neufeld@helios.physics.utoronto.ca (Christopher Neufeld) (01/22/91)
From: Christopher Neufeld <neufeld@helios.physics.utoronto.ca>
Here are some excerpts from bit.listserv.virus-l which you might find
interesting.
Brutally edited from the digest. My apologies to Klaus Brunnstein
and Rich Osman if the meaning is distorted in my editing of their
words. The articles are archived for those people who want to read
the original texts.
VIRUS-L Digest Tuesday, 15 Jan 1991 Volume 4 : Issue 10
Date: 15 Jan 91 11:23:00 +0100
>From: Klaus Brunnstein <brunnstein@rz.informatik.uni-hamburg.dbp.de>
Subject: (No) Viruses in Irak's EXOCET?
French press and media reported in some details that computer
viruses could be planted, either in advance or afterwards, in
French EXOCET rockets to influence their performance.
Following a report of the German Press Agency (dpa), German
media (on Jan.11) were full of reports about "viruses in
Hussein's rockets". According to dpa, (unnamed) French
computer scientists said:
- manufacturers of war material usually implant viruses
in exported war electronics to provoke, after some time,
faults and "profitable repair work";
- though Iraqi weapon computers are "hermetically cut-off
from the outside world", computer viruses could be implanted
e.g. via "weather data";
- moreover, the built-in computers contain programs which may
be triggered remotely; the control system of EXOCET
rockets could be switched off from French ships;
As usual in events related to malicious code, truth is mixed up
with misunderstandings, errors and impossibilities:
- the implementation of weapon software makes self-reproducing
programs (=viruses) impossible; moreover, it is very im-
probable, that such systems may be (re-)programmed remotely;
- on the other hand, other "malicious code" may well be
present in weapon computers; at least in the test phase,
rockets can be destroyed by triggering a self-
destruct system remotely; because of the rule "never
change a running program", such "backdoors" could survive
the test version;
Some interesting questions following from such "possibilities":
- May Irak detect, influence or adapt such weapon software?
- If French EXOCETs are remotely controllable: why did
the French not warn their "friends" who suffered severe
losses to EXOCETS? Have they at least now warned and
properly equipped their allies in the Arabian desert?
Postscriptum: computer "viruses" may nevertheless play a role in
"Operation Desert Shield". There are (yet unconfirmed) news that
several thousands PCs (5000?) have been infected by ordinary
"computer viruses".
------------------------------
VIRUS-L Digest Wednesday, 16 Jan 1991 Volume 4 : Issue 11
Date: Tue, 15 Jan 91 09:06:43 -0600
>From: ROsman%ASS%SwRI05@D15VS178A.SPACE.SwRI.EDU
Subject: Re: (No) Viruses in Irak's EXOCET?
Klaus Brunnstein <brunnstein@rz.informatik.uni-hamburg.dbp.de> writes:
> - manufacturers of war material usually implant viruses
This is not very likely. Most modern defen(s|c)e contracts provide
reliability targets which the contractor must warrant, or include
maintenance to meet the goals.
> - computer viruses could be implanted e.g. via "weather data"
This is entirely concievable, but fairly unlikely. The coordination
required to pull this off would be immense.
> - moreover, the built-in computers contain programs which may
> be triggered remotely;
Same comment as previous paragraph.
> - the implementation of weapon software makes self-reproducing
> programs (=viruses) impossible; moreover, it is very im-
> probable, that such systems may be (re-)programmed remotely;
Not entirely correct. Weapons software is often incredibly complex.
It also often loadable. I assume that you are assuming that it is
ROM'd which is not neccessarily correct in newer, more complex sys-
tems. The code is usually handled by fairly physically secure means,
but anything is possible.
> - on the other hand, other "malicious code" may well be
> present in weapon computers; [destruct etc.]
The self-destruct systems are usually seperate, independent systems,
developed to be reliable, and, hence, simple. They are not present in
production weapons. Maintenance modes/codes might fall into this
category, but almost always require a hardware action to enable them
(switch closure, special connector, etc.) for this very reason.
[ But the two Patriot missiles which were fired accidentally last
week were both aborted from the ground - Christopher ]
> - French warships might remotely influence the
> EXOCET control systems
All within the realm of possibility, but logistically unlikely. More
likely is that the French know well the weaknesses of the sensor sys-
tems on their weapons, and can effectively exploit them. Ditto the
British, US, and others.
> - If French EXOCET rockets are remotely controllable: why did
> the French not warn their "friends" who suffered severe
> losses from EXOCETs?
I we assume (dangerous) that the premise is correct, the French could
not predict the USS Stark incident. Further there is a risk/return
issue. To save British ships, the (postulated) secret would have to
spread further, AND would eliminate the weapon as an option should
Britain and France go head to head. Conservative military thinkers
always strive to preserve options.
Oz (Rich Osman, WB0HUQ) INTERNET: Oz@SwRI.edu
(512) 522-5050 (w); (512) 699-1302 (h, merciless machine)
(512) 522-2572 (just the fax)
------------------------------
--- End Excerpted Articles ---
Christopher Neufeld....Just a graduate student | "Shtarker! Zis is KAOS!
neufeld@helios.physics.utoronto.ca Ad astra! | Vee do not 'yippee yo
cneufeld@{pnet91,pro-cco}.cts.com | kye aye' here!"
"Don't edit reality for the sake of simplicity" | Siegfried of KAOS
broehl@watserv1.waterloo.edu (Bernie Roehl) (01/23/91)
From: broehl@watserv1.waterloo.edu (Bernie Roehl) In article <1991Jan22.022646.22830@cbnews.att.com> neufeld@helios.physics.utoronto.ca (Christopher Neufeld) writes: > French press and media reported in some details that computer > viruses could be planted, either in advance or afterwards, in > French EXOCET rockets to influence their performance. This is something I was wondering about a few weeks back. If I were selling weapons to a country that might turn around and use them against me, I'd program in an override. I wouldn't let it be generally known, of course. Probably a hook somewhere in the ROM that lets you remotely program it, to maintain generality. -- Bernie Roehl, University of Waterloo Electrical Engineering Dept Mail: broehl@sunee.waterloo.edu OR broehl@sunee.UWaterloo.ca BangPath: {allegra,decvax,utzoo,clyde}!watmath!sunee!broehl Voice: (519) 885-1211 x 2607 [work]
smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) (01/25/91)
From: smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) In article <1991Jan23.035257.3832@cbnews.att.com>, broehl@watserv1.waterloo.edu (Bernie Roehl) writes: > > This is something I was wondering about a few weeks back. If I were selling > weapons to a country that might turn around and use them against me, I'd > program in an override. I wouldn't let it be generally known, of course. > Probably a hook somewhere in the ROM that lets you remotely program it, to > maintain generality. I tend not to believe in such things, at least as a matter of policy. You can't assume perfect security on the development project, and that's the sort of thing you *can't* let leak -- after all, if you're selling weapons to a country, it's generally because they may be fighting someone else you like even less. On the other hand, the British reportedly sold lots of war-surplus Enigmas to their former colonies, to secure their diplomatic correspondence...