[sci.military] Iraq's Nuclear Capability

jimm@amc.com (Jim McElroy) (01/18/91)

From: jimm@amc.com (Jim McElroy)


Iraq's Nuclear Threat

I just received my February issue of Scientific American
magazine.  In the "Science and the Citizen" section it has an
article concerning Iraq's nuclear threat.

The basic premise of the article is that Iraq may be much
further along in producing the bomb than we think.  Some points
are:

    - Intelligence information is incomplete.

    - Iraq salvaged 12 kilograms of 93 percent pure uranium 235
      after the Israeli air attack on the reactor in 1981.

    - Iraq holds several kilograms of uranium 235 in a reactor
      supplied by the Soviets.

    - In November of 1990, the International Atomic Energy
      Agency (IAEA) inspected the Iraq nuclear facilities.
      (Iraq is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
      Treaty and must therefore allow inspections.)  Using
      "foolproof" methods, the IAEA verified that materials had
      not been diverted for use in a weapon.

    - IAEA safeguards are not much comfort to some experts
      because it is possible for Iraq to fashion the materials
      into a weapon "in a matter of weeks" if it has a detonator
      and machine tools to shape highly enriched uranium.

    - Published reports say that the Al Qaqaa Military Research
      and Development Institure is creating the chemical
      explosives required for a nuclear detonator.

    - Three employees of the Al Qaqaa institute have attempted
      to import krytrons, capacitors that are used to trigger
      nuclear weapons.  They were caught on March 29, 1990 by
      the U.S. Customs.

    - Experts infer from these events that Iraq is attempting to
      build implosion weapons similar to the bomb that the U.S.
      dropped on Japan in World War II.  Chemical explosives
      surround a core of nuclear material and the krytrons
      provide a detonation signal to the chemical explosives;
      the chemical explosives then rapidly and uniformly
      compress the nuclear material until fission takes over.

    - A conventional implosion bomb can be made from 25
      kilograms of 90 percent pure uranium.  Such a weapon can
      yield more than 15 kilotons.  Using only 12.5 kilograms of
      enriched uranium requires constructing a "sophisticated"
      implosion bomb needing advanced detonators and reflectors
      that increase the efficiency of the chain reaction.

    - If Iraq has already obtained enough weapon-grade
      material, the simple design will suffice.

      [ Aside:  Does anyone know if Kuwait has (or had) enriched
        uranium sufficient to put Iraq above the 25 kilogram
        quantity? ]

    - In 1982, Iraq tried to obtain 33 kilograms of plutonium
      from Italian arms smugglers.  (The smugglers could not
      provide samples, and no deal was made.)

    - Iraq may be able to produce its own weapon-grade material
      even now without diverting material from reactors.
      Companies in France, Germany and Switzerland have provided
      Iraq with technologies that may be used for constructing
      gas centrifuges that concentrate uranium 235 as a
      component of uranium hexafluoride gas.  A system of 1000
      centrifuges can concentrate uranium 235 from 71 percent to
      90 percent purity.  Several kilograms per year can be
      produced this way.

    - On July 15, 1990, the Germans captured a shipment of
      Swiss-made machinery built of corrosion-resistant steel
      suitable for handling the uranium hexafluoride gas.

    - Brazil, Niger and Portugal have provided Iraq with
      *hundreds of tons* of uranium ore concentrate.

    - Polish engineers who were recently held hostage in
      Iraq say that the gas conversion process is being
      developed at the Al Qaim chemical plant.

    - The Bush administration believes that the embargo
      cannot be airtight.  The _Scientific American_ article
      quotes Leonard S. Spector of the Carnegie Endowment
      for International Peace:  "It will still be possible
      for Saddam Hussein to obtain bit by bit the hardware
      he needs for the infrastructure for the bomb."

My own editorial:  I think it best that we fight this war now,
while Iraq has no nuclear bomb (or perhaps one or two untested
ones) rather than to wait until he has twenty or a hundred.
Saddam Hussein has sufficiently demonstrated his way of
dealing with the world to convince me that we will have to
battle him sooner or later.

Cheers --
Jim McElroy