jon@cs.washington.edu (Jon Jacky) (12/19/90)
From: jon@cs.washington.edu (Jon Jacky) That's the headline for this story from THE SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 17, 1990, p. A3: COMPUTER MODELS LEAVE U.S. LEADERS SURE OF VICTORY by Robert C. Toth, Los Angeles Times ... Computer models of ground warfare convince the administration it can deliver on its promise of an overwhelming victory. An Army assessment of US and Soviet-made Iraqi equipment --- from tanks to rifles --- shows that the United States has an edge in quality to compensate for its numerical disadvantage. ... When such assessments are factored into opposing ground-combat units and the forces are pitted against each other in war games, the conclusion by Pentagon and many non-government experts seems to be the same: "We'd crush them," said Joshua Epstein of the Brookings Institution. Iraqi numbers, including its million-man army, should not be a problem, added Barry Posen of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "If anything, we might begin to address the ethical question of how much slaughter you want to inflict on his forces if war comes." ... Computer modelling for a ground war is based on assessments of the U.S. Army War Gaming Agency of the combat value and combat effectiveness of 10 types of weapons. ... Effectiveness ratings were determined for (... tanks and ...) other weapons categories from artillery to small arms. A rifle is valued at 1.0, a machine gun at 1.77, a 155 mm howitzer at 1.02 and a MLRS rocket system at 1.16. (... etc. ...) The combat value, or relative weight, of the weapon categories were decided by a team of experienced battlefield commanders. Most valuable, they decided, are attack helicopters, followed by artillery, tanks, scaling down to small arms. When the number of weapons in a U.S. armored division is multiplied by those effectiveness ratings and their combat value, the resulting total --- about 130,000 --- becomes the Armored Division Equivalent at 1. All other units can be measured against that standard. A U.S. infantry division, for example, is given an ADE of 0.5, or half an armored division. Epstein and his associate, Alf Hutter, calculate that all U.S.-led forces in Saudi Arabia will be valued at 17.6 ADE's by February, when the buildup is completed. They calculate that Iraqi forces in Kuwait will be valued at 7.4 ADE's, and those in northern Kuwait and southern Iraq at 9.6 ADE's. That appears to place opposing forces in balance, but the Iraqi forces are widely dispersed in defense, offering a challenge of only 2.3 ADE's for U.S. forces in the "main attack sector." Epstein's bottom line, based on his modeling, is an 18-day war. The first six days would be used for air strikes to establish control and soften up Iraqi ground forces. In the next six days, the ground attack, breakthrough and movement northward would take place. The final six days would be used to mop up. Casualties would be about 15,000 (with 25 percent dead), he said, although they could range from 3,600 to 22,000. Posen said such models understate the U.S. advantage because they do not reflect the better training, logistic supplies, command and control, and other qualitative edges. "We will have total control of the air," he said. ... U.S. forces wil be able to concentrate at their intended attack point to reach a jump-off advantage of 5-1, Posen said, because of the U.S. expectation that Iraqi artillery --- the usual weapon to prevent such concentrations behind enemy lines --- will be largely wiped out. "We are very good at counter-battery fire," he said, pointing to special radar to locate any Iraqi artillery batteries that could then be assaulted with massive, rapid-fire artillery weapons and the Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems. One MLRS volley of 12 rockets is supposed to have the same effect as 72 rounds of 155 mm howitzers. "In just artillery alone, we figured we could delivery 500 tons of metal (artillery shells) on his positions in only one hour," Posen said. "We astonished ourselves with that figure." [ And so on. There were a few caveats: "There are doubters... skeptics remain unpursuaded... experts .... warn that unpredictable events could turn the most modern technological projections into catastrophe ... - JJ] - Jon Jacky, University of Washington, Seattle jon@gaffer.rad.washington.edu
FQV@PSUVM.PSU.EDU (jim bowers) (12/20/90)
From: jim bowers <FQV@PSUVM.PSU.EDU> In article <1990Dec19.010219.24876@cbnews.att.com>, jon@cs.washington.edu (Jon Jacky) says: > >"We are very good at counter-battery fire," he said, pointing to special radar >to locate any Iraqi artillery batteries that could then be assaulted with If radar uses a balistic solution to figure out the location of artillery, won't this be all screwed up if rocket assisted projectiles are used? These don't follow a simple ballistic path. Jim Bowers
emery@linus.mitre.org (David Emery) (12/21/90)
From: emery@linus.mitre.org (David Emery) >From: jim bowers <FQV@PSUVM.PSU.EDU> >If radar uses a balistic solution to figure out the location of >artillery, won't this be all screwed up if rocket assisted projectiles >are used? These don't follow a simple ballistic path. I believe that the radar takes enough data points to calculate the actual trajectory, based either on a ballistic trajectory, or on a rocket-assisted trajectory. It probably can assume (but I'm guessing here) that the rocket burn is "stable" (i.e. constant over a period of time, or has other known characteristics) when it calculates the trajectory of a non-ballistic "bullet". dave
major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt) (12/22/90)
From: bcstec!shuksan!major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt) > From: emery@linus.mitre.org (David Emery) > I believe that the radar takes enough data points to calculate the > actual trajectory, based either on a ballistic trajectory, or on a > rocket-assisted trajectory. It probably can assume (but I'm guessing > here) that the rocket burn is "stable" (i.e. constant over a period of > time, or has other known characteristics) when it calculates the > trajectory of a non-ballistic "bullet". From what I understand the U.S. countermortar/counterbattery system is not all that good (that's from some 'red-leg' friends of mine). We have the TPQ-4 Radar - but not enough of them. Artillery really doesn't have dedicated tubes solely for counter-battery - their fire support mission take precedence over counter-battery missions. And - I seem to recall - that "taking out the enemy's artillery" was a mission given to the Air Force as an "interdiction" mission - preceeded by F4G Wild Weasels taking out the air-defense protecting the artillery. The Soviets, however, have more CB/CM radars spread across their frontage and dedicate their 180mm Guns to the counter-battery mission. Even a four-digit plot (coordinate) will be fired on by a "battery volley 3". mike schmitt
emery@linus.mitre.org (David Emery) (12/28/90)
From: emery@linus.mitre.org (David Emery) >From: bcstec!shuksan!major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt) > From what I understand the U.S. countermortar/counterbattery system > is not all that good (that's from some 'red-leg' friends of mine). > We have the TPQ-4 Radar - but not enough of them. Artillery really > doesn't have dedicated tubes solely for counter-battery - their fire > support mission take precedence over counter-battery missions. > The Soviets, however, have more CB/CM radars spread across their frontage > and dedicate their 180mm Guns to the counter-battery mission. Even > a four-digit plot (coordinate) will be fired on by a "battery volley 3". Your red-leg friends are either hopelessly out of date or pulling your (nonred) leg. The Q-4 has been obsolete for 6 years or so. The new generation of radars are the TPQ-36 and TPQ-37*. The former is optimized for countermortar, and the latter is optimized for counterartillery. My National Guard unit has 1 Q-36 and 1 Q-37 (out of 3 and 2 authorized, respectively), and a second Q-36 is expected this year. (They're not the fastest things off the assembly line.) Our experience with them has been good, particularly the Q-36. The Q-37 has had some maintenance problems. They both work as advertised, and we love 'em! Current artillery doctrine assigns an artillery brigade per heavy division, and usually gives this brigade the counterfire mission. In exercises that I've participated in, counterbattery missions are often the highest priority (except FPF) missions, particularly for general support or reinforcing artillery. This is especially true during covering force operations or preceeding an attack. There is a joint Army/Air Force group studying "JART" Joint Attack of ArTillery, but counterbattery fire is still an Army Field Artillery mission. The Soviets are replacing their 130mm gun (what I think you meant when you talked about a 180mm gun) with 152mm guns, and they'll dump a "Battalion 3 rounds" (~160 rounds) if they get an opposing FA position. They have more counterbattery radars than the U.S., but these radars are much less capable, and they're not tied into a digital fire direction system. The Soviet radars have much less sophisticated signal processing, and they can be overloaded (too many bullets to track) much easier than U.S. radars. They also are much more succeptable to U.S. ECM. Once they do get a target, then they have to get the target to a firing unit, get authority to fire, etc. The Soviets set up "Reconaissance-Fire Strike Complex" to streamline this process. However, with the U.S. Q-36/Q-37 radars in hostile fire, auto-send mode, the radar will automatically transmit a fire mission to a receiving FA computer (either Tacfire at battalion or BCS at battery) as soon as it detects a target. It's quite possible to have counterbattery rounds in the air against the enemy unit before his rounds have landed. My guard unit practices this digital communications, and the damn stuff actually works! dave emery (CPT, FA, NHARNG 197 FA Brigade Counterfire Officer) * Credit dept: Both radars were built by Hughes Ground Systems. Except for an occasional leak in the Q-37, they're very well engineered systems.
wyvern@agora.hf.intel.com (Scott Sanford) (12/28/90)
From: wyvern@agora.hf.intel.com (Scott Sanford)
jon@cs.washington.edu writes:
(A long newspaper article deleted.)
This article worries me. (I was going to bring it over when I saw it on
comp.risks, but found it had already been posted.) Does anyone know what
methods are being used to calculate the combat values, and whether anything
other than simple strength is taken into account?
I am reminded of a simulation in which I once participated with similar
mechanics; my side lost the war game because the opposition used their naval
power on us...hundreds of miles inland.
"As capabilities rise, system storage -wyvern@agora.hf.intel.com
capacity...will increase beyond the normal
user's ability to fill it." -GURPS Cyberpunk, p67gd@dciem (Gord Deinstadt) (01/05/91)
From: cognos!geovision!gd@dciem (Gord Deinstadt) wyvern@agora.hf.intel.com (Scott Sanford) writes: > I am reminded of a simulation in which I once participated with similar >mechanics; my side lost the war game because the opposition used their naval >power on us...hundreds of miles inland. This is clearly a problem with the method cited, since it reduces strength to a single dimension (one variable). But with as few as two variables, other problems arise. It is possible (not inevitable) that a game with five players on a two- dimensional surface does not have a Nash equilibrium. That means that the competition between them never stabilizes; no matter what alliance is formed, one of the members can always better his position by defecting to the opposing alliance. I believe (going out on a limb here) that you can transform players to situations, ie. instead of five players imagine five successive battles, each at a site offering different advantages and disadvantages to each of the two combatants. In this case the outcome of the war depends on the _order_ in which the battles are fought, even if everything else is nailed down. It's like the game of paper-scissors-rock; there _is_ no way to predetermine a winner. In fact one way of looking at grand strategy is as an attempt to manipulate the number of variables acting. If you're big, you make yourself bigger in the hope that your enemies will perceive you in a one-dimensional way; too big to mess with. You make the outcome certain by adopting strategic weapons which guarantee that war will be one big battle. But if you're little, you try to make the game more complicated. If forced into war, you use guerilla tactics which lead to lots of little battles. In this light Hussein is foolish to threaten the use of strategic weapons; he cannot win that game and only simplifies the situation to the benefit of his enemies. Iraq's isolation can be said to arise from acting like a great power when in fact it is not. -- Gord Deinstadt gdeinstadt@geovision.UUCP
demon@desire.wright.edu (01/07/91)
From: demon@desire.wright.edu In article <1990Dec19.010219.24876@cbnews.att.com>, jon@cs.washington.edu (Jon Jacky) writes: > > > From: jon@cs.washington.edu (Jon Jacky) >...text about computer models predicting victory Two items of caution: 1) Computer models allways carry the bias of the programmers and users. I'm sure the US TOW missile was rated higher than the Russian anti tank missiles, but Egypt proved infantry with RPG's and Sagger's could decimate Isreali tank units with American weapons. Iraq will do the same unless M1's have infantry support. 2) In 1942 the Japanese held war games to predict the outcome of the Midway operation. The US player allocated his carriers NW of Midway and decimated the Japanese forces, sinking two carriers and severely damaging a third. The Japanese player protested the rules and the referees agreed. Two Japanese carriers were refloated and the Japanese declared the winners. So much for war games. The enemy will never react the way you plan... Brett bkottmann@falcon.aamrl.wpafb.af.mil