cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) (02/09/91)
From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) The current controversy regarding the readiness of certain National Guard units is the result of two factors; the actual readiness of the unit(s), and the politics of the reserve program. The reserve forces, and in particular the reserve officer corps, have a great deal of political clout. This clout is both welcomed and resented/feared by the regular military people; welocmed because many of the reserve officers are political high-rollers who can be very helpful in getting things approved by Congress. Feared because the same influence can get in the way of career ambitions - like now. I am not privy to the manueverings of "high politics" in the reserve; perhaps there are others on the net who can comment. But I have seen the infighting that results over mission areas within the "total force". What it amounts to is contention for mission areas, with the regulars generally having the upper hand (since they run the Pentagon on a day- to-day basis). Reserve units generally have the less glamorous missions, but not always. Some Guard units were assigned combat missions; this was not universally popular with the regulars. Under the WWII/Korea reserve model, reserve units would supplement regular units - flesh them out from peacetime to full strength when mobilized. This was changed to a "total force" concept, in which reserve units were given unique missions as units, to be mobilized as such, and to fight as such, with their unit command structures left intact. (There are exceptions, but this is the general idea.) Reserve units were to receive the same training and equipment as their equivalent regular units. This included the guard units. Now there are two things to consider: 1. Did the guard units in question receive the training and equipment necessary to make them ready? 2. Did the guard leadership apply the training and equipment resources to make their units ready? I have no general answers to these questions based on direct observation; I do know of specific guard units (air guard, actually) that have been deployed and are doing one hell of a job, so it is possible that guard units can be ready enough to be deployed without compromising the overall operation. Now the question of politics. Remember, the total force planning was done on the assumption that we would fight the Soviets in Europe. But we are instead fighting a more limited war in the desert. As a consequence, there are a number of REGULAR units (and mission areas) left out. They are not happy about this. Neither are the RESERVE units left out. And with good reason: after this show is over, any mission area which cannot point with pride to its vital contribution will be first in line for the budget axe. I will give one example from personal experience, leaving out names to protect the guilty. 12 reserve units were assigned to be 100% of a mission area as part of the total force. This mission area was seen, during peacetime, to be of tangential importance relative to the other mission ares. But, because of the nature of the Gulf deployment, this small mission area, assigned to reserve units, was 80% of the force needed! True to plan, 3 of the units were deployed in the first wave. In readying for the next wave, it was decided to form the next wave from "volunteers" from the reserve at large, instead of taking the units that had been trained for the mission. Why do this? My opinion is that there were great complaints from the reservists in other mission areas that they were being "left out." This, in my opinion, put politics ahead of sound military judgement. But that's just my opinion. So there is a great deal of anxiety and jockeying for position on the part of both regular and reserve people (officers, principally). My opinion is that the controversy with the guard units is about equal mix of politics and objective evaluation. I will post some data on the reserve components, mission areas, etc from the latest ROA Annual Reserve Forces Review.