davidl@Bonnie.ICS.UCI.EDU (03/07/91)
From: davidl@Bonnie.ICS.UCI.EDU Do any of you have any ideas why the B-1 bomber wasn't use ?? I read somewhere (LA Times or Time magazine) that SAC didn't want to release the B-1 bomber, because they needed them just in case of a nuclear war....The reporter contended that the reason why they were not used, is because of the Air Force brass didn't/does not have much confidence in them and to lose another one due to mechanical failure would put a dim light on the high-tech air superiority we're suppose to have. Your thoughts ???? send them to: davidl@bonnie.ics.uci.edu [mod.note: A couple of weeks ago, it was stated here that the B-1 was not yet qualified for conventional ordnance. Further, they were grounded with engine problems at the start of the war. Anything else ? - Bill ] Also, I agree with Mary and Henry that a new heavy bomber should be developed solely on the lines of conventional warfare and only tactical nuke level...... But of course, there are no plans in the works....Another DoD lack of planning ? Or Congress ? Interesting question eh ?
swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams) (03/08/91)
From: swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams)
> Do any of you have any ideas why the B-1 bomber wasn't use ??
The B-1 was brought up on the CBS News last night; it was said that
this bomber was still having some problems and needed $1 billion dollars
more for correction. Normally, if it was a horse, it would have been
put out of its misery. Since $30 billion dollars have been spent so
far, $1 billion dollars more is nothing by comparison.
While a B-1 can carry a larger conventional bomb load than a B-52 can,
the electronic equipment involved in targeting and bombing still isn't
satisfactory. Furthermore, the coventional bombs tended to hit each
other after they were dropped.
Steve Williams
"An expert is a person who has made all the mistakes which can be made
in a very narrow field." -- Niels Bohr, Danish Scientistsysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) (03/13/91)
From: sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) In article <1991Mar7.012839.29519@cbnews.att.com>, davidl@Bonnie.ICS.UCI.EDU writes: > >[mod.note: A couple of weeks ago, it was stated here that the B-1 was not >yet qualified for conventional ordnance. Further, they were grounded with >engine problems at the start of the war. Anything else ? - Bill ] ABC had a clip about the B-1 the other evening. Apparently, while it can haul more than a B-52, the bombs collide with each other before hitting the ground. Not quite a desirable characteristic. > Also, I agree with Mary and Henry that a new heavy bomber should > be developed solely on the lines of conventional warfare and > only tactical nuke level...... But of course, there are no plans > in the works....Another DoD lack of planning ? Or Congress ? We can only afford one new bomber system per decade. All of our "eggs" have been put into the B-1/B-2 basket, with the B-2 now being sold on its (allegedly) conventional as well as nuclear strike capabilities. About the "best" near-term solution for conventional strike would be to 1) Get the B-1B working and 2) Reopen the production lines for a B-1C (the C being both an improved model B-1 and for conventional). The C version would have to have some sorta gizmos to make it SALT/START complient... Reform may be dying in the Soviet Union, but we have the right to introduce it to the DECUS Board of Directors. -- > SYSMGR@CADLAB.ENG.UMD.EDU < --
john@uunet.UU.NET (John A. Weeks III) (03/13/91)
From: newave!john@uunet.UU.NET (John A. Weeks III) From davidl@Bonnie.ICS.UCI.EDU > Do any of you have any ideas why the B-1 bomber wasn't use ?? The B-1 is part of our nuclear triad--subs, ICBM, and bombers. If we would have used the B-1 in the Gulf, one leg of our nuclear defense would have out of service. American defense theory would not permit this. There are a number of other related points. First, the USA has a fleet of basically obsolete B-52 heavy bombers. The USA could afford to lose B-52's, a B-1 loss would be much more expensive because it is a current front-line plane. We would not lose future offensive capacity by losing a B-52, but we would by losing a B-1. Aircraft engines are very expensive and require frequent overhauls. Why put time on the new B-1 engines and airframes if we can use up the B-52s? The B-1 has a stealth advantage over the B-52. Over Iraq, the B-52 could operate with impunity, so the special features of the B-1 were not required. If the B-1 was not needed, why risk it? The B-1 is only certified to carry atomic weapons. Since we have B-52 to drop conventional bombs, there has been no need to spend the money to build the equipment needed to support conventional B-1 bombing missions. I believe that there are only one or two rotary bomb racks for iron bombs available for the B-1. If the B-52's are ever retired, then the B-1 will have to take over the conventional bombing role. Perhaps, by then, we will have a small fleet of B-2's to handle the nuclear bombing role. The B-52 is a known quantity to our potential enemies. There are some extremely modern systems in the B-52, but it would not be a disaster if one would crash over Iraq and fall into enemy lines. But a B-1 falling into enemy hands could be a disaster if the enemy were to discover any weak spot that could be exploited if the USA were ever required to attack the Soviet Union. Finally, the B-1s were experiencing a minor problem with engine fires this fall. There were two engine fires, one of which caused an engine to be completely destroyed. Although the B-1 remained on alert status with SAC, all non-essential B-1 flights were suspended. SAC did not want to risk a B-1 or its crew over a minor problem that could be fixed, but they were willing to risk the planes if they needed to scramble. > The reporter contended that the reason why they > were not used, is because of the Air Force brass didn't/does not > have much confidence in them and to lose another one due to > mechanical failure would put a dim light on the high-tech air > superiority we're suppose to have. The media loves to rip the B-1. Most of what you hear in the media about the B-1 is simply not true. For example, I heard that the B-1s were not used in the Gulf becuase they leak fuel. There was a fuel leak problem with the early production B-1's, but this problem was fixed several years ago. All airplanes have teething problems. Another system that has received bad press are the offensive and defensive jamming systems. One of the systems does not meet the spec that was issued by the Air Force. The press makes out that the B-1 is junk because of this problem. But the truth is that the spec was very speculative and required technological breakthroughs. Although the contractor was able to make most of the needed break throughs, the system still fell short of a few goals because it was not possible to meet the requirements in the early 80's. A new system is in design and will be retrofitted to the B-1 fleet in a few years. This is not that unusual--look at how many times the B-52 fleet has been updated. > Also, I agree with Mary and Henry that a new heavy bomber should > be developed solely on the lines of conventional warfare and > only tactical nuke level...... But of course, there are no plans > in the works....Another DoD lack of planning ? Or Congress ? If you would try to build a B-52 type plane for the 90's, you would still probably end up with a plane that costed $250-million or more. This is the price range that the B-1 falls into. The major feature of the B-52 that has allowed it to remain in service for 30 years is its adaptability. The B-52 was over designed for its original mission. That fact allowed the B-52 to be adapted from a high level bomber to a cruise missile platform to a low level penetrator. The B-1 is a similarly great plane. I have no doubt that the B-1 can be adapted to other roles, such as conventional bombing and large-scale precision bombing (imagine a computer that could handle 50 independently targeted laser guided smart bombs in one drop), and I have no doubt that the B-1 will be in service for many years to come. As long as the B-52 is available and the B-1 is required for strategic alert, there really is not a need for a new conventional bomber. This need might change if the B-52 is retired, or if we suddenly need more bombers because of a series of Iraq-type wars. The reason that the USA uses B-52's for conventional bombing is that the B-52 was available as a "left-over" when high level penetration of Soviet airspace became impossible after the advent of Soviet surface-to-air missiles. One can almost assume that the B-1 will meet a similar same fate someday. Adapting an obsolete B-1 into a conventional bomber would be like getting the airframe for free. But if we suddenly need new conventional bombers, and the B-1 is still on front line SAC strategic alert duty, would it be wise to build new B-1's strictly for conventional bombing? If you had the lead time, you might be able to do better than a B-1, maybe even for less money. And if you think that you are going to need that bomber 5 years from now, you better start working on it right now. I argue that the USA will not need that bomber, and the B-1 will slide into the conventional bombing role after the B-52 is finally retired sometime in 2007. -john- -- =============================================================================== John A. Weeks III (612) 942-6969 john@newave.mn.org NeWave Communications ...uunet!rosevax!tcnet!wd0gol!newave!john ===============================================================================
john@uunet.UU.NET (John A. Weeks III) (03/13/91)
From: newave!john@uunet.UU.NET (John A. Weeks III) From swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams) > > Do any of you have any ideas why the B-1 bomber wasn't use ?? > The B-1 was brought up on the CBS News last night; it was said that > this bomber was still having some problems and needed $1 billion dollars > more for correction. Normally, if it was a horse, it would have been > put out of its misery. While this is typical of the media, it is totally unfair to the B-1. I discussed some of the B-1 teething problems in another posting. What I want to present here is a short list of problems in other airplane development programs: F-18 - problem with vertical stabalizers developing cracks and failing not discovered until numberous planes deployed--all planes were grounded until a small vertical tail was added on top of each wing. F-14 - two prototypes lost, including the first prototype on its second flight. Both were traced to minor hydrolic problems. X-1, X-2 - Loss of 4 vehicles, some crew, and one carrier aircraft due to a chemical in a gasket that was explosive when in contact with LOX. P-38 - First prototype lost while trying to set a speed record. The Lightning also suffered from a problem called "compressability", which never was fixed. The P-38 was required for the war and could not sit out waiting for a relatively minor problem to be sorted out. F-105 - Teething problems resulted in several years of delays before entering production. Congress and the Air Force lost confidence in the F-105. After the F-105 was ready for production, the Air Force required it to enter a fly-off against the F-107, which the F-105 won. F-111 - structural problem in the wing box supporting the swing wings not discovered until 2 production planes were lost in Viet Nam. F-102 - top speed was much less than expected. Research into the problem resulted in the "area rule". Modifications to the existing planes were not possible. Modifications to the design resulted in the F-106, which were very sucessful (the last F-106's in service were just retired in favor of F-16's--just months short of a 30 year service life). The point of this list, taken from memory, is that all aircraft projects have problems. If it were easy, everybody would be an expert and every company would be building airplanes. But the reality is that airplanes are very complex, and the Air Force & Navy requirements push the state of the art. A vehicle with over a million parts can be 99.99% perfect and still have 100 major problems. (The Space Shuttle is another example of this problem.) > While a B-1 can carry a larger conventional bomb load than a B-52 can, > the electronic equipment involved in targeting and bombing still isn't > satisfactory. The B-1 electronics was pushing the state of the art, and the B-1 program did not have the luxury of flying prototypes before the aircraft entered production (fast-track production). (No, the B-1A's do not count as prototypes becuase they were quite different from the B-1B's.) The B-1B is currently certified to carry exactly 0 conventional bombs. This mission has not been fully developed and is only now entering limited testing with one plane. With a large fleet of B-52's, there is no need to risk B-1's flying iron bombs. It also does not make since to take out 1/3 of our strategic triad to fly iron bombs when we have a bunch of B-52's that can do the job just as well. -john- -- =============================================================================== John A. Weeks III (612) 942-6969 john@newave.mn.org NeWave Communications ...uunet!rosevax!tcnet!wd0gol!newave!john ===============================================================================
fiddler@Eng.Sun.COM (Steve Hix) (03/14/91)
From: fiddler@Eng.Sun.COM (Steve Hix) >From: newave!john@uunet.UU.NET (John A. Weeks III) > >P-38 - First prototype lost while trying to set a speed record. The >Lightning also suffered from a problem called "compressability", which >never was fixed. The P-38 was required for the war and could not sit out >waiting for a relatively minor problem to be sorted out. Compressibility was encountered by several fighters of the period, including the P-47. Once it was identified, ways to avoid it were developed, and with the P-38J modifications to the aircraft lessened the problem. >F-102 - top speed was much less than expected. Research into the problem >resulted in the "area rule". Modifications to the existing planes were not >possible. Modifications to the design resulted in the F-106, which were >very sucessful (the last F-106's in service were just retired in favor >of F-16's--just months short of a 30 year service life). The F-102A incorporated Whitcomb's area rule...and the plane was then able to exceed Mach 1 (and then some) in level flight. Several succeeding versions of the F-102 went on see service, all of them using the area rule. The F-106 was a later design that served in parallel (for a while, anyway) with various versions of the F-102 series. It's almost unfortunate that the two aircraft were so similar, both tend to confused with the other in various publications now. (And they're not *that* similar visually!) -- ------------ The only drawback with morning is that it comes at such an inconvenient time of day. ------------
eachus@aries.mitre.org (Robert I. Eachus) (03/14/91)
From: eachus@aries.mitre.org (Robert I. Eachus)
In article <1991Mar13.001146.4618@cbnews.att.com> newave!john@uunet.UU.NET (John A. Weeks III) writes:
P-38 - First prototype lost while trying to set a speed record. The
Lightning also suffered from a problem called "compressability", which
never was fixed. The P-38 was required for the war and could not sit out
waiting for a relatively minor problem to be sorted out.
Not quite... The compressability problem was "simply" air
around the control surfaces reaching transonic speeds during a dive.
To pull the control surfaces into an "incompressable" airflow was (and
even with modern controls is) impossible. The flow is incompressable
because it would have to go supersonic to get out of the way. The
"right" design correction is to make sure that the air always has
someplace to go, but it wasn't until relatively recently that airframe
designs could be verified not to need dive brakes.
There were two solutions:
1) do an outside loop--the pilot couldn't pull up, but he could go
through the vertical and out the other side.
2) Add "dive brakes" to slow the plane out of the transonic regime.
These were, I think, added in the P38-J model, but they may have come
earlier.
As far as I know the only problem never fixed in the P-38 was that
the cockpit was unheated and unpressurized.
--
Robert I. Eachusstan@gatech.edu (Stan Brown) (03/18/91)
From: emory!Dixie.Com!stan@gatech.edu (Stan Brown) fiddler@Eng.Sun.COM (Steve Hix) writes: >From: fiddler@Eng.Sun.COM (Steve Hix) >>F-102 - top speed was much less than expected. Research into the problem >>resulted in the "area rule". Modifications to the existing planes were not What is this "area rule" I haven't heard of it and I am curious. -- Stan Brown P. c. Design 404-363-2303 Ataant Ga. (emory|gatech|uunet) rsiatl!sdba!stan "vi forever"
stan@gatech.edu (Stan Brown) (03/18/91)
From: emory!Dixie.Com!stan@gatech.edu (Stan Brown) newave!john@uunet.UU.NET (John A. Weeks III) writes: >I discussed some of the B-1 teething problems in another posting. What >I want to present here is a short list of problems in other airplane >development programs: >X-1, X-2 - Loss of 4 vehicles, some crew, and one carrier aircraft >due to a chemical in a gasket that was explosive when in contact with LOX. I hadn't heard of this could you tell us more about it? >P-38 - First prototype lost while trying to set a speed record. The >Lightning also suffered from a problem called "compressability", which >never was fixed. The P-38 was required for the war and could not sit out >waiting for a relatively minor problem to be sorted out. I thought this problem was simply that they wer going transonic & like all WW2 plane had no real areodynamic prior art to base pushing th sound barrier on >The point of this list, taken from memory, is that all aircraft projects >have problems. If it were easy, everybody would be an expert and every BTW another caniadte for this list would be SR-71' with the unstar problem. -- Stan Brown P. c. Design 404-363-2303 Ataant Ga. (emory|gatech|uunet) rsiatl!sdba!stan "vi forever"