steinly@tybalt.caltech.edu (Steinn Sigurdsson) (02/26/91)
From: steinly@tybalt.caltech.edu (Steinn Sigurdsson) I hope this is an appropriate question for this group, but recently (within the last two years) I read of a study which claimed that it was a fairly universal rule of thumb that _Armies_ were defeated when they had taken 30% casulaties (+/- 5% or so), that it was rare for armies to collapse earlier and very rare for them to last longer. Does anyone have a reference to this study, and could people state their opinion of the validity of the research? -- \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/ | Steinn Sigurdsson |I can take the killing, I can take the slaughter| | Physics, Caltech |But I don't talk to Sun reporters | | steinly@groucho.tapir.Caltech.EDU |Billy Bragg 1984 -with apologies|
ccplumb@rose.uwaterloo.ca (Colin Plumb) (02/28/91)
From: ccplumb@rose.uwaterloo.ca (Colin Plumb) steinly@tybalt.caltech.edu (Steinn Sigurdsson) wrote: > I hope this is an appropriate question for this group, > but recently (within the last two years) I read of a study > which claimed that it was a fairly universal rule of thumb > that _Armies_ were defeated when they had taken 30% casulaties > (+/- 5% or so), that it was rare for armies to collapse earlier > and very rare for them to last longer. I heard a similar figure, but it might not be applicable in the Kuwait war. The reason is that few armies have more than 30% of their people actually fighting, as opposed to supporting. When that 30% is gone, there's not much fight left in an army. But in the case of the Iraqi army, I'm not sure how the casualties are distributed. If the support troops get their "fair share" then an army's combat potential isn't hurt nearly as much. (Source, _How to Make War_, author forgotten for the moment.) -- -Colin
hnkst2@unix.cis.pitt.edu (Hanhwe N. Kim) (03/01/91)
From: "Hanhwe N. Kim" <hnkst2@unix.cis.pitt.edu> In article <1991Feb28.050206.6884@cbnews.att.com> ccplumb@rose.uwaterloo.ca (Colin Plumb) writes: > > >From: ccplumb@rose.uwaterloo.ca (Colin Plumb) > [ Argument that generally less than 30% of the troops are in combat.. therefore, when 30% are incapacitated, fighting power drops] > >If the support troops get their "fair share" >then an army's combat potential isn't hurt nearly as much. > >(Source, _How to Make War_, author forgotten for the moment.) >From a naive view point, I'd think that if support troops are killed, and support operations disrupted, armies will not function even if combat troops are available... lack of food, water and ammunition. Also, wouldn't technologically sophisticated forces be more vulnerable to support troop casualties since the ardware needs more maintenance, spare parts etc? -Han kim
freeman@decwrl.dec.com (Jay R. Freeman) (03/01/91)
From: argosy!freeman@decwrl.dec.com (Jay R. Freeman)
In one of John Tolland's books -- _Rising_Sun_, I think, though I could not
find it in the index -- the author mentions that western armies have indeed
traditionally surrendered when casualties reached something like 30 percent,
but further indicates that during the second world war, Japanese forces
routinely continued resistance until total casualties were well above 90
percent, sometimes till 99 percent. I recall Tolland mentioning that
this was so even in circumstances (such as on the Asian mainland) when
the Japanese forces had a clear line of retreat available -- it was not
merely an heroic response to being cut off on a Pacific island with the
Marines storming ashore.
-- Jay Freeman
<canonical disclaimer -- I speak only for myself>jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov (JOSEPH T CHEW) (03/05/91)
From: jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov (JOSEPH T CHEW) Some armies' doctrine and training is superior to others at enabling and encouraging cut-off elements to keep fighting. An example is discussed in the book "Death of a Division" (can't recall author), which goes into the Wehrmacht idea of a "wanderkessel," a group of isolated troops still doing their thing. But we wander into soc.history territory's kessel... --Joe "Just another personal opinion from the People's Republic of Berkeley"
major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt) (03/07/91)
From: bcstec!shuksan!major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt) > From: jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov (JOSEPH T CHEW) > Some armies' doctrine and training is superior to others at enabling and > encouraging cut-off elements to keep fighting. An example is discussed in > the book "Death of a Division" (can't recall author), which goes into the > Wehrmacht idea of a "wanderkessel," a group of isolated troops still doing > their thing. But we wander into soc.history territory's kessel... I recall an article I read a while back that attempted to analyze what impact casualties had on defeat - and if casualties didn't have an impact - what did? I'll dig it up for the details if you want - but, the essense of the article studied about 80 modern battles from WWII to the present day. "Excessive casualties" only accounted for 12% of why a force was defeated, lost, or gave up. 33% of those that 'lost' were "outmanuevered". And the fact that they had been outmanuevered, were cut off, and 'tactically defeated' caused their downfall. In a word, what defeated the Iraqi Army was "Manuever", "Deception", and "Air/Naval/Arty bombardment" - with Manuever and Deception the coup de grace (sp?). They lost the will to fight. Which is, bottom line, the Infantry's mission: Close with and destory the enemy('s will to fight). mike schmitt