cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) (01/16/91)
From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold)
To supply the current force level in the Gulf for combat operations
will require 100 to 150 shiploads of dry cargo per month, plus 10
to 15 tankers per month (yes, really - to meet naval and aircraft
fuel needs). This breaks down to the arrival of 25 to 30 cargo ships
per day in SA to sustain combat operations.
How many ships are needed to meet this requirement? Assume a trip
(one-way) of approx. 6,000 miles (US to SA). The average speed of
the ships would be about 10-15 knots per day, for a distance of
about 360 nautical miles per day. The one-way trip would take
about 17 days.
Total transit time would be:
Load in port of origin ......... 2 days
Crossing to SA .................17 days
Unloading in SA ................ 2 days
Return trip ....................17 days
---------
TOTAL 38 days
For 30 arrivals per day, this would require
30 ships/day x 38 days = 1,140 ships
I am ignoring the tanker problem, because currently there is a large
surplus of tanker capacity worldwide; tanker capacity should not
pose a problem.
The question is, do we currently have the sealift capacity? Here are
the figures I have:
MSC nucleus ............ 58
MSC charter ............ 61
US Flag ................ 545
Ready Reserve ......... 32
------
Subtotal .............. 696
These are the ships available right now, assuming the US can secure the
services of all of the US flag cargo ships.
One problem is that most of these ships are not break-bulk cargo ships,
are container ships or RO/RO and not suitable for many types of military
cargo. So where do we get the rest?
US Control (flag of convenience) ....... 639
National Defense Reserve (2-3 months) .. 245
NATO allies ............................ 400
--------
1,284
The grand total is 1,980, which should be adequate. However, the NDR
fleet (245) is the "mothball" fleet, officially ready in 2 to 3 months,
but no one really believes that (never mind the cost to rehab these
ships). Most likely, the US will charter the needed bottoms from our
NATO allies, the Japanese, Greeks, etc. and (except for maybe one or
two) leave the NDR ships in mothballs.
Incidentally, the NDR fleet are mostly Victory ships, not Liberty ships.
Most of the Liberties have been broken up for scrap. The Victories are
reported to be in reasonable condition; some were activated during
Viet Nam.
The bottom line is that our meager sealift capability is going to be
strained if the fighting lasts for more than 60 days. Yet another good
reason to get it over with quickly.
We are also fortunate in that Saddam has no surface navy, submarine
force, or long-range air force capable of interdicting shipping,
so the convoys will sail unopposed; if we were to allow for,
say, 10% losses for opposed crossings, then we would need to start with
33 ships in a convoy in order to deliver 30, and we would need to be
able to replace the ships lost. Assuming losses of 3 ships per day, we
would be able to sustain the sealift for at least 150 days.
The base figures for tonnage needed is extrapolated from NATO requirements
for a similar size force fighting Warsaw Pact forces.
I have no recent information about port facilities in SA; the above assumes
that there are adequate facilities to complete unloading of break-bulk
cargo ships in 2 days. There are enough good harbors along the coast of
SA and the Emirates, so this should not be a problem. They should be well-
developed by now.
In a protracted war, the port facilities become critical, and thus are
attractive targets for sabotage and other attack by non-conventional forces
(i.e., sappers, terrorists, commandos, etc). Anti-ship missiles like the
Exocet can be used effectively against port facilities. Either attack the
storage areas, or sink a few ships in the channel. I don't think the Scuds
are accurate enough to use against ports with conventional warheads.
All above data from unclassified public sources.
Pat Kauffold AT&T Bell Labs Naperville, ILab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu (Allan Bourdius) (01/18/91)
From: Allan Bourdius <ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu> >To supply the current force level in the Gulf for combat operations >will require 100 to 150 shiploads of dry cargo per month, plus 10 >to 15 tankers per month (yes, really - to meet naval and aircraft >fuel needs). This breaks down to the arrival of 25 to 30 cargo ships >per day in SA to sustain combat operations. The tankers probably won't be as necessary as you think. The way I remember it, Saudi Arabia pledged to supply all the fuel for Operation Desert Shield, most of which is refined in Saudi Arabia itself. The supply problem isn't as grave either. There was enough equipment and supplies on Diego Garcia to support a corps-sized unit for 180 days (again, that's the way I remember it). All of that hardware would be in Saudi Arabia by now. Relatively light supplies, like ammunition and pre-packaged food, can be brought in by airlift. With the arrival of M1A1's from NATO war stocks, all the M1's that they replaced have remained in Saudi Arabia as replacements. I would expect that if we still had to conduct a major sealift (as if we haven't already) of the kind you describe, what would be done is equipment/supplies could be taken to a base of operations like Diego Garcia, the Phillipines, Guam, Ascension, Gibraltar, etc. in traditional (non-RO-RO) ships and then crossdecked to the SL-7's, other AKR's and T-AKR's, and the MPS Ships--all of which *are* RO-RO, and can land their cargo without any port facilities except for the pontoon piers that the Seabees put together. If any praise for Desert Shield is to be given out now, it should be bestowed on the logisticians--they've done a damn fine job. Allan ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Allan Bourdius [MIDN 3/C (Marine Option)/Brother, Phi Kappa Theta Fraternity] ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu or Box 4719, 5125 Margaret Morrison St., Pgh., PA 15213 "Give, expecting nothing thereof." "Phi Kappa Theta, just the best." "An unwarlike Marine is quite as unthinkable as an honest burglar." Nothing that I have written is the opinion of anyone but myself. So there!
det@hawkmoon.MN.ORG (Derek E. Terveer) (01/22/91)
From: det@hawkmoon.MN.ORG (Derek E. Terveer) cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) writes: >To supply the current force level in the Gulf for combat operations >will require 100 to 150 shiploads of dry cargo per month, plus 10 >to 15 tankers per month (yes, really - to meet naval and aircraft >fuel needs). This breaks down to the arrival of 25 to 30 cargo ships >per day in SA to sustain combat operations. Hmmm, i don't follow the math here. Perhaps you have a typo somewhere? I figure that 150 cargo + 15 tankers = 165 ships/month = 165 ships/30 days = 5.5 ships/day. How did you get 30 ships per day?? >How many ships are needed to meet this requirement? Assume a trip >(one-way) of approx. 6,000 miles (US to SA). The average speed of >the ships would be about 10-15 knots per day, for a distance of ^^^ I think you mean per hour. >about 360 nautical miles per day. The one-way trip would take that is 360 miles at 15/hr. The avg of 10 to 15 is 12.5, which means "about 300 miles/day" >about 17 days. about 20 days at 300 miles/day >Total transit time would be: >Load in port of origin ......... 2 days >Crossing to SA .................17 days >Unloading in SA ................ 2 days >Return trip ....................17 days > --------- >TOTAL 38 days >For 30 arrivals per day, this would require > 30 ships/day x 38 days = 1,140 ships 5.5 ships/day x 41 days = 225.5 ships >I am ignoring the tanker problem, because currently there is a large >surplus of tanker capacity worldwide; tanker capacity should not >pose a problem. >The question is, do we currently have the sealift capacity? Here are For 30 arrivals per day, i am not certain that "we" have the port capacity. We quite possibly have the port capacity for 5.5 arrivals/day. -- Derek "Tigger" Terveer det@hawkmoon.MN.ORG - MNFHA, NCS - UMN Women's Lax, MWD I am the way and the truth and the light, I know all the answers; don't need your advice. -- "I am the way and the truth and the light" -- The Legendary Pink Dots
det@hawkmoon.MN.ORG (Derek E. Terveer) (01/22/91)
From: det@hawkmoon.MN.ORG (Derek E. Terveer) ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu (Allan Bourdius) writes: >From: Allan Bourdius <ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu> >Relatively light supplies, like ammunition and >pre-packaged food, can be brought in by airlift. Hmmmm. Perhaps you are thinking of "ammunition lite" (sic) (:-), like small arms; historically, anything short of harassing artillery fire has required quite large amounts of ammunition. Barrages can consume tons (literally!) of ammunition in minutes. For example, a naval 5" (127mm) projectile weighs approximately 68 pounds (lbs), and I am pretty sure (but not positive) that a ground version of similar size would weigh approximately the same. This is only the weight of the projectile -- I'll assume that the cartridge weighs approximately 50 pounds, so each round is approximately 118 pounds. Firing just once per minute, which is certainly possible with manual loading, you would be expending: 60 minutes/hr * 118 lbs/minute = 7,080 lbs/hour = 3.54 short tons/hour. This is for one tube and does not count containers, packing lubricants, transporters, etc. In article <1991Jan14.011014.5995@cbnews.att.com> it was declared that there were approximately (i really like that word -- it's so vague (:-)) 100 105mm, 376 155mm, and 100 203mm field artillery tubes in the kuwait front. A *real* off-the-cuff figure of 34 (short) tons per minute emerges if all tubes were firing at one round per minute. (100+376+100) * 3.54 tons/hr * 1 hr/60min -- Derek "Tigger" Terveer det@hawkmoon.MN.ORG - MNFHA, NCS - UMN Women's Lax, MWD I am the way and the truth and the light, I know all the answers; don't need your advice. -- "I am the way and the truth and the light" -- The Legendary Pink Dots