[sci.military] point and area defense

cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) (12/15/90)

From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold)
In speculating on the possible outcome of attacks against US 
(and allied) naval vessels, it may be instructive to review the
performance of contemporary weapons:

1. The Stark's defensive system (including the humans) exhibited serious
flaws, starting with command and control.  Threat assessment failed.
CIWS failed because the automatic mode can't be used if there are any
radar-reflective targets within its acquisition range (i.e., it tends
to shoot up any local friendlies or enemies).  Some of the shortcomings
have been fixed.  My opinion: similarly equipped ships are in trouble if
area defense fails.

2. Aegis can shoot down large targets at a range that should provide
some area defense capability.  Command and control is still suspect.
Ability to classify targets is in question.

3. Area defenses are probably the easiest to defeat.  In the Falklands,
area defense (Sea Dart) could not engage targets under 2,000 ft.
Threat assessment failed, leading to the loss of the Sheffield to an
Exocet attack (they detected the Super Etendard when they popped up
to acquire target before launch, but did not interpret this as an attack).
Flying low was quite effective against the British area defenses (I
know, this is not the Brits, we're better, blah, blah).

4. Point defenses are not as effective as they are advertized, partly
due to the lack of ideal conditions.  Sea Wolf can defend OWN ship,
but can't engage targets headed for other ships, for example.  Broadsword,
with Sea Wolf, could not defend itself and Coventry (Sea Dart) unless
it could get exactly between Coventry and the attacking aircraft.
The attacking Argies did not oblige, and the Sea Wolf would not engage
targets not aimed at itself.  Result: Coventry sunk.

Each of these systems demonstrated at least one serious (fatal?) flaw
when put into action.  Assuming that the flaws have been corrected since,
all should be well.  Hardly.  It means that we can expect to find OTHER
flaws, probably.  The more complex the systems, the more likely it will
be to find flaws.

Also note that in the first three examples, the major screw up involved
the HUMAN part of the system.  The waters of high-tech, whiz-bang 
warfare is very uncharted.  In particular, there is very little experience
in operating with degraded systems.

You may recall photos of US ships at GQ in the Gulf with people on the
superstructure with Stinger missiles.  These are probably the most effective
close-in systems available (i.e., reliable, available, high probability of
a hit per shot).

randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy Appleton) (12/17/90)

From: Randy Appleton <randy@ms.uky.edu>

In article <1990Dec15.011604.12543@cbnews.att.com> cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) writes:
>
>1. The Stark's defensive system (including the humans) exhibited serious
>flaws, starting with command and control.  Threat assessment failed.
>CIWS failed because the automatic mode can't be used if there are any
>radar-reflective targets within its acquisition range (i.e., it tends
>to shoot up any local friendlies or enemies).  Some of the shortcomings
>have been fixed.  My opinion: similarly equipped ships are in trouble if
>area defense fails.

Is this true?  Couldn't someone program it not to shoot at anything moving
at less than (oh, say, ..) 300 mph?

If not, how far apart do the ships have to be?

Also, how effective are CIWS systems.  Are they estimated at 50%, 80%, or 
hopefully even better?

-Randy
-- 
=============================================================================
My feelings on George Bush's promises:
	"You have just exceeded the gulibility threshold!"
============================================Randy@ms.uky.edu==================

PAISLEY%auvm.auvm.edu@VM1.gatech.edu (12/19/90)

From: <PAISLEY%auvm.auvm.edu@VM1.gatech.edu>
In article <1990Dec17.051203.29418@cbnews.att.com>, randy@ms.uky.edu (Randy
Appleton) says:
>
>
>[regarding CIWS] Couldn't someone program it not to shoot at anything moving
>at less than (oh, say, ..) 300 mph?
>
They did, but consider this: a helicopter based on a CIWS ship flies at
less than 300 MPH, but its rotor blades don't.  How do you program that?

>If not, how far apart do the ships have to be?
>
I don't know offhand what range CIWS has, but I wouldn't want to be
inside it.

>Also, how effective are CIWS systems.  Are they estimated at 50%, 80%, or
>hopefully even better?
>
I don't remember how effective they claim CIWS to be, but remember it's
designed as a last-ditch kind of defense if missiles or 5-in. guns have
not already taken out the incoming cruise missile.  The real limiting
factor is the weapon's ammunition load.  Each Phalanx only holds enough
ammunition to take out a few missiles, it can't go all day.  But when
it comes down to it, I'd rather have CIWS than not have it.
---
L. GORDON PAISLEY, PAISLEY@AUVM.AUVM.EDU
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, DC USA

robinro@bomber.ism.isc.com (Robin Roberts) (12/20/90)

From: robinro@bomber.ism.isc.com (Robin Roberts)

I have heard stories from ex-sailors who had seen Phalanx in operation that
if left on in automatic mode it would shred seagulls which flew into its
radar line of sight.  Now they could have been telling me sea stories ...

-- 
Robin D. Roberts           | <This space closed for remodeling.  Watch for
Interactive Systems Corp.  |  a new witty quotation scheduled to open in
Calabasas, Calif.          |  the Spring of 1991! >
Internet: robinro@ism.isc.com CompuServe: 72330,1244 GEnie: R.ROBERTS10