carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au (Carlo Kopp) (02/07/91)
From: Carlo Kopp <carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au>
[mod.note: This is very long, but it fits the bill. The author has kindly
consented to forward other similar articles; I'd appreciate it if the
readers would let me know if they'd like to see them. - Bill ]
(C) AEROSPACE PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD 1990
P.O. Box 3105, WESTON CREEK, ACT 2611, AUSTRALIA
Ph:+616-288-1677 Fax:+616-288-2021
As published in May and June 1990 issues of the AUSTRALIAN
AVIATION journal
[mod.note: Posted here with their consent. - Bill ]
FULCRUM AND FLANKER
The New Look in Soviet Air Superiority
By Carlo Kopp
One of the most remarkable side effects of the internal pol-
itical upheavals in the Communist Bloc has been the public
showing of the latest generation of Soviet tactical air-
craft. The Mikoyan MiG-29 Fulcrum A and Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker
B have been thus scrutinised in a way that no other Soviet
aircraft of their kind have been in the past. The principal
conclusion which we may draw is simple, the Soviets have fi-
nally produced a generation of aircraft which are comparable
in the least in performance with the generation of aircraft
which have protected Western skies since the seventies. The
implications of this in the area of air war strategy are
alarming, as Soviet air power is no longer tied down to lo-
cal ground control by inferior combat radius and primitive
fire control systems - the Fulcrum and in particular Flanker
are aircraft designed specifically for long range offensive
air warfare.
Russians are generally considered to be obsessive chess
players, and like good chess players they looked at the em-
erging teen series fighters during the seventies and drafted
an appropriate strategy to counter. This strategy revolved
about which design parameters would receive attention in the
generation of aircraft built to succeed the mediocre MiG-21
Fishbed, MiG-23 Flogger and tactically dubious MiG-25 Fox-
bat. To fully understand the scale of change in Soviet
thinking about air warfare we must look closely at the his-
tory of Soviet fighter development which reflects within it-
self much about Soviet military thinking.
The first tactically useful jet fighter which the Soviets
produced was the Rolls-Royce Nene powered MiG-15 Fagot,
which drew heavily upon WW II German research into swept
wing aerodynamics. The MiG-15 was a simple and rugged air-
frame, with a respectable thrust to weight ratio and heavy
gun armament of two 23 mm and one 37 mm cannon. It came as a
rude surprise to Western air forces when the MiG-15 first
challenged Western air forces in Korea, it easily outclassed
the underpowered Meteor and F-84. Lighter than the leading
US air superiority fighter, the F-86 Sabre, largely due to
its rudimentary systems fit, the MiG-15 proved to be a tough
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 2 - Fulcrum & Flanker
adversary when well flown and the quoted 10:1 exchange rate
in favour of the F-86 resulted largely from superior Western
tactical airmanship. The MiG-15 thus set the mold for the
two subsequent generations of Soviet fighters, lightweight,
simple and cheap to produce with good thrust to weight ratio
and primarily gun armament, designed to fit into a closely
controlled air defence environment tied to the local offen-
sive land forces. Arguably this approach did not stem so
much from doctrine as from circumstances, the technological-
ly unsophisticated industrial base of the USSR severely con-
strained what could be done in terms of powerplant perfor-
mance, particularly specific fuel consumption, and avionic
fit which determines radar and missile capability. Given
that the USSR, as a continental power, placed most of its
offensive warfare capabilities into the basket of massed
tank and motorised infantry formations, there was hardly a
perceived need to invest in the Douhet flavoured long range
air war strategies espoused by the major Western powers. The
Soviet military relied on the proven approach of overrunning
its opponent with massive concentrations of armour, rather
than bleeding its opponent to death by sustained air war
against production facilities and infrastructure. In this
environment the role of the air forces, the tactical Fronto-
vaya Aviatsia Voenno-Vozdushnykh Sil (FA VVS-Tactical
Aviation/Military Air Forces) and home defence Istrebitel-
naya Aviatsia Protivo Vozdushnoy Oborony Strany (IA PVOS -
Interceptor Aviation/National Air Defences) was clear cut,
the former would wrest control of the airspace above the
battlefield, while the latter would defend the Soviet home-
land from long range air attack. The specialisation would
eventually lead to two unique streams of fighter develop-
ment, the VVS tactical fighters and the PVO interceptor.
Initially this manifested itself in specialised variants of
standard fighters, ie the VVS flew the MiG-17F (Fresco) and
MiG-19S (Farmer), while the PVO flew the MiG-17PF, MiG-19PF
and PM, the PVO types carrying rudimentary air intercept
(AI) radar and gun in PF or air-air missile (ie AAM) in PM
versions. Both the MiG-17 and MiG-19 were lightweight,
short legged aircraft with good turn performance,
thrust/weight ratio and short field performance.
The early sixties saw the first major split in fighter
development, with the VVS adopting the MiG-21F Fishbed,
essentially a VFR fighter armed with guns and cloned AIM-9B
missiles designated K-13 (AA-2 Atoll), and the PVO adopting
the Su-9 Fishpot family.The MiG-21 proved the more success-
ful, spawning a string of variants with a wide range of
capabilities (FA, PF, FL, PFS, PFM, PFMA, M, R, MF), span-
ning two decades in production, and achieving the distinc-
tion of being built in greater numbers than any other super-
sonic fighter. Exhaustive coverage of the genealogy of the
MiG-21 is well beyond the scope of this discussion. The
Fishpot in turn led to the larger Su-11 and Su-15/21 family
of aircraft, all specialised interceptors locked via da-
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 3 - Fulcrum & Flanker
talink into ground control air defence systems. The PVO had
opted out of the air combat game altogether, these aircraft
being capable only against bombers. This philosophy cul-
minated in the MiG-25 Foxbat family of Mach 3 interceptors,
aircraft virtually useless in any task other than killing
high flying high speed bombers and recce aircraft (the Fox-
bat is a major topic within itself, conceived to kill the
B-70 Valkyrie and ultimately the means of a massive and suc-
cessful strategic deception played against the USAF).
The VVS pursued its tactical role with vigour, adopting the
Su-7 family of fighter bombers typified by the Su-7BM and
creating a split within its own fighter force, between
strike fighters and local air superiority aircraft. This in
turn led to the next major Soviet fighter type, the swing
wing MiG-23 Flogger family. The late sixties saw the rela-
tive success, as perceived by the Soviets, of the surface-
air missile (SAM) in Vietnam which saw the Red Army deem-
phasise the air superiority role in favour of strike. VVS
aircraft would support land forces with air strikes against
battlefield and theatre targets. The Flogger drew heavily
on the fad which created the F-111 family, the idea of the
tactical strike aircraft which by virtue of AAMs could com-
pete successfully in the air superiority role. Much like the
F-111, the Flogger was cast into this mold at an early stage
and thus proved to be an inferior air superiority fighter to
the aircraft it was intended to defeat, the F-4 Phantom II.
The early seventies became a pivotal point in the global
struggle for air superiority. The PVO was largely equipped
with the ineffective Su-15 Flagon, supported by growing
numbers of interceptor versions of the MiG-25 Foxbat and
MiG-23M/MF Flogger, the latter entering massive series pro-
duction. The VVS were still largely equipped with Fishbeds,
but with substantial quantities of the Flogger becoming
available, supported by growing numbers of swing wing Su-17
Fitter strike fighters. There was no capable air superiority
aircraft in the class of the F-4E available, the Soviets
having pushed the specialisation of their inventory to the
point where fighter roles were subjugated to the respective
services primary missions.
The Americans were at that time introducing the F-14A Tomcat
and F-15A Eagle, both aircraft designed around the concept
of energy manoeuvrability and the practical lessons gleaned
from the many engagements flown between the USAF's F-4C/D/E,
F-105D/F, the Navy's F-4B/N, F-8E and the MiG-17s, 19s and
21s of the North Vietnamese Air Force. Vietnam was a rude
awakening for the Americans, who did not enjoy the absolute
air superiority they sought over Hanoi and Haiphong. While
they did decimate the NVAF and ultimately wipe out the NV
air defence system, the exchange rate between the complex
and expensive F-4 family and the cheap and nasty MiGs hardly
reflected the technological advantage of the US. The new
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 4 - Fulcrum & Flanker
generation of fighters, dubbed the teen series, embodied a
number of major departures from previous design strategies.
Air combat manoeuvring performance was a major priority,
with both designs built for maximum thrust/weight ratio and
minimum energy bleed, to provide the sustained turn perfor-
mance required to get a guns or tail aspect heat seeking
missile kill against a manoeuvrable and small target. The
use of afterburning turbofan engines and substantial inter-
nal fuel capacity provided an effective combat radius well
beyond 500 n.mi., to fight a strategic air war in the
opponent's back yard. The cockpit saw major improvements in
ergonomics and all round visibility, and look-down shoot-
down pulse Doppler radars were fitted to allow beyond-
visual-range (BVR) missile attacks on low flying targets.
Both teen series fighters were thus formidable air combat
fighters built for the long range air war strategy implicit
within Western air war doctrine. The strategic deception
played by the Soviets with the Foxbat, seen by the Americans
at the time as a highly manoeuvrable, 600 n.mi. radius Mach
3 air superiority fighter, had to some degree backfired, as
the specifications for the F-14/15 performance and weapon
system included the ability to defeat such an aircraft.
Many observers have commented, in the light of Belenko's de-
fection to Japan, that both the F-14 and F-15 were clearly a
case of overkill in capability against the mediocre Fishbeds
and Floggers of the VVS. While that is true, the margin in
performance has been of benefit in that these types are
still serious players twenty years after their conception
and are likely to remain such for the next decade.
Both the F-14 and F-15 were expensive and this quickly re-
flected in political pressure to adopt a 'Hi-Lo' mix of
fighters, with cheaper aircraft supplementing these types.
The USAF's Light Weight Fighter (LWF) flyoff between the
YF-16 and YF-17 resulted in the adoption of the F-16, ini-
tially a clear weather dogfighter, to supplement the F-15.
The YF-17 evolved into the Navy's F/A-18 multirole strike
fighter, replacing A-4s, A-7s and F-4s in the fleet.
The teen series fighters had undisputed control of the skies
since the late seventies and if there was any surprise, it
was in the Soviets' apparent lack of response to this new
generation of technology.
But the Soviets were not idle, and commenced work on a new
generation of fighters during the early seventies, drawing
heavily on the concepts adopted by the Americans in the teen
series fighters. Clearly the new aircraft had to provide a
worthwhile performance margin against the US aircraft as
they would be at least half a decade later in deployment.
Also they had to be manufactured within an industrial base
much less sophisticated than that of the Western world,
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 5 - Fulcrum & Flanker
while also retaining the simplicity and ruggedness which the
Soviet military uncompromisingly demanded.
There is some contention at this time concerning the origin
of the basic aerodynamic configuration which the Soviets
adopted for both the Fulcrum and Flanker, its nearest
equivalent in the West was one of Grumman's early F-14 pro-
posals with a fixed rather than variable geometry wing. This
configuration was adopted with the addition of ogival fore-
body strakes and wing/fuselage blending, a technique first
used in the West on the YF-16 LWF demonstrator. Many Western
observers, noting the commonality in layout between both So-
viet fighters, have attributed the configuration to the TsA-
GI (Central Aero-Fluid-dynamics Institute, much a Russian
NACA/NASA), who are known to have wind tunnel tested a
Sukhoi design of the given configuration extensively during
the early seventies. No doubt time (and glasnost) will shed
light upon the full story.
The twin engine twin tail blended fuselage/strake hybrid
planform configuration common to both designs is optimised
for sustained subsonic manoeuvring. Excellent high angle of
attack (AoA) lifting performance is achieved by a combina-
tion of body lift generated by the large fuselage carapace,
and enhanced wing lift resulting from the formation of vor-
tices by the large forebody strakes. In this fashion the
configuration exploits attributes of both the F-14 family
and the F-17/18 family. The usage of large strakes well for-
ward will also substantially affect the lift distribution by
shifting the centre of pressure forward and thus reducing
the static stability margin, particularly with increasing
AoA. This, used with a stability augmentation system, will
improve instantaneous pitch rates while reducing the neces-
sary tailplane download required to maintain high AoA. The
twin vertical tails of both the MiG-29 and Su-27 are large
and very widely spaced to avoid interference with the fore-
body vortices at high angle of attack.
The powerplant installation in long nacelles, with inlets
well below the forward fuselage, is designed for minimum in-
terference with external flow and best possible pressure
recovery at high AoA. While this arrangement has some penal-
ties insofar as vulnerability to foreign object damage
(FOD), weapon carriage and undercarriage stowage go, these
were sacrifices made quite readily in the quest for good en-
gine performance at high AoA. Both the Fulcrum and Flanker
have relatively narrow fuselage tunnels in comparison with
the F-14, which limits the usefulness of the fuselage for
semiconformal weapon or fuel tank carriage, again this
penalty was accepted to ensure the desired relative geometry
between the inlets and forebody/nose of the aircraft. The
upper lip of the variable geometry inlets is clearly offset
to ensure removal of the ventral forebody boundary layer.
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 6 - Fulcrum & Flanker
Supersonic dash performance for the air defence role was a
lesser priority but reflects in the usage of variable inlet
geometry and the pronounced area ruling of the fuselage,
resulting in the substantial forward hump. The resulting
airframe configuration thus offers excellent sustained and
instantaneous turn performance at subsonic speeds, adequate
supersonic dash performance and a substantial internal
volume for fuel. It is penalised by limited fuselage area
available for stores carriage, particularly in the MiG
design, and poor fuselage and inlet clearance in landing
configuration. Clearly air combat manoeuvring performance
was the highest priority in the minds of the designers and
little was compromised in the pursuit of this objective.
The common configuration of the Fulcrum and Flanker cleverly
blends aerodynamic features used in several earlier Western
designs with the result of superb subsonic manoeuvring per-
formance, without the benefit of sophisticated flight con-
trol software. The agility displayed by both types at vari-
ous events over the last several years provides practical
evidence of that what can be inferred from the geometry of
the aircraft. The detail areas in which the two aircraft
differ in turn reflect the specific roles of the aircraft.
Mikoyan MiG-29A Fulcrum A
Development of the Fulcrum progressed through the seventies
and was first confirmed by Western reconnaisance when proto-
types were seen at Ramenskoye test centre in 1977. These
aircraft were provisionally allocated the reporting name of
Ram-L, subsequent US intelligence reports stated that the
aircraft entered production in 1982. It is certain that ma-
jor toothing troubles were encountered because the aircraft
did not achieve full operational capability until the mid
eighties, a full decade after its Western adversaries. The
principal user of the Fulcrum is the FA-VVS, the Soviet
Army's tactical air arm, with aircraft deployed in Eastern
Europe and within the USSR. An export drive seeking hard
currency has resulted in export sales to India, Yugoslavia,
Syria, Cuba, North Korea and other Third World nations,
although it is not clear whether these aircraft retain the
full systems capability of the Soviet aircraft.
Airframe and Propulsion
Without access to engineering documentation it is difficult
to analyse the Fulcrum structurally, it is however known to
employ conventional Al alloy construction in most areas. The
forward fuselage will almost certainly be a separate shell,
split into a radar/avionics bay, crew station and possibly a
fuel tank area. The fuselage carapace will be another major
assembly, absorbing the structural loads from the wings and
mounting the tail booms which carry the vertical tails and
horizontal tail surfaces. The fuselage tunnel between the
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 7 - Fulcrum & Flanker
nacelles is narrow and thus not useful for stores carriage,
although a drop tank can be fitted with a major drag penal-
ty. What is unique to the Fulcrum is the FOD protection
mechanism, which uses inlet blocking doors and dorsal
louvres. On the ground at low speed the inlets are closed
and air ingested from above the aircraft. This arrangement
is almost certainly an exercise in fudging an existing
design which probably had far greater fuel capacity and
lower empty weight, but had a FOD problem when operated
under typical Soviet field conditions. As a result, most of
the Fulcrum's 9,000 lb of fuel will be in fuselage/carapace
fuel cells. The aircraft's variable geometry intake almost
certainly uses the FOD door as a single normal shock ramp,
to provide acceptable inlet performance at Mach 2 speeds.
The undercarriage is of conventional design, with a dual
nosewheel retracting aft and single mainwheels retracting
forward, the mainwheels rotating flush into the wing roots.
The vertical tails are very large in area to ensure control-
lability at high AoA without the use of fly-by-wire control.
Roll control is via outboard ailerons and differential sta-
bilator, with aileron control probably phased out at high
speeds. Half span trailing edge flaps and full span leading
edge flaps are used for landing and takeoff, there is no in-
dication of their usage as manoeuvre flaps. The wing has
three stations for pylons, typically carrying two BVR AAMs
inboard and dogfight AAMs outboard. Up to four wing mount
drop tanks may be carried, with quoted capacities of up to
800 lb of fuel. The Fulcrum is powered by a pair of Isotov
RD-33 low bypass ratio afterburning turbofans. The engine
uses a twin shaft arrangement, with a conventional variable
area exhaust nozzle. The engine is rated at 18,300 lb max-
imum afterburning thrust, with a specific fuel consumption
of 0.77 lb/lb.hr and weighs in at 2,700 lb. The high
thrust/weight ratio of the RD-33 has a penalty in poor dura-
bility, although this would not be seen as a problem in the
Soviet logistical system which is structured about complete
engine overhauls at several hundred hours.
Avionic Systems
The core of the Fulcrum's weapon system is the NO-93 Flash
Dance coherent pulse Doppler look-down shoot-down radar,
which is integrated with an Infra-Red Search and Track/Laser
Rangefinder (IRST/LR) system. The radar has a quoted detec-
tion range of 54 n.mi. against fighter size targets, no in-
formation has been released on its target tracking capabili-
ty. The IRST/LR and radar are slaved such that the inactive
sensor tracks the boresight of the active sensor, this al-
lows radar silent IR stalking of targets under VFR condi-
tions with automatic switchover to radar if infrared lock is
lost eg by cloud cover. Soviet engineers claim the IRST/LR
is extremely accurate providing more precise gun solutions
than the radar in visual engagements. What is not stated is
that this arrangement can defeat jamming of the fire control
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 8 - Fulcrum & Flanker
radar, by switching to IRST/LR to complete the engagement.
Little has been published on the Fulcrum's defensive suite,
it is known to carry a Sirena 3 (or possibly later genera-
tion design) Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) and upward firing
flare/chaff dispensers in the vertical tail root extensions.
It is not clear whether defensive trackbreaker ECM is car-
ried, this is however likely given the presence of unex-
plained dielectric patches on the strakes and tailbooms.
Other systems known to be carried are a radio altimeter and
radio equipment for tie-in into the ground control intercept
environment.
Cockpit
The cockpit of the Fulcrum more than anything illustrates
the limitations of Soviet technological capability, as it is
at the best comparable to late sixties Western technology.
The layout is rather conventional, with a left hand console
mounted throttles, centre control stick and a far left posi-
tioned switch bank. The AH, load factor, AoA, altimeter and
DG are left of centre, the ASI, VSI and engine gauges to the
right of centre. The upper right panel area is filled with a
shrouded radar/IRST scope and a block of telltale warning
indicators. A dual flat combiner Head Up Display (HUD) is
fitted, the HUD camera optics are fed via optical fibre bun-
dle. A Helmet Mounted Sight (HMS) can be carried, its out-
put is fed together with IRST and radar parameters to the
fire control computer which drives the HUD and missile seek-
ers. The canopy is relatively low and thus provides inferi-
or rearward visibility in comparison with its Western coun-
terparts. The pilot sits on a K-36D zero-zero seat which was
inadvertently demonstrated to work well at last year's Paris
air show. With a cockpit much like sixties vintage Western
fighters, the workload will be substantial where the pilot
must rapidly switch weapons modes and manipulate systems, eg
during a close-in engagement. While this would be considered
a disadvantage in the West, it was another compromise ac-
cepted by the Soviets to keep the design as simple, main-
tainable and easy to produce as possible.
Performance and Weapons
With an combat weight of 30,200 lb and installed engine
thrust of 36,600 lb, the Fulcrum is a very agile fighter. It
has a wing loading and thrust/weight ratio which allow sus-
tained 9G turning and excellent acceleration, including the
ability to accelerate in a vertical climb at lower fuel
states. The Fulcrum is redlined at 2.3M or 809 kt and has a
sea level maximum RoC of 65,000 ft/min, which is respectable
performance for the dash to intercept mission. In the
fighter escort role the Fulcrum offers an unspectacular com-
bat radius of over 300 n.mi. which is however acceptable for
its primary role. Accepting this limitation, its accelera-
tion and turning performance make up the principal elements
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 9 - Fulcrum & Flanker
of a successful air superiority fighter design. In terms of
weapon load, the MiG-29 typically carries two large medium
range R-23 (AA-7 Apex) missiles and four R-60 (AA-8 Aphid)
heatseeking dogfight missiles. These are supplemented with a
single barrel 30 mm cannon for close-in combat. Soviet Ful-
crums are also reported to carry the new AA-10 Alamo BVR
missile and the AA-11 Archer dogfight missile. All missiles
are carried on wing mounted pylons with the resulting drag
penalties. An unknown factor at this time is the performance
of the new Fulcrum C which is reported to have a substan-
tially higher internal fuel capacity as a result of a larger
fuselage hump. Other upgrades reported involve a fly by wire
control system and glass cockpit, which imply a mission com-
puter and thus highly automated cockpit and weapon system.
Mission
The principal role of the Fulcrum is air superiority and air
defence in support of Soviet land forces. While the aircraft
is claimed to be capable of carrying up to 6,700 lb of air
to ground stores, it does not appear to be fitted with the
inertial navigation equipment or laser designator required
for precision bomb delivery. Given the abundance of dedicat-
ed strike aircraft in the FA VVS inventory, mud bashing was
obviously not a priority. Deployed in the central European
theatre, the Fulcrum would be used to engage NATO's F-15 and
F-16 force thus allowing FA strike aircraft to penetrate
NATO's air defence barrier. In the air defence role it would
use its lookdown shootdown radar to engage NATO's low flying
F-111 and Tornado aircraft, up to now almost impossible to
stop. The greatest tactical limitation of Fulcrum A is its
limited radius which is rather low for its class of air su-
periority fighter (and almost certainly not what the
designers intended), nevertheless it is a vast improvement
over the earlier Fishbed, the later Flogger not being a
serious contender for this role. Fulcrum C will almost cer-
tainly match its Western counterparts in combat radius. De-
ployment of the Fulcrum spells the end for older air su-
periority fighters such as the F-4E/F and the Mirage III/F.1
and will force the need for fighter escort for most NATO
strike aircraft. In Third World scenarios the Fulcrum bal-
ances the F-16A and defeats all earlier aircraft.
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 10 - Fulcrum & Flanker
Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker
The development of the Flanker was a protracted affair. It
appears that conceptual work on the design began as far back
as 1969, in response to the emerging F-14 and F-15. In any
event, the design work progressed slowly as the first proto-
type of the Flanker A first flew in early 1977, soon receiv-
ing the provisional designation of Ram-K. The A model was
largely a technology demonstrator for aerodynamic, propul-
sion and structural design purposes. It differed from later
airframes in many respects, with vertical tails above the
engine nacelles, beavertail afterbody, different wing plan-
form with fences and a lanky rearward retracting forward un-
dercarriage assembly. While this aircraft had many of the
sought aerodynamic characteristics, its undercarriage and
inlet arrangement were unsuitable for field deployment, its
strakes did not perform to expectations and its vertical
tails would have suffered similar problems to those of the
F-17/18 family ie vortex interference. The production stan-
dard Flanker B first flew in 1981 but again experienced
numerous delays to deployment reportedly due to difficulties
with the radar and avionic equipment. This is credible given
the crudeness of preceding Soviet designs. The US DoD
states that IOC was achieved in 1986, when the first air-
craft were delivered to PVO regiments. At the time of writ-
ing Flanker numbers had reached well over 100 with produc-
tion continueing at a steady pace. It is not clear whether
the Soviets plan to export the Flanker in substantial
numbers. Because it is a large and complex aircraft it will
be expensive to purchase and to run, therefore few of the
USSR's Third World clients will be able to afford it, let
alone have a strategically viable use for it. Given however
the desperate need the Russians have for hard currency, and
the bombastic attitudes of many Third World leaders, the
possibility of export cannot be discounted in the longer
term.
Airframe and Propulsion
The airframe of the Flanker is far more aerodynamically re-
fined than that of the smaller Fulcrum. Like the Fulcrum,
the general layout dictates much of the structural confi-
guration of the aircraft, with correspondingly similar
placement of functional blocks. The structure of the Flanker
employs generous amounts of titanium. The fuselage/carapace
of the Flanker employs wing body blending most apparent aft
of the strakes, this provides considerable internal volume
for fuel. Further fuel is housed in the pronounced hump
which also structurally supports an F-15 style dorsal speed-
brake. This arrangment cleverly exploits area ruling for low
supersonic drag while maximising fuel volume, fuel is held
in urethane foam cells. The inlets of the Flanker are typi-
cal of a multiple oblique shock ramp inlet , as used on the
F-14, it is not clear as to how many wedges are used. The
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 11 - Fulcrum & Flanker
result is an inlet with very good performance at high super-
sonic speeds. Like the Fulcrum, protection against FOD is
used, with an internal grill deployed at low speed which
diverts ingested solids out through a bank of ventral
louvres. The aft fuselage uses a tailboom arrangement for
structural support of the vertical tails and stabilators,
with additional ventral strakes fitted to enhance direction-
al stability. The fuselage centrebody ends in a distinctive
tail bullet. The undercarriage is conventional with
nosewheel and mainwheels retracting forward, the nosewheel
has a mud guard fitted. The large size of the Flanker allows
a reasonably wide fuselage tunnel which is much like the F-
14 used for stores carriage. The aircraft has two tandem
tunnel stations and two nacelle stations. The wing is
moderately swept and fitted with full span leading edge
manoeuvre flaps and part span inboard flaperons for roll
control, all tied into the fly-by-wire system. Two pylons
can be fitted and the wingtip carries a fixed launch rail.
The fly-by-wire control system is a first in a Soviet tacti-
cal aircraft, it is a triple redundant analogue system com-
parable to that in the F-16A. An AoA limiter (35 degrees),
load factor, roll, yaw and pitch rate limiters are built in,
some of these may be disengaged by the pilot.
Avionic Systems
Like the Fulcrum, the Flanker's weapon system is built
around a large pulse Doppler lookdown shootdown radar aug-
mented by a IRST/LR system. The designation of the radar and
its performance figures have not been made available to
date, but given the size of the aircraft and thus antenna a
detection range of 130 nautical miles has been suggested.
Other conjecture suggests the radar is a high PRF (pulse re-
petition frequency) type optimised for detection range of
head on targets, which is entirely consistent with the
aircraft's stated primary role of longe range intercept. The
IRST/LR equipment fitted appears to be larger than that of
the Fulcrum which implies larger optics and thus more sensi-
tivity implying in turn better detection range performance.
It is likely that the IRST/LR and radar are integrated in
the same fashion as that of the smaller MiG. Nothing has to
date been published on the Flanker's defensive avionic
suite, but given the size of the aircraft and its alternate
offensive role a capable system must be assumed. Dielectric
patches on the strakes, wing roots, tail bullet and inlet
antenna housings suggest a separate RWR and defensive track-
breaker ECM. The location of the chaff/flare dispenser is
not clear from published photographs. In terms of communi-
cations equipment, the standard Soviet air defence suite
must be assumed, with additional HF equipment for long range
operations. The HF antenna is most likely hidden beneath the
dielectric panel on the leading edge of the right vertical
stabiliser. An unknown at this time is the reported new
variant of the Flanker equipped with a digital flight con-
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 12 - Fulcrum & Flanker
trol system, glass cockpit and presumably a sophisticated
computer based fire control system.
Cockpit
The cockpit of the Flanker is much like that of the Fulcrum,
both in usage of conventional instruments and in layout. Un-
like the Fulcrum, the Flanker has a large bubble canopy with
sills well below pilot shoulder height, and much larger con-
soles on either side. The instrument panel has a similar
layout, but is less crowded with most of the switches shift-
ed to the side consoles. The left hand console mounts the
twin throttles, while the right hand consoles are occupied
with three sets of keypads, the function of which has not
been discussed. It is likely that these will be associated
with a digital weapon delivery computer, stores control sys-
tem and possibly the flight control computer. The HUD is
similar to that of the Fulcrum, but uses slightly different
controls and does not appear to have the lensing and cable
associated with the gun camera. Provision is made for the
Helmet Mounted Sight. The Flanker cockpit offers excellent
visibility in all directions, much like Western fighters and
is spacious enough to be comfortable on long range missions.
As such it is major departure from traditional Soviet design
practice which suggests a more serious view of this matter.
Performance and Weapons
The Flanker is an air superiority fighter with aerodynamic
performance in the class of the F-15 and F-14D, with good
manoeuvring ability, acceleration and excellent combat ra-
dius. Rated at 9G maximum load factor and using a fly-by-
wire control system and relaxed static stability, the Flank-
er offers excellent sustained and instantaneous turning per-
formance which are essential for successful gun and all as-
pect missile engagements. The aircraft's controllability at
extreme AoA, demonstrated at the Paris air show, suggests
few restrictions upon manoeuvring during dogfights. The
combat thrust/weight ratio of 1.25 at 30% fuel load implies
excellent acceleration and climb performance thus providing
the Flanker with a major energy advantage against most op-
ponents. As an interceptor, the 20,000 lb of internal fuel,
climb performance and 2.35M dash speed suggest sustained
afterburning dashes to intercept are feasible which vastly
reduces the opportunities available for its quarry to es-
cape. Flanker's combat radius will depend upon profile and
payload, but will certainly approach 800 n.mi. and with
external tanks would be substantially greater. The Flanker
is equipped with a single internal 30 mm gun carrying over
200 rounds of ammunition, which given its rate of fire is a
reasonable figure if Soviet statements concerning the accu-
racy of the infrared/laser fire control are correct. The
aircraft can carry up to ten air-air missiles which would be
mixed for the mission to be flown. Operational aircraft have
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 13 - Fulcrum & Flanker
been photographed with loads of six BVR AA-10 Alamo mis-
siles, two rounds on tandem tunnel stations, two on nacelle
stations and two on inboard wing stations. Typically the
wing station rounds are the heatseeking AA-10B and the
fuselage rounds the semiactive radar AA-10C. Outboard wing
and wingtip stations are then available for the AA-11
heatseeking dogfight missile.
Mission
The formally stated role of the Flanker is long range air
intercept and air superiority. What this implies is that the
aircraft would defend the extremities of Soviet airspace and
associated ocean areas from hostile aircraft. In practice
PVO Flankers deployed to strategic areas such as the Kola
peninsula and Kamchatka would perform two roles, intercept-
ing SAC bombers on strategic raids and frustrating the US
Navy's attempts to implement the Maritime Strategy by sail-
ing carrier battle groups up to Soviet ocean sanctuaries. In
either of the roles the Flanker will have a major impact.
With its radar/IRST capability it will threaten both the B-
1B and B-52H on penetration missions and possibly even
standoff cruise missile strikes, given its substantial com-
bat radius. In the maritime scenario it will tie down USN
fighter assets at those operating radii where massed
bomber/ASCM strikes against the carriers are most likely, as
a result the F-14s will have to fight both the Flanker and
the inbound bombers. In this fashion the Flanker is a po-
tent defensive asset.
What has received little publicity is the assignment of the
Flanker to squadrons of the Soviet strategic air force,
Russia's counterpart to SAC. In this role the Flanker be-
comes a long range fighter escort for the Backfires,
Blackjacks and Bears tasked with conventional or nuclear
strike against strategic or theatre targets. In this fashion
bombers inbound to targets in the UK, Iceland, Norway,
Japan, Alaska and the Aleutians would receive fighter escort
with the objective of frustrating defending interceptors.
Needless to say, the Tornado ADVs, F-4s and F-16s tasked
with air intercept are likely to sustain substantial attri-
tion if they engage the Flanker. Deployment of substantial
numbers of Flankers in this role would have a major impact
upon any large confrontation, as the Soviets would for the
first time be able to implement a Douhet strategy of sus-
tained strategic air attack and thus put at risk Western
targets up to now secure. The implications are obvious.
The navalised Flanker currently undergoing carrier compati-
bility trials on the new Soviet CVN will cause revolutionary
changes in Soviet naval capability. The absence of capable
naval fighters has rendered Soviet naval surface forces im-
potent in the face of the USN CBG, as there can be no con-
test between a SAM firing ship and a massed strike force of
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 14 - Fulcrum & Flanker
missile firing aircraft. Flanker will defend the fleet and
provide offensive fighter escort for anti shipping strikes.
It is fair to say that the Flanker will ultimately have the
greatest impact upon Soviet air capability of any fighter
aircraft since WW II. It is therefore surprising that the
deployment of this aircraft has produced so little reaction,
in comparison with the ineffective Foxbat during the six-
ties. The success of the Allied air war against the Axis
powers resulted largely from the superior combat radius of
Allied fighters. Flanker represents the first departure by
the Soviets from Axis air warfare strategy and should be
seen as such. Western air warfare strategists are well ad-
vised to take this event seriously.
The Australian Pespective
>From the Australian observer's viewpoint, both the Fulcrum
and Flanker represent a potential long term problem, both in
terms of a general threat to Western air power and as poten-
tial regional threats. While the contingency of a large full
scale confrontation between the Western world and the Com-
munist bloc is increasingly unlikely with time, as the
USSR's relative economic strength and thus ability to fight
a protracted conflict decline, the determined marketing ef-
fort of the Soviet government will see these aircraft sooner
or later proliferating throughout the Third World. In a full
scale confrontation the superior numbers of Western teen
series fighters would lead to rapid attrition of the numeri-
cally inferior Soviet force, ie even trading one for one
will result in a favourable long term outcome and thus So-
viet defeat. A regional confrontation between a lesser
power such as Australia and a Third World threat is however
a rather different situation, as the criterion of numerical
superiority will no longer apply and thus an exchange rate
of that order would be at the least disastrous. In compara-
tive terms both Soviet fighters must weigh out about equal
in performance to their Western counterparts, the slight ad-
vantage in agility would almost certainly be balanced by
better airmanship and superior Western weapons and electron-
ic warfare capability. The latter factors may be considered
seriously by competent air warfare strategists, however
those are few and far between amongst the ranks of Third
World military leaders who are more likely to conclude that
x percent better aerodynamic performance will directly
translate into a very favourable exchange rate. The folly of
the Argentine air force must be quoted as a case study,
where the supersonic Mirage was perceived to be more than a
match for the subsonic Harrier. As the Falklands demonstrat-
ed, airmanship, weapon systems and missile performance had a
far greater impact upon exchange rate. As a result it is
reasonable to conclude that a cheaply acquired force of
several dozen Fulcrums may well be perceived as offering a
sufficient advantage to make a confrontation winnable. That
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 15 - Fulcrum & Flanker
is of course a dangerous situation as it may encourage hos-
tilities, once of course committed to a confrontation, it is
difficult for a government to extricate itself. Faced with
such a confrontation, Australia with its existing inventory
would be in a difficult situation unless the RAAF were given
the freedom to wage a full scale counterair campaign with
the objective of destroying as many of these aircraft as
possible on the ground thus conferring a sufficient numeri-
cal advantage in the air to secure a reasonable exchange
rate. Under these circumstances rules of engagement become
quite critical, as the best means of defeating such a threat
lies in exploiting the superior radar/missile/systems per-
formance of the F/A-18 in BVR combat. If the ROE force com-
bat at visual range, exchange rates cannot be expected to be
particularly favourable. The whole USAF strategy behind the
ATF hinges on the ability to defeat Soviet aircraft in BVR
engagements by using superior radar/missile/systems perfor-
mance combined with stealth technology to degrade the capa-
bility of Soviet radar and missiles. If the ROE force the
ATF to engage the Soviet aircraft in visual combat, much of
its technological advantage is wasted and the exchange rate
may no longer reflect the imbalance in technology. The air
war over North Vietnam was a case study with ROE effectively
robbing the USAF and USN of any advantage conferred by tech-
nology. There are two aspects of defeating this class of
threat which the RAAF would have to address. The first is
ensuring an acceptable kill ratio in air superiority opera-
tions and the second is ensuring that strike aircraft are
not subjected to attrition by this threat. In dealing with
the first aspect, there are several options available. The
firstinvolves hardware upgrades to the F/A-18A to improve
its agility, BVR lethality and electronic warfare capabili-
ty. This would involve fitting more powerful engines (ie
18,000 lb F-404-GE-402 Enhanced Performance Engine), laser
warning equipment and better jammers and missiles to improve
kill ratios in close-in combat. The second would involve
trading in some F/A-18s and acquiring some higher perfor-
mance aircraft instead, producing a two tier hi-lo mix
fighter force like that of the USAF or USN. The third and
least credible to an opponent option is to acquire standoff
airfield attack munitions and attempt to preemptively des-
troy the threat on the ground, once hostilities commence.
In dealing with the second aspect, defending strike air-
craft, the choices are more limited. Because the Fulcrum
will burn through jamming at close range and can use its
IRST/LR at close range, fitting the F-111 with laser warning
equipment is a must, while upgrading the jamming suite may
also be of some benefit. This may not be adequate though and
the choices then largely reduce to that of providing fighter
escort on strike missions, assuming that the RAAF fighter
force can engage on favourable terms, and that of supple-
menting or replacing the F-111 with a stealth technology
strike aircraft such as the A-12A Avenger II (Advanced Tac-
tical Aircraft) sooner than currently anticipated. Both of
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 16 - Fulcrum & Flanker
these options will be expensive. Fighter escort at extended
ranges will require more tankers which would probably need
to double up as communications relay platforms. Airborne
Early Warning may be another requirement. Fighter capability
is another problem, as discussed above. The other alterna-
tive of acquiring the A-12 will also be expensive, although
given realistic timescales the F-111 is likely to be out of
airframe life at about the time when such a contingency
could be reasonably expected to arise. The A-12 may well be
the eventual replacement for the RAAF F-111 regardless, this
aircraft has already been designated as the long term re-
placement for the USAF F-111 fleet.
In summary acquisition of the Fulcrum by regional powers
would require the RAAF to adopt a range of measures to re-
store the current favourable balance in capability. We can
hope that the RAAF will give this problem some careful
thought to ensure that a properly structured and appropriate
response is taken, should this situation arise. The risk in
not doing so will ultimately lie in a potential regional op-
ponent seeing the odds to be more favourable than they real-
ly are, and behaving accordingly. It will be rather late to
cry wolf once that has occurred.
------------------------------------------
REFERENCES:
Whitford R. 'Design for Air Combat', Jane's Publishing Co,
1987
Shaw R.L. 'Fighter Combat, Tactics and Maneuvering',Naval
Institute Press,1985
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 17 - Fulcrum & Flanker
AIR SUPERIORITY PERFORMANCE COMPARISON TABLE (PACIFIC BASIN)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type F-15C F/A-18A F-16A Su-27 MiG-29
Eagle Hornet Falcon Flanker B Fulcrum A
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regional Users USAF, USN,RAAF USAF USSR USSR
JASDF Sth Korea India
Indonesia Nth Korea
Singapore
Thailand
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crew 1(2-D) 1(2-B) 1(2-B) 1(2-UB) 1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dimensions (ft)
Span 42.8 40.4 32.8 48.2 37.27
Length 63.8 56.0 47.6 71.9 57.14
Height 18.5 15.3 16.4 19.45 15.52
Wing Area (sq) 608.0 400.0 300 ~680* 408*
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weights (lb)
Basic Empty 29,900 23,000 14,567 33,800 24,200
MTOW 44,800 37,500 33,000 66,000 39,000
Combat 39,800 30,000 19,100 48,400 30,200
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Int Fuel(lb) 13,455 11,000 6,972 22,200 8,900
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Propulsion
Manufacturer GE GE P&W Lyulka Isotov
Type F110-GE100 F404-GE400 F100-PW100 AL-31F RD-33
Thrust,Dry(lb) 18,300 11,000 16,200 ~17,000 11,000
Thrust,A/B(lb) 28,000 16,000 23,810 27,500 18,300
SFC A/B-Dry(lb/lb.hr) ~2.0-0.8 1.85-~0.8 2.17-~0.8 ~2.0-0.75 1.96-0.77
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapon Load (A/A)
Gun M-61A1 M-61A1 M-61A1 1x30mm 1x30mm
IR AAM (A) 4xAIM-9M 2xAIM-9M 4xAIM-9 4xAA-11 4xAA-8
(B) - 4xAIM-9M 2xAIM-9 4xAA-8 4xAA-11
BVR AAM (A) 4xAIM-7M 2xAIM-7M - 6xAA-10** 2xAA-7
(B) 4xAIM-120 2xAIM-120 - 4xAA-10** 2xAA-10
(C) - - - 2xAA-10** -
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fire Control
Radar Type APG-63PSP APG-65 APG-66 LD/SD PD NO-93
Detect.Range(n.mi.) 100+ 38+ - cca 130 cca 54
TWS Targets 8 10 1 1 1
E/O System - - - IRST/ IRST/
Laser Laser
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electronic Warfare
RWR ALR-56C ALR-67 ALR-69 yes Sirena 3
ECM(Internal) ALQ-135 ALQ-126B - yes yes
Dispenser ALE-45 ALE-39 ALE-40 yes yes
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 18 - Fulcrum & Flanker
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance
Max.Sp.Alt 2.5M 1.8M 1.95M 2.35M 2.3M+
Combat T/W Dry 0.92 0.733 0.85 ~0.7 0.73
Combat T/W A/B 1.41 1.07 1.25 1.14 1.21
Combat Ld Fctr(G) +7.33 +7.5 +9 +9 +9
Combat Wg Ldg(lb/ft2) 63.2 75.0 63.7 71.2 74.1
Inst Turn Rt(deg/sec) 16.0 - - 23.0*** 21.0***
Sust Turn Rt(deg/sec) 14.0 16.0 - 17.0*** 16.0***
Combat Radius ~600 405 490 ~800 ~350
Inflight Refuelling yes yes yes no no
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* not accounting for body lift at high AoA
** usually a mix of AA-10A, short range IR AA-10B and long range radar AA-10C
*** these turn rate figures are provisional and probably inaccurate
Definitions:
MTOW - Maximum TakeOff Weight
Combat Weight - 50% internal fuel, typical AAM load
SFC - Specific Fuel Consumption
IR AAM - InfraRed, ie heatseeking Air-Air Missile
BVR AAM - Beyond Visual Range Air-Air Missile, usually
radar guided
TWS - Track-While-Scan, the ability of the radar to
maintain multiple target tracks
LD/SD PD - LookDown/ShootDown Pulse Doppler
E/O - Electro/Optical, usually infrared or TV
RWR - Radar Warning Receiver
ECM - Electronic CounterMeasures, ie trackbreaker
jamming equipment
Combat Parameter - taken at combat weight, typical weapon load,
at altitude
Missile Weights:
AIM-9=200 lb, AIM-7=500 lb, AIM-120=330 lb,
AA-7=700 lb, AA-8=130 lb, AA-10=~500 lb, AA-11=~200 lb
Author's note:
This table was compiled from a wide range of sources some of
which disagree on specific parameters. Where this has oc-
curred, reasonable estimates or interpolation have been used
and the figure tagged as approximate (~). It is worth noting
that the combat performance of the Flanker is taken at 50%
of its unusually large internal fuel load and thus appears
rather modest. If a combat fuel load of 7,000 lb is assumed,
the combat weight of 44,400 lb yields an afterburning T/W of
1.24 and a wing loading of 65.3 lb/sqft which places the
aircraft firmly in the class of a F100-PW-100 powered F-15C.
Combat missile loads are typical and usually comprise IR AAM
(A) and BVR AAM (A) loads, although the Flanker is taken
with its typical BVR AAM (A) load only.
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 19 - Fulcrum & Flanker
Pictures:
Part 1.
Picture Caption 1 (Fulcrum, in flight)
The MiG-29 Fulcrum is the principal air superiority fighter
flown by the Frontovaya Aviatsia, the Russian equivalent to
the USAF TAC. Its primary role is air superiority over the
battlefield, where it would challenge NATO's F-15 and F-16
force, while also using its lookdown-shootdown weapon system
to hunt down NATO's F-111 and Tornado IDS strike aircraft.
Picture Caption 2 (Fulcrum flying at high AoA)
The hybrid planform of the Fulcrum exploits non-linear vor-
tex lift generated by the ogival forebody strakes at high
AoA. This together with body lift generated by the fuselage
carapace provides for excellent sustained turn rate. The
aircraft is powered by a pair of Isotov RD-33 afterburning
low bypass ratio fans which deliver 18,300 lb of thrust
each, resulting in acceleration and climb rate performance
comparable to that of the F-16 Falcon.
Picture Caption 3 (Fulcrum on the ground)
The Fulcrum is designed for a Third World operating environ-
ment, much like that in the USSR. It has robust undercar-
riage and an elaborate FOD protection mechanism in its in-
lets, its systems are as simple as possible and its cockpit
is of conventional sixties design. A typical weapon load for
export aircraft is two AA-7 Apex BVR missiles and four AA-8
Aphid dogfight missiles, supplemented with an internal 30 mm
cannon with ranging provided by the infrared/laser equipment
or radar.
Picture Caption 4 (RAAF F/A-18)
The RAAF's F/A-18A has inferior thrust/weight ratio to the
Fulcrum A largely as a result of its detuned GE F404-GE-400
engines. These deliver only 16,000 lb each of afterburning
thrust which at almost equal combat weights gives the Ful-
crum a better than 10 % advantage in afterburning
thrust/weight. The penalty paid by the Fulcrum is an engine
TBO quoted at 350 hours, which will vastly increase life cy-
cle costs. Engine upgrades for the F/A-18A could include
current 18,000 lb or newer 20,000 lb versions of the F404,
although the latter would probably require a larger inlet
for increased airflow.
<<<<<SPLIT>>>>>
Part 2.
February 6, 1991
Australian Aviation 1990 - 20 - Fulcrum & Flanker
Picture Caption 1 (Flanker in flight high AoA)
The Flanker B combines the use of vortex lift and relaxed
static stability to achieve very high sustained and instan-
taneous turn rates, which make it a formidable adversary in
gun and all aspect missile engagements. The triplex fly-by-
wire control system and aerodynamic design provide excep-
tional controllability at very high angles of attack. Flank-
er B is fitted with a pair of 28,000 lb thrust Lyulka AL-31F
afterburning fans which provide very good acceleration and
climb performance at combat weights.
Picture Caption 2 (Flanker in flight)
The Su-27 Flanker is a milestone in Soviet fighter design,
radically departing from established design practices. It
has a large bubble canopy for air combat and a 20,000 lb
internal fuel capacity conferring truly strategic combat ra-
dius. To these features must be added a powerful lookdown-
shootdown radar integrated with an infrared/laser fire con-
trol system. Flanker carries up to six large AA-10 BVR AAMs
with up to four AA-11 Archer dogfight AAMs, supplemented by
a 30 mm internal cannon.
Picture Caption 3 (Flanker)
The stated primary role of the PVO Flanker force is long
range air defence, frustrating strategic raids by SAC B-1B
and B-52G/H bombers, and preventing US Navy carriers from
threatening Soviet coastal targets. Flankers deployed with
Soviet strategic air forces have a very different role, fly-
ing long range fighter escort for Bears, Backfires and
Blackjacks tasked with strikes on strategic and theatre tar-
gets, such as the UK, Iceland, Japan, Alaska and the Aleu-
tians.
--- end ---