carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au (Carlo Kopp) (02/21/91)
From: Carlo Kopp <carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au>
(C) AUSTRALIAN AVIATION/AEROSPACE PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD 1990
P.O. Box 3105, WESTON CREEK, ACT 2611, AUSTRALIA
Ph:+616-288-1677 Fax:+616-288-2021
THE AIR LAND BATTLE
By Carlo Kopp
Part 1 USAF Close Air Support
and Battlefield Air Interdiction
Fighting the air-land battle has been a problem for Western air
war strategists and forces planners alike over the last three de-
cades. This period has seen technological changes of major pro-
portions in battlefield air defences, in aircraft and in muni-
tions and as a result, there is considerable disagreement over
what is actually the best strategy to pursue.
Historically the first air force to seriously structure about the
air land battle was Germany's Luftwaffe. It deployed the Junkers
Ju-87 Stuka well before WW2. A precision but short legged dive
bomber, the Ju-87 performed exceptional service in the opening
phases of WW2, hitting battlefield targets identified by
Wehrmacht ground commanders. In this sense it was the first true
Close Air Support (CAS) aircraft. Germany had committed itself
to the strategy of Blitzkrieg, reflecting continental land war-
fare strategy of the twenties and thirties, to that effect it
build up significant tank and armoured personnel carrier
strength, and structured the Luftwaffe tactical forces according-
ly. The strength of the Luftwaffe lay in its fast twin engined
medium range bomber force which was designed to attack battle-
field staging areas, communications and other essentially tacti-
cal targets. Used in this role it performed exceptionally well.
Where it failed to perform well was in the air war against Bri-
tain, which was somewhat more strategic in scope. The role of
the Heinkel He-111 and Dornier Do-17 is what is classed today as
Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI). The Luftwaffe is an in-
teresting case study for various reasons, but in this instance it
usefully illustrates the first force structure build around
CAS/BAI.
Western air forces have traditionally seen their role as strateg-
ic and have never seriously structured for CAS/BAI. WW2 saw CAS
operations flown by RAF Typhoons, Hurricanes and Spitfires and US
Army P-38s, P-47s and P-51s. All of these aircraft were however
initially air superiority aircraft and even if later dedicated
operationally to CAS, suffered in restricted payload and vulnera-
bility to ground fire. Operationally CAS involved a technique not
unlike that pioneered by the Germans, with ground observers cal-
ling in strikes against targets offering resistance to advancing
armour and infantry. The Pacific theatre largely reflected
Western strategy in Europe, moreso in that much of the CAS and
interdiction work was done by carrier based forces equipped by
default with fighters and dive bombers.
The Russians, always ready to emulate the Germans, structured
their tactical air forces almost exclusively about CAS and BAI
aircraft. The Il-2 Shturmovik, Pe-2 and Tu-2 all reflected this
philosophy and formed the backbone of Russia's tactical air
forces until the late 1940s.
During the Korean war Western air forces flew a a great many
CAS/BAI sorties, the by then obsolete F-51 being the mainstay of
the Allied effort, but nothing new was attempted in the area of
CAS/BAI strategy or technology. The late 1950's saw CAS drift out
of sight, as Western air forces spent heavily on strategic and
tactical nuclear strike capabilities. The USAF TAC had by the
early sixties structured its force about F-105s and planned F-
111s, both types designed to deliver internally carried nuclear
bombs against theatre targets. Armageddon was first and foremost
in the minds of force planners. Only the US Marines, by role com-
mitted to amphibious assault, maintained a serious CAS capability
with squadrons of naval tactical aircraft.
The Russians also spent most of the fifties building up nuclear
capabilities, but quickly recognised the potential of theatre
tactical ballistic missiles with nuclear or chemical warheads. By
the sixties a comprehensive warfighting strategy was formulated,
which involved initial nuclear missile strikes against theatre
targets, followed up by massive armoured thrusts into the devas-
tated territory. All tanks and personnel carriers became
nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) warfare capable. Pockets of
resistance would be annihilated by air strikes, the primary role
of the Frontal Aviation (FA VVS). To some degree this strategy
made a virtue out of a constraint, as the principal tactical
fighters of the day, the MiG-21 Fishbed and Su-7 Fitter, lacked
the payload radius performance for any other role than CAS and
BAI.
The US involvement in Vietnam was a major milestone in the
development of Western CAS/BAI strategy. The Americans had to
quickly relearn the lessons of Korea and WW2 and in doing so laid
the foundations of much of today's operational practice and tac-
tics. Initially CAS operations involved the VNAF supported by US
advisers, flying a motley collection of WW2 and fifties piston
aircraft. The T-28B/C and the B-26 (A-26 for the traditional)
were without doubt the workhorses of the early campaigns, but
these aircraft had severe payload radius limitations, a growing
structural fatigue problem and their response times in the re-
moter areas were unsatisfactory, given the slow transit speeds.
The elusive enemy may have disappeared into the jungle by then.
After several T-28s shed their wings pulling out of dive bombing
runs, the US replaced them with 25 dual control A-1E and a number
of single seat A-1H Skyraiders, drawn from inactive stocks in the
US. These sturdy naval strike aircraft served for the duration of
the conflict and ultimately played a major role in the formulat-
ing of a formal CAS strategy. As the war escalated through the
sixties, the Americans deployed newer and newer hardware. Early
entries were two squadrons of B-57s, a US derivative of the Can-
berra. These were shortly followed the F-100 Hun, by then clearly
obsolete as an air superiority aircraft. By late 1965 a further
five F-100 squadrons were assigned to South Vietnam, supported by
Marine Corps F-4B Phantoms and TAC's 12th TFW with its F-4C air-
craft. The tactical jets carried substantial payloads, offered
rapid response times and were fast enough to avoid fire from VC
and NVA automatic weapons and AAA. But their speed over the tar-
gets, often small and hidden, severely penalised accuracy. While
the piston fighters could turn at low level and keep their tar-
gets in sight, the tactical jets were too fast. Tactics had to
evolve and as a result, increasing use was made of former Army
Cessna O-1 Birddog Forward Air Control (FAC) aircraft. Fitted
with white phosphorus 'Willie Pete' rockets and flown by experi-
enced USAF pilots, these frail aircraft skimmed the tree tops
searching for VC targets, calling in tactical jets and then mark-
ing the targets with rockets. Underpowered and vulnerable to
small arms fire, the tiny Cessnas suffered high casualty rates.
It was clear by the end of 1967 that more capable FAC aircraft
were needed and the O-1 was superceded by the larger and faster
Cessna O-2A, better known to most readers as a Milspec C-337
Skymaster. The beginning of 1968 also saw the debut of the
Rockwell OV-10 Bronco, a sturdy twin boom light CAS aircraft
which soon assumed an important role in the South, flying both
CAS and FAC sorties. As the war escalated, the intensity and ra-
dius of operations increased. The Ho Chi Minh trail, a massive
communist resupply zone, came under increasing USAF scrutiny.
While it is beyond the scope of this discussion, it is worth not-
ing that trail interdiction missions forced a whole range of in-
novative technological developments such as night vision equip-
ment, remote acoustic intrusion sensors and even direction find-
ing receivers to track the interference from automotive ignition
systems. By 1970 most strikes were flown by tactical jets, rely-
ing upon FAC aircraft, with the piston A-1s flying largely spe-
cial operations work in support of heliborne troops. The princi-
pal munitions used were napalm and white phosphorus incendiaries,
iron bombs, the then new cluster bombs and unguided rockets. Ac-
curacy was not always spectacular and a high standard of airman-
ship was required to avoid hitting friendly troops. The Spring
Offensive in 1972 saw a major change in the nature of operations,
when the NVA deployed over 500 T-54, T-34 and PT-76 tanks. These
were small hard targets which largely resisted the anti-personnel
munitions in use until then. It was at this time that interdic-
tion of NVA supply routes within the Ho Chi Minh trail and South
Vietnam assumed the character of modern BAI operations, as the
communists fielded shoulder launched SA-7 Grail SAMs, a wide
range of AAA weapons of substantial calibre and in some areas,
even large SA-2 Guideline SAMs. A key weapon in the battle was
the new Texas Instruments Paveway I laser guided bomb, which was
used against bridges, rail communications and supply depots in
the North, and against supply depots and armour in the South.
Openly exposed columns of tanks and trucks were destroyed by TAC
fighters en-masse, halting the flow of men, munitions and weapons
to the battlefront. The battlefront itself saw the debut of
another weapon destined for a long career - the TOW optically
tracked wire guided antitank missile, fired from several hastily
fitted UH-1B assault helicopters. As the NVA offensive ground to
a halt and eventually reversed, the operational philosophy conso-
lidated and the US began to seriously reconsider how they would
fight any battle in Europe. The experience gained in crushing
the very Russian style of massed armour assault carried out by
the NVA indicated that a two pronged strategy would be most prac-
tical - missile firing helicopters and dedicated tank busting CAS
aircraft for immediate CAS and precision guided munition (PGM)
carrying tactical jets for BAI. This philosophy has persisted un-
til the late eighties and continues to have strong support from
the US Army who consider it best suited to their needs.
The principal new element in the CAS strategy was the Fairchild
A-10 Thunderbolt II. TAC had come to the recognition that an air-
craft with the payload and manoeuvring performance of the A-1 but
with turbofan propulsion, substantial armour and dedicated tank
killing weapons was a must, as early as 1966. In 1970 Northrop
and Fairchild were contracted under the A-X program to build two
competitive designs, aircraft with the ability to carry 12,000 lb
of payload on full internal fuel and with substantial resiliance
to ground fire through armour and systems redundancy. The A-10
defeated the Northrop A-9 in 1973, with production commencing in
1975. The A-10 is a large 24,000 lb empty weight aircraft powered
by two TF-34-GE-100 9,000 lb class turbofans, cruising at 345 kt
and limited to 450 kt. Its only internal weapon is a massive 7
barrel 30 mm GAU-8 gatling gun firing high velocity depleted
uranium core shells. The pilot sits in a titanium armour tub,
while most vital systems are armoured and redundant. The fuel
system uses polyurethane foam to reduce the hydrostatic shock of
direct hits and rigid foam is applied around the tanks to prevent
external fires from reaching the 10,650 lb of fuel. The engines
are wide apart and their exhausts shielded from short wavelength
heatseeking SAM seekers by the horizontal and vertical tail sur-
faces. The big wing of the A-10 is designed for tight turning at
low level, allowing a sustained 2,600 ft turn radius at 300 kt,
zero flap and 3,000 lb of payload. This also translates into the
ability to operate from poor quality forward deployed strips as
short as 1,200 ft at 30,000 lb. Eleven stations allow the car-
riage of up to 16,000 lb of payload, keeping within the MTOW of
45,560 lb. The A-10 is very much the mud basher's dream.
The deployment of the A-10 during the late seventies was welcomed
by many, but was also not without criticism. The Israeli experi-
ence of 1973 was fresh in the minds of many observers. The Yom
Kippur saw over one hundred [Note: this figure is still being
disputed] Israeli tactical fighters destroyed in a matter of
days, when they attacked Arab targets covered by heavy concentra-
tions of SA-6 radar guided SAMs and ZSU-23-4P 23mm AAA systems.
TAC's response to the threat of Russian SAMs developed as the
tactics of operating the A-10 were defined. It was soon evident
that conventional tactics would expose the aircraft to SAMs and
AAA, and the operating environment was soon constrained to well
below 500 ft AGL. At these altitudes the A-10 would exploit ter-
rain masking to remain below the visual and radar horizon of hos-
tile air defences, popping up only briefly to acquire and fire at
a target. Typical high noon engagement scenarios between the A-10
and SA-8 or ZSU-23 described in the seventies involved a rapid
popup to over 1,000 ft, acquisition of the SAM/AAA system and the
firing of the 30 mm gun, followed by an immediate dive to low
level, all accomplished in less than the acquisition and tracking
time of the defending SAM/AAA system. To aid in acquiring such
targets, the A-10 was fitted with the Pave Penny laser spot
tracker, which projects a spot on the HUD where the laser illumi-
nation by ground observer or other aircraft marks the target. To
reduce visual detectability the USAF soon discarded the two tone
air superiority grey and after brief experimentation with various
mottled camouflages, settled on a wraparound green/dark
green/grey European One scheme. Munitions were another area of
evolution. While initially iron bombs and cluster bombs were pre-
ferred, these were soon supplanted by laser guided bombs and
TV/infrared guided AGM-65 Maverick missiles. The most recent ad-
dition to the inventory are balloon retarded 2,000 lb Mk.84
bombs, designed for level release at very low altitudes.
Operations in the European theatre are largely coordinated with
the US Army, who will employ their AH-1S Cobra and AH-64A Apache
attack helicopters in nap-of-the-earth (NOE) tank killing opera-
tions. The AH-64 fires laser guided Hellfire antitank missiles,
while the AH-1 force carries both the Hellfire and older TOW mis-
sile. The division of labour involves the helicopters operating
below tree-top altitude, with the A-10 working from treetop level
up to 500 ft AGL. In theory the helos would approach and ambush
advancing armour, providing defence suppression fire for the in-
bound A-10s. With large payloads of heavier weapons the A-10s
would then inflict maximum damage. This philosophy relies largely
upon laser desination of targets for both missile attacks and A-
10 strikes. It is however limited very much to daytime operations
due to the absence of night vision systems in the A-10.
At this time it appears that this philosophy has reached the end
of its effective usefulness. The last half decade has seen the
deployment of the mobile radar guided SA-11 Gadfly and newer SA-6
derivatives, both capable of hitting targets in ground clutter,
supplemented by all aspect heatseeking SA-13, SA-14 and SA-16
SAMs. With monopulse radar seekers and sophisticated infrared
seekers these missiles are quite difficult to jam and manoeuvre
is often a necessary supplement to defeating these weapons. The
low and slow A-10, devoid of internal ECM, is likely to sustain
high loss rates if engaged by these weapons.[Note: Of these, Iraq
has only SA-6 and SA-13, plus a wide range of older missiles]
The USAF response has been to shift the role of the A-10 toward
armed FAC for fast moving tactical jets.
BAI has also made significant strides since the 1970s. A major
gain was the introduction of the agile F-16 to supplement and
later replace the ageing F-4E fleet. With superb manoeuvring per-
formance, good payload range and accurate nav attack, the F-16 is
a potent strike fighter. Where it missed out was in its lack of
night vision equipment and laser designator.
This has now changed with the deployment of the Lantirn pod set.
Lantirn was initially meant for the F-16C and A-10, but as the
A-10's survivability declined in the eyes of TAC, the pods ini-
tially assigned to the A-10 were allocated to the new F-15E
Strike Eagles. The Lantirn pod set is comprised of a Navigation
Pod containing an advanced J-band terrain following radar and na-
vigation Flir projecting on to the HUD, and a Targeting Pod with
a two field of view Flir boresighted with a laser
designator/rangefinder. By fitting two pods to an F-16C/D it ac-
quires a penetration capability much like that of dedicated
bombers such as the F-111 fitted with Pave Tack. The implications
of Lantirn are significant, as it exposes Warpac ground forces to
BAI strikes around the clock in all weather conditions, while
releasing the F-111s and F-15Es previously committed to battle-
field strikes for deep interdiction missions.
The US Army however demands a significant CAS capability be
available for its land forces and has strongly resisted the
USAF's attempts to phase out the A-10. The USAF response to the
declining survivability of the A-10 has been to open discussion
on the subject of CAS/BAI with the view that the two roles should
be merged and preferably flown by one aircraft type alone, carry-
ing specific weapons for specific missions. BAI would be flown by
Lantirn equipped F-16s and CAS by A-16s with dedicated night vi-
sion equipment and 30 mm gunpods. In the context of winning an
air battle, the USAF strategy is superior in that the F/A-16s in-
herently retain excellent air superiority performance and thus
could be flexibly tasked with air superiority, air defence, BAI
and CAS missions. This would allow a theatre commander to concen-
trate air assets as required and as we all know concentration
tends to win air battles most effectively. The USAF position is
further reinforced by an interest in keeping the F-16 production
line open until 1997, when ATF (F-22/23) deliveries commence.
This approach is however exactly what the Army seeks to avoid, as
at that instant that specialised CAS assets are replaced by mul-
tirole assets, the Army can never be certain that aircraft will
be available for CAS when it needs them. In addition, the pilots
who fly only tree top altitude CAS are likely to be more profi-
cient at it, than air superiority pilots who would much rather be
stencilling red stars under their cockpits. By insisting on dedi-
cated CAS airframes the Army is attempting to guarantee both the
availability of airframes and of specialist aircrew.
The political fallout from this disagreement has provided politi-
cians and bureaucrats alike with ample fodder, with the resulting
increase in the complexity of the decision to be made. At the
time of writing the A-10 vs F-16 debate had expanded to include
the reengined A-7F, reengined A-10, AV-8B Harrier and F/A-18.
US defence contractors, facing a bleak future insofar as new con-
tracts go, have responded promptly to this situation. General
Dynamics, in conjunction with GEC in the UK and Texas Instru-
ments, have trialled an F-16B aircraft fitted with a helmet cued
Flir turret. The Texas Instruments Falcon Eye Flir turret tracks
the pilot's line of sight and the image viewed by the Flir is
projected upon a GEC Avionics Cat's Eyes night vision goggle eye-
piece combiner glass mounted on the helmet. As the turret pro-
jects from the upper forward fuselage, its perspective is much
like that of the pilot providing a very natural view of the out-
side world. This is very relevant for CAS work, where the pilot
must often turn about the target while keeping it in sight. In-
terdiction systems such as Lantirn are cumbersome in this appli-
cation, as they are designed for the typical interdiction profile
of a straight run in followed by a popup, roll inverted to ac-
quire the target, roll level and shallow dive bombing run to
weapon release (usually employing CCIP delivery mode). While the
Flir turret is the principal sensor, a Martin Marietta Pathfinder
forward facing navigation Flir is also fitted, it projects a for-
ward view image on the pilot's HUD. Additional nav information is
provided by a British Aerospace Terprom terrain profile matching
covert navigation system, which much like cruise missile nav sys-
tems compares radar altimeter readings with stored digital map
data. The final major element in the mission suite is the
Rockwell-Collins Automatic Target Handoff System (ATHS). The ATHS
is a datalink receiver which places a box symbol on the HUD (or
helmet combiner glass) over a target designated by a forward air
controller on the ground or in a suitably equipped scout hel-
icopter. This removes any ambiguity in the identification of tar-
gets to be attacked. The single modified A-16B airframe has been
extensively tested by GD and also participated in a series of TAC
flight demonstrations of the F-16C in the CAS role conducted in
late 1988. Seven F-16Cs were fitted with Pave Penny laser spot
trackers, painted green and flown in 268 sorties at Nellis and
Ft. Hood, directed by ground controllers and OV-10, OH-58D and
AH-64 FACs. AGM-65D missiles and GPU-5/A 30 mm gunpods were car-
ried but not fired although live Mk.82 and cluster bombs were
dropped.
In a parallel development program, the USAF reconfigured in 1987
its well used AFTI F-16 development prototype for CAS development
work. The AFTI (Advanced Fighter Technology Integrator) airframe
is the A-6 preproduction airframe fitted with canards, a thick-
ened dorsal spine and a digital flight control system; it has
logged over a thousand hours since 1982 evaluating the tactical
performance of integrated flight and fire control systems and un-
conventional manoeuvring techniques, eg direct lift and sideforce
control. A key system in the ground attack tests was the AMAS
(Automated Manoeuvring and Attack System) which allowed the air-
craft to aggresively manoeuvre during the terminal phase of a
bombing run, thus foiling the linear and quadratic fire control
prediction algorithms used by AAA and SAM fire control systems.
Initial CAS tests in the AFTI evaluated the performance of the
Rockwell-Collins ATHS, a Westinghouse Flir/laser targeting system
and a Harriss digital terrain map with a Sandia inertial terrain
aided nav algorithm, these tests were followed by evaluation of
the GEC tercom nav and three ground collision avoidance systems.
In addition, TAC evaluated its Litton Digital Communications Ter-
minal (DCT) system which was designed to transfer messages
between FACs, ground observers and ground based command posts.
The DCT is functionally similar to the ATHS although using dif-
ferent communication protocols between its computers, unlike the
ATHS it was not initially optimised for FAC to CAS air-air com-
munication.
At the time of writing the AFTI was being refitted at the GD Fort
Worth facility with a current Block 40 F-16C quadruplex digital
flight control system and having its canards removed. Subsequent
testing will involve the GEC/TI Falcon Eye Flir, the intention is
to test a fully integrated suite using AMAS, night vision equip-
ment and ATHS/DCT.
The A-7 upgrade program involves reengining the ANG's fleet of
about 330 A-7D Corsair strike aircraft with afterburning F100-
PW220 or F110 turbofans (a further 400 Navy A-7Es are currently
being placed in storage). The TF-41 (Spey) powered A-7D has a
poor thrust/weight ratio which restricts both acceleration and
sustained turn rate performance, thus leaving the A-7D vulnerable
to SAM attack particularly during run in to the target. Increas-
ing the thrust/weight provides the ability to pull high G turns
at combat weights, while also allowing the aircraft to egress a
target area at transonic speeds. In addition the added power im-
proves payload/range and short field performance. The upgrade
program is currently confined to two prototypes, which have been
modified from A-7D aircraft.
The modifications are not trivial. Fuselage plugs are inserted
forward and aft of the wing, the wing is reskinned, the aft
fuselage is redesigned to accept either new engine with an exter-
nal cowl for the afterburner nozzle and the tail surfaces are
redesigned. The vertical tail is taller to compensate for the in-
creased forward fuselage area and the stabilators are swapped
left to right to provide 5.25 degrees of anhedral. In addition
small strakes are added to the wing root to improve high AoA per-
formance, the flaps are improved to reduced approach speeds and
spoilers are added to improve short field performance.
The new A-7F is thus much closer in performance to its ancestor,
the F-8 Crusader, with the ability to sustain 650 kt speeds and
6G turns at 0.9M which compares well against the 539 kt/4G at
0.7M performance of the A-7D. The added thrust is most apparent
in acceleration performance, where the A-7F accelerates from 400
to 550 kt in 15 sec, six times faster than the A-7D. While the
A-7F is heavier with an empty weight of 23-24,000 lb, its fuel
capacity is increased to 17,800 lb, payload to 17,380 lb and MTOW
to 46,000 lb (cf 42,000 lb for A-7D). The penalty is in a reduced
fatigue life of 5,000 hr which still provides a useful life of 20
years at current usage rates.
The reengining of the A-10 is another interesting alternative,
although it is unlikely to substantially improve the survivabili-
ty of the aerodynamically limited airframe. The proposal revolves
about the replacement of the 9,065 lb TF-34 fans with nonafter-
burning 11,000 lb F404 low bypass fans. It is however much
cheaper than building more F-16s or rebuilding A-7s and is
strongly favoured by the US Army. The remaining alternatives,
the AV-8B and F/A-18, are unlikely to be successful due to ac-
quisition cost and life cycle cost; the USAF would have to
develop additional logistical infrastructure to support these
types.
Another player in this game, albeit an outsider, is Scaled Compo-
sites Inc, who are testing a low cost 6,200 lb gross weight mud-
fighter designated the ARES (Agile Responsive Effective Support).
The ARES is a 300 kt twin boom canard design fitted with a GAU-
12/U 25 mm gun and powered by a 2,950 lb JT15D-5 turbofan. Funded
internally, the design may not be particularly successful even if
it flies well, given the position held by TAC.
The outcome of the CAS/BAI debate will be known by the middle of
this year, it will most likely be a case of the F-16 against the
A-7, with the A-7 having a slight advantage in cost and from the
Army viewpoint, specialisation.
To the Australian observer this whole issue underscores the dif-
ficulties in developing an appropriate force structure for Army
support missions. Air forces by their nature have a commitment to
air superiority and interdiction and will thus seek technology
which supports these roles, the multirole fighters of the seven-
ties and eighties underscore this trend. With aircraft usable in
both air superiority and strike operations, an air force can con-
centrate its resources as most appropriate at the time. End users
of air force services, such as army land forces, can however be
disadvantaged if aircraft are unavailable through diversion to
other missions and will always have an interest in specialised
airframes which are unusable elsewhere, as this secures their
availability.
The only service which appears to have resolved this issue suc-
cessfully is the US Marine Corp, with its CAS/BAI force of AV-8
Harriers and F/A-18s. That is the subject of Part 2.
-----------------------------
[Author's comment: this was written early in 1990, since then the
F-16 has been nominated for CAS/BAI and the A-10 has seen a short
term revival due the relatively unsophisticated Iraqi air defence
capability. Post Desert Storm we can see how correct the pre
Desert Storm view of CAS/BAI actually was. So far it seems to be
working very well.]
Picture Caption 1.(slide)
A-10A. Big, green and mean, the large A-10 is the mud basher's
dream. Armed with a huge 7 barrel 30 mm Gatling gun and up to
16,000 lb of stores, the heavily armoured A-10 can destroy any
known armoured vehicle. With docile handling and superb low speed
turning performance, the A-10 is optimally suited for battlefield
close air support, operating from rough forward operating bases.
The deployment of newer SAM and AAA systems has however put its
survivability in doubt and the USAF is looking at alternatives
(Author).
Picture Caption 2.(slide)
F-16C. The USAF's preferred replacement for the A-10 is a role
configured A-16 airframe with night vision equipment and a pod
mounted derivative of the 30 mm GAU-8 gun. The F-16 airframe is
the best possible choice from a susceptibility viewpoint as it is
fast and manoeuvrable and thus difficult to hit, however once hit
it is likely to fall victim to far less damage than armoured air-
craft such as the A-10. It is much like the F-16C a multirole
aircraft and would probably end up sharing its workload between
CAS/BAI and counter-air operations (Author).
Picture Caption 3. (print)
AH-64A. CAS missions flown by TAC's A-10s are usually coordinated
with attacks by missile firing Army helicopters such as the AH-1S
and AH-64. Typical tactics will involve the helos ambushing large
armoured formations, in order to lay down defence suppression
fire with rockets and guns to immobilise as many vehicles as pos-
sible. Once the SAM/AAA cover of the armour is stripped away, the
A-10s will arrive on the scene and destroy armour with electro-
optical Maverick missiles, laser guided bombs and 30 mm fire. The
helos typically operate below tree top level using terrain and
foliage for concealment, with the A-10s flying from treetop level
up to 500 ft AGL.
Picture Caption 4. (prints)
OH-58D/ATHS. The ubiquitous OH-58 plays a major role in USAF/US
Army CAS missions as it scouts for hostile forces. Flying at
nap-of-the-earth altitudes the OH-58D will expose only its
Flir/TV/laser turret to locate and track hostile forces. Once
these are found, the turret laser is used in conjunction with
onboard nav equipment to pinpoint the target coordinates, which
are then forwarded via ATHS datalink to inbound AH-64 helos and
fixed wing CAS aircraft. Inset: Rockwell-Collins Automatic Target
Handover System, a datalink which transfers target parameters
from FAC platforms and ground observers to attack helicopters and
aircraft.