jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov (JOSEPH T CHEW) (12/15/90)
From: jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov (JOSEPH T CHEW)
>We know that the USS Stark did not have CIWS.
Actually, she did, and, contrary to widespread rumor, it was supposedly armed.
The question of how an Exocet got through all her electronic defenses is
complex. Human error played at least one large role, and there are possibili-
ties of equipment dysfunction as well.
As I understand it, there are basically three parts to this question:
* Why didn't the ship respond more aggressively to the first sign of
threat -- an incoming aircraft?
* Why didn't the threat warning receiver acquire and warn of the missile?
* Why didn't the CIWS acquire and fire on the missile?
The September 1987 issue of IEEE Spectrum has a nice overview article that
extracts some answers from the murk. The magazine (unclassified but not
readily available to the general public) is sent to all IEEE members and
is probably archived by your local engineering-school library.
BTW, Spectrum has thoughtful if unhurried coverage of all kinds of civil and
military disasters, both real and potential, in which "electro-technology"
plays a pivotal role -- Stark, Vincennes, EMP on the power grid, etc. Well
worth following if you can get hold of it.
--Joe
"Just another personal opinion from the People's Republic of Berkeley"deichman@cod.nosc.mil (Shane D. Deichman) (12/17/90)
From: deichman@cod.nosc.mil (Shane D. Deichman) I haven't read the IEEE Spectrum article (Sept 87) re: the shooting of the USS STARK. However, what I do understand about the incident is that: 1) The crew aboard STARK had no reason to be alarmed when the Iraqi Mirage approached the ship -- they frequently flew down the Gulf to attack Iranian ships. 2) Something about the refractive properties of the local air allowed the TAO aboard STARK to acquire the Iraqi aircraft with a surface search radar (as opposed to an air search or fire control radar); I am uncertain if any other actions (i.e., using a different radar) would have required a course change. 3) The attempted communications with the Iraqi pilot proved fruitless, as they usually did. Iraqi pilots only listened to two channels -- their own and the one used by Iranian air networks. 4) The "lock on" alarm on the Mirage was calibrated for fire control radar signatures, not surface search radars. The pilot never knew he had been acquired (even if the system in question was non-threatening). Whenever Iraqis got a little too close for comfort, lighting them up with the SM2 fire control radar ALWAYS made them turn away.... 5) Since the plane had been illuminated with the longer-wavelength surface search radar, the separation of the Exocet with the Mirage was not detected. 6) The actual detection of the missile didn't occur until about six seconds before impact, when the Exocet active radar engages. This radar would be detected by the ESM aboard the ship -- and probably was.... There are a number of factors leading up to this catastrophe. Most notably, the error of the Iraqi pilot (who was green -- that was his first, and last according to British sources, solo flight against Iranian shipping) in thinking he had made a 90 degree turn when in fact he only turned 30 degrees, and the unorthodox actions by the TAO who didn't believe it was necessary to request a course change. That last point is conjecture on my part. The systems on STARK are fully capable of dealing with such a threat; the crews are similarly proficient. There were some hard lessons learned from this incident. But the probability of human error always exists.... -shane
PAISLEY%auvm.auvm.edu@VM1.gatech.edu (12/18/90)
From: <PAISLEY%auvm.auvm.edu@VM1.gatech.edu> In article <1990Dec15.012050.13269@cbnews.att.com>, jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov (JOSEPH T CHEW) says: > >As I understand it, there are basically three parts to this question: > >* Why didn't the ship respond more aggressively to the first sign of > threat -- an incoming aircraft? The Gulf is a very busy environment, air-traffic wise, everybody has planes going everywhere, so one more contact could easily be overlooked, plus, Stark doesn't have Aegis, all contacts have to be tracked in a more de-centralized manner, allowing for more human error. >* Why didn't the threat warning receiver acquire and warn of the missile? I don't know the capabilities of this piece of equipment, so I can't comment. It is possible that it was not operating for some reason. >* Why didn't the CIWS acquire and fire on the missile? CIWS is a great system, sometimes too great. Its radar sometimes makes mistakes from being too sensitive. Because of all the other non-threat traffic in the Gulf area, CIWS was turned off to avoid shooting a good guy or innocent passer-by. Since no threat was imminent, there was no reason to have it on. Of course, in retrospect, it is easy for armchair admirals to say it should have been on full auto, but that's hindsight. I hope this sheds some light on why the tragedy happened. It is all too easy to look back and say what should have been done, but without know- ing the circumstances, any 'should-haves' are pointless. --- L. GORDON PAISLEY, PAISLEY@AUVM.AUVM.EDU THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON, DC USA
murf@decwrl.dec.com (Colin Murphy) (12/19/90)
From: daver!cypress!murf@decwrl.dec.com (Colin Murphy) In article <1990Dec17.051322.29553@cbnews.att.com>, deichman@cod.nosc.mil (Shane D. Deichman) writes: > > > 5) Since the plane had been illuminated with the longer-wavelength surface > search radar, the separation of the Exocet with the Mirage was not detected. > A mark 1 eyeball picked up a little bright dot as separation occured, the lookout did not report it in a timely fashion, as he wasn't sure what he was looking at. Question: Was it a Super Etenard (sp?), or a mirage F1? > > 6) The actual detection of the missile didn't occur until about six seconds > before impact, when the Exocet active radar engages. This radar would be > detected by the ESM aboard the ship -- and probably was.... Well actually it was worse than that, Iraqi weapon systems were not programmed into the ESM (SLQ-32, if memory serves), and so may have not been detected or perceived as a threat if detected. Remember that the plane had to illuminate the Stark before letting go his missile. The Stark should have come to some kind of higher degree of alertness when this occured, and the lookouts alerted. If this had occured the lookout would most likely have reported smartly when he saw the dot. > That last point is conjecture on my part. The systems on STARK are fully > capable of dealing with such a threat; the crews are similarly proficient. As usual, humans fail when the writers of specs and the designers of systems set them up to fail. The system that required only specific, pre-programmed threats to be monitored, would seem to me to be the root cause. On CIWS, I remember an article about this systems test results. It did get strikes on an incoming cruise missle, unfortunately the missile impacted the ship, (or the area where a ship carrying the Phalanx would have been, don't remember which) anyway. The test was counted as a success, the scorers determined that the warhead fusing would have been destroyed or some such nonsense. Of course this was before the exocets had hit British ships or the Stark, and the effect of unburned fuel in the missile was not taken into account. Colin Murphy - ROSS Technology Inc. - (408) 943-2887 - daver!cypress!murf
lcline%sequent.uucp@RELAY.CS.NET (Larry Cline) (12/20/90)
From: Larry Cline <lcline%sequent.uucp@RELAY.CS.NET> In article <1990Dec18.015631.5431@cbnews.att.com> PAISLEY%auvm.auvm.edu@VM1.gatech.edu writes: >In article <1990Dec15.012050.13269@cbnews.att.com>, jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov >(JOSEPH T CHEW) says: [various Q&A removed] > >>* Why didn't the CIWS acquire and fire on the missile? >CIWS is a great system, sometimes too great. Its radar sometimes makes >mistakes from being too sensitive. Because of all the other non-threat >traffic in the Gulf area, CIWS was turned off to avoid shooting a good >guy or innocent passer-by. Since no threat was imminent, there was no >reason to have it on. Of course, in retrospect, it is easy for armchair >admirals to say it should have been on full auto, but that's hindsight. Perhaps too good is right. We were docked behind two FFG's, one outboard of the other. The inboard FFG was working on its Phalanx with the ammo links off. The word was passed to all hands on their boats (and ours) to stay off the fantails. To test the tracking and motors they would throw a tin can about 1-2 feet in front of the barrel. The Phanlax would track it and you could here the motors for the barrels whining. For those of you versed in tracking small objects at close range you realize how fast this thing was swinging around. At one point the CO of the outboard ship decided to board and to get to his boat he crossed the first, ignoring the warnings of the OOD and QMOW on the quarterdeck of both ships. Needless to say, the Phalanx tracked him and scared him out of his wits (They had re-engaged the barrels but not put the ammo links up to it). Everybody had a good laugh and he learned not to ignore safety warnings. Larry -- Larry Cline lcline@sequent.sequent.com lcline@crg8.sequent.com ".sig! Contractors don't need no stinkin' .sig!!!"
hall@EBay.Sun.COM (Scott Hallmark) (12/20/90)
From: hall@EBay.Sun.COM (Scott Hallmark) In article <1990Dec19.010704.25797@cbnews.att.com>, daver!cypress!murf@decwrl.dec.com (Colin Murphy) writes: >> 6) The actual detection of the missile didn't occur until about six seconds >> before impact, when the Exocet active radar engages. This radar would be >> detected by the ESM aboard the ship -- and probably was.... Yes the SLQ-32(V)2 should of detected it, but, one of the problems in the Persian Gulf is that it is an extremely RF cluttered atmosphere. Therefore the EW watch sup. needs to have the threats memorized. Unfortunately 6 sec. or 3600 yds. is not enough time to react to a threat. I'm sure they knew what was going to eat their lunch, because the seeker for the Exocet has a very unique signature and would be very hard to miss I.D. >Well actually it was worse than that, Iraqi weapon systems were not >programmed into the ESM (SLQ-32, if memory serves), and so may have not >been detected or perceived as a threat if detected. Remember that the plane >had to illuminate the Stark before letting go his missile. The Stark should >have come to some kind of higher degree of alertness when this occured, and >the lookouts alerted. If this had occured the lookout would most likely >have reported smartly when he saw the dot. In reality the crews posture towards Iraq was too nonchalant. If I was in an area where two countries were at war and conducting sorties with live weapons. I wouldn't even feel comfortable being in the same geo- graphic area. >> That last point is conjecture on my part. The systems on STARK are fully >> capable of dealing with such a threat; the crews are similarly proficient.> >As usual, humans fail when the writers of specs and the designers of systems >set them up to fail. The system that required only specific, pre-programmed >threats to be monitored, would seem to me to be the root cause. The systems were fine it was the Combat Systems crew that screwed up Scott Hallmark Ex EW1(BB-63)(FFG-30)(CG-30)(CG-33) or Brew Drinkin, Dart Throwin Squid and World Traveler. Just some more of my opinionated rantings, not Sun Micro's.