Reserves will have to be deployed very quickly with the Regulars, because there is no large standing military, and no draft, and (3) Iraq has ~900K troops within ~300-400 miles of the objective, gassed up and ready to roll. BTW, the Marine Reserves have the most stringent physical fitness program I know of; more frequent testing, and the semblance of a program to get people fit and keep them that way. My observation was that they tended to be younger on the average than the other services. My guess is that the average Reserve unit will be about 80% as effective as the average Regular unit with the same mission, at the get-go. Within 6 months in theater, there should be no difference, and possibly the Reserve units will surpass the Regulars (many have a high percentage of Vietnam combat vets who, demonstrably, know how to stay alive).
chen@sundial.gatech.edu (Ray Chen) (11/27/90)
From: chen@sundial.gatech.edu (Ray Chen) In article <1990Nov21.221810.20549@cbnews.att.com> randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) writes: >In article <1990Nov16.052603.22130@cbnews.att.com> yun@eng.umd.edu (Dragon Taunter) writes: >>Besides, who would you want to fight a harsh desert war? Middle aged, out of >>condition reservists or less experienced but younger men (this is _draft_ >>so no shouts of sexism please) in prime physical condition? >Actually, I'd trust the trained and prepared reserves much more than people >drafted off the street, who don't want to be there. Also, there is something >more ethical about sending people off to fight who volenteered than those >that did not! On a recent flight, I met a reservist who had been called up. He said a few interesting things, among them: 1) If you've got some guy in a helicopter trying to do something tough while under fire, who would you rather have flying the thing: some 19-year old kid or a 40-year guy who's been flying for years and may have even seen combat? 2) The age of the average soldier in WWII was 27. The age of the average soldier in Vietnam was 19. The additional maturity makes a difference and the Army has realized this. If this guy was at all typical of the quality of men in the reserves, they'll do just fine. Ray Chen chen@cc.gatech.edu
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (11/29/90)
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) In article <1990Nov27.044138.2540@cbnews.att.com> chen@sundial.gatech.edu (Ray Chen) writes: >1) If you've got some guy in a helicopter trying to do something > tough while under fire, who would you rather have flying > the thing: some 19-year old kid or a 40-year guy who's > been flying for years and may have even seen combat? That depends on whether I'm in the helicopter or not. :-) Seriously. The odds are good that the 19-year-old has better eyesight, faster responses, and much less sense of his own mortality. The more experienced 40-year-old is probably more likely to bring the helicopter back, but the 19-year-old may be more likely to get the job done. (On a battlefield with modern AA weapons in abundance, flying CAS missions for any length of time is going to be almost suicidal; the effective pilots will be the ones who don't believe it can happen to them. Of course, it *will* happen to a lot of them...) -- "I'm not sure it's possible | Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology to explain how X works." | henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu (Allan Bourdius) (11/29/90)
From: Allan Bourdius <ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu> >From P.V. Kauffold: >are a bunch of Marines dug in in the sand - not really their mission >specialty. Absolutely incorrect!!! Marine units are trained to fight in whatever climate a crisis occurs in. For example, I have a friend who's MEU (Battalion Landing Team, Composite Aircraft Squadron, and Support Group) left Moorehead City, NC and went to Panama for four weeks of jungle training. After that, they went to Norway for six weeks above the Artic Circle and after that they went to Egypt for Bright Star '88 (I think). In one 5 1/2 month deployment, this Marine Expeditionary Unit trained in jungle, artic, and desert environments. How many Army units do that? BTW, his MEU "won" all the excercises they participated in. Sounds pretty good to me considering that the Norwegians are dedicated cold-weather forces and the Egyptians are dedicated desert fighters. Allan ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MIDN 3/C (PLC-JR) Allan Bourdius, Carnegie Mellon University NROTC "Come on you sons o'bitches, do you want to live forever?" ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu The opinons expressed in this letter/posting do not, nor are they intended to, reflect the official policies/positions of DOD, DON, USMC, USN, NROTC, or CMU. Any information in this posting was obtained using unclassified material and/or personal intuition, analysis, or extrapolation.
oyvinw@ifi.uio.no (yvin Wormn{s) (11/30/90)
From: \yvin Wormn{s <oyvinw@ifi.uio.no>
>
>
> From: Allan Bourdius <ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu>
> >From P.V. Kauffold:
>
> >are a bunch of Marines dug in in the sand - not really their mission
> >specialty.
>
> Absolutely incorrect!!! Marine units are trained to fight in whatever
> climate a crisis occurs in.
> For example, I have a friend who's MEU (Battalion Landing Team,
> Composite Aircraft Squadron, and Support Group) left Moorehead City, NC
> and went to Panama for four weeks of jungle training. After that, they
> went to Norway for six weeks above the Artic Circle and after that they
> went to Egypt for Bright Star '88 (I think). In one 5 1/2 month
> deployment, this Marine Expeditionary Unit trained in jungle, artic, and
> desert environments. How many Army units do that?
>
> BTW, his MEU "won" all the excercises they participated in. Sounds
> pretty good to me considering that the Norwegians are dedicated
> cold-weather forces and the Egyptians are dedicated desert fighters.
>
> Allan
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OK, I have to reply to this.
While the marines may be the best *all-climate* units, they don't beat
dedicated units of a comparable technological level. At least before
glasnost, there were a few exercises a year in Norway with participation
from several NATO countries (GB, Canada and the USA comes to mind).
What happened?
The Norwegians turned out to be the best, in Norwegian territory, over
and over again.
Why?
I believe for several reasons:
***They know the climate. There is a lot of things about cold weather you
can't learn in just a few months or weeks. Also, the equipment is
chosen with cold weather in mind.
***They have the quality. Partly because the Norwegian military is based
on national service, the manpower is of the highest quality. Especially
the non-commissioned officers have more initiative than usual elsewhere.
***Last, but not least, the foreigners seem to try the Central Europe tactics,
or strategy. In Norway, you can't do that. No tanks, no roads, lots
of mountain and other fancy stuff. The Norwegian semi-guerilla-approach
seems to work better.
If the Marines won in Norway, they were probably on the Norwegian side.
They didn't have to be, but probably.
Now, it is common knowledge that who wins exercises is usually decided
beforehand. The stories in sci.military about how difficult it is to
sink a supercarrier during exercises comes to mind, as do similar stories
from this country. The test of battle is the only way to say for sure.
But, to sum up:
Don't underestimate the weather. The Marines won't take the desert
temperatures better than the natives, no matter how much training they
have. You can't train a lifetime.
Your superiority is based on the same as the Israeli superiority, but
probably not to the same degree. (Israel is another country wich shows
the benefit of national service as opposed to a professional army when
it comes to the quality of the men, I think). Organization, education
and better technology. The crews of whatever is likely to be able to read
instructions, and in case something unexpected happens, figure out what
to do.
The other side will usually have the advantages of experience with the
climate and the territory. And, don't forget the will to fight. That
is often the most important factor, as Vietnam and Afghanistan so
clearly showed.
\yvin oyvinw@ifi.uio.nocga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) (12/04/90)
From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) >From article <1990Nov30.022155.8832@cbnews.att.com>, by \yvin Wormn{s <oyvinw@ifi.uio.no>: > > > ***They know the climate. There is a lot of things about cold weather you > can't learn in just a few months or weeks. Also, the equipment is > chosen with cold weather in mind. > Naval Institute Proceedings had an article about a year ago about the Marines in exercises in Norway. According to the article, they spent most of their time keeping warm and getting fed. These things ate up most of the time and energy. Presumably, once you figured out how to take care of these, you could then devote time to training (or fighting). I expect the folks in the desert have experienced the same thing; i.e., how to keep cool and hydrated. To elaborate a bit on the point of the argument: when the Marines dig holes in the sand, they lose their mobility, and thus their principal combat advantage. My opinion.
ntaib@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Nur Iskandar Taib) (12/06/90)
From: ntaib@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Nur Iskandar Taib) >***Last, but not least, the foreigners seem to >try the Central Europe tactics, >or strategy. In Norway, you can't do that. No tanks, no roads, lots >of mountain and other fancy stuff. The Norwegian semi-guerilla-approach >seems to work better. Hmmm... Reminds me of a story from Martin Caidin's book on the P-38. The most maligned fighter plane during the second World War was probably the Brewster Buf- falo. But when some were shipped to Finland, the Finns raved over them. They were easy to maintain and ope- rate in sub-zero temperatures out of primitive air- strips, and would fly when nothing else would. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Iskandar Taib | The only thing worse than Peach ala Internet: NTAIB@AQUA.UCS.INDIANA.EDU | Frog is Frog ala Peach Bitnet: NTAIB@IUBACS !