drn@pinet.aip.org (donald_newcomb) (02/07/91)
From: drn@pinet.aip.org (donald_newcomb) There has been some recent play in the media about how the National Guard wasn't ready for war and had to be shipped off to Ft. Irwin to be trained before going to the PG. This has caused a great deal of reflection about the Total Force concept and how well it will apply in the future. The old question, "Should the Regular Army be strengthened at the expense of the NG?," is being asked, once again. I can tell you that the higher-ups in the MS-NG were absolutely livid! The 155th Mechanized (1st Mississippi) Infantry scored higher than regular units in their readiness tests. They just got back from Ft. Irwin; what was it that the Army forgot to teach them when they were there? There is a lot of historical, anecdotal evidence of the Regulars sandbagging the NG to prove that they can't do the job. This is especially true in the dog-eat-dog world of field and general grade officers, where the Army has often called up reserve units and replaced their officers with Regulars or broken the units up to use as replacements. What are the FACTS? Does anyone have the readiness figures for NG roundout units? How many NG field & general grade officers have been called up? How many left behind? What is the source of these reports about the NG? Please reply directly to this mailbox. I will post a synopsis of the replies. ========================================================================== | Donald R. Newcomb | Disclaimer: These are my opinions| | (601) 863-2235 | and I disclaim nothing because I | | drn@pinet.aip.org (new) | pay for this mailbox. | ==========================================================================
emery@aries.mitre.org (David Emery) (02/08/91)
From: emery@aries.mitre.org (David Emery) We had a briefing in my Guard unit last night with a lot of lessons learned from the recent mobilizations. I really can't go into details, but a couple of general observations are worth noting: 1. USAR/ARNG (generically, RC units) combat support and combat service support units are performing superbly, pretty much across the board 2. Some RC units look just as good as RA units. One example is the Field Artillery Brigade from Oklahoma mobilized at Fort Sill. But this unit has a significant advantage, since it gets to train at the home of Field Artillery, and gets a LOT of assistance during its training. 3. There is a general problem with "not training to standard", where a RC unit is reported as being better than it is, because its evaluators used a lower standard. In general, I think that most units would be unhappy with such an evaluation, but we all know there are politics involved with such things. 4. There are some serious problems with senior NCO and officer skills and qualifications, but the junior level people are pretty good, once they get the right leadership and direction. Overall, I think there will be a lot of changes in RC unit evaluations as result of these lessons, and I think the idea of Roundout brigades for RA units (particulary the RDF units like the 24 Mech Division) is pretty much dead. You really can't expect a unit that trains 40 days per year to match one that trains 250 days per year, but the performance of some RC units is an embarrasment to many of us who _DO_ take this stuff seriously and train to meet Army standards. The approach in the entire Army is to select those (mission-critical) tasks you really have to perform to meet your mission, and this is even more important in RC units, due to the limited resources. You pick the most important tasks and train to them. Some units do this better than others. dave emery CPT, FA, NHARNG
major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt) (02/09/91)
From: bcstec!shuksan!major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt) > From drn@pinet.aip.org (donald_newcomb) > > There has been some recent play in the media about how the > National Guard wasn't ready for war and had to be shipped off to > Ft. Irwin to be trained before going to the PG. This has caused a > great deal of reflection about the Total Force concept and how > well it will apply in the future. The old question, "Should the > Regular Army be strengthened at the expense of the NG?," is being > asked, once again. On one hand, recent Army editorials have pointed to the fact that some divisions deployed, not with their NG/RES roundout units but with an active duty brigade from somewhere else. And they wondered just how effective is the 'round-out' concept. On the other hand, "had to be shipped off to Ft Irwin" because they weren't ready - rather it was a conscience decision to give them additional intense training before shipment. (I guess that's not ready huh?) > I can tell you that the higher-ups in the MS-NG were absolutely > livid! The 155th Mechanized (1st Mississippi) Infantry scored higher > than regular units in their readiness tests. They just got back from > Ft. Irwin; what was it that the Army forgot to teach them when they > were there? > There is a lot of historical, anecdotal evidence of the > Regulars sandbagging the NG to prove that they can't do the job. I have had the opportunity to train, evaluate, and manuever with National Guard and Reserve. I put on a training exercise and evaluated a brigade of the Minnesota National Guard. I was the senior evaluator of a California reserve battalion. On a REFORGER in Germany, we had on our 'left flank' the Indiana NG (38th Division?). In all my dealings I found the officers and men of the Guard and Reserve, dedicated, loyal, and professional in all respects. They took pride in the readiness of their units and worked hard to maintain that readiness - often asking our (active) help in training. Since they were 'round-out' to our units we had a vested interest in helping them maintain their readiness. I don't have any facts and figures - but I do have a sense that in many ways the Guard and Reserves are misrepresented - and their "readiness" is no more or worse than active duty "readiness". The real question is - how do you define "Readiness"? But that, as they say, is a very complex topic - and can only be answered by someone who has actually prepared a "URR" (Unit Readiness Report - prepared monthly!). And THAT, I wouldn't want to start getting into - talk about "peaking". ---------------------------------- This is what will determine "readiness" and "success" in battle: Equipment, Training, and Leadership mike schmitt "All soldiers must train for war. All else is bullshit!" - General George S. Patton Jr